On 29 June the Knesset-held a debate on the war in Lebanon. Mr. Rabin, speaking for the opposition, said that while the nation was united on the original war aims, the new developments went beyond the national consensus. Mr. Sharon spoke about his talks in Washington on the eve of the war and detailed the extent of the P.L.0. violations of the cease fire in the year preceding the war. He reiterated that all major decisions were reached by the entire Cabinet and explained the need for the tightening of the siege on Beirut. He said that the Government had resolved that the P.L.O. must cease to exist and that Israel now wanted to create a triangle of peace along the Mediterranean coast. This would include Israel, Egypt and Lebanon, with open borders from Beirut to Cairo. Text:
We are now in the midst of the struggle to uproot the terrorist P.L.O., its headquarters and bases, from Lebanese soil. The fighters of the I.D.F. have surrounded Beirut and the Government has granted time to the terrorists and their leaders to lay down their arms and to depart the areas in which they are trapped in west Beirut. From a purely military point of view, it is clear that the I.D.F. can guarantee the elimination of this center of anti-Israel international terror. But we are not anxious for war; it would be better were the terrorists to hurry and search their souls at this moment of truth. Nations going out to war against a cruel enemy, that has been responsible for the deaths and many thousands of innocent [victims] do not generally behave thusly. But this is our way: We have offered
the autonomy plan for peaceful coexistence to the Palestinian Arabs of the Land of Israel; but we shall by no means allow the terrorist P.L.O. to continue at the same time to kill and attack, indiscriminately, and, on the other hand, to endanger the peace process, on behalf of whose realization we have sacrificed so much. Almost from the beginning of our resettling in the Land of Israel, Arab terror, Palestinian terror, in various incarnations, has tried to frustrate the Zionist enterprise. It caused innumerable victims; it caused wars. After the Six Day War, it established and strengthened itself in Lebanon. That peaceful and prosperous country was trampled under the feet of thousands of Palestinian terrorists and their commanders who sowed terror and murder in Israel, and elsewhere, against Israelis and Jews. There were Palestinian terror operations that hurt non-Jews; that is to say, they were aimed at Jews and Israelis - including women and children - but fate had it that the victims be non-Jews. In my eyes, there is no difference what religion or nationality the victims were, and I believe that against terror, in the war against it, everyone must be united. We in Israel have overcome Palestinian terror, because we unified our ranks in war against it; and we always aspired that other free nations like us, that citizens regardless of [national] origin, would support and aid our never-ending war against Palestinian terror. This terror, which has originated predominately from Lebanon, has caused between the years 1965-1982 the deaths of 1,392 civilians and soldiers, and the wounding of 6,239 civilians and soldiers, in the Land of Israel and elsewhere. I should like you to know that during this same time we foiled thousands of other attacks, in a quiet effort of our best people - who sometimes paid with their lives; otherwise, the number of victims would have been several times greater.
Similarly, over all these years, we undertook initiated actions, bold operations, like the blowing up of the planes in the Beirut airport in December 1968, and the raid into Beirut and the execution of the terrorist leaders in April 1973. And who does not remember the Entebbe operation? Operations in which we paid dearly. The war against Palestinian terror - its commanders, its members, its bases - has been the declared policy of all the governments of Israel, concomitant with the unification and backing of all the people's ranks. And rightly so: because the declared goal of this terror is to liquidate the State of Israel. After the horrible murder of our athletes in Munich, Minister Yisrael Galilee eulogized them on 7.9.72 and said, i.a.: "The bullets that were fired at our dear ones were fired at the heart of the nation. We shall avenge the spilt blood of our sons." And then Minister Bar-Lev, also on 7.9.72, added: "We must take revenge on the terrorists and crush them." In the same context of the massacre in Munich, the Prime Minister, the late Mrs. Golda Meir declared during a Knesset debate on 12.9.72: "We have no choice but to strike at the terrorist organizations wherever we may find them." And from the Knesset resolution of the aforementioned debate: "The State of Israel will act constantly against the terrorist organizations, their bases, and their accomplices, until all end is put to their abominable activity." After the fatal attack on Kiryat Shemonah on 11.4.74, Mrs. Meir declared in the Knesset: "The Government of Lebanon should know that we consider it and its residents who abet the terrorists" - and she emphasized who abet the terrorists, those who abet the terrorists -"responsible for this murder." And after the innocent boys and girls were slaughtered in Ma'alot on 15 May '74, the Prime Minister of Israel, Mrs. Golda Meir, announced on television: "I can promise that any government of Israel will do everything in its power in order to cut off the hands that want to hurt a child or adult in a settlement, a city, or a town." Most of us supported that policy then. When I say most of us, perhaps the smallest majority did not support [it]. And thus I believe and am convinced, today as well, standing on the brink of the completion of the Operation "Peace for the Galilee". Were we not united, we would not have been able to persevere as we did in the war against Palestinian terror and reduce the number of its victims and its political damage.
The buildup of the terrorists' bases in Lebanon demanded of us constant, ongoing security activity, of broad-scope proportions. Between the years 1970-1981, the I.D.F. undertook no less than 9,794 initiated actions of ongoing security along the Lebanese border and in Lebanon, including patrols, observation and ambushes. In addition, in those same years, the I.D.F. undertook 605 different operations deep within Lebanon - more than 50 wounded per year, to ground, air, sea and integrated forces. This is a broad scale of activity, of onus on our security - not to mention the loss of valuable life that fell in the various operations. South and Central Lebanon became a huge arsenal and training [center] for Palestinian terror. The headquarters in Beirut prepared as an additional stage in the war against Israel a system of artillery of hundreds of Katyusha, cannon and mortar barrels aimed at our settlements in the Galilee - and all this with the protection and support of the armor, the artillery and the anti-aircraft missiles of Syria. Last summer, our towns and settlements in the Galilee became targets of indiscriminate terrorist artillery fire the order came directly from Beirut.
When we agreed to the cease-fire of 24 July 1981, we announced in advance that we shall not acquiesce in any terrorist action from any border or whatever sector. We made it clear that the cease-fire agreement achieved with the mediation of the United States applies also to the attacks of Palestinian terror outside the borders of the State of Israel. In all the contacts with the United States held by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, other Ministers, and me, myself, we spared no effort in clarifying that our firm position is not to ignore terrorist actions aimed from Beirut at our settlements and civilians in the Galilee [in] all of Israel or anywhere in the world. But the terrorist organizations in Lebanon thought otherwise: since the ceasefire of 24.7.81, 290 terrorist actions were perpetrated in Israel and elsewhere, [and] they caused the deaths of 29 people and the wounding of 271 others. We regarded this very gravely. We raised our [levels of] alert, we concentrated army units, in order to deter the terrorists. But we held our fire, in order to find diplomatic ways to silence the terror. Besides the incessant efforts of the Prime Minister and the entire Government in political contacts, I will now quote from the remarks I made in my conversations with ministers of other nations, in addition to remarks I reiterated publicly with regard to the P.L.O. terror in Lebanon and in Beirut.
In my conversation in Jerusalem with the guest, then British Foreign Minister Lord Carrington on 31.3.82, 1 emphasized: "Israel's foremost problem is the problem of Arab terror. It must be understood that Arab terror can lead to war." And I went on to say that in 1950, we were closer to peace than in 1977. But precisely at that time terrorist activity began, and we suffered heavy losses. We were a small army, we tried to defend with intensive measures; we did not succeed: the borders were long, meandering, hilly terrain, covered with vegetation (unintelligible - ed.). And we had to react. The terrorists hid, as today in Lebanon, among the civilian population; and to our great chagrin, civilians whom we did not want to hurt began to get hurt. And then, in order to avoid this, we started to attack military bases, in order to arouse them to action against the terrorist organizations. And thus we were dragged into a cycle of wars for 25 years. I went on and told Lord Carrington: We don't want to attack Lebanon. We indeed have military plans, but we don't want to attack Lebanon. We don't want wars; but there is no way of knowing how things will develop, because it's not in our control. And on 19 April '82 1 explained to another honored guest, the Norwegian Defense Minister, the serious situation that the terrorists - with Syrian protection - are creating in Lebanon; and I stressed that Israel cannot sit with its hands tied in the face of this terror. We are getting close the point where the situation can no longer continue whereby the world will call on us to restrain ourselves every time the P.L.O. kills a Jews; and we will then be requested again to display patience. About a week before Operation "Peace for the Galilee", about two weeks before Operation "Peace for the Galilee" - and then I didn't imagine that this war would be imposed on us so soon - I was invited to talks in Washington during my visit to the United States. On Tuesday, 25 May '82, about ten days before the operation, I brought up the problem of Palestinian terror in Lebanon, in all its gravity, to Secretary of State Haig and Secretary of Defense Weinberger. I explained to Mr. Haig the problem of Lebanon; we are in a difficult position: we cannot permit the activity of the terrorists. The Prime Minister wrote the President to this effect. Explosives were discovered again today. This is simply notes from the conversation. Everything can happen. If the problem were simple we would have acted long ago. But it is almost impossible to act without also attacking the Syrians as well. We have no intention of attacking Syria. The question is whether they will understand that the action is limited, not against them, to clean Lebanon of the military and political infrastructure of the P.L.O., something that will rid us of them for many years. I went on to tell the Secretary of State what I had previously told Secretary Weinberger: Our goal is not to bring about the establishment of an independent Lebanon - that is not our goal - and also not to remove the Syrians, although these could be additional results. We cannot live under the threat of Palestinian terrorism from Beirut. We have a dilemma, but we do not see another way to go in and to clean house. We do not want war at all, or with Syria in particular. At the same time, we do not want you to be surprised. When this will happen, we do not know. This was said on 25 May '82. Several days later, our Ambassador Shlomo Argov was shot and severely wounded in an ambush of Palestinian terrorists in London. We responded with an aerial [attack], and our settlements in the Galilee, which had been turned into hostages by the P.L.O. terrorists, were again attacked. The I.D.F. set out in battle against the bases and headquarters of terror in Lebanon, a complex and complicated campaign, in mountainous areas against terrorists who hid behind civilians, and under the protection of the Syrian army, which thought if enjoyed freedom of action. Our army - its chief of staff, its commanders, its branches, its services and its soldiers - is deserving of all praise, as an Israel army the likes of which we have not known to this day, in its campaigns, in its dedication, its courage and above all its morality and purity of arms. I haven't served in the army for several years now. I said to the commanders after the operation was over: I returned to be with you, and I found a different army. The I.D.F. continued, made progress, developed. We have a wonderful army in all areas, in all the areas I mentioned. We went out to fight our war against terror, not against Syria and not on behalf of the Christians. We are the only people in the world who rose up to give aid to the Christian community in Lebanon, who cried out from under the threats and deeds of the murder organizations. But we went out to this war solely for our defense, a pure defensive war against bases operating against us with power for more than 15 years now. We have lost in this war many of our best sons: 271 fallen - each one our own flesh and blood - fighters who fought valiantly in Lebanon, in order to guarantee peace and security for us. To the bereaved families we send from here our condolences and express our sorrow. 13 are still missing. 1,470 soldiers have been wounded, 69 of them seriously, and 271 moderately. To all of them are sent wishes for full recovery. Indeed, this was a defensive, just and difficult war.
I shall try now to describe to the Members of the house, Mr. Speaker, the central problems we faced during the operation and the difficult decisions we were forced to make while carrying it out. And perhaps I shall begin with another subject which itself, I would say, I think, represents not a little, the lack of clarity that surrounds the operation. The Government of Israel - and I shall give examples - the Government of Israel was always careful in its announcements at the beginning of wars and campaigns. And that is understandable. I shall bring examples. This is the announcement that was made at the outset of the Sinai campaign; and I say again, I reiterate and stress, during our whole history we were, at the start of campaigns, cautious in our announcements. And I justify being cautious in our announcements. And I will simply give examples of announcements, an announcement that I certainly supported and I support it today as well - I don't think I would make a different announcement. On 30 October, '56, this was at night after the Sinai Campaign broke out, the following announcement was issued: "I. D. F. forces penetrated and attacked a fedayeen unit at Kuntilah, in Ein Naqeb and seized positions westwards of the junction near the Suez Canal. This action comes in the wake of the Egyptian military attacks on Israeli transportation designed to wreak havoc and deny peaceful life in Israel." This was the announcement of the I.D.F. spokesman at night. I myself remember it, I heard it on the way, in the region of Kuntilah...
And this is the announcement... issued at the beginning of the Six Day War... "The I.D.F. spokesman announced this morning that... fierce battles are raging on the southern front between Egyptian air and armored forces that were moving toward Israel and our forces that have gone out to check them."
Years have passed in the meantimes, things have changed, circumstances have changed, situations have changed, many things have changed.
The announcement of the Government of Israel on its decision to embark on Operation "Peace for the Galilee" was much clearer and much more comprehensive.
What does the Government's announcement say?
Peace for the Galilee
1. On Saturday night, 14 Sivan 5742, 5.6.82, the Cabinet resolved to instruct the Israel Defense Forces to place all the civilian population of the Galilee beyond the firing range of the terrorists in Lebanon, where they, their bases and their headquarters are concentrated.
2. The name of the operation is "Peace for Galilee".
3. During the operation, the Syrian army will not be attacked unless it attacks our forces.
4. Israel continues to aspire to the signing of a peace treaty with independent Lebanon, its territorial integrity preserved.
During the campaign, major decisions were taken in light of problems that came up. There is personal, comprehensive ministerial responsibility in our Cabinet, and the Cabinet took difficult decisions during the operation. And I am proud to be a member of this courageous Cabinet, led by Prime Minister Menachem Begin, that has already taken difficult decisions, such as the decision on peace, the decision on the reactor and other difficult decisions it faced. What were the main, difficult decisions we faced during the operation? And they themselves perhaps explain and describe the stages of the operation.
The first main problem facing us was how to try and avoid fighting the Syrians. I would like to quote for you, Mr. Speaker and members of the house, an excerpt from remarks I made during a meeting on the night of 6.6.82: "1 want to say now what is happening with regard to the Syrians. During the day the Syrians were quiet; there has been no attempt at aerial interference on their part - but in the afternoon they opened up with artillery fire without our having touched them: with heavy cannons (unintelligible - ed.) and we suffered several wounded. There are two ways of dealing with this: one is to despair of their non-involvement in the war and attack them directly; the second possibility is to advance further north and try to pressure them; or get close to them in their rear, on the assumption that it could be that the very risk of their being bottled up here (I then pointed to the map while I was speaking) will cause them to take the step of retreating.
Our recommendation was not to approach this area, [but] to try to move further north and try to threaten with a cut-off and not attack directly. And perhaps, nevertheless in the face of the danger of being surrounded they will move. That was the recommendation and the Prime Minister wanted to bring it to the Cabinet. The Prime Minister was then at the forward command post of the forces and I was requested by the Prime Minister to present his position, the position of the General Staff, and I presented also my own position at that Cabinet meeting, chaired by the Prime Minister's substitute, Deputy Prime Minister Simcha Ehrlich. And I continue: "We have a very probable estimation that the advance of our forces in the direction of the Syrians today would immediately encounter fire; therefore, comes the idea of perhaps coming from here, from the other side of Karoun Lake, in order to try and create a new situation." And in answer to a question - I was asked a question - of one of the Cabinet Ministers, I answered: "Yes, we are going beyond the 40 kilometers. There are two possibilities: one is to go straight ahead; the other is to try and outflank. We are trying to outflank from here, and not go straight; we hope to make the situation as easy as possible. Despite [the fact] that according to the Cabinet resolution, by virtue of the shelling today the possibility is open to attack, but we decided to give the Syrians a chance to consider and understand that this is not a case of a massive attack on them."
That was, I would say, the central problem we faced: How to avoid war with the Syrians.
On Monday - that was on Sunday evening - on Monday, the Cabinet took a decision, Cabinet decision no. 690 of Monday, 16 Sivan 5742, 7.6.82, which says: "We decided to continue the outflanking of the Syrian force and to inform the Syrians via Ambassador Philip Habib - this was still Monday - to tell the Syrians that they should evacuate the Palestinians in the territory from under their control up to forty kilometers from our border.
That same night, I want to tell the members of the House, we faced another difficult decision. That same night, upon my return from that same discussion, there was a discussion in the advance headquarters of the Northern Command, with the participation of the senior command of the I.D.F. The subject of the discussion that night, it's impossible, if we had had an adequate historical sense we would have filmed it and would show it. I think it was perhaps one of the most dramatic events that one can encounter. A discussion that lasted until dawn. And what was the subject of the discussion?
The subject of the discussion was how to avoid hitting civilians in Tyre and Sidon. No army in the world would have done this. The position of the I.D.F., the position of all of us that night, in the course of which everyone expressed himself freely and we weighed the price and the sacrifices we would pay against the possible harm to civilians. The decision was unanimous in this discussion; there are no votes in the army. But there is supreme moral value in a discussion of this type, in which dozens of experienced commanders take part, all of them experienced fighters, all of them witness to battles from the dawn of their youth. Not one man would be found - from the commanders to the Minister of Defense - who would take a different decision. And we all said and reached the conclusions: we will not bomb Tyre and Sidon and turn them into ruins - despite [the fact] that we knew that this would cost us heavily. And I repeat: No other army, no other people in the world would have behaved this way.
And I want to relate another incident that happened in another time, in another place. And I did not choose an incident in Nazi Germany. I chose an incident in another place, one incident among many, that happened in the month of March, 1944 - not in Nazi Germany, but in Nazi-occupied Denmark. On that date an armada of British air force planes went out to attack Gestapo Headquarters near Copenhagen. But in addition to the target they hit an adjacent school. More than 100 civilians, including 83 children, were killed in this attack. But no one in Britain, which is condemning us today, thought then - nor would he think now - to call this act murder of civilians. Because there is a basic difference between coincidental, non-intentional killing of civilians in a war against those who are oppressing them, and the systematic, pre-meditated murder of civilians that characterizes P.L.O. terror. We, as I said, decided otherwise. And the unequivocal position of the I.D.F. is [a source] of pride for all of us. It is obvious that we are sorry. There is no need to say this; Jews don't have to emphasize this. Jews value human life more than any other nation on earth. But it is obvious that we are sorry about this, that innocent people were hurt. But one must point out the slanderous propaganda against us in this matter. I don't want to say, how many were really killed as opposed to how many were reported killed. Every casualty is a casualty, every victim a victim. But the poisonous, slanderous propaganda [campaign] being waged against us -against that, I wish to preach and warn.
Another attempt at appealing to the Syrians - I'm simply continuing with the description of the problems we faced, for there is no point standing here and describing the military moves with maps; I simply want to present what were the major problems facing the government during the operation - another attempt at appealing to the Syrians, who in the meantime had again attacked our forces - and this before we had done any harm to them, we hadn't done anything adverse to them, we hadn't returned fire, except for several shells after the initial firing on the first day we did not return [fire] and we did not do them any harm - was in Government decision no. 692 of Tuesday, 17 Sivan, 8.6.82, in which it is stated:
1. The Prime Minister will appeal to Philip Habib in his meeting set for the afternoon and will propose that he appeal to the Syrians that the shelling of our settlements cease immediately and that they remove the terrorists in their territory beyond the firing range of our settlements.
Another attempt on our part - it must be noted that at that time settlements on the northern border were being shelled from Syrian territory - a second decision: To approve the Defense Minister's proposal to open a new axis, as he requested. I want to explain: We acted in Lebanon along three axes. One axis, along the coast, Tyre and Sidon; a second axis in the eastern sector, in the Beka'a sector; a third axis in the central sector. The Syrians activated their missiles, their surface-to-air missiles. We were in the central sector in a situation in which we could not render assistance to our forces. Our forces moved along narrow, winding routes, along cliffs whose height or depth were hundreds of meters, on most difficult roads in mountainous terrain covered with undergrowth and forests, as they were making desperate efforts not to harm civilians. And indeed, there are scores and hundreds of villages in which not one stone was damaged as our forces passed. But we couldn't give support because we were in the range of the missiles. I appealed to the Cabinet. I presented the situation to them. The- Cabinet, in general, was a Cabinet that was briefed. The Chief of Military Intelligence appeared before it every day, I appeared before it every day, just as I appeared almost every day before the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee. And I requested to open another axis, more westerly in the region of Aley. Why in the region of Aley? Because this was beyond the range of the missiles. And the Cabinet approved this decision.
The next problem we faced came up on Wednesday, 9.6.82, and that is the problem of the missiles. The Syrians took advantage of the mission of Habib to Damascus and at that time moved their missiles forward. It was necessary to attack the missiles in the light of the additional penetration of missiles. And
there was also a previous Cabinet decision on this matter. In decision No. 694 of Wednesday, 18 Sivan, 9.6.82, it is said: "It is decided to approve the proposal of the Minister of Defense for the attack on the Syrian surface-to-air missile batteries."
Our next decision was the decision of the cease fire. This was a decision that said in unequivocal terms:
Operation Peace for the Galilee - Cease Fire on 11.6.82
It is decided:
1. On Saturday night, 5 June 1982, at 23.00 hours, the Government of Israel decided to charge the Israel Defense Forces with the task of placing all the population centers of the Galilee "Beyond the range of fire of the terrorist who are deployed - they, their bases and their headquarters - in Lebanon".
2. During five days of fighting, the I.D.F. carried out - completely and brilliantly, with valor and self-sacrifice - the task with which they were charged.
3. Proud is a people which has such valiant fighting sons, commanders and men.
4. The Government pays homage to the heroic and the brave who sacrificed their lives for the sake of the Peace of Galilee and of all the citizens of Israel. May God console the bereaved families who lost their dear ones, amongst all who mourn for Zion and fight for Jerusalem, and may they know no more sorrow.
5. The government sends its wishes to all the wounded for a speedy and full recovery.
6. Following the completion of the mission with which the I.D.F. were charged, the Government instructed the army and all its formations to cease fire beginning today at 12.00 noon.
7. From that hour onwards, the Israeli army will not shoot on all fronts in Lebanon, unless shot at. Any Syrian attempt to reintroduce ground-to-air missiles into Lebanese territory to replace those destroyed by our pilots will be instantly repelled and by all the means at our air force's disposal.
8. If the Syrian army will continue firing on the soldiers of the I.D.F. and attack their positions, full responsibility for the severe consequences of this premeditated aggression will fall on the shoulders of the Government of Syria.
9. There is reason to assume that none will hurt any more the Galilee and its inhabitants.
10. We do hope that the day is near when genuine peace will be established between free, independent Lebanon and Israel.
Still on that same day, two hours after the cease-fire took effect - for only two hours the front was quiet, no longer -two hours later shooting started, and actually in one place or another it did not subside until the cease-fire of last Friday evening. This is the first time the shooting died down, first time.
We had another difficult decision: the decision to physically cut the Beirut-Damascus road, during the Syrians' and terrorists' violations of the cease-fire, in order to physically surround the terrorists in Beirut, as they together with the Syrians were preparing for a war of attrition. And we had another problem that arose: The situation in the region of Aley-Bahamdoun, where there was a concentration of a Syrian division that regrouped, plus hundreds of terrorists a situation of inferiority for us, in a very narrow corridor that surrounds Beirut from the east, that brought about the decision to take control of the most essential strategic area for the control of Lebanon.
Decision 728 from the Cabinet meeting of Thursday, 3 Tammuz, 24.6.82:
It is decided to approve the proposal of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff to take control of the Beirut-Damascus road from Aley to Deir-Al-Baideh. The mission was accomplished on 25.6 in the evening.
1. The security area we fixed, the area we set as 40-45 kilometers, is in our hands.
2. The headquarters and men of the P.L.O. are surrounded.
3. The Syrian missiles were eliminated in a brilliant action of air force pilots.
4. An opening for a political settlement has been created.
5. An opening for peace with an additional Arab state has been created.
This was an inter-service, inter-branch operation linked to decisive political evaluations, considerations, and decisions.
Today, at the gates of Beirut, we are surrounding the terrorists and their bases. We are determined that this terror organization will not continue to exist, for the sake of our future and the sake of coexistence between us and the Arabs of the Land of Israel. And I believe that we can implement our plan, the autonomy plan, and arrive at coexistence with the Palestinian people. We are not fighting it; we are not fighting in Lebanon against the Palestinian people, with whom we want to. live in peace and brotherhood. When we eliminate the P.L.O. terror in Beirut, our security will increase beyond the area of 45 kilometers, the area of defense from the P.L.O.'s artillery that we had guaranteed for the sake of peace for the Galilee. We aspire to peace for Israel, to peace between Israel and its neighbours - and we shall fight against anyone who arises to torpedo this peace.
I believe that the day is not far off that, if we remain united and stand firm in our demands, not only will we overcome the P.L.O. and its headquarters in Beirut, but we shall bring about a triangle of peace along the Mediterranean coast: a triangle of Israel, Egypt and Lebanon - with open borders from Beirut via Jerusalem to Cairo. I believe that we are on the brink of a new era of establishing this triangle of peace, along the Mediterranean Sea on whose shores we live. Then peace will come not only to the Galilee, but also to Israel.