By late January there remained three months before the completion of Israel's withdrawal from Sinai, the Supreme Israel-Egypt Commission met in Cairo and at the the conclusion of the talks a memorandum detailing the withdrawal from Sinai and normalization of relations was signed by Mr. Sharon, who also met with President Mubarak. In the following interview Mr. Sharon discussed his impression of future Israel-Egypt relations, rumors of Egyptian military violations of the peace treaty and the situation in Lebanon. Excerpts:
Mr. Sharon: I don't think that Egypt will return to the Soviet fold. Such a possibility seems very unlikely to me. For years Egypt was under Soviet influence and control, and Cairo remembers those years unfavorably. Those were very difficult years for Egypt. In my estimation, their attempt to establish a connection with the U.S. is undoubtedly much more serious than thoughts about returning to the Soviet fold. As to the Arab states, I don't think there is any reason for Israel to fear a rapprochement between Egypt and the Arab states, and there is no need for Israel to sound alarms in this matter. That is not our role. Our role was to remove Egypt from the cycle of wars with Israel, and in my opinion we've succeeded in this. Big and strong Egypt, Egypt the pivotal Arab state, is no longer a part of the war cycle. This is the most important achievement of all, both for Egypt and Israel. Egypt's position is that its renewal of ties with the Arab world will not harm the peace with Israel. On the contrary, this might even serve as a moderating force. It might be possible to moderate the Arab world through Egypt. At any rate, President Mubarak told me that Egypt's relations with Israel would be unaffected by this.
Q: In the course of your discussions with President Mubarak, subjects having to do with Israel's relations with other Arab countries were raised? Did you discuss the situation in the North?
Mr. Sharon: On my own initiative, I sought to explain to the President of Egypt what the situation in Lebanon is, the complexities that country is entangled in. Starting with the political problem of setting up a legitimate government in Lebanon, a government that will sign a peace treaty with Israel and ending with the sources of disturbance, the Syrian conquest and the presence of the armed forces of the terrorist organizations. Between 15,000-20,000 armed terrorists are in Lebanon, along with the military and political headquarters of the terrorist organizations. Of course. I raised the problems arising from the terrorist organizations' build-up. I emphasized that the cease-fire and quiet in the north are threatened by this build-up. I said that Israel would not initiate military action in the north. I made it clear to President Mubarak that Israel would not attack in Lebanon unless the terrorists opened fire and direct their attack at civilian populations. In such a case, Israel would react very rapidly, and not as it did in July 1981. 1 also told President Mubarak that contrary to our usual practice, we didn't keep our military movements in the north this time a secret. The president observed that as soon as he saw the military movements on television he understood that they were meant as a deterrent. As a former military man, he knew how to interpret this step. I told the President that we have no intention of acting unless we are attacked, and I made our position perfectly clear, as I did in conversations with American representatives.
Q: You spoke to the President of Egypt in an unequivocal way?
Mr. Sharon: I believe that to conduct proper relations, relations that will develop further, one has to strengthen the feeling of security on both sides, and avoid surprises connected to the future. I believe that one has to present a constant and clear picture of what might come about, and I therefore raised this subject. I presented the problem and explained it. I stressed that we have no intention of attacking and if we do so, it will be against our will. Since my contacts with the Egyptians began, this has been my approach - not to disclose military plans, and also not to surprise the Egyptians, but rather to discuss our problems with them. This is the main building block in establishing relations of trust, and I think my relations with Egypt's deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Kamal Hassan Ali derive much from mutual esteem and trust. That is why we were able so quickly to reach agreements in our discussions, and to bring matters that were discussed in the past to the stage of implementation. For example: A postal land route via Sinai, truck movement on the main highway and the opening of a border post in Sharm el-Sheikh for Israeli ships. When I came to Egypt, I met with Minister Ali. I explained the problems and proposals to him, so that no surprises would crop up during the discussions. Then I brought the matter before the committee. Periodically, we held additional consultations, and I must say that the achievements we reached were made possible by the good atmosphere, the understanding and trust.
Q: Did you also raise the question of Israel's fears about developments in the North before the other Egyptian officials?
Mr. Sharon: I brought the government's decisions on this matter before Egypt's representatives here. Of course I did not reveal confidential details, but the Egyptians know that Israel will not exchange artillery fire with the terrorists. Therefore, if something happens in the North, it will not, in my opinion, influence the furthering of our relations with Egypt. I believe that mutual personal trust also has great weight in determining possible events. This trust can influence the Egyptian reaction if we are forced to act in the North.
Q: What do you consider the main achievements of these talks?
Mr. Sharon: In my opinion, Paragraph 12 of the summary is the most important. This paragraph enables us to dismantle installations in the Yamit district after withdrawal. This means that there is no further need to disassemble the equipment in a rush, and there is no need to get involved in fights in the area. Egypt's agreement to let us dismantle after April 26 will prevent the difficult fights which might have occurred there during the months left before the Sinai withdrawal. On the other hand, it will prevent having to abandon expensive equipment worth hundreds of millions of shekels. I told the Egyptians that it might take about three months to dismantle everything, and it was decided to consider special arrangements for border crossing by vehicles and technicians. In my opinion, this is one of the most important agreements reached on this visit.
Q: What about the islands of Snapir and Tiran?
Mr. Sharon: On this matter there is an Egyptian-Israeli understanding which states that the islands are in "Area C". Minister Kamal Hassan Ali said that Egypt does not object to establishing a permanent post or observation post on the Island of Tiran. At the same time, they re-emphasized Egypt's sovereignty over the straits. The agreement on a permanent multi-national force observation post should reassure Israel about the freedom of navigation. In this matter there was no disagreement, since it is explicitly mentioned in the military agreement and there are no doubts about it.
Q: The third sensitive subject has to do with Rafah and Eilat, and with everything connected with marking the new border. How do you evaluate the arrangements on these matters?
Mr. Sharon: We raised the question of Rafah for humanitarian reasons, in order to seek a solution that would not entail the destruction of houses and - let us hope - not create more refugees. The Egyptians agreed with us on the need to minimize the difficulties which fixing the border will create for the population. We did serious groundwork on this subject. We have lists of properties, buildings and I hope that we will find a solution to this question next week. Neither of the two countries will tolerate circumstances which would require expulsions. Butros Ghali has a new proposal, and it will be studied.
Q: There were reports in the press that the Egyptians are hardening their position. Ministers in Israel commented sharply on this and other representatives of the Government warned against a possible change in the Egyptian line. Much is said about fears of what can be expected after the withdrawal. And you, what do you feel about this?
Mr. Sharon: I think the matter of difficulties is more a psychological than practical matter. I did not sense unfriendliness during this visit - not in El Arish, not along the way in Sinai, not in the city of Suez and not in the meeting we had in Cairo. You could also see from the receptions that the atmosphere is warm and friendly. President Mubarak reiterated time and again Egypt's commitment to adhere to the peace. He indicated his intention to take this path. He said that there is only one way, and that is the way of peace. President Mubarak told me this: "This is the only way to be followed, because it is the only way to which Israel agrees. There were very many U.N. resolutions regarding Israel, but these resolutions were not implemented because the Israelis were not party to them. The peace is the first subject to which the two countries committed themselves and they will realize it for two reasons - because of their commitments, and the second, since they are interested in this path." This is what President Mubarak told me.
Of course, there are concerns and voices are heard on both sides. The President of Egypt also spoke of these statements and he said that while in Egypt Israel is attacked in the media, in Israel the sharp statements are made by Cabinet ministers. I raised the issue of the attack in the press, and of course I explained that due to the nature of our governmental system, due to political, social and coalition commitments, and in meetings of party executives, people make statements. President Mubarak expressed his opinion that everything must be done to curb the harshness of these statements, to reduce the bitterness and the concern and to point out the positive changes.
Q: Are you quiet about this matter, do you believe the peace process will continue?
Mr. Sharon: I have always maintained that the Egyptians will continue the peace process after 26 April. In the meeting in Alexandria in August I made it clear that there will be no subject which will provoke a more severe storm in Israel as a change in the Egyptian position after 26 April. In my opinion, the Egyptians have decided to take the way of peace. I don't say that they view matters precisely with Israeli eyes, but on the central issues we have identical positions. I think that both sides will adhere to the treaty. President Mubarak emphatically reiterated that Egypt will not alter its position after the withdrawal. The current tension is understandable. But the Egyptians also have fears that Israel will not withdraw from Sinai. And every side has its own reasons. I think that relations can receive new impetus. I talked about this with the Egyptians and also with Minister Ali, and they said that after the withdrawal, relations will receive a big push.
Q: Do the Egyptians today properly comprehend Israel's problems, the internal pressures and confrontations we experience?
Mr. Sharon: It is clear today to Egypt that Israel cannot be pressured. We made this clear to them many times. The Egyptians and the Americans know that pressure will not help and Israel will do nothing that contradicts the commitment it took upon itself. I already mentioned the statements made by President Mubarak regarding Israel and U.N. resolutions. I have no doubt that it is clear to them that pressures will not work. President Mubarak spoke about the Prime Minister and said: "To obtain something from the Prime Minister, to obtain a concession from Mr. Begin is an unbearably difficult task, almost a mission impossible. But if Mr. Begin makes a commitment, he always honors it."
Q: Mr. Sharon, you came to Egypt by land, this is not the first time. Why did you request to arrive by car?
Mr. Sharon: I like the desert. I like to see the desert in which I spent very many years. But the trip had also another meaning. It was important to strengthen our self-confidence, to see the security aspects Israel received as a result of the peace treaty with Egypt, and I mean the 150 km buffer zone. Though we know the situation, when you see matters with your own eyes, then even someone Who knows the area well and is near the sources of information cannot but be impressed by the fact that Egypt will have a 150 km-wide strip of demilitarized territory. We will make absolutely no concession on this matter. We will regard any violation as a serious development. We made this unequivocally clear to the other side. This space gives Israel those precious hours it needs in the event of war to call up the reserves. And I say this with the assessment that the peace between us and Egypt will be kept. The peace is a developing process. The signing of a treaty is an extremely important act, but a one-time act. The peace process is a continuing process, and layer after layer must be placed in order to build it. This is the reason why I chose to get an impression of what is happening in Sinai. To see Jebel Libni empty. To take a look at the Ya'alek and the Marara, at the Umm Hashiba area. When you see these sites and the open area and the absent fortifications, this has importance.
Q: Regarding the continuation of contacts, regarding the autonomy talks, this is a subject on which the positions of Egypt and Israel are contradictory. Was the matter discussed in the talks with President Mubarak?
Mr. Sharon: The subject of autonomy was brought up by me in only one context. I said that our position is that the Egyptians and Israelis must conclude an agreement as early as possible. The Cabinet did not set a date either. An early date was mentioned. This is the only thing I said. Egypt's position, as presented by President Mubarak, is that Israel can rest assured that after the withdrawal as well there will be no change in Egypt's position. They see no urgency in the date of signing (an agreement) since relations will not change, in their opinion, after the withdrawal.
I would like to add something before we conclude the interview, something about cooperation between the Foreign and Defense Ministries. Such cooperation is a decisive factor for success. After many years, perhaps after 25 years, there is cooperation between these two ministries. There is joint work which makes possible orderly and good staff work. Both sides are making use of professionals in each one of the ministries. There is someone to consult with and it is possible to work together, and this is a very important change from which we must learn.