Ten days after the beginning of the war, Mr. Sharon declared again that most of the war's objectives had been gained and that essentially the war was over. But Israel now wanted to insure that the terrorists would not be able to operate against Israeli and Jewish targets from beyond the 40 km line. That meant that they would have to be eliminated from Beirut, peacefully or by other means. He confirmed that the I.D.F. was blocking entry into Beirut of the Syrian army and the P.L.0. that it now had a first class bargaining card through its control of the Beirut-Damascus road. He reiterated that Israel would remain on the new line the I.D.F. was holding until a political arrangement was achieved He followed that by saying that while not intervening in internal Lebanese affairs, the time was ripe for the Lebanese to organize their internal political affairs, but that depended partly on the United States and its actions.
The bulk of the interview was devoted to questions dealing with cabinet decisions, the degree to which the cabinet was fully informed of all moves and approved them in advance, criticism within the cabinet and the issue of national consensus and its rupture already during the second week of the war. Text:
Q: Is the war over?
Sharon: Insofar as we have achieved our goals, it can be viewed as a war which is over. Along with that, I must say, why did we go to war? The war in Lebanon was clearly a defensive war. Over a period of many years, we suffered from terrorist activities whose source was in Lebanon. From the end of the '60's until the present campaign, as the result of actions whose sources were in Lebanon, in which instructions were given in Lebanon, 1,002 Jews and Israelis were killed and 4,250 wounded in Israel and in Europe. This was the price in blood. This was a system of terrorism behind which stood the Soviets, and we can look and see the Soviets training the terrorists. The Soviets trained them, supplied them and prepared them. To counter this we set out with a defensive action, and we have achieved the goals we set for ourselves.
Q: Did the war achieve all of its objectives?
Sharon: The war achieved its objectives, which were several. One was the destruction of the terrorist infrastructure that was developed over the years. To hurt the terrorists, to capture many of them - and we have thousands as prisoners now. They have sustained heavy losses of life. The infrastructure we found among them far exceeded our estimates. We knew that the terrorists had developed this infrastructure over the years, but we did not know to what extent they had prepared themselves. I would like to tell you that we are transporting 40 large trucks full of terrorist equipment a day. We are talking about weapons, ammunition, terrorist devices. If we will continue at this pace, we will have to work another month and a half to empty out the tremendous arsenals we found.
Q: You knew that we would be doing this?
A: We didn't really know, but we had spoken about the possibility many times. But the first goal was actually the destruction of the terrorists. We succeeded in doing this. The second goal was to push the terrorists back from our settlements in the north to a point 40 to 45 kilometers away. This line is what our forces are holding. In whatever political arrangement is agreed upon, the terrorists will not be allowed to remain in this area. And I would like to emphasize, whoever thinks that the government, even for a moment, has given the terrorists immunity to operate beyond this line is mistaken. The government has not acknowledged the right of the terrorists to operate against us anywhere in the world and will not permit it. Imagine that we had gone just to the 40-45 kilometer line and stopped, and we would have left alone the terrorists who fled or who concentrated in the Damour area. What would happen when we reached a political arrangement? If we are talking about achievements, I would like to mention some more of them. We are preventing Syrian entry into Beirut. As well as that of additional terrorists. We have established roadblocks at the entrances to Beirut, but Beirut is not, under siege. We have blocked entry, we have prevented entry of Syrians and terrorists. And it must be remembered that without the Syrians, there would not be the infrastructure the terrorists had in Lebanon.
Q: How much time will we have to remain in Beirut - until a political arrangement is reached? And you said the war had ended because we had achieved our goals. In which way has the war not ended?
Sharon: We are currently facing difficult political contacts and negotiations. When we set out on this campaign, we knew that this was not going to be a little hike, that this would be a difficult war; but I want to say that also in this regard we were surprised. Veterans of past battles, experienced soldiers, the best of our officers and commanders participated in this campaign, and they themselves say that this was one of the toughest campaigns in which they were ever involved. We knew that we were going out this time in order to create a strip of 40 to 45 kilometers, in which there would no longer exist a base or infrastructure for terrorist operations. That was our goal. Now we have to enter difficult political negotiations, and I would like to say to you that - and this is one of the achievements of this war - in addition to the destruction of the terrorist infrastructure, in addition to the clearing of a security belt, in addition to blocking of Syrian access, we now have a first-class bargaining card. Our blocking the Damascus-Beirut road is this first-class bargaining card. And I would like to present some more achievements of ours: We have been able to contain the battles with the Syrians within Lebanese borders and not bring about general warfare. One of our big fears, and I believe this was the fear of everyone in Israel, was that of being dragged into a general war with Syria. We were successful in limiting the conflict. I see this as an achievement. I believe that we have opened the way to creating a new political situation. I would like to emphasize that we would not have gone to war for this purpose, but this situation has been created.
Q: Will we really stay in Beirut until new political arrangements are made in Lebanon?
Sharon: We will stay. First of all we are not in Beirut, we are in the suburbs of Beirut, the eastern suburbs of Beirut. We are not entering the city. I have given unequivocal orders. I have been there, and not just out of curiosity. I came there to make sure that our forces are in the places that we determined, even though I have complete confidence in them. I want to say that I have found, after not having been in the I.D.F. for many years, that this is a different I.D.F., it is a wonderful I.D.F. The chief of staff - I must say I was astonished at how he runs this force. The G.O.C. Northern Command, the Command Staff, the commanders in the field, the air force, the navy, this is a different armed force. This was a surprise - a pleasant surprise - all of us can be proud.
Q: I hear there is a bit of criticism on the I.D.F. that we had before.
A: God forbid, God forbid. A fighting force develops. Was the armed force of 1973 comparable to the force of 1948?
Q: What about the issue of a political settlement?
Sharon: We are not in Beirut and we are not besieging Beirut. We are just preventing the Syrians and the terrorists from bringing forces into Beirut because Beirut is a key point.
Q: We are also preventing them from leaving.
Sharon: We are not preventing the population, following inspections, from leaving.
Q: That is to say the Syrians and the terrorists are trapped and captive and cannot enter or leave.
Sharon: I believe that on this subject, this is a matter for the Lebanese and the terrorists to work out. I imagine some arrangement can be worked out whereby the terrorists will lay down their arms. That's their business. We have, I believe, a golden opportunity today. The Lebanese have an opportunity, one that just does not happen, does not come twice, to try and solve their problems. We are not intervening. That is their problem. At the same time, I would say that to state that the political situation in Lebanon is not important to Israel, for the Syrians to remain in Beirut and under their sponsorship reorganize the terrorist organizations so that they will again operate in a free manner - to Israel this is not important? Anyone who says this is expressing hypocrisy of the first order. This is important to Israel. But not for this did we go to war. Now for your question. Will we remain there? We will remain not just in the area east of Beirut, but along the whole line that we are holding today, until we come to a political agreement. We have no desire to take even one square centimeter of land from Lebanon. We honor the territorial integrity of Lebanon. We have repeated this many times. We also did not want to fight with the Syrians. We made every effort not to fight with them. This too, we did not want. But after we set out, after we got there, after we fought with them -and we had clear objectives - we will stay in place until a political settlement can be achieved that will guarantee that there will no longer be a terrorist infrastructure in Lebanon. That is our task.
Q: Mr. Sharon, you were always in favor of a new political order in Lebanon, or an altered one. What form do you anticipate for this new order in Lebanon?
Sharon: I was once asked this and I answered: If I were to be asked by the government whether I recommend going to war in order to attain a new political order in Lebanon, my answer would be certainly not. I was not asked by the government if I would recommend going to war in order to push back the Syrians, who occupied Lebanon in January 1976. To my sorrow, it was one of the mistakes of the government then that, I would say, it did not even oppose this action, even saw some good in this occupation, assuming that this would bring about control of the terrorists. But it endangered us greatly. But I want to say that if I were asked by the government if I would go to war in order to push back the Syrians, my answer would have been certainly not, certainly not. We set out here on a defensive war against the terror organizations which have caused us thousands of losses over the years. I have already mentioned what happened from the end of the '60's until now. I can add that in addition to the more than 1,000 who were killed in the '50's, we have stood for 100 years against Arab terrorism. In regard to the arrangement, we cannot intervene in this arrangement, this is an internal Lebanese matter. We would be very happy if in Lebanon a government would be formed which would be free and a part of the western world, and with which we could reach a peace agreement. I see this as a dream, in which we would sign a peace treaty with another Arab state. I would be happy to do this with Lebanon, as well as with any other Arab state. But we cannot intervene. What I can say is that to my way of thinking, the Lebanese today have a golden opportunity to organize their internal political affairs. This is not Israel's affair.
Q: Are they capable of doing this in view of the divisions among them?
Sharon: In my opinion, a situation has been created in which this is possible. it is up to them. I repeat, it is up to them. From our standpoint, we will insist on an arrangement in which there will no longer be any terrorists in Lebanon.
Q: That's already clear, but are the Lebanese able to take their affairs into their own hands?
Sharon: I believe the Lebanese are capable. I think the matter depends to a great extent on the Americans. To what extent they will understand that there is an opportunity today to turn Lebanon into a free country. It is a country that mostly has been occupied by the Syrians and another part has been occupied by the terrorists. It was no mere accident that our forces were received - and I heard today that MK Imri Ron said - it was not for nothing that our troops were received with flowers when they came. Those people were under an intimidating regime for years. I think that if the Americans understand this - and I believe they are thinking along these lines - and they can give the Lebanese a period in which to organize themselves, they will be able to do this. I believe this is important. This matter contains the seeds of a possible peace agreement with another Arab government. But we will not intervene in this matter. Not for this purpose did we go to war.
Q: Is this not a timely opportunity to destroy the terrorist command in western Beirut, which in the past we attacked from the air?
Sharon: The cabinet decided that we will not enter western Beirut, on the basis that this is a capital, although essentially this is a capital of a seeming government, a controlled government, a government trampled upon by the Syrians and the terrorists. But formally, this is the capital of a nation, and the cabinet made the decision not to enter. We hope that the Lebanese will perform this action. At the same time I must say frankly that everyone who today accuses us will one day come to us and say, "Look, you were in Lebanon, you were on the outskirts of Beirut, you were a stone's throw from the terrorists, you erred in not attacking them." The present cabinet decision is not to enter Beirut.
Q: Are you able to accept this?
Sharon: I am a member of the cabinet. All decisions taken in connection with this campaign were cabinet decisions. As a result, I certainly accept this. The cabinet makes its decisions by majority rule. I would also like to say that it seems to me - and I am familiar with all of Israel's wars, I had the privilege of participating in all of Israel's wars -there was no war in which not a "kitchen cabinet" or even a ministerial defense committee, but... the whole cabinet sat as a defense committee. The cabinet met every day, at least once a day. There were even days when it met more, and it made decisions. Perhaps because of the sensitivity of the subject, it made the decisions. Not only this: The cabinet participated in all the decisions, made all the decisions, weighed all the situations. I must say that I appeared daily before the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee. I must tell you something personal. During these ten days, I was at the front every day. I met every day with the commanders in evaluating the situation, in planning operations. I was in Jerusalem at least once a day for the cabinet meeting, and I was in the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee every day.
Q: So why have the members of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee expressed rather severe criticism that they were not kept informed? How can that be reconciled with what you have said?
Sharon: The members of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee were kept fully informed. In what way were they not informed as compared to the cabinet? They were not informed, and rightly so, of the steps that were about to be taken. Every day the cabinet knew what was going to be done the next day. The committee was not kept informed in this way; it was told in a general way what happened, why it happened, and I don't think that we have to expand on this. Maybe it would be enough to look at today's meeting and what came of it to realize that when one is dealing with matters affecting the fate of thousands of people, it is impossible to come to a body that is essentially a political body.
Q: You don't rely on such people as Haim Bar-Lev, Motta Gur, or Yitzhak Rabin?
Sharon: It is not a personal issue at all.
Q: But these are the people on the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee.
Sharon: It is not a personal issue. The Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee never received reports on steps that were yet to be taken. They were told about our aims, and about what was being done. The cabinet, on the other hand, got a full report on what was happening, on our thoughts, our assessments of the situation, and moves and steps. I would like to hear one minister - maybe you know of some minister who says he wasn't a partner in these decisions, who didn't know, who wasn't told.
Q: This is not a cabinet session. But there is public criticism.
Sharon: I would like - excuse me, I have something to say on this subject. I am full of esteem for the cabinet - and I am responding to your point here - (interruption) - no, excuse me, let me finish what I have to say.
Q: Maybe you didn't understand what I meant.
Sharon: No, no, I understood, and I want to tell you something. The Prime Minister and the entire Cabinet were partners in the consultations and fateful decisions taken throughout the period. So your observation that this is not the Cabinet is out of place.
Q: No, I meant Sharon: I think the Cabinet, for the first time - not that past cabinets weren't reported to, but this is the first instance I'm aware of in which on the one hand, an operation involving several branches of the I.D.F. was conducted in the field - perhaps one of the toughest and most complex operations, in which a tremendous amount of thought was invested at all levels - and on the other hand, the most complicated political problems were involved, in which the cabinet was a full partner. Here I would like to say, this is a cabinet which showed great courage in making uniquely difficult decisions on this subject. I think that both the Prime Minister and all the cabinet members deserve nothing but praise for this, for all of them took part in the deliberations Q: Are there no cabinet ministers who would disagree with what you have just said?
Sharon: On the fact that they took part...
Q: They were all partners and comrades? We know there is criticism within the cabinet.
Sharon: The political structure: Does any minister claim that he did not take part in the deliberations, or wasn't given a chance to say what he thought? If you are asking me whether all the ministers agreed on every step that was taken, there's no reason why it should have been that way. Our structure in Israel is truly democratic; decisions are made by majority rule. Each person in the Cabinet had a chance - and the sessions sometimes went on for hours -to say what he thought. I would like to praise the Cabinet members for sticking firmly and resolutely to their positions. Decisions ultimately were made by majority rule, as is required in a democratic regime.
Q: I would like to ask the question I intended to ask you before. There is public criticism of the operation for having exceeded the 40-45 km area. Aren't you afraid that this departure simply puts cracks in what is termed our national consensus on war?
Sharon: The war did not depart even slightly from what was decided. We never gave the terrorists immunity beyond the 45 km line. We never gave such immunity. Just as an aside, the figure of 40-45 km does not appear at all in the Cabinet resolution. I have something else I would like to tell you - (interruptions)
Q: What is the public consensus?
Sharon: What do you mean by "Public Consensus?" How does a public consensus get undermined? When people come and say, "The operation went beyond what the cabinet resolved," That is how they attempt to destroy a national consensus. Now then: We had very difficult and sensitive problems here. One of these problems was that we wanted to avoid combat with the Syrians. So we tried to convey to the Syrians, who were in the eastern sector of the front, both direct and indirect messages. We didn't ask a lot of them: We demanded, not their withdrawal northward to the radius (of 45 km from Israel's northernmost settlement - ed.), but only that they move the terrorists to the other side of that radius. We thought that if we made a flanking move behind the Syrian rear lines, in addition to our diplomatic efforts in Damascus via Philip Habib and other ways, we could save lives. And so we did. All our efforts here were to save lives. We believed that an offensive via a threat from the north and erosion from the south would save human lives, and so we acted. This matter was brought before the cabinet, which adopted a resolution; and I think that this is the way to act. We also had a problem in the Beka'a: a missile system. This missile system was beefed up. Here the Syrians deceived us just when Philip Habib was visiting, and so we had the problem of this whole area (which I am pointing to now) being vulnerable to missiles. Therefore, so as to reach the north and there constitute a threat - whose purpose, I repeat, was to save lives - we had to look for a route that was beyond missile range. It is for this reason that we went in the direction of Aley; we went that way so that at least one thrust would be beyond missile range. So there was no departure from the cabinet's declared aims here. This is a war. In war, moves are determined, but then - in the Six-Day war, someone thought of going to Jerusalem, of going to Judea and Samaria - there were developments. And here, too, there were developments. We had hoped to avoid war with the Syrians. Once it became clear to us that we could not persuade them, we engaged in an outflanking maneuver whose purpose was to threaten them.
Q: Excuse me for insisting on this point. The Prime Minister brought the question of national consensus to the Knesset. He got the opposition's support for the 45 kilometers. When the war went beyond that, the national consensus was damaged. My question concerns the national consensus, not the cabinet's decisions.
Sharon: For now I'll leave it for the opposition to decide why it is criticizing the government. I suggest we discuss this after the war. I think that this will not be one of the prettier chapters in the [history of] the opposition. But if you think for one moment that in order for this or that member of the opposition to support us all the way we would have had to halt our forces here, facing concentrations of thousands of terrorists, under Katyusha and artillery fire, and we wouldn't have reached the position in which we now hold a first-rate bargaining card - this, just so as to win the support of this or that member of the opposition? This is a responsible government... (unintelligible) it adopted the resolution on the nuclear reactor in Iraq which, too, was a daring decision. When we are at war and are faced with the problem of casualties and losses, we do not regard the question of support by the opposition, but rather what is best for the Israeli people - that is what we consider. I would like to say a word here to the bereaved families, to the mothers. 1, along with everyone else, feel the pain of these losses. We have paid a high price. I don't buy it when experts and veteran fighters tell me that the number of casualties wasn't great for such a difficult war - and I have to say, this was an extremely difficult war - but I don't buy it. Why? Because for us, the anxiety for each life is such that we don't look at our casualties as statistics. We don't play with statistics when it comes to our fallen. But this I will say: For a hundred years we have been fighting for bur existence here, a hundred years. Over a number of years we have had 1,002 people killed by terrorist acts.
Should we not go to war for defense, for our natural right to defend ourselves, in such a case? The casualties are painful, I feel the pain of these losses. I knew many of them, I have seen these boys in the field, it hurts me just as it hurts each and every one of us. It's a high price. But should we be willing to pay this price of 1,000 killed - this price we are willing to pay? But that we should go to war to defend ourselves - this price we are not willing to pay? We have no choice if we want to exist here. If we want to go on living and building here, we must do this sometimes. Let's hope that it will be as seldom as possible, and that we really will attain true peace.
Q: Is there any fear of a renewed outbreak of fighting with the Syrians in Lebanon in the near future?
Sharon; We have said again and again that we don't want war with the Syrians. We have done this since the start of the war. Even the order of I.D.F. received from the Cabinet said that we would not attack the Syrians unless they attacked us. And that, by the way, is what happened. They attacked us while we were dealing with the terrorists; they attacked us when we hadn't even touched them. This is also our position after the war: We do not want war with the Syrians. Not because we cannot defeat them - we have proved that we can defeat the Syrians. Even though the fighting was confined to a very narrow sector, the Syrians sustained very heavy losses and the I.D.F. once again proved its total superiority. But we don't want to fight the Syrians. I hope the Syrians understand that the cease-fire must be kept, and I hope that everyone understands that negotiations should be started as soon as possible, though I will say that they may be difficult. But we must be capable of dealing with these difficult negotiations, and we have come up with the best possible bargaining cards for these difficult political negotiations.
Q: You said you hope Sharon: And I hope that it will be a short period, because we have no interest in staying there a long time.
Q: You said you hope the Syrians don't start a war. But what is your assessment
will they start a war or not? Aren't they beefing up their forces in the Beka'a?
Sharon: In the framework of the cease-fire, we explicitly set out that the Syrians should not introduce surface-to-air missiles into the Beka'a. On this matter they were told straight out that the missiles would be attacked immediately if they were brought in - and they understood this and did not introduce them. At present, I view the Syrians in the Beka'a as engaged in reinforcing, mainly building up fortifications, doing everything an army does in a defensive position. But one thing should be recalled. Our current deployment in Lebanon - and this, too, is important to know -not only how you begin an operation but where you are when it is over, in view of the possibility that despite our desire for peace (which we have already demonstrated), the other side might start a war. In our current deployment, whereby we are sitting, I would say, on the Syrian-Lebanese border with Damascus in range of our artillery on the one hand, and on the other hand in the northern sector in such a way as to threaten the Syrian deployment from its rear, we already have done something, though we didn't want to; we have already faced this battle and proved that we can do it. I hope that the Syrians will understand that a political solution must be found. But one thing must be understood about this political solution: Israel has conditions, and will, I think, insist on these conditions with complete resolve; and the cabinet, which has shown courage in these decisions, will face its decisions in the political sphere with the same courage.
Q: Is one of our conditions for withdrawing the I.D.F. from Lebanon a complete and total Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon?
Sharon: Yes. We feel that no foreign military force should be in Lebanon, except for that force - perhaps multinational - whose task will be to ensure that the terrorist infrastructure isn't rebuilt, and maybe to provide a screen behind which the Lebanese government can get organized and build up its army. Except for this, no foreign army should be in Lebanon, neither terrorist forces, or the Syrian army, or the Israeli army.
Q: What about the superpowers? For instance, there have been reports of a Soviet airlift to Syria. Are these reports correct? What role are the Soviets playing now in the Lebanese crisis?
Sharon: We don't make light of the Soviet Union, we never have. But at the same time, I think we need to take things calmly, to examine matters thoroughly. There is an airlift of sorts, principally bringing war material
Q: On a large or small scale?
Sharon: On the scale, I would say, which has been the accepted one following past wars. It should be understood that the Syrians sustained a very heavy blow. They have lost, I would estimate, about 30 missile batteries either destroyed or severely damaged. Something that had been perceived as impenetrable was in fact shattered into fragments by our Air Force, which demonstrated its incredible superiority not only in the pilots' daring and the commanders' ability, -but also in a great deal of planning. Replacements will be supplied for this destroyed equipment. I would guess that the equipment currently being supplied is meant to fill in the gaps from what was damaged.
Q: Is it a real airlift, with...
Sharon: I don't think we should exaggerate. I suggest we take things more calmly. The Soviet Union isn't to be treated lightly, it's a superpower; but we should see the dangers as they are, and not exaggerate them. We should see the danger and weigh things as they are.
Q: Would you include in this assessment the movements of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean?
Sharon: There have been Soviet fleet movements - and there have also been American fleet movements. Today an American destroyer entered the port of Beirut. Both sides have moved. Look, we're not playing by ourselves in this arena. We have two superpowers here, and there is also Israel, which must show courage, endurance, and most of all composure. Israel must demonstrate composure, national unity - I would say, more love, internal love, fraternity -believe me, if we had that we could face anything.
Q: The Americans have shown restraint towards, if not support for, this operation. How would you explain this?
Sharon: I think the Americans understood. Perhaps I should say, we didn't surprise them. Not that they knew the date of the operation, nor that we knew there would be an assassination attempt on the life of our Ambassador in London.
Q: Were they in the picture?
Sharon: As to the date, absolutely not. But they knew that Israel had reached the end of its ability [to put up with the situation in Lebanon] - and a great many meetings were held on this issue. I would like to say that when I last visited Washington, contrary to the reports according to which the main topic was the Iran-Iraq War, a completely secondary issue - maybe it was raised by the Americans, but not at all by me - the main issue I raised there was that of terrorism, the Palestinians, being a threat to peace. That was the main issue. I told them that there was no greater threat to the peace which has been reached in the Middle East - though I am happy it has stood the test -and to any future peace processes than that of terrorism. There is no greater threat. I made it clear to them (and this was one of the reasons I went there) that Israel had reached the end of the road, that we would act because we had no choice. They, too, understood that there was no other alternative. I think that it was the threat of terror to peace which disturbed them, and that they had begun to understand this issue in its broader context, which is the threat of terror to peace. It is for this reason, I would say, that the American reaction has been relatively restrained.
Q: Might this operation affect the autonomy talks, or participation by Arabs from Judea and Samaria in those talks?
Sharon: I think it can only have a positive effect. I would never have recommended to the cabinet to go to war for such a purpose, never. I like everyone else, had great hesitations; like every other cabinet member I had great hesitations. As the person responsible for thousands and thousands of lives of men in the field, I knew precisely. I had great hesitations, and therefore I was extremely cautious. I wouldn't ever recommend going to war for such a reason. But I think that when they see how the P.L.O. infrastructure has been shattered, the residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, those who believe as we do in the necessity for peaceful coexistence, should come to the conclusion that we must start talking to one another. I hope that as soon as we have time, we can start having more intensive contacts and attempt to make progress in our relationship with the Arabs in the territories.
Q: You spoke very emotionally before about our long and bloody struggle against terrorism. Surely you agree that the terrorists haven't been so badly hurt that all terrorism will cease? What does it do to us, to have the U.S. media showing the destruction we caused the civilian population, while the terrorists become yearly more sophisticated? How can we live with our image in the world and with our self-image?
Sharon: First, we must fight. We are a 3,700 year-old people which has fought 3,700 years for its existence, and we must go on fighting. For the last hundred years we have been fighting for our renewed existence in the Land of Israel. When terrorism comes - which is one of the main factors - you ask how we can endure this?
Q: I'm asking what it does to us, when in fighting for our existence we hurt civilians, cities...
Sharon: I would like to read you an order, operations order No. 4, I'll show it to you - this is one of tens of thousands of documents we found. Not all of them have been translated yet. This is the order in Arabic, but I'll read it in Hebrew. It deals with built-up areas in the city of Sidon, excellent areas in which to take cover: the subject of operations order No. 4. "To the Palestinian National Liberation Front, Fatah, the General Command of the AI-Asifah Forces, Al-Castel Forces, Black September Brigades, Sidon Area Headquarters." In this document found in Sidon, it says, inter alia (I will read two paragraphs): "The built-up areas of Sidon and surrounding villages are excellent areas for taking cover. The trees give perfect camouflage to vehicles and people. We should locate in the built-up areas of Sidon, in the refugee camps, and in the villages." I would like to tell you something. I myself gave a briefing to all the commanders at 5 a.m. on Sunday, the first day of the war, in which I ordered all the commanders not only to obey the order but also to convey it to every single last soldier - the order not to harm civilians. The figures being reported are exaggerated. You should know that the entire population in our hands, including Christians, Shiites, Druze, Palestinians - the entire population is 600,000 people. All together, 600,000 people. There are tens, hundreds of villages and towns that were completely unharmed. That same morning I went to give instructions not to harm civilians. But after a day of fighting, we realized that in Tyre and Sidon, where we had already landed our forces, the terrorists were shooting at us from people's homes. I held a middle of the night discussion (as were held every night) to which I summoned all the commanders. I wish the entire Israeli people could have looked on during that discussion; they would experience deep shock, a deep shock of admiration. I put the question to all the commanders: We have run into an extremely difficult problem. We have an easier way to solve it, by bombing and utterly destroying those areas through which we must pass. The other possibility is much harder and bloodier: We can clean out buildings. We discussed it. All the commanders took part, and all of them, from the Chief of Staff on down, including me, came to the conclusion that we must not do this (i.e. bomb the cities - ed.). We said we knew this would cost us, and it did cost us. But we decided not to do this. I must say, every one of us has had his moment of truth, but in that meeting I witnessed one of the greatest moments of truth I had ever seen in my life. I came to these commanders, who had to send their men, had to order them to go into this hell - and we came to the conclusion that we must not do this. We came to the conclusion that though in the short term it might be easy and effective, with fewer [Israeli] casualties, in the long national view, as a moment of truth, when we decided not to do this. For several days we fought extremely difficult battles. You must understand that there were frequently cement cellars and bunkers under the houses, which had two, three, four storeys. It should also be recalled that we were dealing with an enemy whose values are utterly different, an enemy which held members of its own people hostage and executed children in front of their parents (as happened in Al-Hilweh, in Sidon) to keep us from cleaning out the houses. We are dealing here with a cruel enemy. Only when we reached the last stages, when we realized that we had no choice, did we use more massive air force and artillery fire against civilian settlements. I tell you, we did something that no army in the world, no people in the world - even if it has pretensions to being the most ethical and cultured people in the world - would have done. But we did it, and I want to say, with all the pain - maybe bereaved mothers and fathers are watching me at this moment - I can look them in the eye on this issue. I think we made the right decision on this, and that any people could be proud that its army decided to take such a course.