Mr. Sharon discussed the possibility of a war between Israel and the P. L. 0. and/ or Syria, saying that Israel was making every effort to avoid war. But he admitted the existence of an Israeli troop concentration along the Israel-Lebanon border. He also discussed the war between Iran and Iraq. Passages in brackets and explanatory material was written by Wall Street Journal Editors. Excerpts:
Q: Are we heading for war between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization and/or Syria in the coming months?
A: We are making every effort to avoid war. The purpose of Israel's concentrating troops along the northern border (with Lebanon) wasn't to go to war, but to try to deter war. We have concentrated troops there because we are facing a very complicated problem. Our intention wasn't to invade Lebanon. Our intention wasn't to invade Syria. Therefore we made it open: We announced what we are going to do if something should happen. We are facing a very complicated problem and that is the problem of the PLO, Palestinian terrorism.
(Mr. Sharon discoursed on the history of Palestinian terror attacks going back to the 1950s and then argued: Arab Palestinian terrorism is dangerous not only because of the number of casualties that we suffer. By itself every casualty is a tragedy. But you cannot measure Arab terrorism only by the number of casualties that we had or by damaged property and (harm to) our economy. Palestinian terrorism, PLO terrorism has been one of the main means by which the Soviets are preparing the ground for further extension into the Middle East and in other places. A third danger of Palestinian terrorism is that (it is) a real threat to the peace).
Closer to Peace in the Past
In 1949 and 1950 we were closer to peace with Arab countries than in 1977. We used to meet Arabs at the boundaries. We used to talk to them. We used to have mixed garrisons, mixed platoons. I remember - I was a young officer then - I said then that the peace was knocking at our doors. Then (came the) wave of Palestinian terrorism (in the 1950s). We tried defensive means, but they failed. Because there were hundreds of kilometers of borders - mountain, hilly terrain, bushy terrain, and a very small standing army - we couldn't contain these raids.
We then started with our retaliation operations. We started to attack the terrorists, but they were all living, like at present, among the civilian population, as in Lebanon, and heavy casualties were inflicted on them. So we had to stop it.
In 1955 we changed our strategy. We started to attack military installations of the neighboring countries to force them to take steps against the Palestinian terrorists. And both sides came to a situation where they couldn't proceed. We couldn't live with the casualties. They couldn't contain our raids. I know this period thoroughly. I commanded most, if not all, of those raids between the years 1953 and 1957.
The Soviets moved into the Middle East. The dream of controlling these areas is an old one, back to the beginning of the 19th century, but the implementation started in 1955. (Here Mr. Sharon used color-coded maps to illustrate his argument, a lengthy explication of expanding Soviet influence in the Middle East. From there he moved to an explanation of how Syrian forces and PLO forces occupy much of Lebanon, often overlapping one another, and argued that the PLO mounts extensive terrorist training and terrorist operation's from Lebanon, which strike in Europe as well as in the Middle East).
Right to Defend Ourselves
The main danger is that we don't know when something may happen. Two weeks ago explosives were found in a school in Ashkelon. A month ago we had an explosion at a kindergarten near Tel Aviv. The children were inside, so nobody was hurt. But assume that explosion had happened minutes earlier, when the children were out, if that had happened, then we would have been in Lebanon. Not because we want it, but because we wouldn't have had any other choice, We have our natural right to defend ourselves.
Q: You say that if this bomb had gone off in the school, you would have gone into Lebanon?
A: I said that if that had happened and we had suffered casualties, I don't believe we could have continued to restrain ourselves all the time. Since the cessation of hostilities agreement (arranged by the Reagan Administration's envoy, Philip Habib) was signed July 24, 1981, we suffered the following number of casualties: 25 killed, more than 250 wounded in 127 actions in violation of the cessation of hostilities agreement. We restrained ourselves, but you come to a point that you cannot do it any more.
Q: You've done some retaliating...
A: Yes we did. Very little. Believe me. If the problem were simple, we would have solved it. But the question of Lebanon is complicated. If we could really act only against terrorists (in Lebanon) it would have been much simpler. The problem is that (the PLO) employed quite a part of their artillery and rocket launchers within the Syrian defensive positions.
Q: We referred in the beginning of our interview to the possibility of war with Syria.
A: We have a dilemma here. We have a problem. If we (could have) we would have solved it a long time ago. It's not a military problem, because militarily Israel can solve it. It's a very sensitive one because you have here the terrorists, the PLO and you've got the Syrians...
Q: Are you considering the possibility, now that you have the troop concentration, of doing something preemptive to eliminate this kind of buildup?
A: No, we're not going to take any preemptive action here, though I would say from the purely military point of view maybe that should have been the act. But the answer is, no: We are making every effort to deter.
Q: If circumstances lead you, or force you, to go into Lebanon in force, what would you minimally seek to accomplish? Would it be to punish the PLO? Would it be to buy some long period of respite from terrorism or would it be to fundamentally change the geographic and political situation in Lebanon?
A: First of all, we'd like to avoid it. If we have to act there the purpose will be the destruction of the terrorist organization and their infrastructure - the military, the artillery, the tanks and the positions that they've been building there, the tremendous big arms and ammunition stores they have been digging into the mountains and so on.
Q: Can you do it without engaging the Syrians?
A: We will try. We will try.
Q: What about news reports that suggest basically that (PLO Chairman Yasser) Arafat is trying to tilt toward the Americans and appear as a reasonable potential partner?
A: The last written material by the PLO I saw was the material issued last May in Malta. When you read that you aren't going to have, believe me, any further questions about this subject.
Q: Let me ask you, if we could switch focus to another dangerous military situation in the Middle East - the Persian Gulf area. Can you tell us what you expect to happen in the Iranian-Iraqi situation and what you consider most dangerous about it?
A: The most dangerous situation is the attempt to build and support a new coalition headed by Iraq, which is the most radical country in the region, with the participation of Jordan and Saudi Arabia and the backing of Egypt ... It's a silent understanding, or maybe something more than that. I don't know what word to use in order not to hurt anybody - the American belief. That would not be a secret, getting the the blessing of the American administration. (But) that would give the Soviets an excuse for further involvement in Iran. We may face what I would regard as the most dangerous situation, and that is the Soviets on the shores of the Persian Gulf.
Naive Approach
Q: Are you convinced Khomeini won't go into Iraq?
A: Not convinced, but I believe that. What is it that Jordan talked to the administration about the danger of the Iranians? It's 1,300 kilometers from Teheran (Iran) to Amman (Jordan).
And you look at this naive approach that these people with such deep understanding and experience in Washington take seriously. I mean, 1,300 kilometers. And all these Mongols coming riding horses. Thirteen hundred kilometers. The Iranians lost tens of thousands of dead. It's one of the most terrible wars. (But) people say, look, they're going to overrun all of us.
Q: Maybe people have had. a bad experience underestimating Khomeini in the last few years in Washington?
A: I believe one should look a little bit into the future.
Q: You think it can all end at the border?
A: More or less, more or less.
Q: Is that why Israel helps Iran in this war?
A: Israel helps Iran very little.
Q: Why at all?
A: III tell you why. Of course, I could have denied. What I'm telling you now I also told the American Administration many times. Two reasons.
One is a short-term. Iran is maybe the most hostile country to Israel in the last 34 years. Then there is another. We must look ahead. We try to compare what is more important to the Free World from the strategic point of view, having Iraq or Iran. The answer is Iran. Iran never joined the Soviets against the West until Khomeini came there. They were maybe one of the most loyal allies of the U.S. in the Near East.
The Iraqis, they turned to the Soviets. Iran never did it. Iran, even in their hardest days never applied to the Soviets. Iraq, without any pressure whatsoever, did. In the future, what's more important? Iran is more important.
People are Suffering
Talking in Washington, I tried to convince and explain who will be in power (in Iran). People are fighting in the battlefields, suffering tens of thousands of casualties. These officers, these commanders in the battlefield that fight -they will one day have a say in Teheran. So if one wants to see the short-term advantage - and the Saudis are shouting and the others are crying and the Jordanians are weeping - so help Iraq. But we are not influenced by the crying, shouting or weeping of any Arab leaders. We try to analyze the situation.
Q: You backed the winner.
A: We supported them when they were fighting for their life. Our support, if you ask me, is symbolic.
Q: Thirteen hundred kilometers from Teheran to Amman doesn't strike me as a large distance, given some of what we're learning about capabilities of modern weapons systems in the Falklands.
A: You know, we have been trying to convince (people) for years that a nation, Israel, cannot live where 66 percent of the population is on a strip of land which is between six and 17 miles wide and about 60 miles long. From the Jordan River in the east to the Mediterranean, it's less than 70 kilometers. Not 1,300 kilometers, like from Teheran to Amman. Less than 70. Suddenly, when it comes to others 1,300 kilometers disappear. Just like that. They just disappear.
(Next Mr. Sharon argued that the way to handle the dangers of the Iraq-Iran confrontation was for the U.S. to develop a highly mobile force for use in the Middle East. Then the focus of the discussion shifted to the portions of the West Bank of the river Jordan occupied by Israel).
Q: How will you deal in the next year or six months with riots or uprisings on the West Bank?
A: No riots. I don't know why you don't write there are no riots. Every day, I open the newspaper and I want to see an announcement that there are no riots. And I don't see anything. There are no riots.
Q: Maybe there is no problem for now, no riots...
A: There are no riots.
They are Not Zionists
Q: How can you expect to have peace in Judea-Samaria, as you call it, or the West Bank and in the Gaza Area as long as you're occupying it and it's populated by three quarters of a million Arabs who don't want to be under Israeli rule, rightly or wrongly?
A: I want to tell you that we have within the boundaries of Israel 600,000 Arab-Israeli citizens of Israel - within the pre-1967 boundaries. If you ask if they don't want us, they don't want us. But they live peacefully.
Q: Maybe they do want to have Israel...
A: Let's have it - they are not Zionists. They are not Zionists. I am sure they would like to have a state of their own. I'm sure. Come and see: They live peacefully, a normal life.
Q: It isn't different in Hebron, where there's a military government today.?
A: Look, things will take time. We don't offer them Israeli citizenship. We offered a plan, an autonomy plan, a plan that wasn't offered during 400 years of Turkish occupation, not during 30 years of British occupation, not during 19 years of Egyptian and Jordanian occupation. We offered them autonomy. Nobody pressured us to offer them autonomy. We decided to offer inhabitants of Samaria-Judea and Gaza District an autonomy. We were very specific about it. We didn't hide anything. We said from the beginning - autonomy isn't a state. It's not a Palestinian state. It's not a corridor. It's not even a corridor to a Palestinian state. Autonomy is how the inhabitants of Samaria-Judea and Gaza District will be able to run their lives almost without interference.