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55 Interview with Prime Minister Begin on Israel Radio- 11 September 1981

11 Sep 1981
 VOLUME 7: 1981-1982
 
 

55. Interview with Prime Minister Begin on Israel Radio, 11 September 1981.

In this interview,' Mr. Begin went into greater detail when he described his talks with the President, and explained the nature of the threat to Israel's security from the planned sale to Saudi Arabia of American made air-to-air missiles, six aerial refuelling tanker aircraft and other items. Excerpts:

Q: What makes, or will make, this visit, with Ronald Reagan a successful one, as you have described it?

A: Time will tell. I can say that I heard this morning my friend and colleague Moshe Dayan claim that actually the whole strategic security cooperation between Israel and the United States boils down to the building of a few hospitals. He said this because he simply doesn't know the facts. We are talking about real cooperation. We haven't signed an agreement yet, but we have come to an agreement in principle on the matter. The preparations for implementation are already beginning. It is obvious that nothing happens overnight, certainly some things will take several months. There will be need for more time ... the details are many, and very serious. We are -not talking only about a few hospitals, but about real cooperation, on land, on the sea, and in the air.

Q: Still, Mr. Haig said that there were limitations acting against the U.S. on the matter of such cooperation.

A: I didn't hear this from him, but this morning I read the "New York Times", a serious newspaper, and he talks about joint maneuvers, and what the Americans call trade positioning...We have distinguished and differentiated between defending Israel and the common interests of the two nations in standing up to Soviet expansionism ... And I think this idea was well-received. Now they understand that we have nothing to fear from the reaction of Arab states. This does not apply to Israel's defense against an Arab attack. This is a world concern for freedom of men and independence of nations. I think that now that we've made this distinction, the Americans will take this track of explanation, if their Arab friends complain that they are cooperating with the Israelis. This could happen. So they will have a logical answer - assuming that the Arabs will accept a logical answer.

Q: And the AWACS?

A: I think we spoke persuasively to the President and his advisors. The Def6nse Minister and Major-General Saguy presented details, I opened this discussion and brought basic facts. The Foreign Minister and the Interior Minister spoke on this matter ... it was not a five- or ten-minute conversation, as they thought here at first. The talks on this took one and 1/2 hours - most of the time was devoted to this problem. The first part of the conversation was dedicated to strategic cooperation ... but the President's answer was very short: I agree. It's O.K. with us. We immediately went to the matter of the double deal: Not just the AWACS, but also the auxiliary equipment for the F-15's. They are very dangerous: They give the Saudi F-15s the capability - not immediately but in a few years - of reaching Tel Aviv and returning to Saudi Arabia. And they have missiles, most modern air-to-air missiles ... then we went on to the AWACS, which as I said, makes us transparent. I think we proved our thesis.

Then we were in Congress, and of course, the AWACS problem came up right away, in the committees both of the Senate and of the House of Representatives. And we said to the two Congressional committees exactly the same things we said in the administration's meeting room just as I advised the President that we would do. He was not surprised at all...

The Executive Branch want to go through with the sale, there is no doubt about that. In the Legislature there are very fundamental differences of opinion ... we do not intervene in this debate between the two branches of the American government. We only state what we see as the most important thing: This is a danger to Israel's security - we reiterate this definition. We are adamant on this definition: We were asked if we could change our position, and we said no. When we're talking about Israel's security, there are no compensations and no middle roads - we tell the truth. Since it's a danger to our security, obviously we oppose it. The decision is in the hands of Congress, in accordance with U.S. law.

Q: Even before this visit, Reagan spoke of Israel as a strategic asset, and this didn't prevent him from suspending the planes ... why are you so optimistic now?

A: Where did you see optimism in my face?

Q: You express satisfaction with this visit.

A: Ask others, they may tell you similar things. About the past - when I arrived at Andrews (Air Force) Base from New York, and got on the helicopter with the Secretary of State, his first words were: "Everything that's happened until now, we must put behind us, and not talk about them." I agreed with this. Then I would have had to talk about the planes whose delivery was delayed, and are now sitting pretty on Israel's airfields. All of them, all seventeen, 14 F-16s and 3 F-15s. A serious addition to Israel's strength. They're ours and we deserved them, of course. In my opinion a great wrong was done Israel when they were held up here. Should I have brought the problem up when the Secretary of State said let's put all this behind us, and talk about the future?

So that's how we played it. We didn't mention this, or the atomic reactor near Baghdad, or the attack - justified, as we see it - on the terrorist and murderers' headquarters in Beirut. None of these things came up. We talked about the future, and I think that's very healthy.

 
 
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