Mr. Shamir dealt with two major issues which were discussed by the cabinet in the preceding week. The first had to do with the Israel- U.S. memorandum of understanding on strategic cooperation, and the second with the creation of the Multinational Force and the participation of a European contingent in it. There was a feeling that in both cases the government acted hastily. Mr. Shamir refuted the allegations and explained the need for speed on both matters. He travelled to Washington at the end of November to deal with the issue of the Multinational Force. In the interview he explained the benefits that would accrue to Israel from the two agreements with the United States. Text:
Q: Mr. Shamir, what's the rush? Why the panic? Both regarding the strategic cooperation with the U.S. and the participation of the four European countries in the Multi-National Force in the Sinai, the Government acted as though the sand in the hourglass was running out, and a decision had to be made immediately, without delay. Other ministers did not hesitate to say that the Cabinet meeting on Sunday of this week, in which the Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. was debated, was a disgrace. The Ministers were not given ample time to study the text of the Memorandum and to learn its contents. A helicopter was waiting for the Minister of Defense in the landing field near Hadassah Hospital in Jerusalem. What happened?
A: Nothing happened. There was no panic and no rush, but there were and are many problems which must be solved by means of decision-making, and not a single one of them should be put aside. If we are talking about strategic cooperation with the U.S., the handling of this subject, the discussions and the clarifications have been going on for a long time. The Defense Minister was supposed to complete this discussion now, so that if he hadn't left for the U.S. on Sunday, the talks on the Memorandum of Understanding would have been postponed for a long time, due to the business and travels of the American Secretary of Defense, Mr. Caspar Weinberger.
As to the question of the participation of the four European countries in the Multi-National Force in Sinai, it (the Force) must be established in the near future, and this requires visits - both between the U.S. and Israel, and also, perhaps, between the U.S. and European countries. Every one of us from among the Ministers of Israel and the U.S. has various responsibilities and a tight schedule. In general, every issue, in our time, is carried out dynamically and intensively, and we must "march with the times", at least in terms of the tempo.
Q: But such panic, when the Ministers don't have sufficient time to study the documents, does this not weaken their judgement?
A: No. The debate was not rushed. Time has passed since the Europeans publicly announced their declarations, which accompanied the announcement on their agreement to participate in the Multi-National Force. We expressed our opinion on the declarations, and we declared that under such conditions, Israel would not agree to the European countries' sending their units to the Multi-National Force. Debates were held on this subject. Letters were exchanged, proposals were formulated, and there was a need to reach an agreement with the U.S., in order to finish this episode together with it (the U.S.). I am not of the opinion that in these two matters under discussion, the time factor weakened judgement.
Q: A feeling exists that regarding \central political and security matters the Cabinet has ceased to be the deciding body. The Prime Minister convenes with a few ministers (Ehrlich, Sharon, and yourself), and together with them, makes the decisions. The Cabinet looks like a rubber stamp, and at best, one of the ministers may dare express his differences in a cabinet meeting, on the position of the "chosen" group of ministers.
A: In all of Israel's governments there have been different ways of conducting debates and consultations, outside of the Cabinet's plenary sessions. What looks somewhat unjustified in this government, of late, results from the fact that due to various difficulties, the Ministerial Defense Committee has not yet been formed. We are about to overcome the coalitional and other difficulties. Perhaps the accident that happened to the Prime Minister will cause an additional delay, but the solution already exists. Were there such a committee, things would be simple, clear and conducted according to the long-standing established procedures of Israel's governments. Issues under consideration and other security matters would be placed on the Committee's table, and the Committee would decide if there were a need to bring the decisions to the cabinet.
In the absence of a Ministerial Defense Committee for Security Affairs, the Prime Minister holds consultations with a limited number of Ministers, in an unconventional forum. Consultations of this sort must be held, and every issue brought to the Cabinet for a decision.
Q: The Prime Minister and his deputy, Simcha Ehrlich, announced last week that the Government would veto European participation in the Multi-National Force in Sinai, because of their (the Europeans) declarations. Why did the Government back down? How did the U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig convince you (to change your mind) during your 7-1/2 hour talk in Washington?
Q: Yes. That really was the longest discussion I've ever had with anyone in my life. The Government did not back down. Not at all. The opposite is the case. it was a diplomatic achievement of the first degree for Israel. A joint Israeli-American achievement of stance on the issue was formulated. We are still engaged in negotiations on some of the sections, and one must wait and see how the European states will behave in view of the joint Israeli-American statement.
It is now clear to everyone well-versed in the subject that the States of Europe specifically intended to drive a wedge between Israel and the U.S. Our course which was really initiated by the Secretary of State who invited me to come to the U.S. - turned the tables, and fundamentally changed this situation. Today, a joint U.S.-Israeli stance is crystallizing. The ball is now in the Europeans' court. This is a great achievement, and not a retreat.
Q: Will it be said specifically in the joint statement that the U.S. agrees that the PLO cannot become a party to the negotiations - as opposed to what was said in the "Venice Declaration", which they (the Europeans) mentioned when they expressed their consent to participate in the Multi-National Force?
A: According to the text of the joint statement, there will be no doubt whatsoever that the U.S. stands, without any hesitation or reservations, on the basis of the Camp David Accords. According to these agreements, there is no possibility of negotiations with the PLO or agreeing to the establishment of a Palestinian state, or to any component of the Venice Declaration which is not acceptable to Israel.
Q: It might turn out that the European countries did Israel a favor - that because of their declaration, the U.S. agreed to make public this kind of joint statement with Israel...
A: It certainly does happen in politics that "he who comes to curse, finds himself blessing and he who comes to harm, finds himself helping". Yes, that surely does happen.
Q: Will the Europeans be required to add a declaration of their agreement to the contents of the Israeli American statement, or will Israel be satisfied with their silence?
A: The deliberations have not yet been concluded, and therefore I cannot answer that question.
Q: What will Israel's position be if, after the publication of the Israeli-American statement, the Europeans announce that they reject its contents and would only agree to participate in the Multi-National Force on the basis of their previous declarations?
A: In that case, the Europeans would not be able to participate in the Multi-National Force - this is also the American position.
Q: Was this agreed upon between you and Secretary of State Haig?
A: If this had not been agreed upon, I would not have said to you that this is the American position. I would like to add that during that same prolonged discussion with Mr. Haig, I was given an excellent opportunity to engage in detailed discussion on very important subjects which touch upon our relations with the U.S. and on Middle Eastern issues.
Q: Were achievements also made in areas other than the Multi-National Force?
A: There most certainly were. We coordinated positions on many issues. It is not every day that the opportunity arises to go into such depth and to reach common ground with the U.S. There was not agreement on or identity with all of the issues, but now at least both sides are better able to know where each of them stands. I am. sure that this discussion will be influential in the future as well on a number of issues - on the issue of Lebanon, on the issue of peace with Egypt, and on the issue of autonomy. There are differences of opinion, but there also is a wide range of identity in outlook and in stance.
Q: The agreement on strategic cooperation with the U.S. has definite political aspects, in addition to the military and security ones. It is being said that, as Foreign Minister, your positions were not given their due weight in the negotiations on the Strategic Memorandum of Understanding, and that everything was determined according to the wishes of the Minister of Defense. Is this true?
A: The details of the agreement fall into the natural jurisdiction of the Minister of Defense. I dealt only with the political aspects, I did not enter into other details. I stressed from the outset that, in an agreement of this kind, strategic value of the first degree is prominent. Immediately following the Prime Minister's visit to the U.S. (and his talks with President Reagan and the leaders of his Administration in September of this year), I left for the Latin American countries. Both in talks with Foreign Ministers there and in the scores of meetings I held upon my return to the U.N. General Assembly plenum in New York, positive and immediate weight attributable to the strategic cooperation with the U.S. was very definitely felt.
Q: It was not then known that the U.S. intended to whittle down drastically...
A: No, no, the news spread quickly all over the world, that the U.S. and Israel had decided on strategic cooperation, and I immediately sensed the great esteem of representatives of nations from all corners of the world, from all forms of regimes, both friendly and hostile to Israel. The attitude toward Israel changed completely and expressions of admiration were not lacking.
Q: Are you of the opinion that African countries were also influenced by this agreement, and that their tendency to renew diplomatic relations with Israel was given a boost?
A: Certainly, that too. The agreement influenced them as well. I heard expression along the lines of "Who could ever compare to you? Who would dream of achieving such standing with the U.S. as you have?"
Q: But no African country has yet renewed its severed relations with Israel?
A: True, but the relations are becoming closer. I believe that the end result of the rapprochement process will be the renewal of diplomatic relations.
Q: Why did the Israeli Defense Minister and the American Secretary of Defense sign the Memorandum of Understanding and not the Foreign Ministers?
A: Different kinds of agreements exist. This is an agreement between the two defense establishments of the countries signing the memorandum. All sectors of the Memorandum are within the framework of the defense establishments.
Q: Is this an agreement between the Defense Ministers or between the countries?
A: This is an agreement between the countries, which are represented by the Defense Ministers.
Q: Before Mr. Abba Eban called your attention to the fact that only in the Memorandum of Understanding between Israel and the U.S. is the Soviet Union specified by name as the danger against which there must be defense - while in the 48 agreements between the U.S. and other states, especially NATO, and all the other agreements and alliances, the Soviet Union is not named - had you not been aware of this?
A: This is not true. The fact is - and it was made public a few days ago that in the Cabinet meeting on Sunday of this week, I proposed avoiding specifically naming the Soviet Union (in the Memorandum). I was of the opinion that it would be better to avoid (the use of) the name outright. What Mr. Eban perhaps told me that was new to me, when he came to me on his own initiative, was that he did some research and discovered that in all of the U.S.'s strategic accords, since the Second World War, use was not made of the explicit name of the USSR - even though the goal of all of the agreements was defense against it (the USSR) and that nobody doubted this was the case.
Q: Why, then, was Israel required to have the dubious honor of being the first country in the world which, in its agreement with the U.S., specifies the Soviet Union?
A: I was not surprised by what Mr. Eban told me. I did oppose the mentioning of the Soviet Union, it is true, but the full use of the Soviet Union's name should not be exaggerated, for even if we had used another term, it would be clear to all what and whom we meant. The fact that the name of the USSR is not mentioned in the U.S.'s agreements with other countries is not what decides the nature of the issue.
Q: Yet in the other accords, it is also clear against whom they are directed and nevertheless they do not specify the USSR. Why do we have to be different? Because we have the responsibility for the fate of the three million Jews in the USSR, while others of the U.S.'s allies are free of this worry?
A: I do not know if there is no other state in the world which has an agreement with the U.S. specifying the USSR. I did not check this out. There were also considerations which obliged specifying clearly the USSR.
Q: Israeli considerations, or only American ones?
A: Both Israeli and American. There is logic also to the claims of those who do not accept Israel's need for restraint in dealing with the USSR. Notice that in the agreements of the USSR with Iraq and with Syria, Zionism is defined as the identified enemy. In Section 4 of the agreement with Iraq and in Section 3 of the agreement with Syria, it is stated that "the Soviet Union and its ally will continue to fight against colonialism and Zionism".
Q: But that was not the reason for naming the USSR specifically, but rather the U.S.'s desire to remove the suspicion of any Arab country, that the Memorandum of Understanding is, heaven forbid, directed against it...
A: That too. To the extent that danger is imminent to Israel, it does not lie in the military power of our Arab neighbors, but in the massive assistance given by the USSR to Arab states which have not abandoned yet the path of war.
Q: And this is exactly the problem. The Memorandum of Understanding mentions clearly only states outside of the region.
A: But it does speak of the Soviet presence in the area...
Q: Just a moment, excuse me, IT try and understand your position on the basis of a more concrete example: If, in an Arab state bordering on Israel, a Communist regime is established, supported by the Soviet Union and acting in accordance with its instructions, and if this Arab state's army attacks Israel with Soviet weapons, and with the help of Soviet advisors and officers, then will the agreement for cooperation with the U.S. be valid or not?
A: Well, this agreement is not a military alliance. It is an agreement for strategic cooperation, which is to be implemented mainly in times of peace, and whose goal is one of deterrence. We are beginning with the assumption that we will not need military aid from the U.S. if the Arab states force war upon us. But it has been clear throughout the years - and now, following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, it is even more clear - that if we are attacked directly by the Soviet Union - the Americans have to help us. This agreement has the power of deterrence, the importance of which rests in the fact that the U.S. and Israel will operate together to prevent a Soviet attempt to attack Israel.
Q: If this issue has been clear throughout the years, why was there a need for an outright agreement which defines the USSR, from the nature of things, as a state in conflict with Israel, thus adding new dangers to Israel?
A: I do not think that the agreement will affect the quality of relations with the USSR. The relations were not good even when there were full diplomatic ties between the two countries. Regarding the Jews in the Soviet Union, it is worthwhile to remember that when there was a Soviet embassy in Tel Aviv and an Israeli embassy in Moscow, practically not a single Jew was allowed to leave the confines of the Soviet Union - while in the last few years, without diplomatic ties, the situation is different.
Q: For example, regarding the diplomatic ties: Does the agreement with the US enhance the chance that the USSR will renew its diplomatic ties with Israel?
A: I do not think that this is the thing that determines USSR policy. One might, perhaps say that the strategic agreement between Israel and the US could even speed up the normalization of relations...