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43 Excerpts from an interview with Chief of Staff Eitan on IDF Radio- 8 September 1979

8 Sep 1979
 VOLUME 6: 1979-1980
 
 

43. Excerpts from an interview with Chief of Staff Eitan on IDF Radio, 8 September 1979.

Parallel to the peaceful progress on Israel's southern borders, tension continued along its northern borders, where the P.L.O. continued to use Lebanon, its only and nearest territorial base to Israel, to launch attacks on Galilee. The situation in the north was the main theme of this interview with the Chief of Staff, who also discussed Israel's information problems and its image in view of the on-going border struggle in the north. Excerpts:

Q: Israel is conducting a war against the terrorists wherever they are: What is the most effective method of warfare against the terrorists in Southern Lebanon?

A: The war against the terrorists is not only in Southern Lebanon. The method of anti-terror warfare cannot be organized and made operative according to methods of conventional warfare for which armies are structured and organized. Anti-terror warfare has to be patterned to the system of terror - that is to the system by which the guerrillas operate - here they're called terrorism - guerrilla - the name does not matter. The British demonstrated these methods in Malaya and Kenya for the first time, on a large scale. That is, they employed simple methods, throughout their operations, with the advantages of an army with an organized structure and with sophisticated warfare systems.

We operate in a similar manner but we ourselves have had experience of underground organizations, guerrilla operations, or operations in terror before the establishment of the state. And we, in my opinion, are more flexible in our thought and can bring in sophisticated means to operate along these fines. And not only by using the direct warfare methods for which a modern army is organized. We employ these methods wherever terrorists operate. Now they operate in Southern Lebanon so we have directed our efforts there.

The first issue is good intelligence without which there is no basis for operation. The second principle is disruption of organizing and preparation for operation, by all means and the third principle is containment. Despite aggressive operations we also have to undertake containment actions, understandably, intelligence and attack. The first two principles, are in the area of initiative and initiative in the field of anti-guerrilla operations is highly important.

We are operating with these methods in Southern Lebanon - fitting them to the situation in Lebanon, fitting to their deployment in Lebanon and fitting to the character of their operations there. Available to us are all the means that a modern army such as ours has, including units and commanders training for such needs.

Q: With respect to the aggressive actions by which we are disrupting terrorists actions in Southern Lebanon - are you prepared to detail these methods and what is their effectiveness?

A: The actualization of the aggressive principle is in that we are hitting bases, places of organization, areas of preparation, supply equipment depots according to the most effective means for that particular target.

Q: You made mention, from the past, of countries which employed regular forces against guerrilla and terror. In light of this, the question is raised as to what degree of success can be expected from operations of this type or how is it possible to measure success in these type of operations?

A: Here I took an example from the past, only in the military sphere. Success, in the final analysis, is also measured by the political elements. If England left Malaya and Kenya, it wasn't because it failed in its operations against terror, rather she succeeded in her anti-terror operations but from a political point she was forced to leave these two places just like she was compelled to leave other places after World War II. Our success is measured in the scale of the attacks or the damage of these organizations of terror and sabotage to the State of Israel.

Q: You mentioned the political problem - Israel is attacked in the media of the world, in light of our operations in Southern Lebanon. Does this put a brake on military operations?

A: I don't think that it inhibits. The problem of information is a very complicated problem for Israel. I don't think that in any period of our history, despite that we are sure we are right, have we succeeded in convincing the world that we are really justified. I remember that even in the murder of Maaleh Ha'akrabim, of the bus passengers there, we didn't succeed in convincing the world that it was a terror operation against the State of Israel. There are many similar examples.

Q: In connection to what is occurring today, what, in your opinion, could be the most effective information policy which can deal with such a situation?

A: We have to tell the truth and to say that the terror against us is part of a process whose aim is to replace us in Eretz-Israel.

Q: The terrorists take advantage of the fact, for propaganda purposes, that we attack terror concentrations in the midst of civilian population. It is possible to make use of different methods so that we can withstand the propaganda attacks of the terror organizations and to explain our position in a more visual manner in line with the media possibilities of our age?

A: The IDF concerns itself with information related to its area. We allow others involved in outside information full access to all the information we have. But the IDF does not conduct an information campaign towards outside elements like the U.N. and foreign countries.

Q: To what do you relate the fact that in the past few months the terrorists have not succeeded to infiltrate Israel?

A: To all the variety of our operations against the terrorists: by air, by land and sea, effective operations, aggressive -and defensive tactics along the borders. These are connected with each other - with good intelligence and even so I will not take it upon myself to guarantee that some band won't succeed in infiltrating at some place, for to hermetically seal all the borders is virtually impossible. But these variety of operations, in my opinion, is what enables us to prevent more groups from infiltrating.

Q: In what manner is there coordination between the military operations in Southern Lebanon and the government and in what degree is IDF free to make its own decisions on this issue?

A: The IDF is responsible to the state and carries out its operations only in accordance with government directives.

Q: How do you see the connection between the IDF and the Christian and Shiite soldiers in South Lebanon? To what degree are we responsible for their actions? To what degree do we control them and coordinate with them?

A: The IDF is not responsible for their actions, does not control them and does not dictate to them what to do or not do.

Q: Is it not a situation where they are dictating to us - that is to say that they pull us into all kinds of things or they do things that afterwards, the results are ascribed to IDF?

A: Negative. They didn't drag us in and they don't dictate anything to us.

Q: When American T.V. shows pictures of an area that was shelled by terrorists they often say: Here, these are the outcomes of the IDF operations and thus blur the difference.

A: This pertains to the overall relationship to Israel and her struggle with the Arabs. The general attitude towards the essential element that the Christians in Lebanon are fighting for their lives. This is so in the north and in the south and who in the world cares that they are killing thousands of Christians? Nobody cares. In no place did I hear one protest from any self-righteous country that there were terrible bombardments on Beirut, on Juniyeh and on all the Christians there. Who was aroused? Who turned to the Security Council, to the Red Cross or whoever? No one.

Q: To what degree do you see Israel as being obligated to the defence of the Christians in south Lebanon from the terrorists or the Syrians?

A: The obligation of the State of Israel to the citizens of Lebanon who are cut off from their land was determined by the government.

Q: How can you classify that obligation?

A: The State of Israel decided from a moral viewpoint that Israel will not allow the Christians or the population in south Lebanon to fall prey to the clutches of the terrorists.

Q: Let us move to a broader area. How do you appraise the military situation of the Syrian army today? Is the dispersion of its forces on the Israeli and the Lebanese borders still causing it some difficulty?

A: The Syrian army is in a process of re-equipping and improving its means and organization by organizing its elements. I don't know to what degree the deployment in Lebanon is causing difficulty. I only know that it is not affecting the unceasing delivery of modern equipment by land, air and sea, and organization: absorption, training, and organizing of military elements.

Q: When we analyze the State of the Syrian army, don't we see the fact that it is stationed in a part of Lebanon as a military advantage to the Syrian army?

A: This is a very difficult question, because we have to examine what would happen if the Syrian army were not there? What kind of riots would break out there, who will gain the upper hand, what would be the results. It is an issue on which today, it is difficult to give a clear-cut answer. The second issue is the deployment of the Syrian army in Lebanon in connection with the eastern border and the threat to our northern border. The third element is that the Syrian army is concentrated in Syria and that relates to the first question of what will happen in Lebanon.

There are many answers to all of these questions - the answers are complex and are such, that converse answers may also be the right ones. That is, it is impossible to declare emphatically, whether it is good that the Syrians are inside or not. If it poses difficulties for the Syrians or not, or what will happen in Lebanon if they leave or stay, very complicated, including the influence of all this on Syrian internal problems.

Q: To what degree do you see the Syrians as responsible for terrorist actions in Lebanon?

A: I don't know if they are responsible but I think that a sizable amount of weaponry of the terrorists reached them with Syrian help, through Syria, with Syrian knowledge. The Syrians, in certain sections of Lebanon allow the terrorists to live under their protection, so to speak, to organize, train and to establish bases.

Q: After the air battle with Syria, where Syrian Migs were shot down - is there a situation, like an unwritten agreement between us and the Syrians whereby we know what is allowed us in Lebanese skies and what is allowed to them in Lebanese air space-and everyone operates according to this arrangement?

A: I don't know what Syrian intentions are - what they want to do, what they don't want to do. We operate in that area according to our needs and according to what the State of Israel has decided are vital to her, and there is no agreement unwritten or otherwise with the Syrians. They attempted to disturb us and we do not tolerate that interference. We responded in the way that we did.

Q: Their attempts to interfere with our air actions have ceased?

A: As far as I know, they haven't once, since then, tried to interfere.

Q: What are the implications of the absorption of modern tanks by Syria? (referring to the T-72 they are receiving).

A: There were announcements of that. T-72 is a modern tank, perhaps the most modern in the world, at least in the eastern bloc. The meaning of this is, that they have new and good weapons that affords advantages to those having them at their disposal.

Q: How do you sum up, in a general way, the relations between the IDF and the Egyptian army?

A: The connection between the two armies is through the committee, there is no other relationship. I've met them -but that is not a connection between two armies.

Q: In your impression of your meeting with Egyptian military men - has anything changed in the perception that you had previously about the Egyptian army command?

A: I did not have particular stand on the Egyptian command previously and after the meeting I did not form any position. I did not meet with the, entire Egyptian high command, and we did not hold any discussions apart from my talks with the Egyptian C-O-S of a general nature. On this matter, I don't have enough data to express a clearcut opinion.

Q: Are the Egyptians keeping all the obligations that they took upon themselves?

A: As far as I know - yes.

Q : The IDF has been lately attacked for mixing into issues which are considered political. What is your position in this regard?

A: Which issues?

Q: There was a claim that the C-O-S opinion on the positioning of settlement..

A: That is not a political issue. That is a security issue.

Q: That is, according to your assessment there is no interference of the IDF in political issues?

A: In my opinion, no.

Q: Why was so much criticism directed, lately, on this subject?

A: For that, ask the critics. I am not responsible for the critics. This criticism stems, I think, from problems - from internal differences of opinion. The subject of Elon-Moreh is purely a security matter, from my viewpoint.

 
 
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