On 10 August Ambassador Habib arrived with the new plan for the P.L.O. departure from Beirut. It was made possible by the last minute agreement of Syria to accept 4,000 terrorists. Israel feared a trap and insisted that no U.N. observers be allowed in the Beirut area, that the multi-national force enter after the majority of the P.L.O. had left Beirut by sea and not by air, and they remain in Beirut only 30 days. Mr. Sharon feared that if some P.L.O. terrorists would remain in Beirut, the presence of the multi-national force would prevent the I.D.F. and the Phallangists from extirpating them. He ordered the air force to continue the bombing and 16 sorties were flown on that day. On 12 August the pace was stepped up to 75 sorties, and although little physical damage occurred, the U.S. government was aroused. During that day, the Prime Minister replied in the Knesset to a motion by the Alignment opposition to discuss the continued war. He gave additional details regarding exchanges of letters he had with President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz, which shed new light on the highly delicate issues involved in the withdrawal of the P.L.O. Text:
Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset:
A review of political and military events relating to Operation "Peace for the Galilee". On Saturday evening, 5 June 1982, The Government adopted resolution No. 676, which says:
1) To instruct the Israel Defence Forces to place all the civilian population of the Galilee beyond the range of the terrorist fire from Lebanon, where they, their bases and their headquarters are concentrated.
2) The name of the operation is Peace for the Galilee.
3) During the operation, the Syrian army will not be attacked unless it attacks our forces.
4) Israel continues to aspire to the signing of a peace treaty with independent Lebanon, its territorial integrity preserved.
On the following day, Sunday, 6 June, the I.D.F. went out to implement the resolution of the Cabinet - its supreme commander. On the first day of the fighting, between 6-7 June, the following activity took place: In the western sector - the capture of Tyre, Sidon was bypassed, its purging was begun. A force entered the U.N.I.F.I.L. area in order to purge it of terrorist concentrations emplaced there. The eastern sector - the capture of Nabatiyeh, a force moved in the direction of the Awali river, while bypassing the Syrian deployment in Jezin. A force moved towards Sidon in order to purge the area of terrorists and to link up with forces that had landed north of Sidon.
The enemy's actions: The Syrians - a battalion moved towards west Jezin, in order to stem the advance of our forces in the central sector. A division of tanks moved towards the eastern sector. Our forces in the eastern and central sectors were shelled by Syrian artillery, our forces advance axes were barred in the central sector. The terrorists inside the Syrian deployments in the eastern sector shelled the Galilee settlements.
Tuesday, 8 June 1982: The I.D.F. operation - continuation of purging the terrorists in the central and western sectors up to the Awali river. A link-up was effected with the forces in Sidon. The encirclement of Sidon was completed. Our forces reached Damour. Advances against the Syrians in the eastern sector in order to create threatening pressure on them. Advances in the central sector and the application of armored effort. Advances towards the Shouf mountains to purge the Syrian deployments. Activation of an armored force to capture Syrian and terrorist deployments in Jezin. Eight Syrian planes were downed in dog-fights.
The enemy's actions: Tank and artillery fire in the central sector. Activation of blocking forces against the flanking force. Reinforcement of the deployment in Jezin by a battalion from the Karoun region. Reinforcement by a brigade in the Karoun Region. Artillery bombardments from the Syrian deployment in the eastern sector. An addition to the ground-to-air missile deployment in the eastern sector: Five additional batteries.
9 June 1982: I.D.F. activity - in the central sector, completion of conquest of the Jezin area. Continuation of the advance to the Beirut-Damascus highway. Control of the Shouf mountains. The eastern sector: The destruction of 17 Syrian ground-to-air missile batteries located in Lebanon. Purging of the area up to the Syrian terrorist deployments in the area of Lake Karoun. Dogfights: 30 Syrian planes were downed. In the western sector - continuation of the purging, tightening of the siege of Sidon, the inhabitants were permitted to leave the city.
The enemy's action: Publicized mobilization of reserves in Syria. Completion of the transfer of a tank division to the eastern sector.
Thursday, 10 June: The flow of reinforcements from the Damascus area. A Syrian division moves towards the eastern sector. A battle to block the retreat of the Syrian force that was deployed in the south of the Bekaa. The advance of new batteries of ground-to-air missiles into Lebanon. Reinforcement of the Aley area by commando forces. On the night of 10- 11 June, an attempt to transfer tanks from Horns to the eastern sector. The Syrian brigade was attacked by the air force.
I.D.F. activity: in the central sector - completion of the conquest of the Shouf area. Battles on the way to capturing the road. In the eastern sector, armored forces purged an area up to 45 kilometers from Israel's northern border. The air force destroyed three batteries of ground-to-air (missiles]. 31 Syrian planes were downed in dogfights. The purging of Tyre and Rashidiyeh was completed.
Friday, 11 June 1982: I.D.F. activity - stabilization of the defence line in the eastern sector. Battle in the Ein Zahlata area. Continuation of the purging of terrorist concentrations. Downing of 21 Syrian planes.
Mr. Speaker, from what I have just recounted to the Knesset it is manifestly clear that the I.D.F. carried out the Cabinet resolution not to attack the Syrian army unless the latter attacked our forces. We tried to bypass the Syrian army; but it attacked our forces, and therefore the I.D.F. entered into battle against it and subdued it on land and in the air. We destroyed all the SAM-6 batteries - deathly weapons by virtue of whose activation during the days of the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur war Israel lost 80 planes. This time not even one plane was downed in the battle between ground-to-air missiles and Israel's planes.
During the course of the fighting the Syrians introduced three SAM-8 batteries - the most advanced Soviet weapons -into the battle against planes. We destroyed those as well.
A few days ago, the Syrians introduced three SAM-9 batteries; these too we destroyed. And we have warned the Syrians that if they attack our planes engaged in vital defensive reconnaissance from the other side of the border, we will also destroy those batteries as well; and I assume that the Syrians have taken this warning seriously.
On 10 June, at 12:00 hours, we unilaterally declared a cease-fire. By that time I had received a letter from The President of The United States on 9 June, at 02:00 hours of 10 June, in which the Israel Government was requested to declare a cease-fire at 06:00 hours on Thursday, 10 June. We were unable to accede to this request because the terrorists deployed among the Syrian positions were still 18 kilometers from Metullah. In other words: All of the Galilee panhandle was still within firing range of the terrorists' long-range weapons.
And this was the long-range weaponry that the terrorists had: Katyushas - range 21.6 kilometres, heavier Katyushas - range 30 kilometres; 130 mm. cannon - range 27 kilometres; and cannons - albeit antiquated, of world war 11 vintage - range 43 kilometres.
Thus the fighting continued for a further 24 hours.
I am not empowered to publicize the U.S. President's letter to me; yet I am entitled, nay obliged, to inform the Knesset - and through it the public - of the contents of my reply (editor's note: all quotation marks are taken exactly from the official Knesset transcript):
"Honored President, Dear Friend,
This is my letter of 10 June 1982, in reply to the demand that we declare a cease-fire on 10 June at 06:00 hours.
Thank you for your letter of 9 June, which reached me at 02:00 hours. I immediately convened the Cabinet: the earliest possible hour to do so was at 04:00 hours. I shall convey this letter to Ambassador Lewis without delay following the conclusion of the Cabinet debate.
Mr. President, we accept the idea of a cease-fire. Actually, we initiated it, in our talks with your personal representative, Mr. Philip Habib. I met him in the Knesset on Tuesday afternoon, 8 June. I proposed to him the following four suggestions, so that they could be presented to President Assad.
A. We do not want any fighting with the Syrian army.
B. If the Syrian forces do not attack us or do not try to attack us, no Syrian soldier will be harmed.
C. Over the past three days, the Syrian army has advanced a number of kilometres from the north to the south and from the east towards the west. These troops must withdraw eastwards and northwards.
D. P.L.O. personnel in the eastern sector under the control and supervision of the Syrian army have to withdraw a distance of 25 kilometres northwards."
Your Honour recalls that I said: The terrorists on that day were still a distance of 18 kilometres from Metullah. If they withdraw 25 kilometres, they would be beyond the 43-kilometer line. That is to say, all the long-range weapons will no longer be able to reach the northern Galilee or the Galilee panhandle. And so, they must withdraw a distance of 25 kilometres northwards. And thus - I continued - the civilian population in the area called the Galilee panhandle, like Kiryat Shemonah, Metullah etc., will finally be beyond their missile and artillery range.
"Our friend Philip Habib agreed to present these demands to President Assad. At 04:00 hours, I received from Ambassador Lewis a transcript of the Habib-Assad discussion. It transpires that Assad in effect did not accept the idea of such a cease-fire. He is not agreeable to the aforementioned withdrawal by the Syrian army or P.L.O. personnel. Instead of this he demands a withdrawal by Israeli forces for - as he terms it - disengagement. Therefore, as we see, President Assad has actually rejected your request.
As far as we are concerned, we are ready for an immediate cease-fire, in the wake of a renewal of the status quo ante as regards the position of the Syrian army and the army of P.L.O. personnel and their guns beyond the range of the Galilee and its inhabitants.
Early in the morning, before writing this letter to you, we learned that Soviet-supplied Syrian S.A.M. missiles are advancing from Syria into Lebanon in order to replace those which we succeeded in destroying in a special effort, accompanied by one of the largest air battles in which we had the upper hand. These S.A.M. missiles cannot, of course, again be positioned in the Beka'a to endanger our army and air force.
In conclusion, Mr. President, you can be sure that there is no reason for the friendly relations that we have established between ourselves and our countries, and which we value, to be vitiated. On the contrary, at this juncture, which is so important to the free world and to the effort to overcome the terrorist scourge, the friendship and cooperation between us can and must be deepened."
Mr. Speaker, on the following day, Friday, 11 June, the Cabinet adopted the following resolution:
1. On Saturday night, 5 June 1982, at 23:00 hours, The Government of Israel decided to charge the Israel Defence Forces with the task of placing all the population centers of the Galilee "beyond the range of fire of the terrorists who are deployed - they, their bases and their headquarters - in Lebanon."
2. During five days of fighting, the I.D.F. carried out - completely and brilliantly, with valor and self-sacrifice - the task with which they were charged.
3. Happy is the people which has such valiant fighting sons, commanders and soldiers.
4. The Government pays homage to the heroic and the brave who sacrificed their lives for the sake of the peace of Galilee and of all the citizens of Israel. May God console the bereaved families who lost their dear ones, amongst all who mourn for Zion and fight for Jerusalem, and may they know no more sorrow.
5. The Government sends its wishes to all the wounded for a speedy and full recovery.
6. Following the completion of the mission with which the I.D.F. were charged, the Government instructed the army and all its formations to cease fire beginning today at 12:00 noon.
7. From that hour onwards the Israeli army will not shoot on all fronts in Lebanon, unless shot at. Any Syrian attempt to reintroduce ground-to-air missiles into Lebanese territory to replace those destroyed by our pilots will be instantly repelled and by all the means of our air forces's disposal.
9. If the Syrian army will continue firing on the soldiers of the I.D.F. and attack their position, full responsibility for the severe consequences of this premeditated aggression will fall on the shoulders of the Government of Syria.
10. There is reason to assume that none will hurt any more the Galilee and its inhabitants.
11. We do hope that the day is near when genuine peace will be established between free, independent Lebanon and Israel.
Mr. Speaker, everyone listening heard and understands, if he wishes to understand, that while the Syrians accepted our proposal for a cease-fire, the terrorists continued to attack our army and declared that the war will continue. We were ready on Friday, 11 June, to terminate the fighting completely, on all fronts, and we so declared unilaterally. We did not pose any questions, nor raise any conditions, nor conduct any negotiations; we stopped the fighting. We had reached the 45-kilometre line. We had removed all the Galilee settlements beyond the firing-range of the terrorists.
We said we are prepared to conclude the fighting, and to deploy along that line, so that the Galilee settlements are no longer harmed. What did the terrorists do? Contrary to our warning, they continued firing at our army. There were, therefore, three possibilities: One - our army would remain where it was. Our soldiers would be killed.
A second possibility - our soldiers would receive an order to withdraw. They would draw the terrorists after them, and the Syrians, too. And the terrorists, after a few hours, a day or two, would again reach the point from which they could shell the whole of the Galilee panhandle.
A third possibility - to return fire with fire, to push the enemy further and further north.
Mr. Speaker, with humility and bowed head I admit that the Government of Israel choose the third possibility. There was no, there is none, and there will not be another. The army has to defend the nation. A Government worthy of its name has to protect its army, by making the correct decisions. There is no army in the world, if it knows how to fight, that would withdraw in the face of fire, or that would position itself in a place where it is being fired upon. Any army worthy of the name, if fired upon - fights and repulses the enemy.
And thus, Mr. Bar-Lev, the fighting continued. You were not misled. When I met with you, with MK Rabin, with MK Shimon Peres, and with MK Shemtov and informed you that the intention is that the army will deploy itself along a 40-45 kilometer line, the Government so intended. The Government carried out its decision - but the enemy rejected our proposals for a cease-fire.
(Editor's note: At this point, Mr. Begin has an exchange with MK Shemtov on the possibility of an investigative commission to look into this matter, telling the Mapam MK that "we will talk about" it; most interjections and responses have been deleted from this rendition.)
I repeat: what we said to the representatives of the opposition, we kept. The enemy prevented the implementation of our declaration of a unilateral cease-fire. Therefore, the fighting continued.
Mr. Speaker, if he will be so kind as to listen to my words, I shall read to him another resolution of the Government. On 27 June, the Government adopted the following resolution:
1) Israel will maintain the cease-fire in Lebanon. If the enemy violates the cease-fire the I.D.F. will respond with full severity.
2) The Government of Israel recommends that the Lebanese army enter west Beirut.
Members of the Knesset, I request [you] pay attention: on 27 June, the Cabinet resolved that not the army of Israel, not the I.D.F., not the Israel Defense Forces would enter west Beirut; the Lebanese army would enter west Beirut.
3) All of the fifteen terrorist organizations of which the roof organization called the P.L.O. is comprised will hand over their weapons to the Lebanese army. Not to the I.D.F. - to the Lebanese Army.
4) The departing column of the terrorists, under, the protection of the International Red Cross, will move across the international Lebanese-Syrian border along the Beirut-Damascus road. The I.D.F. will ensure that in the sector of that road which is under its control the column will have safe passage. If the terrorists prefer an alternative route, this will be made possible for them by the I.D.F.
A month and a half ago, we proposed, of our own initiative, that the terrorists leave Beirut. We gave them a promise that we would not touch them, that they will travel along the Beirut-Damascus highway, none of them would be hurt.
5) With the liberation of west Beirut and the reunification of the Lebanese capital, the political negotiations between all the parties concerned will begin with a view to reaching an agreement which will guarantee the territorial integrity of Lebanon, the departure of all foreign forces from that country, its independence, and the peace of its inhabitants. This agreement will ensure security and peace of the Galilee and its inhabitants, of Israel and its citizens.
One of the opposition spokesmen dared write that we wanted to impose a "new order" in Lebanon. I don't want to say what he meant by those two words. All the Members of Knesset sitting on all sides know what the malicious intent and the use of this blasphemous expression was. Did we propose a new order in Lebanon - or territorial integrity, absolute independence, peace with Israel, withdrawal of all foreign forces - including the I.D.F. - from Lebanese soil. A "new order"!
6) Israel will gladly accept the good offices of the United States to the negotiating parties, in order to reach this agreement.
Mr. Speaker, on 4 August I received another letter from President Reagan. Again, I say, I am not entitled to make it public. I am entitled and obligated to bring to the knowledge of the Knesset and the public my answer to this important letter.
"Honorable President, I thank you for your letter of 4 August, which was conveyed to me by the Charge William Brown after midnight. Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Professor Moshe Arens had read it to me over the phone previously.
Israel's policy, Mr. President, is based on two principles: cease-fire on condition that it be absolute and mutual. Not one of these two conditions has been honored by the terrorists in Beirut and in surrounding areas. So we've already had 10 cease-fires, all of them violated by the terrorists, while Israel honored and kept them.
Regarding the immediate future, these two conditions, 'absolute and mutual,' must be self-understood and carried out. "Under no circumstances," I wrote, "will we order I.D.F. forces to refrain from actively defending themselves, if they are shot at. "
Mr. Speaker, with humble heart and bowed head I admit that today, too, we stand fast on this declaration to the President of the United States: Under no conditions. And if sometime there should be pressure, no matter what it may be, we won't order the I.D.F. not to defend itself if they [the terrorists] open fire on it.
And I went on: "We prefer a political solution. However, Mr. President, if the military solution is ruled out from the start, then the political solution to get the terrorists out will self-destruct."
Again I will explain to all the Knesset Members: If the terrorists were to get an official statement from the Israeli Government - as we were asked to do just a few days ago by the honored opposition - that we would never under any conditions take military action to get them out of west Beirut, they would stay in west Beirut for good. Any thinking person, anyone with common sense understands that.
And I went on: "We prefer a political solution. The Security Council resolution and the declaration by the U.S. Government that Israel's army must not enter Beirut to rid it and Lebanon of the terrorists" - I wrote openly and sincerely to the U.S. President - "The Security Council resolutions and the announcements by the U.S. authorities can only encourage them to go on using every possible method of procrastination, and these methods are still being used. Just last night I got a letter from Ambassador Philip Habib. In the first paragraph of his letter, the Ambassador writes, and I quote: 'So I am happy to report to you, Mr. Prime Minister, that there is more and more evidence that the P.L.O. is ready to seriously negotiate its withdrawal from Beirut.' I was happy to read these words. However, after writing this general optimistic statement, the Ambassador went on to add the concrete clarification, quote: 'until I receive the P.L.O.'s answer, its position will not be entirely clear. I expect,' wrote Philip Habib to me, 'That within the next 24 to 48 hours, I will be able to say with some measure of certainty whether the P.L.O. is indeed serious or not. "I underlined the word "not" in my letter to the President of the United States. 'If not, maybe he isn't serious,' Philip Habib wrote to me. Mr. Habib ended his message with the following words: 'I would like you to know that we are doing everything to ensure that there will be countries to receive the P.L.O. leaders and fighters in appropriate numbers, at the same time as we are dealing with the problem here. But without satisfactory countries of destination for them,' Mr. Habib concluded his letter to me, 'our efforts here are likely to fall through.' He wrote this to me. At the time he wrote, he didn't have countries of destination willing to take the terrorists from Beirut and Lebanon. He told me right out: If they cannot be found, then all the arrangements will fall through.
So I ended my letter to the President of The United States with the following sentences: "As you see, Mr. President, yesterday, the 3rd of August, Ambassador Philip Habib, with all his energy and goodwill, still didn't know whether the P.L.O. is indeed serious or not. That is the situation today, Thursday, 5 August, as I am writing to you, at -the end of the 45 days which Ambassador Habib has had to conclude the negotiations for the evacuation of the terrorist organizations from Beirut and Lebanon - as you had decided, Mr. President. Therefore it is clear, Mr. President, that Israel's security and the lives of her citizens are hanging in the balance."
Mr. Speaker, on 7 August, I received a letter from the Secretary of State. Again, I have no right to make public Mr. Shultzs letter to me. But I have the right, it is my duty, to let the Knesset and the nation know the contents of my reply: "I thank you for your letter of 7 August 1982. 1 read it to the Cabinet, and we considered its contents with all seriousness. The Cabinet has authorized me to reply to your message and to submit the following proposals to you:
1. According to reliable information, countries of destination haven't been found - with the exception of Jordan, which is willing to take about 700 terrorists holding valid Jordanian passports. These 700 belong to the Badr unit. Syria refuses to take any number" - from this point of view the situation changed two days ago, but then it was just as I wrote - "Syria refuses to take any number of terrorists, Egypt doesn't want them, Saudi Arabia doesn't even want to hear about them, and Algeria, too, belongs to the refusers. It is therefore clear that it isn't fear" - he had used the word 'fear' - "which moves us to make our proposal to you. On the contrary, it is the certainty that if the multi-national force enters Beirut at the start of the evacuation, or immediately after a small number (those 700) leave, all the others will stay in Beirut, for the simple reason that they have nowhere else to go.
"We would be prepared, Mr. Secretary, for them to go willingly to Israeli detention camps, where they would receive humanitarian treatment until countries could be found for them. We don't, however, make this proposal, lest the terrorists and their friends yell that here is proof of Israel's intention to harm them. We have no such intention, Mr. Secretary. But we cannot put up with a situation whereby thousands of terrorists are forced to remain in Beirut because they objectively have nowhere to go except to stay behind the screen (The Secretary had written 'screen') as you said, of French soldiers. What could we do then, in that situation? The answer is clear: Nothing, nothing at all. We wouldn't even think of harming, even unintentionally, French soldiers. We have had deep feelings for them ever since the days of Lafayette and the '90's of the 18th century.
"Hence our proposal: Before any package agreement is presented to us, a list of countries will be submitted to us along with a list of the terrorists, so that we may know ahead of time that each of the approximately 9,000 terrorists (besides the Syrians roaming Beirut) has a country to go to. The terrorists must leave Beirut together with the Syrians who are still in the city, as you yourself wrote to me, Mr. Secretary, in the first paragraph of your letter.
3 (sic). When should the multi-national force enter the city? We propose a compromise - do you hear that, Haim? We propose a compromise, not a territorial one, a compromise; aren't you impressed? What is the compromise? -After most of the terrorists have left Beirut and Lebanon. This was Ambassador Habib's original proposal, and we agreed to it at the time. As the weeks passed, however, we noted the delaying tactics used by the P.L.O., so we came to the logical conclusion that prior to any entry by a multi-national force, all the terrorists and the Syrians would have to leave the country. Now we are willing, so as to make progress towards a solution, to re-adopt Mr. Habib's original proposal.
4. What will happen to the small number remaining? The terrorists who remain there will most likely use some excuse and say: we won't go. Therefore, we request a written commitment by all Governments sending units to participate in the multi-national force, whereby if that same small portion refuses to leave, either the multi-national force will compel them to do so, or alternatively, if the multinational force will not deign to compel the terrorists to leave, the multi-national force will leave Beirut - and Israel's forces will solve the problem. I think that this is very logical. All possibilities are accounted for. We prefer a political solution - that they should get out.
5. The multi-national force should come after all parties have given their agreement to their arrival via the port of Beirut. The multi-national force should not have to land as if 'descending' on the Lebanese coast.
6. The French, Italian and American liaison officers should make contact with the Israeli G.O.C. northern command, General Drori, and other officers with him who will be authorized to represent him. Our friend Mr. Eagleburger yesterday assured Ambassador Arens that such contact would be made. I would point out as an aside that Mr. Habib and I agreed explicitly that all liaison officers who come with the U.S. or the French contingent - Italy had not yet joined - would immediately establish contact with an I.D.F. liaison officer, and the Defense Minister named G.O.C. northern command General Drori, for this purpose. But Mr. Eagleburger, at my request, told our Ambassador that he would immediately issue the appropriate order to establish contact. But to continue:
"At the hour that I write to you, Sunday, 13:00 hours, Israel time, no contact has yet been established. Mr. Secretary, issue the proper instructions."
7. Finally, though no less important, the terrorists are holding an Israeli pilot. Since the Litani operation and up until Operation "Peace for the Galilee," nine of our soldiers are missing. We demand that they hand over the pilot and the missing to us. We don't know officially and decisively what their status is; and therefore we continue to use the term 'missing,' as is done by every army. We fear that otherwise we will never see our pilots and our missing again.
Finally, Mr. Secretary, I asked our friend Ambassador Habib a number of times to consult us ahead of time and not after the fact. I therefore am sending you this letter without delay following the Cabinet's deliberation, and before the package agreement - Mr. Habib used the term 'package agreement' - is made and sent to us. I believe that we have the incontestable right to know ahead of time what the contents of the package are "before the package is wrapped up" - thus I wrote in the original to the Secretary of State.
You write to me - the Secretary of State to me - "The P.L.O. has crossed the Rubicon" - I'm glad that the Secretary of State guessed that I would understand the meaning of those words and wouldn't add any explanation to them -"The P.L.O. has crossed its Rubicon, and has accepted the necessity of departure. They haven't the strength to go on anymore, the will or the support to do otherwise." The I.D.F. made a significant contribution to that.
I admit I wrote in understated language, Mr. Speaker, and I repeat: I admit this with humble heart and bowed head. I think that this sentence was written entirely by the I.D.F., and was copied by the Secretary of State.
"Please don't forget, Mr. Secretary, that about 322 - with 4 more today - courageous Israeli officers and soldiers have given their lives, 1,400 have been wounded, so as to bring about the liberation - yes, the liberation - of Lebanon from 20,000 terrorists who were armed by the Soviets and were a danger to every citizen in Israel and to the many free nations throughout the world. It is therefore our right to know and to be consulted ahead of time."
Mr. Speaker, aren't these conclusions clear from all the documents I've read? Let my honored adversaries say. We were about to put a total end to the fighting at 12:00 noon on 11 June.
Alignment MK Shulamit Aloni: Don't you have even one word to say about half a million civilians Prime Minister Begin: Ms. Shulamit Aloni, you are slandering Israel. You are following in the footsteps of the liars who spoke about 600,000 homeless. Now you are talking about half a million. No such thing. Less than 20,000, and we are seeing to them and their rehabilitation.
The honored speaker who preceded me, Mr. Speaker, Knesset Member Haim Bar-Lev, my dear friend and honored adversary, tried to accuse the Government of not paying attention to the losses among the civilian population. I want to assure you, Mr. Speaker, that the I.D.F., by order of the Cabinet, did not intentionally harm the civilian population even once. I won't deny that civilians, too, were hurt in the war; but all combat was directed at military targets, whether of the Syrian army or whether of the terrorists holding weapons in their hands that are found in a regular army - field guns, tanks, rockets, R.P.G.'s, and more. But if the alignment is complaining of civilian losses - this time I will present a document:
"Question: But first we must identify the enemy.
Answer: A soldier has no such problem. The problem is whether one goes to war or not.
Question: But in the event of an encounter with civilian population.
Answer: This is a civilian population which was known for actively aiding the terrorists, and this is a historical fact. It won't help in retrospect to be bleeding hearts. I shelled them two and a half years after the massacre near Avivim. I bombed and shelled four villages without any approval. What did the residents of Irbit do, that I bombed and shelled them?
But then it was near Beit She'an, near Maoz Haim, near Beit Alfa. Then it seems natural to you. The I.D.F. safeguards, therefore, it bombs. What has happened to you, have you forgotten history? Don't you know that the entire Jordan Valley emptied out during the war of attrition? I haven't got a selective memory. I have been serving in the army for 30 years, do you think I don't know what we've done all these years? Ismailia, Suez, Port Said, Port Fuad, a million and a half refugees. What happened all of a sudden? You sit by the border in Kiryat Shemonah and Manara, and for ten years you can't move at night. Since when has this population of south Lebanon become so holy?
Question: Your argument is that this population should be punished?
Answer: For sure. (You hear the native expression, 'for sure.) I never doubted it even for a minute. You ask me about the population of Nakoura, from whose midst Katyushas were fired at Nahariya and in whose midst all the terrorists lived. I saw from a lookout-point how the terrorists live in the central house with the green wall and were fed by the population around them.
The decision to go into south Lebanon in force was a political-strategic one. When I gave Yanosh the go-ahead to use planes, artillery and tanks, I knew what I was doing. When I told Yanosh: Bring the tanks in as fast as possible and hit them from a distance before the boys get into face-to-face combat, didn't I know what I was doing? I gave that order. Do you think it was the first time I had given that order? It's been 30 years since the War of Liberation, and to this day we are fighting a population that lives in villages, in cities, and the question that accompanies us constantly, every time, is to harm or not to harm civilians. We got the best lesson with the squad that carried out the massacre on the bus. I had the knowledge, I had another plan so as not to harm the population. We paid the price in blood on the spot. We paid with the blood of 36 dead and a hundred-and-some wounded."
Who gave these answers? Guess... one of the alignment leaders, who wants to be Prime Minister of Israel, against Rabin and against Peres. Here are the answers. You will condemn us? He purposely aimed at the civilian population. I don't blame him, he went his own way. Under our command, the I.D.F. never aimed at a civilian population.
(MK Shulamit Aloni: You were Prime Minister during operation Litani.)
Begin: But I have another very important announcement for you, so that they will know not to preach anymore. We have a memory. And how did my Rabbi and teacher write? We know how to debate better than you, excuse me.
I will give numbers. In the Yom Kippur, war, we suffered 2,297 dead, and 6,067 wounded. In the War of Attrition we suffered losses: Dead - 362; wounded - 1,184. In the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War we suffered: Dead -2,659; wounded - 7,251. Together - 9,190 casualties...
Mr Speaker, between the years 1951 and 1957 there were 118 acts of reprisal: Dead - 67, wounded - 281. On 28 February there was a reprisal action in Gaza: Dead - 8, wounded - 13. On the enemy's side, 36 soldiers were killed, 28 wounded ... afterwards, on 3 March 1962 there was a reprisal action against Syria, in Nuqaib ...
Last night, Mr. Philip Habib visited Jerusalem and we held talks with him for three hours. I want to announce to the Knesset that this week we progressed a lot towards an agreement through negotiations on the removal of all the terrorists from Beirut and Lebanon and all the Syrians who are in Beirut... we made great progress this week towards an agreement or a settlement which will enable the liberation of Beirut from all the terrorists and all the Syrian soldiers, who have remained in effect bereft of any command worthy of the name, running around there without appropriate arms as well, but they are there.
There are a number of problems which remain open to negotiations, and we raised them in all frankness before Mr. Philip Habib. I will bring before the Knesset two major questions, since in most cases he accepted our proposals, and we thank him for that. Our proposals will in no way interfere with either the negotiations or reaching a settlement. But there are two major problems. Mr Habib suggested that U.N. observers should enter Beirut or its environs. We said: we cannot accept that proposal. It is good that he came at my invitation, because the impression we had the day before yesterday was that he intended to implement the Security Council resolution to post U.N. observers who would maintain the cease-fire. At the end of the second discussion Mr. Habib explained to us that that was not the intention. That is to say: The U.N. observers would have no connection with the cease-fire. The cease-fire would stand. The I.D.F. would keep it absolutely, to the end, on the condition that it be mutual. If the I.D.F. is fired upon, the I.D.F. will react, with all the strength it has. Let it be known that this is our decision, since we must defend our army as our army defends our people.
But he explained to us that U.N. observers must be parties to the arrangement for the terrorists' departure. If so, what are they needed for? There will be a multi-national force. We had to explain it to him. U.N. observers? What is the U.N. today? It's true that once, in the fifties, there was a certain orientation towards the U.N., in Israel. Woe to us if that same orientation existed in the seventies and eighties.
The U.N. has three general institutions: the Security Council, the General Assembly and the different agencies. Let's begin from the end. There is no agency that has not tried to oust Israel; and only the threat from the U.S. that if Israel is ousted, then they - the U.S. - will not finance that agency (Mr. Meshel, you know as well as I that that pertains also to the International Labor Organization) prevents the expulsion. They always have a decisive majority, usually a two-thirds majority.
Now, there is a General Assembly. Today there is a communist bloc of 19 states. Not only Federal Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, but also Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, South Yemen, North Yemen - 19 states. Twenty-one Arab states. The decisive majority of the third world, together, always two-thirds.
In other words, not only are they able to adopt but they do adopt the basest anti-Israel resolutions. It was the U.N. that adopted the resolution which compared Zionism with racism. There has never been such a desecration in any international organization. We are the victims of racism. We are anti-racist according to Jewish teaching. We are they who have accepted converts from ancient times up to the present. They compared Zionism and the liberation movement of the Jewish People to racism in a resolution by a two-thirds majority.
The Security Council - most of its members have no diplomatic relations with the State of Israel. That is the U.N. of today. The atmosphere in the secretariat is hostile. Is it any wonder? If we have encountered the phenomenon that some of the U.N.I.F.I.L. have signed a separate and clandestine agreement with the terrorist organization - we did not know about it. In Lebanon we found the secret document, an agreement with the terrorists, in which they allow them to act within their positions. So observers who are under the command of that same U.N. will come to our aid? They cannot be objective. We do not agree to the posting of U.N. observers. They are not needed at all. They will only cause harm. I thank MK Shimon Peres, who was the first to say that even according to the Security Council resolution, observers do not have to be posted. That was good advice, and look, we have accepted it. We insist that no U.N. observers come.
The second problem, not the demand, the problem - we had a very good discussion together, very positive - was when will the multi-national force enter. As I already proved with the written documents, Mr. Habib once suggested that the multi-national force enter after most of the terrorists will have left Beirut and Lebanon. The major part. We agreed. Afterwards, we said: look, there are delaying tactics. We want all of them to be out first. It did not help. We renewed his suggestion. He told us: it's difficult; in the meantime, I have promised that they will come under the auspices of the multi-national force on the first day. Departure day. We said: How can that be? And especially the French?
The truth is, Mr. Speaker, that the State of Israel today has every right to tell our French friends: Stay at home and don't come to Lebanon. Every right. Why? I'll explain. Not only because of the ugly anti-Semitism running wild these days in France - the likes of which there has not been since the days of the Dreyfus affair. They shouted in Paris then: Death to the Jews! Today, too, they arc shouting in the streets of Paris: Death to the Jews! But also even more than that. France's vote in the Security Council: It was among 11 states which voted for placing an embargo on any supply of weapons to Israel. We can imagine that the resolution would have been adopted if not for the American veto.
Haim, I promise you that our relations with the U.S. today are good, good. I also have proof. Perhaps privately I will show it to you. Can't in the Knesset. Those who understand will understand.
Without the American veto, that resolution would have been adopted. Let's assume that it would have been implemented. Today, there are 12 thousand tanks in Arab hands. I cannot say how many we have. Enough. But they have several times more than we have. They also have billions of petrodollars. That allows them to buy in the U.S.S.R., in the U.S., in Britain, in France, in Italy and in Germany. Nu, what will happen if they get up to 20 thousand tanks? Will there be an embargo? Did the French Ambassador not know what he was doing when he voted for an embargo on all arms to Israel in the existing situation in the Middle East?
Behold, this is a hostile act in the fullest sense of the term. Monsieur Cheysson will go so far as to teach me lessons as to what to say? He didn't know [enough] to instruct his representative in the Security Council how to vote? Britain abstained in the vote - France voted in favor.
However, we do not say what we have the right to say. Why? Because the negotiations are nearing their end. The fighting must be stopped, our boys must be allowed to return home to their parents, our fathers to their children, as the Minister of Defense said so well last night on the "Moked" program on television. We say, therefore, good; Philip Habib arranged a multi-national force to be comprised of Americans, French, and Italians - O.K. But 350 French to enter on the first day? And what will be when a day or two later the terrorists say, 'we are not leaving' For I have said: We will not hurt the French. We have liked the French soldier from days of yore, as Thomas Carlyle has written: The soldiers of France sang the Marseillaise and said, with a crust of bread and a grain of salt and the Marseillaise - till China (translated from the Hebrew rendering - ed.). They didn't get to China. They got to Moscow - but that was also superfluous.
We like France and its soldiers. Would we shoot at them? Inconceivable. And if this is the case, there is a danger that the terrorists would stay. We therefore insist that first of all most of the terrorists depart, and that only a minority remain; afterwards, the multi-national force will enter. If the minority will not want to leave, the multi-national force will have to eject it.-If the multi-national force will not want to do this, it will leave. We shall solve the problem, and without entering west Beirut. There will be no need to enter west Beirut. The situation will be otherwise.
We hope that Mr. Philip Habib will arrange these two matters as well, and we shall shortly end the fighting. I believe wholeheartedly, Mr. Speaker, that a prolonged era of peace will begin, not only for the Galilee and its inhabitants but for the State of Israel and all its citizens.
Sometimes I wonder why France supports to such a great extent this murderous organization called in French the "Organisation de la Liberation Palestinienne, O.L.P." I have an explanation. For years, France conducted a very stubborn war in Algeria, against an organization that called itself "F.L.N. - Front de la Liberation Nationale." Always "liberation." In the end, it surrendered to this organization. Who surrendered? De Gaulle, none other. He brought 800,000 French from Algeria to France. Even since, the French have not been able to understand how they, a nation of 50 million, with the Foreign Legion, with their mighty army, had to surrender to the F.L.N., while the tiny state of Israel - what did the journal "Strategic Studies" say? Israel is the fourth [world] power, after the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. There is something to that, since together we reach 1,603,000,000; but we are not the fourth power, we are only 3 million. We know how to defend ourselves, we have the power to repulse any enemy, any combination of enemies. The People of Israel [yet] lives and exists and will live forever as a free people in the Land of Israel. But we are no [world] power, certainly not fourth, not even fifth, not even tenth.
Still in all, we are a small country. And the French are thinking: How can this small country stand up against the Arab F.L.N., the P.L.O.? And not only does it not give in to them - it defeats them. It destroys their infrastructure. And the commanders and leaders must leave Beirut and Lebanon. If they go to Syria - that very day Assad will take away their personal weapons, with which we permitted them to leave with, in order not to humiliate them. He will do it on that same day.
The French are astonished: How we can act this way when they had to give in? And therefore, even a friend such as Frangois Mitterrand is actually a fan of the P.L.O., and he and Monsieur Cheysson want to rescue the terrorist organization. No, we will not let them rescue.
At the Cabinet meeting, I made an announcement, and I do not want to repeat it, in connection with the deadly, murderous crime, the abomination committed yesterday in Paris. A French Minister arose and said that my announcement constitutes interference in the internal affairs of another state. I have come to announce from the podium of the Knesset: This is my feeling, my belief; I am certain that it is the position of the Government; and I presume that it is the position of the entire Knesset, except for one small faction. The murder of Jews is not the internal affair of any state. This contention, the domestic problem argument, we have been hearing for six full years; and the enlightened world has accepted it - and the outcome is known. The murder of Jews will no longer be an internal affair. It is our affair, the affair of the whole Jewish people, the affair of the State of the Jews.
Therefore, I voiced the call as I did; and I stand by it. It is forbidden for Jews to be killed any more while their murderers enjoy escape from punishment or even luxuries. They must defend themselves and their human dignity.
Thus far, Mr. Speaker. I suggest that MK Haim Bar-Lev's beautiful proposal be referred to the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee.