Wednesday, 9 June, the fourth day of the war, witnessed a major turning point. Even before Mr. Habib had a chance to see Assad, word reached him from Washington that he was to tell the Syrian president that Syria should withdraw the additional surface-to-air missiles (SAM) batteries that the Israelis claimed were being brought in to reinforce Syrian positions. Habib had delivered the Israeli warnings to the Syrian government but was still waiting to see Assad when the Israeli air force attacked 19 Syrian SAM sites in the Bekaa Valley, destroying them all and shooting down 23 Syrian MIGs. That morning Mr. Sharon presented to the cabinet the plan to destroy the missiles. He explained that advance units were 8 kms from the Beirut-Damascus road, and exposed to Syrian artillery; they required aerial protection, and this could be provided only after the missile batteries were destroyed. While opinions were expressed that this could lead to wider confrontation with the Syrians, the cabinet approved the attack and it was carried out beginning at 14.00 that day. The attack was a spectacular success and changed the entire character of the war. The following are excerpts from a press conference with the Defense Minister.
Minister Sharon: The situation at this time - and this is before I go back and describe the beginning of the operation, its goals, methods of execution, [and] stages of execution so far - I would like to start with a report of today, which represents, without a doubt, a turning point in the war - and that is the destruction of the enemy's missile system. These missiles took part in air battles that took place.
During the attack on the missiles, approximately 20 Syrian MIG-21-s and MIG23's were shot down, while our air force suffered no losses. There is no doubt that this is a turning point in the war, and I estimate that in the wake of this action we will succeed in completing also the part that we have not yet completed, and that is the existence of those terrorist artillery and Katyusha units that are located in the southern Beka'a region and that we were unable to deal with until now because they were situated within the Syrian deployment. With the attack on the missiles there has begun a deterioration in the Syrian deployment in the Bekaa, retreat under pressure has started, and the situation at present is that our forces are pushing, while hitting - and I estimate hitting hard - at the enemy's armor in the eastern sector; and in my estimation, in a few more hours in this sector as well, the settlements in the north [of Israel] - and in this case the Galilee panhandle - will be completely beyond the range of any and all weaponry in the terrorists' hands at present. As you know, in the western sector this task was completed two days ago already, in an action which I would term very successful; and from an I.D.F. operational perspective, the general staff's planning, the total command of the Chief of Staff, the G.O.C., the divisional and brigade commands - and I would say, down to the last soldiers who fought - I think that this was one of the most brilliant actions that has [ever] been carried out. Not that there weren't a number of more difficult operations in the past; [but] the problem here was not only the operational difficulty - although this too was not absent here, and these were difficult actions - but these were very complicated, very involved actions, which required a great deal of thought to go along with the support, a lot of imagination in the planning which had to accompany each and every stage, whether before the start of the operation or while it was being carried out - daily monitoring, I would say even monitoring hour after hour on the ground, making decisions and implementing them exactly. In this matter I cannot but praise the Chief of Staff and the general staff, the G.O.C., and the field commanders; it seems to me that any nation would congratulate itself for having such commanders and such an army.
As for the operation itself: As you know, the operation was defined as an operation whose goal was to distance the settlements of Israel's northern border from the artillery range and rocket weaponry of the terrorist organizations. For the purpose of this range, the range was defined as 40 km.
The aim of our operation was not to attack the Syrian army - and we wanted to avoid attacking the Syrian army - and that is why we also did not attack in the sector where the Syrian army was located until now. And we tried every means, both direct and by relaying messages through others, in order to make clear to the Syrians that we have no intention of attacking them, but rather our intention is to bring about the elimination of the terrorists. To our regret, the Syrians did not reply to these appeals; and actually from the first day of the operation there was Syrian interference with our activities, interference which began with shelling, continued with the widening of the Syrian footholds beyond the limits in which they were located before we began the operation, and finally the dispatching of planes to attack our forces who were rooting out terrorists nests. And we tried during, all these days to limit hitting the Syrians as much as possible. We did only what was most necessary, with the aim of not widening the war. We had no intention of starting a war with Syria, [and] today also we have no intention of getting involved in a war with Syria - and we made this clear as possible. But we had no alternative. Ultimately it was not possible to complete the operation when some of the Galilee settlements were within artillery and Katyusha range of the terrorists. Therefore we began operations in the western sector, and only in the last stage did we successfully deal with the western side, and this after the government took a decision this morning - which was undoubtedly a key decision - which made the attack on the missiles possible. We had to do this already today, due to the moving of additional batteries into the area and the extension of the missile range area, something which greatly hampered our forces' operations and threatened them. The results were as I told you.
The picture in the other sectors is as follows: Beginning with the eastern sector, I would like to point out that the operation was perhaps an example of cooperation between branches, in which ground and navel forces carried out complex, complicated and successful operations, with a scope which is perhaps unprecedented for the I.D.F.
We never had its like. The I.D.F. carried out an operation of such scope, whether the navy's landing operation, or, I would say, the support to our forces via sea; and of course we must emphasize here the exemplary command and the precise planning of the air force headed by the air force commander and his pilots.