In this wide ranging interview, Mr. Begin divulged much of what had transpired in his talks with President Reagan and discussed at great length the proposed strategic cooperation agreement, seeing in it an effective means to halt Soviet expansion. He also made comparison between Presidents Carter and Reagan and again expressed his full confidence in President Sadat's determination to carry out the peace treaty with Israel. Excerpts:
Q: Israel spokesmen continually issue soothing statements that the failure of the "AWACS" deal will not affect strategic cooperation with the United States, while a senior official in the Pentagon issued a precisely opposite statement. Did you win such a promise in your talks with President Reagan in Washington?
A: I received no promise from President Reagan. I can only say that in all my talks with the President and even in those between our Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense, not once was a link between the two mentioned. Not once was a word said about strategic-defense cooperation being dependent upon approval of the deal with Saudi Arabia. But after I left the United States, unofficial statements were issued by anonymous figures saying that approval of the deal by the Senate will have an effect on strategic cooperation. Since I don't know who said these things, we can't respond. We don't argue with "anonymous spokesmen".
Q: M.K. Shimon Peres claims that even before you went off to Washington you knew about the clear link between strategic cooperation with the United States and the "AWACS" deal and the sophisticated accessories for the F-15s. Under such circumstances he claims you ought not to have gone to the United States, or if so, you should have gone to struggle vigorously against the "AWACS" deal. What is your response to this?
A: It's an interesting argument, but it doesn't have a grain of truth to it. Before our departure for the United States, we boned upon on the "two-sided deal". One shouldn't say the "AWACS" deal because in the first place, we are talking about assault equipment for the F-15s - and this equipment will threaten us no less than the "AWACS". Therefore we must talk about the two-sided deal, as I called it in the United States. We brought maps, numbers, measurements, etc. We gathered, at the President's invitation, in the Oval Office. The Americans were represented by the President, the Vice-President, the Secretary of State, and the U.S. Ambassador to Israel. Our group included the Minister for Foreign Affairs, our Ambassador in Washington, and me. We sat around the round table. The President, as is his custom, presided over the meeting with a great deal of warmth, good humor, and pleasantness. We spoke about various subjects - "small talk" as they say in English. "Mr. Prime Minister", says the President, turning to me, "I would like to talk to you for a few moments about the Saudi "AWACS", I listened respectfully as the President spoke for three or four minutes on this matter. The essence of his words were: "I understand that you oppose this deal. I understand it but I want to promise you that Israel will not be swallowed up when it comes to security. Israel's security cannot be harmed. We will see to that. But we must have the deal." "I hope", the President said, "that it will bring Saudi Arabia closer to the peace process." This is the gist of what the President said and I have reports - more than I have indications that our American friends thought this would solve the problem of the "AWACS" talks. This, in fact, was the plan if not the intention. Before the two delegations enter the Administration's meeting room, let's solve the problem by some pleasant words from the President.
But it didn't happen that way. After the President concluded his remarks, I turned to him with something like these words: "Mr. President, the problem you raised is very serious for us from the point of view of our national security. I do not believe that it can be solved in such a short talk. I suggest that we go into the meeting room, where my colleagues and I can explain the problem to you in all its seriousness and magnitude. What I ask of you is very simple: we want to present our position, and, please, listen to us." The President said, "Fine. I accept your suggestion." Then I added: "But this problem has stirred up differences of opinion between us. Why begin with this problem? I suggest that we begin with another subject on which, I believe, we can agree: What to do from the standpoint of possible cooperation in the face of the danger of Soviet expansion in our region and our immediate neighborhood, a danger the likes of which has not existed since the end of the Second World War. We live in the region and we do not want the totalitarians to spread there. This is a common interest. I suggest that we discuss what to do on this matter. "
President Reagan replied "I accept this suggestion concerning the agenda." A few moments later, we all went into the meeting hall. The President opened with one sentence: "The Prime Minister has an announcement to make. Please, Mr. Prime Minister." After he gave me the floor, I said that I thought that there lay the key to American agreement in principle on strategic defense cooperation between the two countries. I distinguished between two aspects of the problem: The aspect of the defense of our country and our people and the international aspect. As to the first matter I said: "We have defended ourselves in five wars, and we have never asked any nation to send its sons to defend us or to endanger their lives for our sake. We did it by ourselves, and we will do so in the future as well. But there is another problem - what is going on in the region ... There is the problem of Ethiopia.
The Russians now maintain 2,000 tanks in Libya, as well as weapons stores under their supervision and control, and missiles and planes. In Syria they maintain apart from 2,600 tanks, all of them Soviet - 1,000 of the best tanks - T-72s and T-62s, missiles and planes. All of this is very close by and we are concerned. I assume that you too are concerned about this situation, about what is likely to happen tomorrow in Iran, if Khomeini disappears and the "Tudeh" is able to take power. They will then, without any difficulty, invite the Soviet Army. They have a very long border with the Soviet Union and the Soviets can within a few hours be deep within Iran. Then let us talk about understanding and cooperation. I am talking only about the principle. The details have to be gone over by the two defense ministers."
The President responded: "We agree." His final word was "fine". This concluded the matter of strategic cooperation from both our points of view. And in fact, the two Defense Ministers have met, and have discussed many details.
Whoever says that we claimed that by tomorrow there would already be practical strategic cooperation, whoever laughed about American bandages - doesn't know what he's talking about. We never said that actual cooperation would take place overnight. We spoke only of agreement in principle and that's very important. Our Defense Minister and the American Secretary of Defense agreed to meet each other in the United States in November. Perhaps they will then sign a memorandum of understanding - that's what I suggested. That there should be a memorandum of understanding. Implementation will likely take more than a few months - perhaps a year or two. This is indeed a very serious step and there is no basis to those charges that we have placed the I.D.F. at the disposal of the United States. The I.D.F. is here to serve the State of Israel and its elected government.
Q: Let us go back to the question of the "AWACS".
A: After the end of the discussion on strategic cooperation, which lasted 10-12 minutes - no more, the entire subject of the double arms deal with Saudi Arabia came up. I estimate it lasted and hour and fifty minutes. I proved the danger that Israel would face once the Saudi Arabians receive assault equipment for the F-15s. As for the "AWACS", the most important thing I told him was that would make us transparent. I didn't want to use the word "naked". The entire delegation took part in the discussion: The Foreign Minister, the Defense Minister, the Minister of the Interior and me. Afterwards the Chief of Intelligence, Major General Saguy, approached the President with excellent maps, prepared in Israel - a work of craftsmanship. I'm sure it made an impression. The President asked to speak, then the Secretary of State, then the Secretary of Defense. They all said: "We understand your fears but believe us - they are without foundation. Well make certain that you don't suffer in terms of security."
The U.S. spokesman said at all times that they would never allow the qualitative superiority we have over our enemies to disappear. I explained to them that according to that famous scientific principle, that sometimes quantity turns into a new quality: the well-known example taken from science has to do with water and ice: when the temperature goes down so much that water turns to ice. I told them: "Today the ratio is three tanks to one in favor of the enemy. We can, perhaps, live with this thanks to the special skills of our tank crews and their experience - as was demonstrated, again, in the Yom Kippur War. But should there be five enemy tanks to every one of ours, it would be very grave. When it comes to the enormous quantities of arms flowing into the Middle East, we are in need not only of quality but also of quantity." President Reagan replied to this argument with a very interesting statement: "I want to promise you, Mr. Prime Minister, that we will look after Israel's security both quantitatively and qualitatively."
The next day we were present at the two most important committees in Congress: The Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees. Early in the morning I met with the President again, privately, and I told him that I would present the same maps before the two Congressional Committees that I had shown to him, because we did not speak out of both sides of our mouths. But I would also announce what the President had told me - that he would not allow Israel's security to be endangered. For the sake of truth, I must say that. But I will add that all the same we are sure that this is a very serious danger to Israel's security. And this is what we did.
Later the Secretary of State telephoned me and told me that Senator Baker had phoned the President and told him that there was a danger that the Administration would lose the vote in the Senate too - and the President was very concerned about this. I asked him: "What do you want from me? How can I help?" The Secretary of State answered, "Senator Packwood is gathering signatures. Did you know this?" I replied: "This is the first I've heard of it. Must I give orders to an American senator?"
The Secretary of State said to me at one of our meetings: "The President has received a report that you gave a list of Senators to Minister Falwell". Fallwell is a very talented man, who heads a movement called "The Moral Majority". They are very pious Christians. He maintains that he has the support of twenty million such Christians, Catholics as well as Protestants. They support Israel on every issue. Really devoted friends of ours. I met with Fallwell and with 20 of his fellow ministers. It was an extremely pleasant meeting. He began and then everyone there talked for two or three minutes about his warm feelings toward Israel. I thanked them and said: "We know how to be grateful for friendship." But it never even occurred to me to give them a list of Senators in connection with AWACS. I told the Secretary of State that this was a totally fictitious concoction. I didn't want to say "a lie." If the President is getting such information, this really is not good.
Q: - Was the "AWACS" deal also the subject of the unscheduled talk with Secretary of State at Kennedy Airport before you took off for Israel?
A: I can tell you that we did in fact discuss this matter. He expressed concern that they were liable to be defeated in the vote. But this was not the only subject. We exchanged friendly words, which could not have been more pleasant.
Q: Did you ask something of you?
A: He asked, but allow me not to tell you what he requested. I was unable to comply with his request and I told him so.
Q: After having a number of discussions with President Reagan, can you describe the differences in style and character between him and his predecessor?
A: I'm not happy about going into detail here, for it's a very personal matter. First of all, I want to say that former President Carter and his wife are dear friends of my wife and me. I went to see them in Plains. It took me 8 hours. The meeting was very emotional. Mr. Carter is a man of very sharp intelligence. He demonstrated a great deal of friendship towards Israel, but there were times when we had very sharp exchanges. He himself wrote about it ten days ago when he described Sadat and me. But this happens among friends as well. If we have a Camp David Accord and a peace treaty, it is to a large extent thanks to President Carter. When we sat up at Camp David until 3 o'clock in the morning, Carter was already on his feet at seven the next morning, talking to Professor Barak and me, looking for formulas, etc. He truly worked twelve days and twelve nights.
President Reagan is a man of different qualities. Above all, he is a very warm man towards others. When he receives someone in his office, he exudes optimism. He makes people feel comfortable, tells a story, a joke. Everything he says is pleasant to hear. He is decisive. When we spoke privately, he told me a story which I can't repeat. But the story proves that he can make decisions. As a result, he really did change much of American policy.
Carter once asked me whether I would be willing to sign a defense pact with the United States. I answered him "We are a parliamentary government. Therefore I cannot speak on behalf of the government until I consult with my colleagues. But I can express my own personal opinion: I will recommend a positive answer, but the initiative must come from you. Our small state cannot initiate such an idea - lest it be turned down. Since then, the matter has not been discussed. President Reagan in his first talk with me, already made a decision without giving a thought to the cries that arose in the Arab and radical states: "We agree to strategic cooperation." This proves his decisiveness.
Mrs. (Golda) Meir once said: "We have a friend in the White House" - referring to President Nixon. Of Reagan, I have said, "We have a great friend in the White House". Now that I'm back in Israel, I want to say it again. He is really a great friend of Israel. He has a great deal of feeling for our country, aside from his assessment of our mutual interests.
Q: Strategic cooperation is meant to block Soviet expansion in the Middle East. Could you imagine that under the terms of this agreement, Israel would dispatch its soldiers along with American soldiers to fight against Soviet domination in - for example, the Persian Gulf?
A: I don't foresee such a situation. Great powers usually send their soldiers to far-away places. Small nations usually don't. I'm certain that if the United States maintains a policy of deterrence and the nations close to it help it in this, the Soviet Union will not venture forth on an expansionist war. This is the wisdom of such a partnership. The Russians are realistic politicians. If they confront a serious opposition, they know when to stop. I believe they will stop. Therefore all these efforts are not aimed at war with Russia, but to prevent Soviet expansionism. It's a healthy policy both for the great power and the little country like us. But the intention is not that our soldiers will be sent to one front or another. And there will be no such need.
Q: Recently Defense Minister Sharon said that in 1956 the I.D.F. was placed at the disposal of Franco-British military adventurism. In those days you were on the inside of things, and, as far as we know, supported the plan. Do you now, in looking back, share Sharon's opinion?
A: First of all, I want to set one thing straight. The Defense Minister did not say that the Sinai Campaign was harmful or unnecessary. I myself heard all the details on the Sinai Campaign from Ben Gurion before it was carried out and I told him that we would stand together on it:
What Arik Sharon said: You complain that we, as it were, have put the I.D.F. under American command, that we have sold ourselves. Who are you, Alignment people, to say such a thing? Why, under your rule, the affair known as the "plot" took place ... now we can talk about the affair freely. 15 years ago, I wouldn't have breathed a word about the entire affair. What was the "plot"? The British and French would come into the war after us and present, as it were, an ultimatum to both sides (Israel and Egypt), to move back 10 kilometers from the Suez Canal. So what Arik Sharon said was: You tell us we sold our independence to the Americans, and offered the I.D.F. to American command. Remember what you did in 1956. But he uttered not a word of criticism about the Sinai campaign.
Q: Until not long ago, you took a strong stand against the Syrian missiles in Lebanon. Lately there is an impression of total silence on this subject. What happened? Are the Syrian missiles no longer a "causus belli"?
A: We have not changed our position one bit. There was a discussion on Lebanon in the State Department meeting room that lasted two and a half hours. Philip Habib was there too, and one of the first questions I presented to the Secretary of State was: "Why is Mr. Habib in the United States and not in our region? Why isn't he working to remove the missiles?" The Americans repeatedly told us: "We obligated ourselves to remove the missiles." They admitted that they had not fulfilled their task. Philip Habib said to me: "Give me some more time." We could not say no. We do not want war with the Syrians. We would have destroyed the missiles within two hours, and the Americans know this too.
We will not tolerate these missiles indefinitely. These missiles bother us to some degree. But this does not prevent us from carrying out photographic flights. Thanks to these photographs we know exactly what is going on in Lebanon. But we have not been reconciled with the missiles. O.K. a bit of time has gone by in the meantime. But sometimes one has to know how to wait a bit.
Q: You have just met with Jacques Attali, the adviser to the President of France. Did you get the impression from your talk with him that a change has occurred in France's policy toward Israel?
A: There is no doubt that a change has occurred. Mitterrand is truly a friend of Israel. It is true that he talks about something close to a Palestinian state - and we will never agree to that. But he said that he would not allow Israel or its security to be harmed under any conditions. The French Ambassador told me what Mitterrand thinks about the State of Israel. For him, it is something sacred. Why? The State of Israel is a Jewish state, and it demonstrates the historic continuity of the Jewish people. This is a very interesting philosophical idea.
Q: We are being warned from all directions that the P.L.O. is strengthening itself in Lebanon under cover of the cease-fire. Will Israel be able to continue the cease-fire under these conditions?
A: The strengthening of the terrorists in Lebanon is no myth. If we reach the point of an additional military clash with them, what force will they throw in? They now have 18 new 130 min cannon with a range of 27 kilometers. But this is not a problem. We know where they are, and if there is a need, we will destroy them. The problem is something else. We told the Americans: "You cannot expect from us that the cessation of hostile acts should be interpreted by the P.L.0 as a permit to kill Jews. From our point of view, there is no difference if it is in Vienna, in Paris, in Athens or in Jerusalem. Jews are Jews and they must not be killed. We will not allow a situation where there are people who think that a Jew is born to be killed." They understood this. On the other hand, they are also working, mostly through Saudi Arabia, for a cessation of these vile activities. I heard from someone whose name I cannot reveal, how Saudi Arabia influences the P.L.O. - Saudi Arabia gives Arafat 20 million dollars. That's the whole secret. He is now very hard pressed financially.
We can't deny it - Kiryat Shemonah and Nahariya suffered. I was in both places. I went into one of the shelters and I saw that you can't stay there for more than ten minutes. I couldn't breathe. These shelters are no good. We must build new ones. It's a financial problem, of course. But there are certain issues where money doesn't count. We must defend our population. Now they have calm. We would like that cease-fire to last indefinitely. If we could bring about a political proposal whereby Jews would not be harmed anywhere, we would have to accept it. We will make an effort in that direction.
Q: The evacuation of the Sinai is approaching and along with it, an extremist element is coalescing, prepared to take violent measures to prevent it. How does the government intend to guarantee the implementation of the withdrawal on schedule. Will it send in soldiers to forcibly evacuate settlers, knowing a priori that this might end in bloodshed?
A: First of all, I want to set the following principle: We signed a peace treaty and will fulfill every letter of it. The second thing I want to say is that there's nothing more painful to me personally than the commitment we took upon ourselves - not at Camp David, but in Jerusalem, as a result of the rejection of my proposal to separate the vote on Camp David from the vote on evacuation of the Jewish settlements in Sinai. The decision was taken by the Knesset with a large majority. Since then, there have also been elections, and had the nation not accepted it, it wouldn't have given us 718,000 votes. Now I can tell you: The Government decided, the Knesset decided and the people decided. Morally - when you sign you must fulfill. Therefore, threats and violent opposition cannot make the slightest bit of difference. It goes without saying that we wish to prevent violence and will make every effort in this direction. In terms of the moral support this government enjoys among the public, we can permit ourselves, than God, to refrain from sending soldiers to evacuate Talmei Yoseph.