The Foreign Minister addressed himself mainly to the issue of the answers that Israel will be expected to give Sadat either during his visit to Jerusalem or after this event. Mr. Dayan saw the visit as an indication that after thirty years of war and hostility, the Arabs have changed their position and are willing to embark on the negotiating path even while Israel was still in occupation of what they considered Arab territory. Mr. Dayan also discussed the nature of peace, peace borders and the Palestinians. Text of the interview:
Q. Were you surprised by President Sadat's latest move, or were your mysterious talks in Europe a preparation for this?
A. At all events, I was surprised.
Q. You did not expect such a visit?
A. No. Definitely not. I did not expect a personal, public visit by the President of Egypt. Even the most favourable expectations I could imagine took into account only possibilities of unofficial contacts: That is not with Sadat or not for public knowledge, and certainly not in the Knesset in Jerusalem.
Q. The President of Egypt has again overcome the barrier of fear and has taken a step which if should it fail, is liable to cost him his life - and we will perhaps face the threat of a new war. What step will Israel take in preparation for the talks with him in Jerusalem? What will we offer him, and will we show any political courage?
A. First of all, I am not entirely certain that he has overcome the barrier of fear. I hope that this will be the case, but we must wait until he returns from Damascus. Secondly, I fear that we shall simply not have to confront a situation in which we shall have to give him substantive replies. At all events, so far he has made two reservations. Firstly, he said that he would not make a separate, Egyptian peace, and secondly, that he would not speak on behalf of the other Arab states. If he were ready to make an independent, separate peace between Israel and Egypt, and he came and made specific proposals, then we would be obliged to give him an answer. But he has said - and I assume that this is how things will be - that he does not want to do that. He will not conduct negotiations for peace, and he certainly will not be authorized to do so in the name of the other Arab states, and he has already said that his visit here is not and will not be a substitute for the Geneva Conference. Therefore I fear - and I do not say this with pleasure - that in the end he will not confront Israel with a situation in which it will have to give concrete answers, because he will not want to conduct concrete negotiations.
Q. Despite what you have just said, is it your assessment that President Sadat will be able to leave Israel empty-handed. In other words that Israel will not promise him anything that will enable him to pursue the political option, or the continuation of the fantastic option he has now chosen?
A. I wouldn't say "fantastic": He has chosen a certain step. I think that even if Sadat himself, personally, can leave here without a concrete answer, Israel will not be in a situation vis-a-vis the entire world - in which it will be able to be satisfied. During Sadat's visit, only with listening and not reacting, as I said earlier, I believe that Sadat himself will not want to bring about the issues to the point of concreteness, for the reasons I mentioned previously. But he will have his say, and his remarks will have wide reverberations. We can pretty well conjecture the framework of his remarks, or not conjecture, but recall what he has stated in the past. His basic demands are withdrawal from all the territories and the right of the Palestinians to establish a Palestinian State, in return for which he will very probably promise peace. He will not be able to speak on behalf of all the Arab states. He will speak for Egypt. And let us suppose that Israel replied: 'Very well. Let us sign a peace agreement including total withdrawal from Egypt's borders" - then he would say: "Gentlemen. No. I am not ready for that. I did not come to make a separate peace with you." I think Israel will not be exempt from replying to the questions he has put, even if he, personally, not only does not request, but even refuses to listen to a concrete answer which entails bilateral undertakings.
Q. I heard that yesterday you told a meeting of senior Foreign Ministry staff that our problem is answers and that in fact we have no answers.
A. No. I'm glad that there are no leaks - at least not accurate ones - from that forum.
Q. That is why I requested confirmation.
A. Fine. Then the denial is of that section which says we have no answers. I said that all the preparations of flags and flowers and anthems and fanfares and trumpets notwithstanding. In fact the principal preparations we must make are for the serious political reactions to this visit, which will have worldwide reverberations, and will deal with the central issue - that of peace - and perhaps also with the possibility, even if he does not say so explicitly, of war. Israel must have answers ready. Under no circumstances did I say that we had no answers, and 1 have no doubt that we will have answers.
Q. Do you regard the very fact that Sadat is coming to Jerusalem as an achievement in itself, or, even if he does not come, is his very declaration that he might come an achievement in itself, and one which could bring about the end of Israel's international isolation?
A. Well, a good deal would be needed to change the fact of Israel's international isolation, and this will not depend only on his visit, if it takes place. For our isolation is also felt in Europe and other parts of the world. I definitely would regard the visit in itself as an achievement, if it takes place. The achievement lies in the fact that until now this same Sadat has stated on various occasions that he would not meet with Israeli representatives so long as Israel held Arab territory - that he would not sit at one table with us. And now he is ready to do so, that is, he is ready for a dialogue without making it conditional on our withdrawal. If he does not come, then I would hesitate to say that we should regard it as an achievement that he wanted to come but did not. I recall the time when King Abdullah co-initialed a document with us, and was assassinated, and the result in the Arab world was not encouraging, was not a breakthrough. Therefore if Sadat, let us say, returns from Damascus, and says that after meeting with the other Arab leaders he believes it is preferable to preserve a united Arab front, etc.. and cancels his visit (to Israel), then I am not sure we should regard this as a breakthrough. Perhaps it will serve as a lesson to other Arab leaders that one can only get hurt by this kind of attempt and does not succeed in it.
Q. Sadat has to some extent dissipated the taboo on us as lepers: Is not the very fact that he is considering the meeting something positive?
A. In my view, if he cancels the visit the effect will be entirely negative, and I do not think that we, or anyone else in the world, thinks we are lepers and that he is a purifier of lepers. The question is whether the Arabs are ready to meet with us, and not whether we are lepers, and should it emerge that such an attempt has failed because of Arab pressure, that will deter the others. For our good name we do not need Sadat, and I do not think any good would come of this. On the contrary: I think that such an abortive attempt would deter others.
Q. In your answer to the first question you said "In any event, I was surprised". Do you mean that the general feeling that Sadat is again initiating a surprise move, is again gaining the support of international public opinion, is correct, and that we are again being dragged behind?
A. That is not my feeling. Again.. surprising... being dragged... what do you mean by being dragged? Sadat said he would come to the Knesset. In what way are we being dragged when we say he should come and that we shall welcome him gladly? What could we do? Bring him here by force? We were ready to go there. They did not want to welcome us. We were ready for open and direct talks. They did not want them. What Sadat is doing now is nothing surprising or unreasonable. Sadat is doing now, or promising to do now, what he refused to do until now, he and others. Any meetings there occasionally were with Arab leaders were, on their part, surreptitious, not open. He has decided to take another step forward. Why should we interpret that as a sign of weakness, or being dragged, on our part? On the contrary, I see that as an achievement, not because we have managed to complicate matters by some trick, but because while Israel has been adamant about her position throughout the years, it is now apparent that the Arabs have changed their position, or one of them has, at least, and he is saying: We must talk with the Israelis even while they are occupying territories, and have meetings and talks before laying down conditions. The Sadat, who in 1970, laid down as a condition, prior to going to Rhodes, which was then being planned, that Israel agree to retreat from all the territories, including the Gaza Strip, has changed. Imagine what would have happened if we had changed our minds like that. You would all be saying, "Look how inconsistent we are, and how we change our minds." It is Sadat who changed his mind, not us.
Q. Has Israel contributed in any way, in the recent political moves, to what is happening now?
A. I do not know whether she contributed to this move. I certainly cannot say that this is exactly what I planned what I was aiming at, and - look, it is all happening, as I thought it would. In my opinion this government has contributed much, with consistence and determination, to Israel's readiness-willingness to talk with the Arabs. Despite all the criticism that this determined government announces that it is ready to sit down with a Palestinian delegation, a united Arab delegation etc... that it is ready to go to Geneva without prior talks with the Americans on substantive matters. We have definitely reached the stage, from Israel's point of view, and from Egypt's, that Geneva is a concrete possibility. Other Arab states may put a stop to it, but the moves made by Israel in connection with Sadat's visit, the positive moves, and there are such, are expressed in her willingness to sit at the negotiations table with the Arabs and her readiness to meet them on both procedural and substantive issues, because the paper we gave to the Americans on the substantive issues - the rough draft of a peace agreement, was phrased in such a way that, even in substantive matters, and not just in procedure. Great steps have been taken towards the possibility of holding talks with the Arabs, and the Arabs will most probably hear about them.
Q. Sadat is bringing some sort of message with him and will be expecting some sort of reaction. Will our reaction be as it has always been that everything is open to negotiation. What is he coming here for?
A. Perhaps what you are saying is what in fact will happen. I am not speaking on behalf of the government. I am only speaking for myself. I do not know exactly what he will say, but assuming that what he has said so far, in anticipation of his visit, will not change. If he really came and said, "I have come here, and I am ready to sit down here, as I said at first, three, four, or five days, and come to some sort of arrangement." Israel would have to sit down, and I would recommend this very strongly, and hold talks with him, despite Geneva, to which we are already committed, and see whether we could reach an agreement with him. I very much fear that it will be he, and not Israel, who will not want that. It will not be us who will be in a position in which it will be said that Sadat comes to us with a message and we back away. Let's say that he finishes his brilliant and convincing speech, and I hope it will be convincing, he explains the Arab position - he says. "I want to explain the Arab position to the members of the Knesset - and we all believe him.. We still believe that Sadat wants peace - we know that sort of talk - and we say to him, "Fine, come and let's sit down and sign an agreement. Let's talk and sign a peace treaty." I'm afraid he will say. "No, I cannot come to a separate agreement with you. I am not authorized to make any comprehensive agreement. I came to explain our position, and even if you want to give an answer, whatever it is, no peace agreement will come out of it. We will go home, and then to Geneva, and then we will discuss peace." I don't think it will be Israel that retreats or hesitates. It will be Israel that will say "We are ready for anything, come and let's negotiate." I think he will be the one to say "I am not ready for everything."
Q. Why do you think he is coming? After all he does not need the Knesset.
A. I cannot speak for him. I do not know what he is thinking. I think that Sadat has been thrust into a situation in which he is pulled between two poles. On the one hand he wants to get things moving and present his case as a kind of ultimatum, as a sort of alibi: "Listen, you have a chance of achieving peace, in exchange for - withdraw from the areas and you will have peace. I, the President of Egypt, say so." This is the positive aspect, and this is what is motivating him, in my opinion. But, on the other hand, he does not come with practical authority, he can go as far as saying that, and if we say to him, "Right, we are ready to sign a peace treaty, let's sit down in the next room and sign any agreement." I think he will say. "I cannot do that." "So what did you come for?" "I came to tell you that one thing, so that you should be prepared for it. As for the actual signing, that I have to do with the other Arab states, not here but in Geneva. Not on a hurried theatrical visit but with officers, and maps, with Syria and Jordan and the Palestinians and so on." I think that is his situation, being pulled in two directions, so he can say that this is a performance, or a move in various stages, that he is making the first, opening move but that it is not the final one.
Q. I understand that you too do not see Sadat's move as an alternative to Geneva.
A. That's right, and that is because of this situation. If Sadat were ready to negotiate with us here, directly, and to sign a peace agreement, I would be ready to do it now, now, without Geneva, and without all the others, and not because I want to drive a wedge between him and the others. If he came and said that he was ready, I would rather do it with him immediately than say "wait a moment, we are only prepared to sit in Geneva".
Q. Will you try to make him sign? Maybe Egypt wants to cut herself off from the rest of the Arab world. Would you say to him "lets talk about Egypt's interests, forget about the Palestinians and about Judea and Samaria for a moment"?
A. If such an approach were not to be interpreted as an attempt to drive a wedge, not negatively received, I would do it, and I would recommend to the P.M. that it should be done, but I'm afraid that if we do it, in spite of his reservations, knowing full well that he will refuse, it would be interpreted as a hostile move towards him and the others. I think that from a practical point of view it should not be done. However, if there is any shadow of hope, the slightest chance, that he would agree, I would recommend that we do it immediately and with all our hearts. But, I must repeat, you are talking as if Sadat had not already made himself perfectly clear on this issue. He has said repeatedly, quite clearly, that he will not sign a separate agreement with Israel, that he will not negotiate here, that negotiations must be carried out in Geneva, and that his visit here is not a substitute for Geneva. He has said all this, he even attacked P.M. Begin for addressing the Egyptian people instead of the whole Arab world. And indeed yesterday evening, in his speech in the Knesset, Mr. Begin addressed all the Arab leaders, and the representatives of the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, and I was very glad that he did that, that he addressed the representatives of the Palestinian Arabs.
Q. Why should there not be a split in the Arab world. What would be wrong with it?
A. There is nothing wrong with a split. What would be bad would be to try to cause a split and fail and that is what would happen.
Q. Do you think that, if Sadat does come to Jerusalem, that would constitute Egyptian de jure recognition of Israel?
A. I do not think so, de jure recognition is something very specific, which must be stated explicitly, etc. The visit will be what it is - in its positive aspects, and it may possibly even be accompanied by negative aspects.
Q. Mr. Dayan, in what way are you preparing yourself for this visit?
A. As far as I personally am concerned, only on one issue: By thinking, reflection, consultations with others on what Israel's reaction should be - and I mentioned this at the beginning of the interview - even if Sadat is not ready to translate his approach into concrete terms. We may have to react, and his appeal will have worldwide reverberations. What will Israel's reaction be? What should it be? These are the matters that are engaging me prior to his arrival.
Q. Will your trip to West Germany take place next week?
A. If Sadat comes here next week, I shall request that it be postponed.
Q. Yesterday, the Chief of Staff was in effect, reprimanded in the Knesset for the remarks he made as regards Egyptian war preparations. How do you assess the political option Egypt is following as opposed to the war option which is perhaps also being considered in Cairo?
A. Without any connection with the Chief of Staff - that is a matter between him and the Defence Minister - I have stated, and I am ready to reiterate here, that if, in the end, the political moves fail, we must take into account that the Arabs may launch another round of war.
Q. As all this came about through reciprocal declarations between Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat, don't you think that to some extent the United States is being shifted from its mediating position, if Sadat is ready to respond to Begin's challenge?
A. First of all, Sadat did not respond to any challenge: he was the initiator - and the positive feature in the Prime Minister of Israel's statements was that he responded to what Sadat said. But it was not some kind of dialogue which developed into a visit. Sadat said what he said unilaterally, and the Prime Minister welcomed his remarks. I have no fears for the position of the United States. I do not think that position is deteriorating, or collapsing, or has even been weakened to any extent, and I do not think the Americans are worried over this step.
Q. In the light of these developments, what do you expect of the Geneva Conference?
A. It is still too early to say, but in the most general way, I wholeheartedly believe that we are now in the period of serious negotiations, which holds out possibilities for peace. We may divide Israel's history into periods, each of which had its own emphases, which stemmed from the needs of that particular period. There were periods when aliya (immigration) was at the centre of our life: Before the establishment of the state - the "second wave of immigration" - and then, after the establishment of the state, the period of mass immigration. There were periods in which war was the central thing: First and foremost, in my opinion, the War of Independence in 1948 - that was the war that determined Israel's existence and territory. Even the Yom Kippur war, with all its importance, was a war of defence. There were periods in which settlement was the principal subject.
We are now entering a period in which the key issue is the possibility of attaining peace with the Arabs. However, for the sake of precision, not only precision but correct definition, this issue is composed of two parts: Not only whether it is possible to attain peace which is of supreme importance in itself - but also what Israel's natural borders will be: Not only peace but also the determination of Israel's borders. That, then, is the major subject, and whether or not Geneva gives results, we shall return to this subject. Nor do I think Sadat's visit is coincidental. Why is this subject a central one? Because it is not only we want this, but the Arabs, too, in one form or another, and it makes no difference if we say they want it, or need it, or are being pushed into it by the Americans, or by the European approach to the matter. This issue, then, is today, in my view, the political - perhaps even the historic - framework of the central subject in our life. Geneva is one of the possibilities of doing this thing - and if it fails, and this subject does not stop being a central one, then other frameworks will be found, or such attempts will be made again. But I expect of Geneva the possibility of achieving the full or partial fruit of the needs of this period. This is a period in which peace settlements or something like them should be determined between ourselves and the Arabs, and as part of that process, also Israel's natural borders.
Q. But what chance does Geneva have if the American position is very close to the Arab stand and we do not accept it?
A. That is the way things are, and we shall have to stand up for what we want. We have two advantages which to a large extent counterbalance the alignment of forces. The first is that we hold the (administered) territories. It is not that we are asking something of them and the U.S. and Arab stand is identical: that they do not have to give this -and we haven't the strength to get it from them. But they are demanding that we pull out of territories, and we do not want to withdraw from those areas as regards which the United States supports the Arab position that we should withdraw. I do not think the United States will exert military pressure on us. The fact that we are there, that we are holding Judea and Samaria, the Golan Heights, Sinai: that is the critical fact. We are there, and if they don't send in the marines against us the question will ultimately be one of Israel's internal strength and stability.
The second thing is our capacity for living together with the Arabs. For the present, I believe we are showing good sense and a capacity to live together with the Arabs in the (administered) territories. That is to say: If Geneva fails, or if we do not want to agree to what the Americans and the Arabs demand of us, we have an alternative, that is something of supreme importance. We could not enter into negotiations with meagre prospects if we did not have an alternative and had to accept what was demanded of us. We are in a situation in which we can say: "You are demanding things of us which we are not ready to accept, so we can go home and go on living as we are now." Perhaps this will prove a disappointment to the people of Israel, and we won't want it. But I would very strongly encourage ourselves to understand this, and be prepared that, within certain limits, limits of demands, if we are called upon for something that Israel is not ready for - that we shall be ready to go on living even without peace. If we are not ready for this we shall have absolutely no bargaining power in negotiations.
Q. Are you prepared to say what that limit is? Not the geographical limit, I mean the principle.
A. I am prepared to repeat the definitions of this and other governments, but I want to emphasise the difference in the way this government puts them. In general, this government, like its predecessors, has said that it will not come down from the Golan Heights, that we are prepared to make significant concessions in Sinai, we are prepared to live together with the Arabs in Judea and Samaria, but we are not prepared for foreign sovereignty. You and the listeners know the whole theory. In addition, this government has said that those are our positions. It has said. "We are going to Geneva with no prior conditions, and the Arabs are free to present their positions, and we shall negotiate with them with an open mind and an open heart." In other words, what I have defined so far is Israel's position. Only a few days ago, the P.M. said, with reference to a Palestinian State, that if Sadat recommends, or suggests, or demands the establishment of a Palestinian State, he is perfectly entitled to do so, and the P.M. did not say that we should not be prepared to discuss it. In other words, Pres. Sadat is entitled to raise such a suggestion because that is what going to Geneva without prior conditions means, Each party will submit its position and the discussion will be over those very positions, we oppose the establishment of a Palestinian State, but we do not oppose his right to raise the issue as a proposal of his, and we are not saying that if he proposes it we have nothing to discuss. Similarly, we are not prepared to accept any particular Arab position in advance and say that we accept it before the Geneva talks even begin. That is why, when you asked me what the limits of the Israeli position are, I wanted to say that I don't know if those are the limits, that these are the positions regarding the Israeli stand on the Golan Heights, on Sinai, Judea and Samaria, on the Gaza Strip, and on the Palestinians, the positions as they are known.
Q. These are not the last words then?
A. I don't know. We go to Geneva, in my opinion, without ultimatums.
Q. It appears that with regard to the settlements in Judea and Samaria not much is happening. Gush Emunim people are settling in military camps, and America appears to be acquiescing. Is the government deliberately halting settlement activity, which would be a little surprising coming from a government led by Mr. Begin?
A. I neither can, nor do I want to speak on behalf of the government. But for myself I can say that I do not think that the government is halting activities. On the contrary, I see nothing wrong with putting Gush Emunim groups in military camps. At this stage, I don't regard it as an insult or degradation for the army, or a clipping of Gush Emunim's wings that they are going into army camps. Kiryat Arba also began in a military camp of the engineering corps. I was Minister of Defence then. They stayed first in the Hebron police headquarters. First, they came to the Park Hotel - then we took them of there. No settlement without permission, that is still my opinion. Then they moved to the police building, and when permission was given they moved to the army camp of the engineers near Hebron. I see nothing wrong with that, either from their point of view or from the point of view of the army. If there are a number of such settlements, or whatever name we choose to give them, in the near future, 4, 5 or 6 of them, and they are put into army camps, why should that be called "halting" activities? I don't regard that as halting. I think that the rate of progress is quite satisfactory, and we are talking only about one area, Samaria. We have not discussed other areas. It is certainly necessary to reinforce existing settlements, Ma'aleh Adumim, or other places, I think that in principle, any group that is ready to settle in the administered territories can find somewhere to settle. Perhaps first of all the existing settlements, in which there are too few people, should be reinforced.
Q. And does it not depend on "political'' timing?
A. Political considerations must definitely be weighed, and they are weighed, and they should be weighed. If they were not, would they not exist? They exist. Both the fact that we are on the eve of the Geneva Conference, and the position of the U.S. and even the position of the General Assembly, we neither can nor should ignore them. The question is how. In the circumstances, not to halt or to decide to stop settlement altogether, and how to do what we can in view of the situation. In my opinion, things are being done, and not at a slow pace, and the activities are not being halted.
Q. In the light of the Security Council's resolution concerning an embargo of South Africa, what in fact is Israel's stand?
A. Let us begin with the embargo: Israel will act in accordance with what the Security Council has decided. Israel will not defy that decision or act otherwise on a subject on which the Security Council has passed a resolution. Secondly, we have no hidden, under-the-table ties with the government of South Africa, and the political and economic aspects of our relations with it are open and clear. On the subject of apartheid and the internal repressions there from time to time, we are opposed to them no less than other countries and I have requested our representative at the United Nations to vote against South Africa, that is to vote for a resolution condemning South Africa. In those instances when the United States votes in that way, on those cases of internal repression connected with apartheid, we have no little difficulty in this matter, because many U.N. resolutions link condemnation of Israel with condemnation of South Africa, and I hope that no one expects that we shall also regard ourselves as a part of South Africa and vote for condemnation of ourselves. But we shall not hesitate, not only to express our opinion - and this we are doing from various international rostrums - against apartheid, but also to vote, in the U.N. framework, in condemnation of that regime. However, if an Israeli Minister should have to go to South Africa to open a campaign for the United Jewish Appeal or for Israel Bonds, I will support that trip. I do not think we have to cut ourselves off from South Africa, or to weaken our relations with it, beyond what the Security Council has decided.
Q. What of the rest of the continent of Africa: Is there any news?
A. In general, in the political sphere, there is no news, but Israel has many economic ties with Africa - perhaps even more and broader ones than in the period when we maintained political relations with all or most of the African nations.
Q. I should like to return to a subject which we left behind, having reached Africa. When you speak of living together in Judea and Samaria, what do you mean? After the Six Day War there was much Jewish traffic to and within Judea and Samaria, but all this has now been muted. People are afraid to go there. What kind of "living together" do you see?
A. First of all, I do not think people are afraid to go there. Perhaps there are those who are afraid, or there may be other reasons why they do not go. At first they went out of curiosity, now that the entire house of Israel has been and seen, there is less enthusiasm for going there. In my opinion, it is more dangerous to walk down the street in Tel Aviv than in the Gaza Strip, and if you examine the cases of murder and rape and all violent acts in Tel Aviv or in Jerusalem or in Israel as a whole - as compared with the virtually non-existent cases of violence in the (administered) areas, then you should be afraid to go to Ramat Gan via that bridge adjacent to the Tel Aviv train terminal.
Let us take as an example the settlements - Dozens of settlements in the territories, including the Gaza Strip and the Jordan Rift: Well, people travel there, they don't sit shut up in their houses, they go out to work and travel to every town or city.
Do you ever hear of any difficulty experienced by the people living in those settlements? Buses go through the Jordan Valley: do you ever hear of them being attacked or harassed? What you said, then, is incorrect, it is factually wrong.
But you asked what I meant by living together. Well, in this period I mean that Jews will be able to settle there, to purchase land and to reside there, without displacing the Arabs, without wanting to try to dispossess them - and the Arabs will be able to live in those same areas with free access to Israel and unhindered contact with the Arab countries, and we shall reside not one in place of another, and not with a line dividing one from the other, but side by side. Kiryat Arba next to Hebron. The best illustration of this is Jerusalem - as life goes on now in Jerusalem. For if you speak of a line dividing East Jerusalem (from West Jerusalem), this is not even a physical matter, for it is difficult today to speak of the physical partition of Jerusalem, but to transfer the sovereignty over East Jerusalem to the Arabs, and we must remember that this would include Mount Scopus, the Hebrew University, Hadassah and the Jewish Quarter. Does anyone even conceive of such a possibility?
I think that objectively there is simply no line by which you can partition the West Bank or the Gaza Strip in a way acceptable to both sides. If there is no such line - and for ten years we tried to sell the Allon Plan to the Arabs, and today not only is there no Arab who is ready for that, but even the Americans are not proposing it - I know that Allon still supports it, but the Americans with all their pro-Arab proposals are not suggesting partition of the West Bank -neither the Allon Plan nor anything resembling it - if, then, there is no such line, what is there? There is one possibility. Namely our total withdrawal from there with minor adjustments and transformation of the West Bank into a Palestinian state: Or, if not that and not partition - and if the Arabs suggest partition we shall take it under consideration - if not partition, then to find some modus vivendi together in which it will be laid down what the rights of the Arabs are and what the rights of the Israelis are, without incorporating that territory either within Jordanian sovereignty or in a Palestinian state or within Israeli sovereignty.