The foreign minister answered questions concerning the world reaction to the Israeli air strike in Iraq. He dealt specifically with the Egyptian reaction as well as the American public condemnation of Israel. Excerpts:
Q: In the last few months, since President Reagan entered the White House, the Prime Minister has tried to represent Israeli-U.S. relations as a far-reaching idyll of understanding, friendship and American support of its loyal ally, Israel. In this connection, what does the sharp reaction of the U.S. against Israel after the destruction of the Iraqi reactor mean?
A: Neither the Prime Minister nor anyone else in the government ever tried to present relations with the U.S. as an idyll. We always stressed that even between friends, and even between the friendliest and closest countries, there exist and can develop, differences of opinion. There is never total identity of view. Before the destruction of the Iraqi reactor, sharp differences of opinion broke out over the supply of sophisticated arms to Saudi Arabia and then too we said that differences of opinion do not, and will not, cast a cloud over the relations of closeness and understanding between the two countries, nor will they obscure the identity of view in many important areas. Differences of opinion are normal and understandable.
But as for recent events, it is too early to judge the U.S. position. We must wait a number of days to see how things develop. I would not now be too hasty in determining what the U.S. position is. It has not yet crystallized.
Q: Do you hope that the crystallization of the American position will moderate the severity of the first statements?
A: That's what I hope. There is still wide scope for Israeli information activity which could have a positive affect on the crystallization of the American position.
Q: Before the reactor affair began, there was another crisis - if a good deal smaller - in relations with the U.S. The Americans maintained that you did not at the start oppose the supply of AWACS to Saudi Arabia. Is that true?
A: There is not a grain of truth in that. During my visit to the U.S., the supply of arms to Saudi Arabia was discussed in general terms and I expressed firm opposition to this plan before, during and after the visit. My opposition was unmistakable, and I voiced it before President Reagan too, during our meeting at the White House.
Q: How will the military action in Iraq affect the chances of preventing the sale of the "AWACS" to Saudi Arabia?
A: I see no connection between the two subjects.
Q: Even among the supporters of the I.D.F. action in Iraq, you will find quite a few people who say that there is a connection between the timing and the elections. Can you refute this charge?
A: Without a doubt. There is no connection whatsoever. The Prime Minister explained the timing in the most convincing manner: it was clear to us that the reactor would be put into operation in the very near future, at the beginning of July or at the latest at the start of September, and would be a "hot" reactor. In such a case any attack would have been liable to send waves of radioactive pollution over the population of Baghdad and its environs. This would have severely endangered the people. We could not have allowed ourselves to do such a thing, and thus the date we chose was just about the last possible time.
Q: Why did the government not instruct the Air Force to act a few months ago?
A: And had we acted a month or two ago, would there not have been critics? Who would have maintained that the timing was linked to the elections? There were various reasons against acting before we did. Not one of them was connected with the elections. On the contrary, the closeness of the elections made the selection of a date more difficult. Such an action involves many dangers and it could have ended very differently than it did. In such a case, it would have had a different impact on the outcome of the elections.
But I repeat, there was no connection between the timing and the date of the elections. The authoritative information that they would soon be putting the reactor into operation was received only lately, and it determined the date for carrying out the military action.
Q: Did Egypt's reaction, calling Israel's action a "serious crime", surprise you? What reaction did you expect?
A: First of all, I must make a correction. The Egyptians did not say "serious crime". Someone erred in the translation.
Q: Was it an innocent mistake?
A: It was a mistake. The correct wording was "a serious step", and there is a difference between the two. But I want to tell you, that in this case, too, I would not rush out with the statement, that Egypt's announcement is the one which accurately expresses and reflects that country's stand. We must wait and follow all developments.
Q: The Egyptians say that Israel violated the Camp David Accords. Is there, in your estimation, imminent danger to the peace with Egypt?
A: No, I do not believe that such a danger is imminent. Egypt chose the path of peace because it decided to give priority to its national interests over its attachment to the Arab world. Egypt achieved many advantages as a result of the peace with Israel and I don't believe that it would risk those achievements because of what happened in Iraq, of whose leadership and president it is no great fan.
Furthermore: the two central pillars of Israeli policy in the region are peace and security. Israel is actively operating to achieve peace. The actual expression of this was the meeting in Ophira. And it (Israel) is establishing facts for the basis of security as is reflected in its manner of waging battle against the terrorists in Lebanon, and in its eradicating the danger of nuclear arms production in Iraq. There is no contradiction between the two paths: peace with whomever desires to live with us in peace, and mortal harm to whomever seeks to destroy us.
Q: And is that the lesson that Syria should learn from the operation in Iraq?
A: The lesson that Syria should learn is simple: Israel is not a paper tiger and Syria should prefer peaceful solutions over provocation and war mongering.
Q: What were the political efforts which Israel made before deciding to destroy the reactor in Iraq, and were these efforts exhausted, before Israel had to resort to military action?
A: Since Iraq decided to erect that reactor, with France's help, in 1975 Israel has not been still and it has not ceased in its in its political efforts to prevent this danger. The agreement between Iraq and France was signed back when the Prime Minister was Chirac, and Saddarn Hussein, Iraqs present ruler was vice president. Since Israel realized what the aim of the reactor was, it made great efforts to influence France to avoid this act. The Foreign Minister at that time, the late Yigal Allon, invested great efforts in this. Foreign Minister Dayan continued with this during his visit to France. In his meeting with President Giscard Dstaign, and with the Foreign Minister at the time, Francois-Poncet. At the same time, during all those years, there were talks with members of the Italian governments, to whom the Israeli delegates also pointed out the gravity of granting a country like Iraq and a ruler like Saddam Hussein the possibility of producing nuclear arms.
Many talks were held with representatives of the American administration, beginning during Carter's term, with Secretaries of State Vance and Muskie, and currently with President Reagan's administration.
Q: How did the Americans react?
A: They promised us several times, that they would intervene with the French and the Italians and would try to influence them not to supply the Iraqis with enriched uranium and the equipment necessary for nuclear arms production. The Americans kept their promises and tried to use their influence on the French and also the Italians, but they did not succeed.
The French and the Italians responded to our representatives that the danger was not imminent that the Iraqis would produce nuclear arms, and the Americans reported to us that this was the response that they received from the French and the Italians. All the information in our hands refuted the claim that the aim of the Iraqi reactor was solely for the purposes of research and peace. We had no doubt that the Iraqis intended to produce atomic bombs. Saddam Hussein himself and his people never denied that this was their intent, and that these bombs would be aimed against Israel. The Prime Minister recently discussed the matter again with U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig, during his visit to Israel.
Q: Did Israel send the information at its disposal about the Iraqis' intention to produce bombs to the U.S.?
A: We brought everything to the attention of the Americans. We placed before them the facts which verified our claims about the real aim of the Iraqis.
Q: What did the Americans Say? Did they receive the facts, and were they convinced?
A: They never questioned them, or tried to convince us that there was no basis for our concern.
Q: But now American sources, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency are claiming that the Iraqis did not violate the conditions of the purchase of the reactor, that they did not intend to produce nuclear bombs, nor would they have been capable of doing so within the next ten years, without outside help...
A: What does it mean that they would not have been able to do this on their own? What is on their own? The reactor which they built, all of its parts and pieces, the Iraqis built on their own? Everything that they have, they bought with money from outsiders, and they have plenty of money. With the help of this money, the Iraqis would have also gotten what is necessary for assembling atom bombs, and Israel would have been exposed to danger, the likes of which it has not yet known.
Q: With the help of this money, the Iraqis can purchase ready-made atomic bombs...
A: Until this day, ready-made nuclear weapons are not being sold. We have not heard of such a thing to date.
Q: So what is the solution? Each time Iraq purchases an atomic reactor from foreigners and builds installations we will blow them up?
A: There is no absolute solution, but we must delay this process as best we can and by the means at our disposal. At the U.N. we suggested demilitarization of nuclear arms in the area, and the signing of an agreement between all countries in the region to demilitarize the Middle East of nuclear arms. In my speech at the last U.N. Assembly, in September 1980, 1 reiterated this suggestion. The Arab states rejected it. I suggested convening a committee of the nations of the region to discuss nuclear arms demilitarization. We were not answered.
As regards the claims of various elements concerning the Iraqi intentions - I repeat: the evidence that accumulated on the government's desk left no room for doubts. We received information from sources and elements, whose credibility cannot be doubted (indicating) that the Iraqis' intention was to produce atom bombs and to threaten Israel with them. The evidence given by the owner himself must also be recalled. In Radio Iraq commentaries (and there, as it is known, commentators do not take personal initiative) made after the destruction of the reactor this week, the commentator establishes that Iraq would not agree to allow Israel to hinder its developing of its military potential by modern technology. So can anyone seriously doubt Iraqs intentions to build nuclear arms?