The government of Israel felt that after the completion of the military phase of Operation "Peace for Galilee" a summation should be made in the Knesset, where the Prime Minister and the Defense and Foreign Ministers would present to the House the results achieved and the problems ahead Mr. Shamir devoted all of his remarks to explaining why Israel could not consider the Reagan Plan a basis for any negotiations. He reiterated Israel's interpretation of resolution 242 and the Camp David Accords and stated that the Reagan Plan emptied them of their content, designed to "subdue and cow Israel. " Text:
Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset,
Upon completion of the first stage of Operation "Peace for the Galilee", when the strongholds of the organizations of murderers in the capital of Lebanon were destroyed and new possibilities and horizons for peace were opened in our region, we were ready to open a peace initiative for the purpose of mobilizing all the resources of goodwill in our nation and in the neighbouring countries, and in order to complete the process which we began five years ago, the Camp David process.
We believed, and we still believe today, that the removal of the terrorist plague has opened up and will continue to open up hearts and minds to the understanding that the way of violence cannot bring Israel to capitulation, and that there is only one way open for the solution of the problems and alleviating of the distress of all the people and countries in our region - and that is by means of direct negotiations for a comprehensive and honorable peace.
There is not, nor has there ever been, a need to discover anew and to pave again this road, for it is already in existence; it exists and it is paved. Israel, Egypt and the U.S. have invested much work, thought and spiritual and intellectual effort, which grew into the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and the Camp David Accords. Only a few months ago, in April of this year, has Israel proved its complete faithfulness to its obligations under these accords. With intense inner suffering which the whole world watched, as it completed the withdrawal from Sinai and uprooted for the first time in its history magnificent settlements which were erected and established by the sweat and blood of its building sons.
We were ready to get down to completing the negotiations on establishing autonomy for the Arabs of Eretz Israel, in order to put into effect the remaining section of the Camp David Accords, and to create the conditions for coexistence in peace and honor with the Arab residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. There is no doubt that Egypt and the United States, partners from the very beginning, had to first and foremost take part in these negotiations. Even recently talks have taken place between ourselves and emissaries of the U.S. concerning the coming stages of the peace treaty. We learned from them that they are busy studying the various stages of Camp David in order to work out their suggestions and positions.
And suddenly, last Wednesday, 13 Elul (1.9.82), the President of the United States delivered a speech to the American people, whereupon he presented the positions of the U.S. with regards to the questions of a political settlement that would take place in the regions of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. The main points of the American position were brought to us a day previously to the Prime Minister by the U.S. Ambassador in Israel, The Cabinet met in a special session on Thursday, 14 Elul (2.9.82), and its decision was brought to the Knesset. The U.S. administration did not see fit to consult with us concerning its new political plan which concerns our borders, our security and our stands. This is an unacceptable action. It stands in opposition to the express commitments which the U.S. administration took upon itself three times in the past: In the memorandum of understanding of 20.12.73, and in President Ford's letter of 1.9.75, whose contents were reaffirmed in the memorandum of understanding of 26.3.79, it is stipulated that the U.S. would consult with Israel fully and step-by-step and make every effort to coordinate its proposals with Israel. In spite of this, the American administration found it proper to consult with another Arab state or states which have more than once expressed their opposition to Camp David. This is a serious insult, but even more serious is the content of the new American ideas, which we cannot accept as a basis for peace negotiations in the area.
The Camp David Agreements were achieved after difficult, wrenching discussions and disagreements. Every word in those agreements was the result of thorough deliberation, and every topic that was not included in them was consciously dropped. The U.S. truly participated in the negotiations, influenced the positions of the sides and mediated between them. The then-President of the U.S. signed the Agreements as a witness. In the course of all the negotiations and until 1 September 1982, the U.S. refrained from taking a specific public position regarding the substance of the topics that were subject to negotiation. The reason for this was clear and obvious. The two partners to the agreement well know that the taking of such a step on the part of the U.S. would hurt the negotiations and the chances for reaching an agreement between the two sides.
The Camp David Agreements constituted a package in which all of its parts were logically and politically connected, even though there was no operational connection between them. Israel agreed to wide-ranging concessions in Sinai in return for peace with Egypt, knowing that this would be the extent of its security and territorial risks, since in the eastern sector there was agreement on autonomy rule in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district for a five-year transition period. Egypt did indeed demand in the negotiations Arab sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza and a freeze on Jewish settlement. But its demand was not accepted, and Egypt agreed to autonomy for five years. This whole structure has been undermined by the action of the U.S., which ignores the inter-relationship of the positions and concessions that were made and is again raising claims and positions that were discussed and rejected in the course of the negotiations at Camp David. In regard to the new proposals of the United States, one could say that if the Americans had insisted at Camp David on the positions it is putting forward today, we would not have signed the Camp David agreements. The Israeli Cabinet gave serious consideration to the U.S. proposals as they were officially submitted to the Prime Minister, and it has decided to reject them and not to enter into any negotiations with any party based on these positions.
The President of the United States, Mr. Ronald Reagan, expanded on these positions in his speech to the American people. He stated that Israel has the right to exist within secure and defensible borders, and it is its right to demand that its neighbors recognize this. He even noted that the width of the State of Israel along the pre-1967 lines was less than 10 miles and that a great segment of the population lived within artillery range of hostile Arab forces. He let it be known that he had no intention of suggesting to Israel that it return to those conditions. President Reagan also said that the nations of the Middle East could achieve a secure peace only via a process of negotiations. He stated too that Jerusalem must remain undivided, although its final status would have to be determined through negotiations. Finally, the President reiterated his previous statements regarding the commitment of the U.S. to Israel's security.
These are positive, important remarks; and we believe that they express a sincere, deep expression of commitment and friendship for Israel, its security and its future. However, it is our obligation to point out with great distress that the operational aspects that accompanied the President's statements which I have just quoted contradict them and do harm to Israel and its security, particularly as regards the negotiations and the agreement and the chances for peace between us and our Arab neighbours.
In the position paper the U.S. administration presented to us, it was stated that the meaning of full autonomy is the grant of "genuine authority" for the inhabitants to govern themselves, the land and its water sources. In the Camp David Agreement the language used was "granting of full autonomy to the inhabitants," and Israel made it clear in the negotiations at that time that the reference was to the inhabitants and not territory.
The operational significance of this point was the subject of negotiations with Egypt, and now the U.S. has taken its own determined position that deviates from the agreement and does great harm to the negotiations process. This position turns upside down everything that has been achieved in this regard by Israel's representatives in difficult, lengthy negotiations. This is a change in the essence of the Camp David Agreements. We did not accept this position then, and we will not accept it today.
The U.S. states also that it will support economic, trade, social and cultural ties between Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District and Jordan. The Camp David Agreement refers to the connection between the autonomy, Jordan and Israel in careful, thoughtful language. The U.S. has deemed fit, in its new paper, to emphasize specifically the ties with Jordan and to ignore the ties that in any case already exist with Israel. Open borders and free movement are the fundamental principles which Israel has always advocated; and until now, they were acceptable as well, as far as we know, to the U.S. How much more so is this the case when we are speaking of an area that is part and parcel of Eretz Israel, 'from which we will never be separated, not now and not forever.
Jerusalem was not mentioned in Camp David itself, since Israel did not agree to anything that would harm the status of Israel's united capital. Egypt does indeed differ with Israel's stand on this subject, and the positions of the sides can be found in letters that accompany the agreement. Now the U.S. comes and takes a stand completely contradictory to that of Israel. There can be only one actual outcome to the participation of Jerusalem Arabs in the elections for the autonomy authority: the re-division of Jerusalem - and to that we will never agree.
The American call for the freezing of Jewish settlement in Judea, Samaria and Gaza already during the transition period is negative and harmful. It is not by chance that there is no mention of this in the Camp David Agreements, since no self-respecting Israeli government could agree that the right of Jews to settle in all parts of Eretz-lsrael should be an issue for discussion or even for mention in any political document. The right of Jews to settle in the Land of Israel is fundamental and inalienable; neither does it require the approval of any element. Just raising the issue is an insult. Even worse, it will encourage Arab elements to believe that they can continue to strive for the isolation of segments of Eretz-lsrael and their transfer - "Judenrein" - to foreign ownership. It is impossible to understand how this position can be reconciled with that which is written in the President's letter of 31 August to the Prime Minister; I quote: "This position does not contravene his deep recognition of the continued right of the Jews to live in peace in Judea, Samaria and Gaza." (translated from the Hebrew rendering - ed.)
The subject of security was widely discussed at Camp David and is divided into two parts: The overall security of Israel from outside attack, and the security of its inhabitants from terror and sabotage attacks from among the Arab population of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. The key sentence in this matter in the Camp David framework agreement states that all steps and measures will be taken in order to guarantee the security of Israel and its neighbours during the transition period and afterwards. In order to lend support to the attaining of this security, a strong police force is to be established by the autonomy authority. The significance of this is that Israel would retain in its hands for the transition period and beyond supervision over security against attacks from the outside as well as terrorist acts. No Israeli representative to the negotiations conceived of the possibility that the prevention of terror and the war against terror would be turned over to a foreign element in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. The new American position seeks to place upon the Arab inhabitants the responsibility for internal security, that is, beyond the defined area of police jurisdiction. The new definition differs significantly from that which was adopted at Camp David, and its significance is to turn over all the responsibility for internal security matters to the autonomous authority. Its actual significance: The responsibility for combatting terror would not be within our jurisdicton. No Israeli in his right mind would accept this position.
A few words about the interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242 and the connection between it and the Camp David Agreements. In all of the Camp David documents, and afterwards in the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, Resolution 242 appears in a prominent position in the treaties and documents. It was accepted by the participants at Camp David that the negotiations were designed, La, to realize the sections of the resolution by means of peace treaties between Israel and its neighbours. In this manner, the parties gave the resolution a specific interpretation and would implement it in practice. Now the U.S. comes along and reopens the subject as though there were no Camp David and as though there were no connection between 242 and the Camp David Agreements. The autonomy implements Resolution 242. But the new American interpretation does not stop there and demands that Israel specifically withdraw also from this area. When you combine into one entity all of the American positions in this matter in all of its facets - i.e., the principle of withdrawal from Judea, Samaria and Gaza, the principle of territories in exchange for peace, the relative connection between the depth of the withdrawal and the extent of the peace, the freezing of settlement, the opposition to Israeli sovereignty over the territories of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and the granting of voting rights to East Jerusalem Arabs for the autonomy authority - then the practical interpretation of this concoction is Israel's return to the partition lines of 1967. When we add to this the possible option of doing away with Israeli sovereignty in the future and the equivocal language used in all of the language referring to the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state, the resulting scenario from the possible realization of these positions is very clear and very grim.
The Camp David Agreements are being emptied of their content; everything that was proposed in Camp David by the Arab side and rejected by Israel reappears in the form of a "presidential position" coming from above to subdue and cow Israel.
Mr. Speaker,
The Government of Israel could not but reject these positions, even if they came to us from the friend-President of Israel's greatest friend and ally, the United States. Our relations with the United States are of a special character. Between our two nations there is a deep friendship, based on common values and identical interests. At the same time, differences between our two countries crop up occasionally, chiefly on the subject of our borders and how to defend our security. These differences of opinion are natural; they stem from changing conditions and they express our independence and our separate ways. A true covenant can exist only between independent nations, with each knowing what is peculiar to it and what they have in common. Israel is a difficult ally, but a faithful and credible one. We are certain that what we have in common with the United States is permanent and deep, but what we disagree on is temporary and ephemeral. The permanent will overcome the ephemeral.
Mr. Speaker,
The people in Israel have known changes, fluctuations, ups and downs in our relations with the U.S. The people know and have known that fundamental issues of life-and-death are concerned - such as security, Jerusalem, the 1967 borders, the danger of a Palestinian state - we have no choice but to insist on our position, firmly, strongly, and clearly - even against our great friend the United States. No differences of opinion, school of thought, or political parties can justify the adoption of any position that differs from the one which the government of Israel has taken. The people in Israel will stand together and overcome.