The key question following the Sadat visit, which the Egyptian President had termed a "historic turning point"; was what would be the next step. In this press conference, Mr. Dayan said that Israel would now be required to take hard decisions on all the major issues. He also said that the next step would probably be preparatory talks before a Geneva conference. He added that Egypt indicated it did not want a separate agreement with Israel and that it will try to involve other Arab elements. It appeared that Sadat did not object to going to Geneva on the basis of the Israel-U.S. working paper of 5 October. Text:
Q. Since President Sadat concluded his visit here, you have stated twice that we must decide on our positions quickly and be ready for a decision. What did you mean, exactly?
A. I meant what I said: that this time, perhaps - I hope so - we shall really arrive at true negotiations for peace agreements, peace treaties - perhaps, and this I am not sure of, with all the Arab states - and we must decide our last-ditch attitudes so that we should not fail in or frustrate the negotiations for peace - which, I believe, are close at hand, at least with Egypt.
Q. When you say "we must decide," to whom are you in fact referring - for it is you and your Ministerial colleagues who must take such decisions?
A. When I said "we," I specified: the Government and the parties. The Government is the representative of the parties, or at least of the coalition parties that are part of it: the NRP, the Likud, the DMC, and so forth. And it wouldn't hurt if the parties that are not in the coalition determined their positions as well. But definitely, first and foremost the Government and the parties.
Q. Does this mean that in your opinion the Government should take decisions which differ from its present positions?
A. In the first place, this Government has not actually discussed this subject in detail since its formation. In its Basic Guidelines it set out its general approach, and that was before the DMC joined the Government. Since then there has certainly been no discussion of this subject. But it would be worthwhile even for those who did discuss this subject two or three years ago, to now examine his positions.
Q. What do you mean when you say we must form our "last-ditch attitude" - does this refer only to matters between ourselves and the Egyptians, or to the other Arab states as well?
A. The Golan Heights and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as well.
Q. That is, we must in the near future decide on the future borders of the State of Israel?
A. If the talks with Egypt make progress - the Egyptians say, and I believe them, that they do not intend to make a separate peace treaty only for Egypt - and if, as they say, they do it at Geneva - because Sadat's visit here and the talks that will come in the wake of the visit - I hope there will be such talks - are no substitute for Geneva, then these two things, the Geneva framework and Egypt's desire for an overall settlement with all the Arab states, will compel us, too, to consider our positions as regards borders, and the nature of the peace, and other, connected matters, not only vis-a-vis Egypt but vis-a-vis all the Arab states.
Q. Mr. Dayan, a personal question: are you also reconsidering your known positions on the subjects of the (Administered) Areas and a settlement?
A. Considering, certainly.
Q. Do you think you may change any of your conceptions from the near past?
A. That I do not yet know.
Q. Is it possible?
A. I don't know, I really don't know. I don't know yet, I still have to work it out. If you're really interested in my own personal approach on this issue, then I have to clarify various proposals or possibilities which will also come from the other side. Let us say as regards Egypt: if you refer to Sharm e-Sheikh - I once said that "Sharm e-Sheikh without peace is preferable to peace without Sharm e-Sheikh" - but I was also one of those involved, perhaps even the initiator, after the Six-Day War, in our proposing to return Sinai and the Golan Heights, with certain adjustments and safeguards for our security interests, within the framework of peace agreements. And I was also the one who proposed to BenGurion to prefer that Sharm e-Sheikh - we are speaking now of Sharm e-Sheikh as an illustration -be transferred to Egyptian hands and not to U.N. forces. What I want to say is: each period has its considerations, and now the question fundamentally is that Sharm e-Sheikh means for us the key to freedom of navigation, etc. -things that are well known: the security considerations. So the question is: what will be the alternative proposals to the present situation? - And then it will be possible to decide whether to make changes, or to stick to this or the other formulation, let us say to the "oral doctrine" (of the Labor Party in the early 1970's), or to propose changes in that formulation.
Q. Do you mean that the positions taken by the present Government under Mr. Begin are inadequate and inappropriate to the new situation created in the wake of President Sadat's visit?
A. I have not proposed a revision (and I know that word - if I had wanted to say that I would have said we must revise our conception), not that, but I said - and I was careful in the word I used - that we must formulate positions, consider positions, because we have reached the moment of decision. As long as we were speaking theoretically and there was no one ready to make a true peace with us, we had not reached the moment of decision. We did, I believe, face the moment of truth - I do not think that we ever, in the history of the country, faked, or evaded the moment of truth - but we never, most of the time, faced the need to decide, only to formulate positions. And it is one thing to formulate a position, and another thing when you must say that a position is not enough, but now we must decide, and decide in a situation presented by the other side as its last-ditch position. I believe - I hope - that we are approaching the moment of decision.
Q. In other words, Israel now has to draw her future map.
A. Not now, now is too early, but Israel has to be prepared for it that if we really reach that moment, and we listen, and we bargain, and get to that last-ditch position of the Egyptians, the Syrians, and the others, then we should say whether we prefer peace on the basis of those conditions because we can't get from them any more than that, or whether we would rather have the status quo than accept the conditions they present. We have not yet arrived at that point.
Q. But we are approaching it.
A. I hope so.
Q. Do you think we also need to reconsider our position on the subject of the Palestinians?
A. I also said I don't propose reconsideration - I want you to be precise - I did not say revision, which is what reconsideration means, but I said that the time is approaching - and I suppose that this also applies to the Palestinian question - when we are approaching the hour of decision, and after discussion and bargaining and so forth we shall arrive, at some particular moment, at a position when we shall have to decide whether we are prepared to accept peace and pay, on those conditions that are presented to us, when it seems that we shall not be able to get other conditions, or whether we prefer to maintain the status quo and not accept the peace, in order not to accept those conditions that are too difficult for us, which we must not accept even in return for peace. That is the decision.
Q. Do you agree with the general view that President Sadat deserved to get a special quid pro quo from Israel?
A. No. And I am perfectly satisfied with the Prime Minister's speech on that score, not only with the speech as a speech, but with the terms of the Prime Minister's reply to President Sadat's address. I even think that if we had offered any territorial quid pro quo to Egypt, not only would we not have done Sadat any good or made things easier for him and ensured his success, but on the contrary we would have made things harder for him. Sadat did not come here in order to go back home with assets he had accumulated here, with a quid pro quo. He emphasized, over and over again, that he had not come to make a separate agreement, or a separate peace. The pressure on him is not from France or Germany or the other countries that ask us to present maps, but from the Arab states. Just imagine the outcry the Arab states would have raised against him if he had gone with a full shopping basket and said: I got it from Israel. They would undoubtedly say: You went there to get things for the benefit of Egypt. We would have made it harder for him. He did not want to hear about anything like that. In fact I asked him before the speech: "Mr. President, what would you like us to say in our address of reply so that your visit here should be a success and not a failure?" He said, "I want you to speak sincerely and to tell me what you are prepared for and what you are not prepared for." That was his reply.
Q. I think senior members of the Egyptian delegation were disappointed after the speech.
A. On one point, there was something wrong not with the speech but with the translation: that was on the Palestinian question. The impression that was made by the translation, a bad translation, was that we were not prepared to have any contact on negotiations with representative's of the Areas, and that is not what the Prime Minister said. The Prime Minister said both in his Knesset speech on the eve of Sadat's arrival and also in his reply to Sadat, that we are ready and willing to talk to real representatives of the Areas, of the Arabs of the Land of Israel, and the interpreter said "Israeli Arabs," which means Arabs living in Israel, citizens of Israel.
Apart from this - which was a mistake and perhaps caused disappointment - I don't know what others expected, but I suggest that we should examine the question of whether they were disappointed or not in the light of the reaction in Egypt on their return. Basically, in my opinion, the question of whether Sadat was disappointed or not depends on the reaction of the Egyptian people, and especially the Egyptian army, to this visit. I don't think the Egyptian people made any distinction between the leader of the Opposition's speech and the Prime Minister's. They saw this mission as a mission, they saw on the TV how Sadat was received here and they saw Sadat's journey to Israel a mission, as Sadat defined it, a mission to break that psychological barrier to a dialogue, how he got off the plane, and the band played the Egyptian anthem in his honour, and he shook hands with the chief of staff and the Prime Minister and the President and Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan and Arik Sharon - all those names they know in Egypt - and the crowds in Israel and the Knesset in Israel welcomed him with affection and enthusiasm and applauded him even when he said those things that perhaps we did not find so pleasant. The public in Egypt saw this as a major success.
Q. If the Prime Minister had decided to make some gesture to President Sadat, do you think he would have regarded it as a disappointment?
A. Yes. It depends what kind of gesture. If he had said to him: I agree - since we have heard you and have been very impressed by your words, we agree to withdraw from all the Areas and establish a Palestinian state - he would have been delighted, he would have accepted it with great pleasure, but if we had offered him free access to El Arish, or some piece (of territory) here, or said we would withdraw ten kilometres here or there, he would have said: "Thank you very much, I did not come here to collect crumbs under your table. I want peace and total withdrawal and negotiations with all the Arabs, and your giving me so many kilometres of dunams in Sinai for Egypt - thank you very much, that was not what I came for." He would have given it back, rejected it, he would have said: "I don't want that." Do you know why I think so? Someone said so in the private talks.
Q. If Israel offered some gesture in connection with the working paper agreed between Israel and the U.S., would he have been disappointed even then?
A. My dear sir, President Sadat said he was satisfied with that paper. He never said the paper was not satisfactory.
Q. He said he was satisfied with it?
A. Yes.
Q. Has Egypt accepted the working paper?
A. President Sadat said he was prepared to go, even before his visit here - I will refresh your memory, I'm glad Ehud Yaari is already nodding his head - President Sadat said as follows: "I am prepared to go to Geneva on the basis of the Israeli-American working paper, it does not interest me, and no power in the world will prevent me going to Geneva to demand a Palestinian state." But even more than that: when he was here we wanted to discuss with him what he thought about the working paper, and he said: "Forget it, it doesn't interest me, the working paper doesn't interest me. I want to talk about peace and not about the working paper." If I may quote myself, he said it in such a sharp and cogent way. I said to him, "I understand" - we were talking in English about the working paper - "I understand you are interested in the working and not the paper." He said, "Well said, that's it exactly, Moshe." So he was interested in the "working" and not in the "paper". We tried to talk to him about it, but it didn't interest him, and he is prepared to go to Geneva on the basis of the working paper. Sadat never asked for a different paper not that this paper is his heart's desire, but he doesn't care.
Q. When are Israel and Egypt going to Geneva? There's no obstacle?
A. Not so. Egypt does not want a separate peace, and therefore she does not want to go alone to Geneva or anywhere else to make a separate peace. This he emphasized. This is an obstacle. It doesn't matter what Sadat thinks, because Syria is not prepared to go on the basis of this paper. Secondly, Egypt does not want to go to Geneva without prior preparations on matters of substance. She doesn't want to go to Geneva and start with negotiations there. So these are two obstacles. She does not want to go alone and she does not want to go without prior discussions.
Q. When President Sadat told you he wanted to talk about the "working" and not about the "paper", were you prepared?
A. Yes.
Q. Then you discussed substantive matters?
A. We were even ready, while he was here, to go into substantive matters, but time was pressing and it was agreed between us that the talks would have to continue - but talks on substance, not procedure. And I hope they will continue.
Q. Then, if Israel and Egypt are holding bilateral talks on substantive issues, the Geneva Conference must be virtually worthless. Is the United States pleased about this?
A. Let me, then, reiterate: Egypt is not ready to make a separate agreement with us, nor can it speak in the name of Syria. Therefore it needs all the Arab states, and the framework for that is Geneva. Egypt will not sign a separate peace agreement with us, therefore he said that these meetings, those in Israel and those to follow, are not a substitute for Geneva but a preparation for Geneva, in anticipation of Geneva, and not in place of Geneva. That is what Sadat said.
Q. Since, as you say, Egypt has accepted the working paper, and since that working paper refers to Palestinian
representation at Geneva, perhaps you could say who those Palestinians will be.
A. I don't know, and we didn't go into that with Sadat, he did not raise the question, and we didn't discuss it with him. That is a question for a separate interview.
Q. You did not discuss at all the question of Palestinian representation at Geneva?
A. No.
Q. Article four of the working paper says that the solution to the question of the Palestinian refugees and the Jewish refugees is to be discussed in line with guidelines which must be agreed upon. Have you already come to an agreement on them?
A. What exactly are we speaking of: Sadat, Geneva, what? As for the working paper, we did not discuss either article four or article three, neither the Palestinians nor the working paper - if you want to talk about the working paper, I'm more than willing, but...
Q. The Foreign Minister also said they discussed the "working" and not so much the...
A. We did not discuss (it), the working paper was not placed on the table and we did not deal with it, and he did not ask for any change in it and we did not discuss a single paragraph in it.,
Q. You have claimed that the road to Geneva is paved, that all the problems have been solved. Is that correct?
A. As far as procedure goes, Sadat is ready to go to Geneva on the basis of the working paper. But he says that he is not ready to go to Geneva, first of all without advance preparation, that is, talks on substance. So the way is not paved.
Q. Bilateral talks?
A. When he speaks with us, those are bilateral talks. Secondly, he does not want to go to Geneva or anywhere else where a peace agreement is signed, without other Arab states, without a resolution of the Palestinian question. Therefore he cannot go to Geneva, if he does not want to without Syria, let us say, and it is not he who can hold preparatory talks about the Golan Heights. That is the situation. In anticipation of Geneva, for him the obstacle or the barrier he must overcome is not the working paper or the procedural aspect, but substantive clarifications from his point of view in regard to Egypt, and the participation of the other Arab countries. Without these two things he cannot go to Geneva. He hopes Geneva will convene.
Q. Can you tell us how the contacts between Israel and Egypt will continue?
A. First of all, I should like to take advantage of the opportunity of this interview to say, not vis-a-vis Premier Begin -as far as he is concerned there is clear understanding - but to the public. When the public hears about "continuation" of the visit here, it gets the impression that Egypt is ready to continue the normalization of relations, and I have already seen how the Histadrut Secretary-General is inviting the head of the (Egyptian) trade union federation, and soccer teams and orchestras. Now, I have nothing against this - but, friends, that is not the idea. "Continuation" for them means not to make progress with the normalization of relations while we continue to hold all the territories, but to advance only as regards one subject: the discussing and achievement of a peace agreement -only that and not in any other spheres. So, on that subject, they want substantive talks between their representatives and our representatives. But no technical arrangements have been worked out on this, only the principle.
Q. Have the levels of representation been decided upon?
A. Only the principle.
Q. Then if I have understood you, the preparatory process for the Geneva Conference might well be more important than the Conference itself, and instead of being the start of a process, it will perhaps be the end of one.
A. You are right: that is the basic difference between the American approach and the Egyptian. The Americans thought - I think-that the negotiating process must be begun with the convening of Geneva, and then to split up into working groups for negotiations. I do not say that the Egyptians say that the negotiations have to be concluded before that, and to come to Geneva just for the signing. But they do not think that we should go to Geneva before sufficient substantive preparations have been made. There is another important point to bear in mind here, and Sadat made it very clearly. His attitude towards the Russians is one of total reservation, and he has a certain grudge against the Americans for having brought the Russians in through that joint statement. That is one of the reasons he gives that to go to Geneva with a Russian co-chairman, and to conduct negotiations under Russian, not American chairmanship - he said that was not for him; they had enough of the Russians in Egypt and that was not for him. But that was only an example that I wanted to give concerning Egypt's attitude both towards the Russians and vis-a-vis certain American approaches to the time and place for the Geneva Conference.
Q. By the process of elimination, if Sadat feels resentment against the Russians and to some extent against the Americans - and certainly he is not exactly popular at the moment in the Arab world - is Israel the only friend he has left?
A. That is a caricature. He is slightly annoyed with the Americans for having brought in the Russians, but he does not reject the Americans as chairmen and mediators; on the contrary, he is counting on the Americans not only as chairmen but as those who will help in the reconstruction of Egypt. When he wants peace, he also wants the fruits of peace, which are economic fruits and the raising of the standard of living - and the address for that is America. Not only does he not reject the U.S. but he threw off the U.S.S.R. in order to draw closer to the United States. As regards the other Arab states, they say: This is already a tradition in the Arab world - fight and make up, fight and make up - so there is just now a quarrel with some of the Arab states.
May I make a comment here on this matter. To a large extent and in many spheres, Egypt can live without Syria; but it is very hard for Syria and other small Arab states to live without Egypt. Egypt can make war without Syria -war against us, against Israel without other Arab countries, or make peace without them too. Syria cannot. And today there are, at Egypt's side - it is not so isolated - both Sudan and Tunisia and Morocco, and I don't yet know where Jordan stands in all this. So Syria and Libya and Algeria are against Egypt. You know what? They cannot live without Egypt.
Q. Mr. Dayan, is it possible to bridge over the differences between Sadat's view of Israel's security and the Israel Government's?
A. I do not know how to bridge the differences. These are two entirely different points of view. What Sadat sees as Israel's security is not his most cherished wish. When he says he recognizes Israel's need for security, he immediately adds a definition of security. He says that this security does not mean defensible borders, or territories, or straits, but arrangements: demilitarization and arms, treaties and warning stations and guarantees; all sorts of things, all of which are meant for one purpose. He said: "Withdraw from all the territories. I recognize and agree with your need for security, but you will get this security not in the form of territories - a hill here, a river there, a strait somewhere else, etc. - but through international agreements." This is what he means. Not so much the positive as the negative.
Q. Is it really possible to reconcile these two conceptions?
A. I do not know whether it is necessary to reconcile the points of view. The negotiations will encompass everything. It will deal with borders, arrangements, both borders and territories. We don't have to build bridges.
Q. What, in your opinion, is the future of Sharm e-Sheikh in the agreement which will be reached between Israel and Egypt?
A. This is a subject for negotiations. There's no point - you don't expect me to say something here - but I want to say that I am willing to approach the issue with an open mind and listen to various suggestions, Egyptian and other, not only the initial proposals. What Sadat said here was a starting point - not a bargaining point from which he has decided in advance that he is willing to withdraw. He presented the fundamental Arab position: The Arab position means withdrawal from all the territories to the last inch, a Palestinian state with the right to self-determination, and so forth.
But what brought Sadat here? What brought Sadat here for this visit was Egypt's own need for peace, not Egypt's need for Israel to have peace, but the vital need of Egypt, the country of Egypt, the Egyptian people, for peace. He too will have to weigh this in the balance. As I said previously, when he will have to consider our proposals he will have to decide which he prefers: to remain in this situation, which is apparently not very comfortable for him, in fact it is difficult enough to bring him on his plane to Ben-Gurion airport and to the Knesset. He too will have to decide whether he is willing to move the Israeli position. He did not say, after hearing Prime Minister Begin, who presented the Israeli position, he did not say: "If you do not accept our position, I have nothing to go to Geneva about, nothing to discuss with you." He said, "I have heard your position, it is different from ours, let us go on to the talks." So we'll go on to the talks, and Sharm e-Sheikh will be included in these discussions. It is far too soon to say what will be the end-result of the discussions, be the future of Sharm e-Sheikh. The future of Sharm e-Sheikh is the end point of the discussions, not their starting-point.
Q. But I noted that you view this issue with an open mind, that you are willing to listen to proposals.
A. Certainly. Of course I am willing to listen to proposals. And not only on Sharm e-Sheikh.
Q. How do you view the expression "No more war after October" - is this a slogan, or also a mutual commitment?
A. I certainly do not regard it as an operative commitment. It is not a slogan, it is more than a slogan, but it is anchored, on Sadat's part, in his first statement, "You should get out of the territories, off the Arab land," and it would not be fair to ourselves if we try to separate the two and say "But he said 'No more war!' It's true that he also said: 'Leave the Arab land,' but he (one might say) does not link the two things." He definitely does link the two topics. When he says "No more war," as a goal, as. a slogan, it is tied in, on his part, with our not sitting on Arab soil, what he calls Arab soil. If we remain in all the territories I do not think that it will be possible to come and say to ourselves that we were promised that there will be no more war. So why should we bother with all this? That would be a superficial view of the matter. The saying "No more war" - from his point of view, even its sincere part - is closely linked to withdrawal from the territories. In both cases it is, at any rate, not an operative statement. It is not a saying which means: "Look, I Sadat, am going home, sending the soldiers home, disarming, putting an end to procurement, not repairing the Migs." You'll see how they'll repair all the Migs, and so forth. In, any case, there is some kind of connection between the preparation of the Egyptian army and this declaration. This is not a declaration of disarmament.
Q. Do you expect that in the coming days or weeks that, in the wake of the Sadat visit, Egypt will lower its propaganda profile against Israel, will perhaps make some gesture as regards the Arab boycott -Egypt has already closed down the PLO radio station in Cairo. What will the Egyptian tone be?
A. When you say Egypt has already closed down the PLO broadcasting station, one might think it did so because the PLO had vilified Israel. She did so because the PLO vilified Sadat and not Israel. This has nothing to do with any softening of hostile propaganda against us, but measures against those who vilified and reviled Sadat. They have done this in the past, too: every time the PLO came out against the Egyptian rulers they shut down that station and expelled its representatives. I don't know, I don't know, I regard the cardinal question - and I am sure that the Egyptians do, too, because they said so - as that of continuation, and continuation on this one subject only: progress towards a peace agreement. And should there be meetings, and those meetings produce progress, then other things of the kind you mentioned might also go along with them.
Q. When is Hussein likely to join the process?
A. I don't know.
Q. Perhaps you could share with us some of your impressions of President Sadat's personality?
A. I am not good at that. I remember every word he said on the subjects we discussed and the contents of his. statements, but I'm no good at character description, that's not my area. l'm sorry.
Q. Is there not a contradiction between the fact that a large part of the substance will be discussed before Geneva and the fact that, as President Sadat said, Geneva will be convened immediately?
A. President Sadat does not say that Geneva is to be convened forthwith. There is no contradiction.
Q. The Prime Minister stated at the joint press conference that Geneva would be convened even before Christmas or immediately thereafter.
A. The Prime Minister said that Sadat, that the Government of Israel is ready for the convening of Geneva at any time, and has no desire to postpone it. I don't know if you are quoting correctly, but I know what Sadat said and I am certain that the Prime Minister did not say anything different. Sadat said he wants a continuation of the substantive dialogue which has started - and it has started with his meeting here - before Geneva. So I don't know what "forthwith" means, but if that substantive clarification has to take time, well, Sadat said that Geneva has to follow the clarification: the idea is not to prepare all the forms for signing, but a thorough clarification.
In the meantime, I think that additional factors enter in here, the present rift between Syria and Egypt, let us say, is also a factor hindering the intra-Arab dialogue on this subject. So I don't know what the Prime Minister may have said, I didn't hear it, and it is true that from the point of view of the working paper, as regards the procedural aspect, Sadat has no objections to going to Geneva tomorrow; he himself said he did not care, he could go on the basis of the working paper, "I do not care, even without any paper let's go to Geneva." But he does care about not going to Geneva without any preparation.
Q. Is it your impression that Saudi Arabia is supporting him, even if tacitly?
A. I don't know, we did not discuss that. I am aware of Saudi Arabia's public stand, which spoke against the visit, that King Khaled spoke against it.
Q. And your assessment?
A. What the King says must be so, I don't know.
Q. To sum up, would you say the most important thing now is that we must prepare ourselves quickly for fateful decisions?
A. No. The main thing, as I see it, is that on the Egyptian side - and this is the key thing - I believe there is on the Egyptian side readiness to make a peace treaty with us. Not under any conditions, and under conditions which are in fact very difficult for us, and so on. Secondly, they want continuation of the clarification, and that is the immediate thing. If both those things are correct - both that it transpires that their desire is sincere, and that I have not erred on this, that we have not erred, and the preliminary substantive clarifications will take place-then in 1977 or 1978-1 don't know how long these talks will continue - we will reach that moment, that stage, when we shall have to decide if, under those conditions, after all the clarifications and all the debates, etc., if we can reach a peace agreement or not, arrive at a decision.