In the wake of the passage of the AWACS deal by the Senate, Mr. Shamir expressed his fear that the Reagan administration is leaning towards a pro-Saudi orientation in the region and that it was taking the Saudi "peace-plan" too seriously, which was in contradiction to the Camp David Accords. But on the positive side, Israel could not
ignore the promises contained in President Reagan's letter to Mr. Begin. He now looked forward to the strategic cooperation agreement to counter the military threat posed by the AWACS deal. Text:
Q: Mr. Shamir, following the passage of the AWACS, deal, the fear was expressed, in Jerusalem and Washington, that full or partial American recognition of the Saudi "peace plan" will follow. Is there a basis to this fear?
A: There are fears that today's American Administration attaches too much importance to something which I don't even know whether it can be called a plan all in all, it is a collection of ideas taken from the most extreme resolutions against Israel, resolution adopted at the U.N. or, at Arab League conferences. There are a number of clauses, each of which, I would say, is a poisoned dagger thrust into the heart of Israel's existence. What is not included in it? Withdrawal to the 1949 borders - lines which don't exist any more - Arab sovereignty over Jerusalem, return of the 1948 refugees, establishment of a Palestinian state - all these things will make Israel's existence impossible.
Q: And such a serious plan is accepted by the Administration in Washington - Secretary of State Alexander Haig also said that certain parts were very reasonable.
A: The is very surprising. There is some kind of rationalization that there is one clause that is very unclear, and is formulated in a very evasive manner, on the recognition of all states in the area to exist in peace. Israel's name is not mentioned. There is no mention of the word peace in this entire document, no mention of negotiations. We don't think that the U.S. government can consider that Israel will ever accept such suggestions or will even see in them a basis for negotiation...
The U.S. administration doesn't recognize the fact that total or partial acceptance of such a plan means a retreat from the Camp David Agreements. The Egyptian Foreign Minister certainly said so, while here, that the only practical peace plan existing today is the Camp David plan and anyone who offers other plans weakens and undermines the basis of the Camp David plan, to which we are committed to its entire execution.
Q: Don't you see signs that the U.S. Administration is starting to retreat to a certain extent from the Camp David plan?
A: I said that there were signs of concern, there are fears. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the clear declarations of the President of the U.S. endorsing the obligation of the U.S. and the obligation of the President to Israel's security, on the need to ensure Israel's military and technical advantages. We cannot ignore these words, which are in themselves encouraging, but as always in the dialogue between us and the U.S. there have always been ups and downs, it will never be conducted entirely over still waters, and it was possible from the first days of this administration to see that one of the most worrying problems with which we will have to contend is the over-importance which this administration attributes to the Saudi stand.
Q: What about the danger in the pro-Saudi orientation, which could lead to granting Saudi Arabia senior status in the Middle East, more so than any other state in the area?
A: We shall have to counter this, and I think that there is hope for this struggle, since if we listen to an analyze the things said in the Senate during the latest debate on the matter of this double deal, there is the clear impression that the thesis that Saudi Arabia is a moderate country and seeks peace in the area, did not win. One of the Senators said this with great accuracy, although he changed his stance, he said: "I know that Saudi Arabia is not moderate. It is moderate like Arafat is moderate," and this really reflects the situation, and many others who voted for the president's stance said specifically that they don't accept this thesis. And I therefore believe that we have hope and that there is a basis to the assumption that this policy - and if there's someone who's considering it - will not be carried out in our area.
Q: Mr. Shamir, are we intending to demand compensation for the AWACS deal? Do we expect that the Americans will offer financial, political or security compensation?
A: It is not a question of compensation, but it is to be expected that after the declaration of the President, after what he said in his latest letter to the Prime Minister - he recognizes the necessity for military and technological advantages for Israel, and that he repeats his obligation to Israel's security - that the U.S. will have to give this practical expression, through the strengthening of Israel in such a way that it will have an answer to the challenge which we will face after this deal goes through.
Q: In other words, we are expecting additional American defense support for Israel?
A: We hope that we are entering a stage of strategic defense cooperation with the U.S. and for the framework of this cooperation we will have to increase our strength to an extent that we will be able to face these new challenges.
Q: More than once the AWACS deal has been linked with the strategic cooperation agreement and President Reagan and Prime Minister Begin mentioned an invitation for the Defense Minister to visit Washington in November to discuss the realization of this agreement. So far the invitation has not arrived. Is there some delay?
A: This is not a matter of days, we hope the matter will materialize and be stabilized.
Q: In view of the AWACS deal, do you see the need for reassessment of our relations with the U.S.?
A: This is not a question of reassessment. I have said also in the past, all along, there have been disagreements and differences of opinion, which is understood, since there are different interests, but from the disagreements and through the confrontation, we reach, in the end, cooperation which, nevertheless, aids Israel's advancement and strengthening.
Q: What, in your opinion, is the next stage in the dialogue between Israel and the U.S. - the strategic cooperation which will now start to materialize?
A: Certain, this is one of the most important, vital matters.
Q: Do you think that this will materialize within the next few weeks?
A: I cannot state a time, it isn't a matter of weeks, it could be a matter of months. Whatever the case, one must start
Q: And this depends particularly on the Americans, the ball is in their court?
A: This is, of course, a matter of two partners.