Ambassador Habib was finally received by President Assad in the late afternoon of 9 June, shortly after the word reached Damascus that the Syrian SAMs were destroyed and that the Syrian Air Force lost almost 30 planes and many experienced pilots. He proposed to the Syrian President a cease fire effective from 10 June at 06.00. He requested that Syria remove the P.L.0. forces from the Syrian army deployment in the Bekaa. Assad accepted the cease fire proposal but rejected the demand regarding the P. L. 0. He demanded an immediate and overall Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Habib contacted Washington and saw Assad again before midnight. President Reagan dispatched two messages. One to Assad promising eventual Israeli withdrawal and one to Mr. Begin demanding a ceasefire. Assad insisted on an immediate Israeli withdrawal, while Israel demanded special security arrangements in the 40 kilometer zone. By the end of that day, the I.D.F. had made impressive gains, but failed to reach the strategic Beirut-Damascus road and to unite with the Phallangist forces led by the Gemayel family. In the following interview the Defense Minister discussed the possibilities that Israel would have to consider once the war was over. Text:
Mr. Sharon: The Government of Israel's position is that there can be no further return to a situation in which the terrorist organizations will be able to base themselves, organize and use southern Lebanon as a base for murderous activities against Israel or against other places on the Golan. What will the solutions be? That, of course, is something which has to be discussed. There are various possibilities. This is not the kind of things that have to be done in the heat of battle. The battle is not yet over, the war it still at its height. In my opinion we have already achieved our objectives, but the war is not yet over. There is need for careful deliberation, for examining various possibilities. And, in the final analysis, to decide which is the best way that will make it possible that such a situation does not recur. And we are determined that such a situation will not recur. We are not under any pressure - and neither do I think that in this matter of protecting Jewish lives any pressure will avail. No one has the moral right to prevent us from defending our lives.
Q: What is the situation vis-a-vis the I.D.F.'s present deployment?
A: From the day we began planning the operation we saw the objective facing us to make every effort not to get involved in a war with Syria. Not because the I.D.F. does not have the military capability to beat the Syrians - we have the military capability to beat the Syrians. But we have not found any reason why we should get involved, or why the Syrians should get involved, in a war over a matter which does not concern them. Thus, when we began the operation, and while carrying it out, we concentrated large forces on the Golan Heights in order that the Syrians should understand, as a result of this, that it is inappropriate and there is no chance of achieving anything in the event of [military] involvement on the Golan Heights. Today as well, we have no interest in fighting the Syrians; and today, too, I would say to the Syrians: Don't get yourselves involved in a war. We are not looking for a war with you. Our objective is eliminating the danger of the terrorists in Lebanon. That is the purpose of the operation.