Foreign Minister Shamir visited Washington in late February and early March 1981 and was the first senior Israeli cabinet member to meet the newly inaugurated President Reagan and his top foreign and defense policy advisers, including Secretary of State Haig and Secretary of Defense Weinberger. In the following interview Mr. Shamir related his impressions of the new American administration and its intentions regarding the Middle East. Excerpts:
Q: Did you receive specific commitments from President Reagan or Secretary of State Haig that Israel would get proper compensation for the upset of the balance of power in the Middle East?
A: Compensation is not what is being spoken of. What was specifically spoken of at a number of opportunities, were clear expressions of the United States' obligation to protect the security interests of Israel - and even more specifically, to protect the existence of Israel's qualitative advantage in the military balance in the Middle East. Physically we cannot achieve a quantitative advantage in the arms balance, in view of the enormous quantity of arms flowing into the Middle East, but it is possible to maintain our qualitative advantage. We received specific promises on this score. The value of promises is always in their fulfillment. We will have to test this in the future...
Q: Are the heads of the American Administration aware of the danger of the Arab leaders' efforts to attain nuclear weapons?
A: The Americans know everything it is possible to know about this. I do not know whether they relate seriously to this possibility, but they well know our concern about this subject. Still in all, the main problem as far as we're concerned is the quantity of conventional weapons. We had many discussions about this.
Q: Did you bring up Israel's request to write off debts? Is this a possibility?
A: I did not go into details. I spoke about policy. We must exercise caution in this matter. The time is not right, because of President Reagan's policy of cutbacks. In our talks, the President emphasized that despite the cuts, it was decided not to reduce aid to Israel. The Americans I talked to reiterated to me, on various occasions, that American policy will be the economic strengthening of Israel, and the United States' obligation to discuss, in the very near future, practical ways of implementing this American policy.
Q: Did you ask for an increase in grant allocations this year, instead of loans?
A: In the framework of discussions on the economic strengthening of Israel we will soon discuss how to ease Israel's economic distress, and how to ease Israel's heavy economic debt.
Q: What is the practical significance of America's permitting Israel to market weapons on the world market? Are clients waiting in line, and only America's refusal has so far frustrated the big business deals?
A: The situation, of course, is not so simple. Compared to other manufacturers, Israel is not a large factor in the field of weapon manufacture. But our security exports could carry serious weight as part of general exports, and could contribute to improving our economic situation. The attitudes of previous American administrations to Israel's security exports have been reserved, if not negative. A change for the better will now begin - this was specifically promised me by the most authoritative and eminent sources in the Administration.
In the past, the Administration's attitude disturbed Israel's amplitude in security manufacture and export. According to the Reagan Administration's new policy, we will be more successful. It is an encouraging policy, which open good possibilities.
Q: Logic dictates that Israel should have congratulated the new U.S. Administration, which relegated the Israeli-Arab dispute to a lower category of importance - since the previous administration, in maintaining that "the Middle East is a powder keg from which one must remove the wick before it causes a world conflagration," created an atmosphere of panic, and used it to extort concessions from Israel for its own sake. Do you agree with this assumption?
A: One must distinguish between two things. First: the exaggerated degree of importance that is attributed to the Israel-Arab dispute among all the disputes in the Middle East. Here, of course, I welcome the view that our dispute is one of many disputes in the Middle East and not even the most pressing or important one among them. Secondly: the active American participation in the peace process that began at Camp David and in which the U.S. took a very important role. Israel is concerned that this participation continue. Because if it does not, a vacuum is liable to be created, which invites all kinds of evil winds and negative initiatives, that will not contribute to the advancement of the peace process. Rather they are liable to cause a retreat from this process.
Q: Did you find understanding for this argument?
A: Yes. I found a certain understanding. But the truth is that the Reagan Administration is new. At the time of my visit, it had completed only its first month. The Americans explained to me that there are many priorities, in particular the President's new economic policy: They say that without serious economic achievements there will be no American foreign policy accomplishments either. At the same time, my interlocutors emphasized that they will not neglect the Middle East. They are busy learning the problems. They want to understand the factors impeding the autonomy negotiations, and they will formulate their policy at the end of the learning stage and will decide on the steps to take. The visit of Secretary of State Haig is also a step in this direction.
Q: Is it true that the decision on this trip of Mr. Haig's came as a response from the American side to your entreaties?
A: It came at the time of my visit, and it is possible that the arguments I raised had an influence. Before that time, there was no talk of such a visit. One must understand one other matter that is important in understanding the new administration: this administration avoids walking precisely in the footsteps of the previous administration. Even when there is basic agreement with the measures taken by the previous administration, an effort can be seen to seek out different paths and other forms for American policy. Both the President and the Secretary of State told me clearly that they recognize American obligations to continue the Camp David process, but they must still decide how.
Q: In other words, this obligation to the Camp David process can be expressed in different, new ways?
A: Yes. This is what was understood...
Q: Is it now completely clear that the autonomy negotiations will not be renewed until after the Israeli elections?
A: There is no connection whatsoever between these negotiations and the Israeli elections. We have no chance of forcing any negotiating partner to continue with the negotiations. Egypt slowed down the talks when it decided to wait for the results of the U.S. elections. Perhaps it is not surprising that now the Egyptians are waiting for the Israeli elections, and it may be that after the Israeli elections they will have another reason. We are against any postponements. The negotiations must be conducted without disruptions and without interruptions and without considerations of the Israeli elections.
Q: When the United States repeatedly emphasized that it had moral obligations toward Israel, we wanted to hear that it has a strategic interest in us. Now that the administration sees us as a strategic asset, is there no danger here that its moral obligations will diminish? Strategic interests by nature change, while a moral obligation has more of a dimension of permanence.
A: There is no contradiction. The President of the U.S. and the heads of his Administration emphasized to me that the friendship between the U.S. and Israel is based on the two factors together: the moral obligation of the U.S. toward the existence and the invulnerability of democratic Israel, and the identity of strategic interests between the two countries. These words were spoken in a very explicit manner, more than once. The moral obligation and the identity of strategic interests complement one another. If there is only a moral obligation - it is sometimes ignored when strategic interests dictate another path. If there is only an identity of strategic interests - interests can change. A moral obligation and common strategic interests - this is a system of relations that is based on the firmest foundation, that can be relied upon. This administration places the firmest emphasis on the strategic aspect without harming the stability of the moral factor: commitment to friends is a most important principal for President Reagan.
Q: And all these good things were said to you by President Reagan in your meeting?
A. Yes. This was a very warm, very cordial conversation. The President endorsed in principle all that was agreed upon before in talks with Secretary of State Haig and with Defence Secretary Weinberger. The things the President told me in our conversations were really gratifying.
Q: What did the President say?
A: He said that we are an inseparable part of the Free World. He said, "As such we will continue to strengthen you. You can be sure, that your qualitative advantage will be preserved. We will help you export arms. We will concern ourselves with arranging comfortable terms for your arms purchases." The Reagan Administration thinks that world peace can be assured only if the U.S. will be strong. I told the President that only a strong Israel can achieve peace. Only if it is strong will its neighbors maintain the peace. The President said: "That is exactly our approach."
Q: Have ways already been indicated for the establishment of the multinational force to supervise the peace and security arrangements in Sinai after the Israeli withdrawal in April 1982?
A: Preliminary deliberations have already been held, and various things have been indicated, but we cannot yet talk about agreements.
Q: Do you assign as much importance as does Moshe Dayan to the setting up of the multinational force?
A: It is of primary importance for the situation in Sinai after the Israeli withdrawal.
Q: Is the setting up of the force an Israeli condition for withdrawal?
A: Of course. Israel has announced that if this section of the peace treaty is not observed, we will not retreat from that part of Sinai that we now hold.
Q: Did you say that now to the heads of the administration?
A: Of course. The matter is completely clear to them.
Q: Did you raise before your American interlocutors Israel's arguments on the slow pace of normalization and on the obstacles Egypt is piling up in its way?
A: I did not go into details. I told them about the progress of normalization despite the many difficulties. I pointed out that there are obstacles. I did not criticize the slowness of the pace of normalization.
Q: As foreign minister, were you consulted on what to leave in and what to delete from Moshe Dayan's disclosures on his meeting with Hussein and Tohamy?
A: No. There is a Ministerial Committee whose function is to review this type of book. I am not a member of the committee and no one consulted me.
Q: Did the Committee act correctly when it approved the public disclosure of secret meetings?
A: You know I never publicly criticize the actions, deliberations and decisions of other ministers.
Q: The Pope...
A: Ah - I was wondering why you did not ask me.
Q: Well, now I'm asking: were you sorry about cancelling the meeting?
A: All right. I was sorry. We arranged the conversation and I thought that we have important things to tell the Pope. But I am sure that the meeting will take place.
Q: Did the Vatican express some kind of annoyance at the cancellation of the meeting? Only the Pope himself has the right to cancel meetings with him.
A: Annoyance? The Vatican received the notice with complete understanding, although there is no precedent for anyone cancelling a meeting with the Pope on his own initiative. The Israeli Ambassador in Rome is now working on setting a new date for my meeting with the Pope. We came to Rome at two in the afternoon, on Friday. Even before then the Ambassador clarified with the Papal Office when it was possible to hold the meeting, since I had arrived late in Rome. They answered that the meeting could be held only at 6:30 in the evening. I immediately informed them that the meeting could not take place at this hour. I did not hesitate. I did not ask for instructions from Israel. It was absolutely clear to me that the Foreign Minister of Israel should not meet with the Pope after the start of the Sabbath.
In general, we sometimes forget, to my sorrow, that adherence to basic principles still evokes respect and esteem. When I was with the President of Mexico a few days ago, he expressed admiration for Israel, for its adherence to its principles. Mexico behaves in the same way, the President said, and added: "At one time you refused to fight against the Romans because of the sanctity of the Sabbath and for this reason Jerusalem fell. But look what were the results... Israel today holds all of Jerusalem ... and where are the Romans?"