In the following statement, Mr. Vance said there has been no change in U.S. policy as Washington continued its efforts towards a comprehensive peace settlement. Secretary Vance also commented on the U.S. vote on I March at the Security Council on the situation in the territories, a vote that President Carter later called an "error". Mr. Vance said that it was he who misrepresented the President's instructions and has accepted full responsibility for his misunderstanding". Text:
There has been a great deal of discussion about the subject of today's hearings: The events surrounding the United States' votes in the United Nations Security Council on March 1. Mr. Chairman, I know that all of us here are aware of the importance of approaching our discussions today with a view to their possible impact on our efforts for a comprehensive peace. In this regard, Ambassador Linowitz is leaving tomorrow for a round of particularly sensitive negotiations with the Egyptians and Israelis.
Over the years the United States has been forthright in staging its position on these issues. We have made clear:
Our strong view that in the interim the parties should conduct themselves in accordance with international law and common-sense restraint so as to build trust that a sequence of successful negotiations can bring about a just, honorable and lasting peace for all.
After nearly 30 years of stalemate and strife, we finally have seen concrete progress toward peace through negotiations. President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and President Carter embarked on a process that has led to the Camp David framework, the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and the present negotiations to establish full autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza. At the request of the parties, the United States is a full partner in these negotiations.
It is important to stress that the objective of all three partners is a peaceful settlement compatible with the Camp David accords and achieved through negotiation. The approach which has begun to bear fruit in the last two years is to reach accommodation on those issues that can be tackled now and then to use the progress made in the present stage to facilitate resolution of the tougher issues in later phases of negotiations. It is critical to this process that each side gain trust that a negotiated settlement on fair terms is possible.
Let me turn now to several specific issues.
THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS
The current negotiations provide the context for concrete discussion of individual issues. It is important to define what the current negotiations are and what they are not.
They are not, for example, designed to define the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. All issues relating to permanent institutions in these areas are to be resolved in a later negotiation where the Palestinians can participate in the determination of their own future through the process set forth in the Camp David accords. Our concern is that unilateral acts tend to prejudice the outcome of those negotiations and therefore to undercut the avenue to a peaceful and honorable resolution of these complex issues.
The current negotiations are an effort to establish a self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza for a transitional period while fully protecting Israel's security. In order for that effort to succeed, some important issues will have to be resolved.
The current negotiations must also define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. These arrangements should assure full autonomy for the inhabitants of these territories while providing for the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.
There is, also, the question of how the elections will be conducted which will produce the freely-elected body called for by the Camp David framework. Those elections should assure that that body has the popular support necessary to carry out during the transitional period its responsibilities as agreed among the parties.
On the question of security, let me reaffirm the statement in the Camp David accords that "all necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond". That commitment is an integral part of the Camp David framework, and this administration intends to see that it is honored in full.
THE U.N. RESOLUTION
In February, we were faced with a draft resolution on the question of Israeli settlements which was circulated in the Security Council.
We disagreed with a reference in the resolution to dismantling existing settlements, and sought unsuccessfully to have it removed. As often happens in the U.N. Security Council, therefore, we stated our reservations without opposing the resolution as a whole. President Carter has stated clearly our view that this call for dismantling was neither proper nor practical.
As you know, we did succeed in removing paragraph seven of the draft, which called on Israel to assure the exercise of religious freedom in Jerusalem, thereby wrongly implying that it is not already doing so.
There was a misunderstanding, however, with regard to our position on other references to Jerusalem in the resolution. The president understood that all references to Jerusalem would be removed before we would vote for the resolutions, believing that in the present phase of the autonomy negotiations it would not be helpful to raise the issue of Jerusalem in a U.N. resolution concerning settlements. I believed, that what the president wished to have removed was the reference to Jerusalem and related material contained in paragraph seven. I was mistaken and have accepted full responsibility for this misunderstanding.
As Ambassador McHenry stated in the Security Council immediately following the vote, the U.S. considers Resolution 465 as recommendatory rather than binding. With regard to the reference in the resolution to "Palestinian and other Arab lands", it is our position that this phrase should not be construed as in any way prejudicing the outcome of the autonomy negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza.
As the president unequivocally stated on March 3, our policies with respect to settlements in occupied territory, and with respect to Jerusalem, have not changed. I think it is important that I take a moment to reiterate briefly our policies on these two issues.
SETTLEMENTS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY
U.S. policy toward the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories is unequivocal and has long been a matter of public record. We consider it to be contrary to international law and an impediment to the successful conclusion of the Middle East peace process. We have consistently urged Israel to halt actions to create new settlements or to seize land to expand existing ones. We regard such restraint as particularly important while the autonomy negotiations are underway.
The Camp David framework does not refer specifically to Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. Nevertheless, certain questions concerning the status of the settlements during the transitional period will obviously have to be resolved in the course of the autonomy negotiations.
The permanent resolution -of the settlements issue must then be decided in the subsequent negotiations on the final status of the occupied territories.
JERUSALEM
Our policy on Jerusalem has remained consistent under the past four presidents. As President Carter stated March 3, our position remains, on the status of Jerusalem, unchanged. That position remains as indicated by the president in his letter to President Sadat signed at the time of the Camp David accords.
With respect to the future of Jerusalem, it has been our consistent position that the final status of the city must be settled in the context of negotiations for a final peace. We believe that whatever solution is eventually agreed upon should preserve Jerusalem as an undivided city. It should provide for free access to the Jewish, Muslim and Christian holy sites without distinction or discrimination for the free exercise of worship. The solution should have taken no position on exactly how the final status of Jerusalem might be defined.
THE PEACE PROCESS
In sum, Mr. Chairman, there has been no change in U.S. policy as we continue our dedicated efforts toward a comprehensive settlement.
Before turning to your questions, I would like to say a few final words about the Middle East peace process as a whole. Over the past three years, there is no foreign policy goal on which the president and I have worked harder than a genuine peace in the Middle East. The achievement at Camp David, the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the launching of negotiations to establish full autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza are historic accomplishments, particularly when viewed against the past history of this tragic conflict.
It is certainly important that we concentrate our fun and undivided attention on the autonomy negotiations and do all we can to give these talks best possible prospect or success. The autonomy negotiations offer the first real opportunity for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza to achieve full autonomy within the context of assured Israel security, as the next step toward achieving a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement.
As reflected in the agreement reached at Camp David, such a peace is deeply in the interests of the United States, of Israel, of Israel's neighbors, and of the world. Every decision we have made - and will make - is designed to move us toward that goal.
With this in mind, the president has invited President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin each to come to Washington in early April to discuss with him how best we can accelerate the movement toward our mutual objective.