In a major policy statement, the defense minister formulated a new defense doctrine for Israel. He coined new "red lines" for Israel that if violated would bring about an armed Israeli response. Among the "red lines" was the acquisition by the Arabs of nuclear weapons, entry of Syrian troops into Southern Lebanon, entry of Iraqi troops into Syria or Jordan, entry of Egyptian troops into the demilitarized zone in Sinai in particular, and a violation of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty in general. He also drew up a picture of Israel's role in the struggle against Soviet expansionism. Excerpts:
As I see them, our main security problems during the 1980's will stem from external threats to Israel, her integrity and her sovereign rights...
One - the Arab confrontation.
Second - The Soviet expansion which both builds on the Arab confrontation and at the same time provides it with its main political and military tools.
Later on, I will comment on the implications in terms of political and military requirements in order to cope with the threat and to ensure Israel's national security in the 1980's.
Starting with the Arab challenge, I must touch upon the three major factors which, in my mind, contribute the most to sustain Arab enmity and confrontation at a level that presents an actual danger to our security and which, I believe, will continue to sustain it in the foreseeable future - at a level which might confront us with a potential threat to the existence and integrity of Israel.
Those factors are:
A. First, the national ideology of radical Arab regimes (such as in Syria, Libya, Iraq and South Yemen) and their political and strategic ambitions which motivate them to invest, on a first priority basis, in the creation of a political-military setting designed to serve a strategy of political and military stages for the liquidation of the State of Israel.
The main elements of this strategy of stages can be summed up as follows:
1) A combined effort of sustained political pressure and, when needed, limited military action aimed at the harassment and weakening of Israel.
2) The build-up of a military power, conventional and eventually non-conventional, to be used in appropriate conditions in the future, for a decisive onslaught against Israel.
3) The third element of the strategy is the political and military reliance on the Soviet Union to ensure the Arab capability to initiate and carry out the confrontation.
4) The fourth element is to maximize the political strategic impact of the oil weapon.
5) And the fifth is the political and military backing to the PLO as an instrument to carry out terrorist activities. This constitutes a central element in the strategy of stages, so long as Israel's deterrent posture and other political considerations prevent the formation of an Arab coalition, ready to wage war.
That brings me to the second major factor, which is the PLO. On the challenge presented by the PLO, I will say only this: The PLO poses a political threat to the very existence of the State of Israel and remains one of the main obstacles to the resolution of the Palestinian problem on the basis of the Camp David accords.
It constitutes a framework for terrorist organizations operating against Israel, in its territory or in the world at large, with the following purposes:
- To undermine the domestic stability in Israel and its security.
- To generate international pressure on Israel.
- To drag the confrontation states to war against Israel.
- To deter Arab countries and moderate Palestinian elements from negotiations with Israel on the basis of Camp David.
The third factor is one of growing concern to us and to the Western World, and might well develop as the main challenge of the 1980s. It has to do with the Soviet strategy of expansion in the Middle East and Africa. The Soviet strategy is under no pressure of time, but its achievements since the middle of the 1950s are really impressive ... It is a strategy of expansion which, if not checked, could eventually enable the Soviet Union:
- To ensure a sea-control capability in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.
- To establish the military infrastructure for direct or indirect operations.
- To expand and penetrate other key countries in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, from the direction of Afghanistan, Iraq, South Yemen and Syria.
- To outflank NATO's eastern tier (Turkey) through Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
- To outflank NATO's southern tier in the Mediterranean, through Libya, Syria and Algeria.
- To gain control over other key countries in Africa, from the direction of Libya, Algeria, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola and Congo-Brazzaville...
Today, as in the past two decades, the Soviet strategy of expansion in the area continues to build on:
- Arab regimes which Soviet political and military support enables to survive, to carry out their own ambitions and to maintain military confrontations - including the confrontation with Israel.
- Radical elements and terrorist organizations, which Soviet political and military support enables to create upheavals threatening to shift the region toward Soviet political-strategic patronage.
The shadow of Soviet presence in the Middle East and Africa endangers the stability of the region and vital interests of the free world. I want to stress this point with all possible emphasis. The greatest danger to the free world in the 1980s would be to continue to indulge in the wishful thinking and the inaction which have characterized Western attitudes to Soviet gradual expansion during the last two decades... Obviously, in order to be able to protect our national security interests, we will have to ensure our ability to maintain a balance of forces and a qualitative and technological edge over any combination of Arab war coalition; in other words:
- To prevent war by maintaining a deterrent posture against the threats to the existence of Israel.
- Should deterrence break down and war erupt, to ensure a military capability to preserve the integrity of Israel's territory, in any war-opening situation including a sudden Arab attack, and to disrupt the war coalition by damaging the core of its offensive capability.
To achieve these goals, we will have to structure our military strength on new approaches, taking into account:
- The lack of territorial depth and therefore the necessity to establish a strong territorial defense system, based on populous and high quality settlement of key border areas in Judaea, Samaria, the Gaza district, the Golan Heights, the Galilee and the Negev.
- The need to provide maximum protection to human life.
- The need to develop and produce weapons systems and equipment which should enable us to maintain a permanent qualitative advantage over Arab confrontation states - including with regard to advanced and sophisticated equipment they might get from Eastern and Western sources.
As a rule, while striving to establish ties of strategic cooperation with the United States to enhance stability and security in the region as a whole, we will continue to ensure our own independent ability to cope with the Arab military threats to our existence and security. In order to cope with the threat, Israel cannot build on a balance of power based on a simple quantitative ratio of military forces. We cannot hope to match Arab numbers. Therefore, Israel's defense policy will have to ensure our ability to maintain a military balance based, beyond the quantitative ratio, on a clear qualitative and technological superiority. Israel is confronted by the challenge of maintaining a balance in peace of countries which have practically no limitation in funds to finance their military effort and furthermore in the ... military technology and sophisticated weaponry they receive from all three sources - the Soviet, the American and the West-European supply sources, which are all competing by the same means for influence and economic advantages. Among the three sources of supply, the United States remains sensitive to the need of maintaining a balance in the Arab-Israeli confrontation. But there is no control on the influx of armament from Soviet and European sources. Therefore, Israel has to build on her independent capability to develop and produce systems which are vital to ensure our qualitative advantage and our security. This puts a tremendous burden on our defense budget and on Israel's national economy ... The second "safety valve" if I can use that concept, in our defense policy, is our resolve and our ability to prevent the disruption of the territorial military status in neighboring countries. That includes our resolve.
- One - To prevent the violation of security arrangements laid down in political agreements such as in the Sinai with Egypt and the Golan with Syria. It must be crystal clear: We did sign the peace treaty with Egypt and we faithfully carry out its provisions of withdrawal to the international border, but we have no intention to accept any violation of the status and of the security arrangements in the Sinai as agreed between us.
- Two - We will prevent any violation of the status quo ante in south Lebanon.
- Three - We will prevent any change in the geographical-military status of the confrontation area which might present unacceptable threats, such as the massive introduction of Iraqi forces into Jordan or southern Syria or Syrian forces into Jordan. Such an accumulation of forces in the confrontation area would endanger our very existence and is therefore unacceptable to Israel...
The third element in our defense policy for the 1980s is our determination to prevent confrontation states or potentially confrontation states from gaining access to nuclear weapons. Israel cannot afford the introduction of the nuclear weapon. For us it is not a question of a balance of terror, but a question of survival. We shall therefore have to prevent such a threat at its inception.
There are three major elements in our defense policy for the 1980s. We shall, of course, also maintain our freedom of action and our ability to act in order to overcome the terrorist threat. To sum up - in order to strengthen the foundation of its national security, in face of the direct Arab threat as well as in face of the challenge from outside the region, Israel will make special efforts:
- One - To ensure our qualitative advantage and maintain the required balance of forces.
- Two - To expand and consolidate our economic, industrial, scientific, demographic and physical infrastructure, so as to carry the burden of our national security.
- Three - To hold political negotiations from a position of security for the purpose of continuing the peace process between Israel and her neighbors.
- Four - To consolidate and nurture national unity in Israel as well as the ties between Israel and the Jewish people in the Diaspora.
- Five - To enhance strategic cooperation with the United States and to develop security relationships with Middle Eastern and African countries and with other countries in the world. In that respect, I want to stress that Israel is not a liability but an asset, as the United States has gradually come to realize. For the common defense of the Free World, beyond our military capabilities, Israel has to offer an example of true democracy and stability in the midst of regional uncertainties and upheavals, and moreover, the capability to contribute to the well-being of developed and less-developed nations, in many important fields such as science, medicine, food production and sophisticated agricultural technology in general.