The Israel-Egypt peace treaty stipulated that the Israeli troop withdrawal and the demilitarization arrangements would be supervised by UNEF, or failing that, by a multinational force which the United States had undertaken to create. Prior to the expiration of the UNEF mandate, it became clear that another extension would be vetoed by the Soviet Union. Therefore, in informal consultations, the members of the Security Council decided not to renew UNEFs mandate and it lapsed on 24 July. A proposal to employ the UNTSO instead of UNEF was unacceptable to Israel. The U.S. was having difficulties in setting up the multi-national force due to the cool attitude of the European nations. The matter remained unresolved for some weeks while U.S., Israeli and Egyptian diplomats were in constant consultations. In the following press conference Ambassador Blum explained the reasons for the Israeli objections to replace UNEF by the UN Truce Supervision Observers:
LETTER DATED 24 JULY 1979 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
I have taken note of the recent Security Council consultations concerning the United Nations Emergency Force. I understand that members of the Council are agreed that there should be no extension of the UNEF mandate, which, accordingly, will lapse at midnight on 24 July. It is my intention, therefore, to make all the necessary arrangements for an orderly withdrawal of UNEF.
(Signed)
KURT WALDHEIM
PRESS CONFERENCE WITH AMBASSADOR BLUM, 29 JULY 1979
Last Tuesday at midnight, the mandate of UNEF in Sinai expired because of the non-extension of that mandate by the Security Council. The reasons for that non-extension of UNEF's mandate are well known. Basically, it was a Soviet threat to cast a veto and thus to prevent the further functioning of UNEF. As a result, Secretary-General Waldheim informed the Council that he intends to deploy U.N. observers in Sinai, in fact, with an unspecified mandate, in accordance with further arrangements to be reached with the parties. Israel had objected to that procedure and had indicated its attitude to the Secretary-General on bilateral and other levels. I would like to point out briefly the reasons for Israel's objections:
Fundamentally, it is Israel's position that last week's scenario constitutes a clear departure from the provisions of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. Article 4 of the Peace Treaty refers to the U.N. forces and observers, but it becomes abundantly clear from the Annex to the Agreement, more specifically from the persual of Article 6 of that Annex, that the distinction between U.N. forces and U.N. observers pertains basically to both sides of the border. Whereas, on the Egyptian side of the border in the zones described as zones A, B and C, U.N. forces are to be deployed. In the zone described as zone D, on the Israeli side of the border, U.N. observers should be deployed on the completion of the Israeli withdrawal, three years after the ratification of the Peace Treaty.
It has been maintained that this specific distinction between U.N. forces and U.N. observers applies only to the permanent stationing of U.N. personnel on the completion of the withdrawal. In other words, that it does not apply to the interim period - that is, between now and the completion of the Israeli withdrawal. However, it becomes quite clear from even a cursory reading of the Appendix to Annex I that the same distinction holds true also for the interim period. Thus, for instance, Article 2 (b) of the Appendix to Annex I provides: "As Israeli armed forces withdraw, U.N. forces will immediately enter the evacuated area." U.N. forces, not U.N. observers. Likewise, Article 3 of the same Appendix stipulates that "U.N. forces should be deployed to perform the functions described in the Appendix up to the time of the completion of the final Israeli withdrawal," that is quite obviously, during the time of the interim period.
The parties clearly envisaged the possibility of a Soviet veto while they had both agreed that the mandate of UNEF should be extended, and in fact requested Secretary-General Waldheim two weeks ago, that this be done. They were well aware of a threat of a Soviet veto, and it was with this in mind that President Carter, on the 26th of March, on the day of the signing of the Peace Treaty, addressed a letter in identical terms to Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat, in which he committed the US, in case of such a contingency, "to establish a multinational force". If "the Security Council fails to establish and maintain the arrangements called for in the Treaty, the President will be prepared to take steps necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an acceptable alternative, multinational force". It clearly follows, therefore, that the proper procedure that should have been followed last week, could have been for the Security Council to decide on the extension or non-extension of the UNEF mandate. From all we know, the requisite majority of nine votes, possibly even more, was available at the Council for the extension of the mandate. In all likelihood, from what we know, the Soviets would have cast a veto, but one should have gone through the motions, if for no other reason than, at least, to expose Soviet belligerency and Soviet unwillingness to encourage the peace process in the Middle East - or rather, Soviet willingness to undermine and subvert the ongoing peace process in the Middle East. If the Soviets indeed had cast that veto (and they were spared this unpleasant experience last week), then we should have proceeded to the second stage - the contingency plan as quoted before -the establishment of a multinational force as provided for in President Carter's letter of last March.
Instead, we were faced with this curious arrangement, which was not even formalized in a formal meeting of the Security Council. It took the form of a letter from the Secretary-General to the Council in which he indicated to the Council his intention to use the existing UNTSO personnel in Sinai, in accordance with arrangements to be reached in the future. In other words, UNTSO has no clear mandate and, in addition, the whole arrangement constitutes a departure from the provisions of the Peace Treaty.
There are, of course, a number of practical objections which bring into force and strengthen Israel's objections to this arrangement:
1) The numerical aspect: UNEF was composed of 4,000 soldiers. The U.N. observers' troop consists of 110 observers, and Secretary-General Waldheim, being in a very optimistic mood, said last week that it could, under special circumstances, be beefed up to the strength of 400 observers. It is totally inadequate to meet the functions assigned to U.N. forces under the Peace Treaty, and those functions are clearly set out: they consist, in addition to functions of controlling verification, also of those of ensuring the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Eilat.
2) The second practical objection is that an observers' troop has no specified mandate and certainly has no mandate within the framework of the Peace Treaty. Secretary-General Waldheim explicitly admitted last week that this, in fact, was the situation. UNTSO was born in 1948 - even before the conclusion of the Armistice Agreements. As such, it is difficult to visualize for it the proper place within the framework of the Peace Treaty.
3) The third objection, equally practical, is the fact that UNTSO comes under the authority of the Secretary-General. The parties, in full awareness of the constitutional situation at the U.N., provided for a U.N. force that comes under the authority of the Security Council - and the Treaty specifically provides for that. It is not difficult to realise why this provision was incorporated in the Treaty. The idea was that the U.N. force was not to be removed except with the approval of the parties, and the veto available to the five permanent members of the Council, including the US, was a guarantee that in fact this force would not be removed without the consent of the parties. The U.N. observers' troop is not a Security Council force. It comes under the authority of the Secretary-General, and given Israel's experience with another U.N. observers' force which was under the authority of the Secretary-General in 1967, it is not difficult to understand why Israel now objects to a recurrence of such a situation.
Taking into account all these considerations, the Cabinet, today, accepted an invitation extended to the Foreign Minister, to meet with Secretary Vance and with an appropriate Egyptian representative to be designated by the Government of Egypt, in Washington, for the purpose of ensuring that all the provisions of the Treaty will be carried out fully and faithfully.