The statement was in response to a motion to the agenda to discuss the I.D.F. entry into west Beirut and the "grave consequences thereof'. Mr. Sharon described the military events of 15-18 September and admitted that the entry of the Phalange units to the Palestinians camps was coordinated with the I.D.F. He also disclosed that although he, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister had told the Knesset on 8 September that all P.L.O. terrorists had left Beirut, some 2,000 terrorists had remained in the Lebanese capital and had to be rooted out. Mr. Sharon again elaborated on the conduct of the war and the minimal role played by the Phalangists in the fighting in Beirut. He also used the opportunity to accuse the opposition of a non-stop campaign to topple the government with the help of certain elements in the U.S. The motion was defeated 47 to 70. Another motion calling for the creation of a judicial commission of inquiry was defeated by 48 to 42. Text:
Mr. Speaker, distinguished Knesset, this is a grim day for all of us. Innocent people, old persons, women and children were murdered for no reason in Beirut, with the most terrible cruelty. The heart rebels, and the eyes refuse to absorb, but this is not under our control. I came here to report on the areas for which we are responsible and I will speak only about them. They have nothing to do with the criminal murder, since we have not war with the Palestinian people. We have declared a war to the finish against Palestinian terror. And if there is someone indirect responsible for this murder (interruptions) - those directly responsible are the Lebanese, but if there is indirect responsibility for this murder, it is the P.L.O. terrorist organization. Therefore I can say here, immediately and clearly: not one soldier and not one I.D.F. commander participated in this terrible act. The hands of the I.D.F. are clean, purity of arms was preserved there too, as we acted throughout the months of the war.
When we agreed to the entrance of the Phalangists into the terrorist camps, they were expressly told by the I.D.F.'s senior commanders, and I quote, "that a military force will enter the Shatilla camp from the south and west and will comb out and mop up terrorists". It was emphasized in the coordinating meeting that "the action is against terrorists and that the civilian population should not be harmed, especially women, children and old persons." End of quote. The second doubts arose regarding what is happening in those camps, which we knew as terrorist centers in west Beirut. The G.O.C. Northern Command immediately took steps to stop the actions of the Phalangists in Shatilla, through the Phalangist liaison officer who was in the forward command post of one of our divisions.
It must be remembered that the Phalange are not the I.D.F. Their units and men are not subordinate to us and they do not have to report to us. For example, in this serious affair we made efforts, made special efforts, since the Prime Minister asked: What did the Phalange commanders say following the assassination? This was at one of the last Cabinet meetings. And he repeated this question and pressed and asked again: What did they say? What did they tell you after it? Did you speak to them after it? What did they say? We made efforts. The G.O.C. Northern Command, the Chief of Staff and I myself went to question their commanders in order to try and understand what, when and why this tragedy occurred. But the people refuse to talk to this day. They are not at all prepared to admit to it. We ourselves had to try and we are still checking and trying to investigate why they did it, in contradiction to commitments made to us, as we demanded. But we were told (interruptions).
If M.K. Peres happens to be here - he who was so alarmed at the cooperation and says things happened unbeknownst to anyone - I would like to remind him that something happened in his time with full knowledge (interruptions).
Therefore, this whole attempt to attribute in any way - and you did this in every forum, and to the whole world, and added fuel to the fire.
I understand the demand to resign. I understand. You would like me to resign. So would the Americans. By the way -as I read lately - they want me to resign. But there is a reason why you, who join the Americans, want to replace, and why the Americans want to replace. The Americans want to replace, since their aim is not Beirut. Their aim is Jerusalem, their aim is Hebron, their aim is Beit-El. Their aim is Elon Moreh and Ariel. And you, by your collaboration (interruptions) so as to assist in the weakening of Israel, to reach power with others' help and to hand over parts of the Land of Israel. Your aim is this (Cabinet) table, and their aim is there. By joining, you are helping them move toward the comprehensive solution proposed to us, which is the handing over of parts of the Land of Israel. You won't succeed.
Therefore, this whole attempt to attribute this grim affair in any way to the I.D.F. - including the demand to appoint a commission of inquiry - all this does a disservice to the I.D.F. We are ready to be examined on any matter, we have no problem. All this does a disservice to the I.D.F., to those responsible for it, and to the whole nation of Israel; but you will not succeed in driving a wedge between the I.D.F. and the Government. The Government is the I.D.F.'s commander. You are not the commanders of the I.D.F. The Government is the commander of the I.D.F. The Phalangists are the address, not the I.D.F., and no one here wants to hide anything.
Our Government, like our whole people, is sensitive to acts of murder and terror, more than any government and other peoples of the world. For three months, the I.D.F., its fighters and commanders, have been waging a marvelous campaign in Lebanon, which has brought and will yet bring huge security achievements. We knew of every movement of our troops and units, we were briefed and we reported immediately. In the tragedy which occurred within the camps, we did not know clearly what was happening, and to this day we still do not know exactly, since when what happened occurred, the Phalangists were inside (the camps - ed.), and not I.D.F. soldiers. I.D.F. soldiers and commanders did not enter these camps, on explicit orders. There were rumors and snippets of information; but by the time these combined to form the shocking picture and by the time the extent of the tragedy was clarified, it was too late and there could be no rescue, despite our intervention as soon as the first suspicions arose.
M.K. Peres preceded me here and with assumed self-righteousness attacked something we didn't know, which happened with no one's knowledge. I would ask you, M.K. Peres: In your day, and knowingly, there was another affair, and I would not have raised this if you had not stooped so low. During your term as Defense Minister, there was an affair, also in Lebanon, at Tel Zaatar. I won't give details here. How come your conscience did not torment you then? How come it didn't torment you? Thousands of people were murdered, and M.K. Peres (interruptions), M.K. Peres, you stood here and charged that things happened without anyone's knowledge, that it happened unbeknownst to anyone. Where were I.D.F. officers on the day of the massacre at Tel Zaatar? And this knowingly. Where are they today? (interruptions) charges cannot be made about something that happened with no knowledge. We didn't know.
I am citing here an official report of ours and I would like to emphasize that I requested, as soon as the atrocity was discovered, that detailed reports be prepared on everything that happened. If we have testimony on what happened -so I would like to report to you what happened here, according to an authoritative military report regarding the camps in Beirut, and I will read what relates to the matter at hand.
A. The Phalange forces entered the area of the Shatilla refugee camp on the night of 16-17 September 1982. Their action was stopped by the I.D.F. on Friday 17 September 1982 in the afternoon, following rumors of what was happening in the camp, and they withdrew from the area completely on the morning of Saturday 18 September.
B. After the murder of Bashir Gemayel, a decision was made that the I.D.F. take control of key areas in west Beirut. The order was for the Northern Command to take over key areas in the west of the city, and it (the decision) was taken on 15 September 1982 at 00:30.
C. This action was carried out beginning on Wednesday, 15 September 1982 at 05:00 and ended on Thursday, 16 September 1982, in the afternoon, with emphasis on avoiding harm to civilians and property - and indeed there was almost no harm to civilians and property.
D. In the order given the Northern Command regarding the take-over of the western part of the city, it said, inter alia, "It is forbidden to enter the refugee camps. Searches and mopping up will be done by the Phalange or the Lebanese army."
E. On Wednesday, 15 September 1982, after the murder of Bashir Gemayel, at 03:30, there was a meeting with the Phalange staff, with the participation of the Chief of Staff and the G.O.C. Northern Command, in which there was discussion of their action in connection with the events and of the I.D.F.'s entry into the western part of the city, and there was discussion in principle of their entry into the camps.
F. On Wednesday, 15 September 1982, in the afternoon, an absolute negative answer was received from the Lebanese army regarding our demand that the Lebanese army enter the refugee camps.
G. On Wednesday, 15 September in the evening, the G.O.C. Northern Command met with the Phalange commander and Colonel Michel Aoun, commander of the Lebanese army force which operated in Beirut. And the G.O.C. Northern Command strongly requested, after a negative answer was received from the Lebanese army, that he should act to convince the political level to approve the entry of the Lebanese army into the camps.
H. After a check, the officer claimed that the matter was impossible, and even claimed that in a meeting with the Lebanese Prime Minister, he was told that he must open fire on I.D.F. forces entering west Beirut, and was even threatened that he would be court-martialed.
I. On Thursday, 16 September as well, the Lebanese army gave a negative answer to the possibility that the Lebanese army might enter the camps.
J. On Thursday, 16 September in the afternoon, there was a meeting of the G.O.C. Northern Command with the commander of the Phalange regarding different topics; and on that day, in the afternoon hours, there was a meeting between the local division commander and the Phalange representative to coordinate the entrance of the Phalanges to the Shatilla camp.
K. The conclusion was that a military force would enter the Shatilla camps from the south and west, comb out and mop up terrorists. It was emphasized in the coordinating meetings that the action was against terrorists and that the civilian population should not be harmed, especially women, children, and old people.
L. On the night of 16-17 September, the Phalange force entered the Shatilla camp. At its request it received at a certain time illumination from 81 mm mortars and from planes. These were afterwards halted.
M. On 17 September the Phalangists concentrated a military force which included infantry, armored and medical units, in order to continue the mop-up operation in the camps.
N. The I.D.F. prevented the entry of this force to continue action in the camps.
O. On Friday, 17 September, 1982, in the afternoon - at about 11:00 - the G.O.C. Northern Command met with the Division Commander. The Division Commander raised suspicion regarding the Phalange mode of operation. It was not known then what was happening in the Shatilla camp. The G.O.C. Northern Command ordered the cessation of the Phalangist operation immediately, through the Phalange liaison officer who was at the forward command post.
P. On Wednesday, 17 September, 1982, at 16:30, a meeting was held between the Phalange staff, the chief of staff and the G.O.C. Northern Command, in which it was concluded that the Phalange would all leave the refugee camp on Saturday, 18 September in the morning. It was also concluded that an additional force would not enter the camps. In this meeting as well, the events inside the Shatilla camp were not known.
Q. On Friday, 17 September in the evening, an official announcement was received from the Lebanese army (following a meeting of the Lebanese political echelon) that the Lebanese army would not enter the refugee camps.
R. On Saturday, 18 September 1982 in the morning, the Phalange forces left the area of the refugee camps, and then reports began to arrive on the events inside the Shatilla camp. As a result, the G.O.C. Northern Command ordered I.D.F. forces into the Fakahani camps, and on Sunday, 19 September 1982, in the morning into the Sabra camp, in order to protect and calm the population, which welcomed the I.D.F. The G.O.C. also gave an order not to enter the Shatilla camp, so that the I.D.F. would not be linked to the events that occurred there.
At that time we did not know who would link the I.D.F. with the events. It did not enter our minds that you would be the ones to make the connection.
I do come here to claim that that's all there is to it, (that) nothing more was seen and nothing more heard than is written in this report. But this is the picture that was drawn in the Northern Command and the General Staff. One must again recall that we were not the ones who entered the Shatilla camps, but rather the Phalangists.
In the neighbourhoods of Shatilla, Sabra and Fakahani, neighborhoods that we call "camps", one must understand that we are talking about urban neighborhoods that comprise thousands of houses. We are speaking about thousands of houses in these neighbourhoods. But these are houses ranging from one to 12 stories. This is a built-up area, crowded. This is not a camp in the regular sense as we refer to a camp. This is not a camp such that when you stand on the side, you can look and see what is happening. This is a crowded and built-up area. We are speaking of a crowded urban district. One must understand that the activity which I have described was done against the background of events and widespread operations of ours in west Beirut. From reports reaching us after the assassination of Bashir Gemayel, we learned of an increase in the level of readiness and state of alert among the terrorist units positioned in the various sectors, out of fear of an Israel military reaction following the assassination.
I quote here from an official document dated 15.9.82 at noon. In that report, the terrorists tell of the advance of our forces and of fighting along the approach routes in the western part of the city. In this framework, it was reported that the terrorists were not the only ones fighting against the I.D.F., although at this stage the leftist organizations were refraining from participating in the fighting.
In another official I.D.F. report - from 16.9.82, Thursday, at 5:00 in the afternoon - it was stated that on that same day in the afternoon hours, the surrounding of west Beirut and the seizure of areas of control was completed by the I.D.F. With the completion of the encirclement, the report states, the fighting was focused on pockets of resistance which remained in the areas which were not cleaned out yet - Fakahani, Sabra, Shatilla and Hamra.
On Friday, 17.9.82, at 1:00 in the afternoon - and again I quote from an official document - the cleaning out of pockets of resistance against our forces continued in west Beirut. According to the reports the fighting was concentrated in the eastern Corniche, Talat-Al-Hirat, the stadium area, in Fahti and Fakahani.
I have quoted up to now from official situation reports that show that there were terrorists in the district. When the question is asked as to why we did not send I.D.F. forces there - we did not send I.D.F. forces there because we wanted to save the lives of our men. And this argument of wanting to save lives is one which everyone must remember. Therefore we did not send I.D.F. soldiers when there were others who could perform this action.
I have quoted from official situation reports, and I want to quote from another report from Saturday, the 18th of the month, the first day of the New Year holiday, at 3:00 in the afternoon. It is stated there: Parallel to the control of our forces in the neighborhoods in the northern part of the city, the Phalangists yesterday, that is to say the 17th of the month, made violent searches and patrols in the Sabra and Shatilla camps. 120 deaths were reported there. From this one can learn that our granting permission to the Phalangists to go into the Shatilla camp - against a background of terrorists being discovered in West Beirut neighborhoods (including Shatilla), terrorists who fought against our soldiers - arose from a desire to prevent our troops from getting hurt; and here you have been crying out all this time. These neighborhoods, Shatilla, Sabra, Fakahani, which the Phalangists had planned to enter, were considered terrorist strongholds throughout all the months of the siege of Beirut.
We did not imagine in our worst dreams that the Phalangists would act in this way when they entered the battle at this stage of the fighting. They appeared to be a regular army in every way. They promised to fight just against terrorists. We had good experience with them in the past, when they captured the science faculty in Beirut during the siege of Beirut, and the Reihan and Jamhour neighborhoods. In addition to this, they were active at the roadblocks between the two sections of the city and they carried out their tasks efficiently. We transferred responsibility to them in various districts that we captured and they functioned generally - and I emphasize the generally, because there were a number of routine difficulties, outside of some small, irregular incidents.
We agreed to the entry of the Phalangists in order to avoid endangering our soldiers, but we did not imagine in our worst dreams that these same men of the Phalange would perform the worst possible (deeds - ed). It is likely that you will say that this was an error in our consideration and evaluation of the situation. I do not say this, but you may come and say this. Let us see which of you have erred. Some three weeks after the outbreak of the war, a well-known and distinguished personality turned to me and said: God in heaven, what task has been given to the Christian Phalangists, our allies, in this matter? We were told that at a certain stage the Christians would enter Beirut. The bottom line is that this is their capital and they also have to do something to free their homeland. What is their share in this war? Is their role to throw rice at our soldiers and give them flowers, while we have to shed our blood? Didn't we, the Alignment, when we were in power, open the way to the Christians? When I heard these words "God in heaven," I thought, could this be a member of the Aguda or the National Religious Party? But now, it was the distinguished MK Victor Shem-Tov who said these words. He came to me with this argument, MK Victor Shern Tov.
MK Shem-Tov was right when he said: When we, the Alignment, were in power, we opened the way to the Christians. You should be congratulated for that. We have continued in your path, vigorously. The government headed by Menachem Begin has done this. And have we been able to choose our neighbours in the Middle East? We have no pretensions to change the character, tradition or behavior of our neighbors, even if they are strangers to our spirit, even if our moral standards are as different as the East is from the West.
On 20 July 1982, when the siege of Beirut was at its height, I was asked by a veteran public figure from the Labor party, a man who had the opportunity to learn at very close hand the subject of our ties with the Phalangists - he asked me: My main question concerning the Phalangists is, what was the extent of the expectations or disappointments in the I.D.F. concerning the Phalangists' conduct, fighting ability and willingness to participate in the fighting during the operation? And he went on to ask: Is the belief that the Christians will fight still current? And he also asked me: Can you or are you ready to say anything about this? This was absolutely a proper question. This was the question of a man who himself hoped that the Phalangists would not prove to be a disappointment, but would take part in the war. This was a man who was familiar with the manner at close hand, a very serious man. This was MK Danny Rosolio who asked this question.
I also received good advice from a distinguished former minister in an Alignment government. He said to me: I noted to myself that the significant turning point in this campaign came on the day when, at a certain stage, we heard that the Christians had begun to operate in Beirut. Here he saw the beginning of the significant change, that the Christians were at last to operate within Beirut, and there was an expectation that the Christians would enter Beirut. And he said to me: I think that if we play this game (and by the way this was not our thinking) and plan to let the Christians attain control of the government without getting their hands dirty, you are creating here a regime that we cannot depend on at all.
In the course of all these months, I was asked without letup by many members of the Knesset: Why are the Phalangists not fighting in Beirut? Why do they not go in? Why are their hands still clean? And you repeatedly came and warned and talked. I just quoted some of what was said.
Honorable Gentlemen, one cannot have it both ways - to criticize and complain, to rejoice and be glad - as to why the Phalangists did not take part alongside us in the war, and at the moment that a terrible tragedy takes place for which we are not responsible - they roll their eyes heavenward. But what is interesting - and this is perhaps the essential factor - is that Lebanon, after the slaughter of the Moslems by the Christians, has already achieved a consensus; but among us, regarding our interpersonal relations... (interruptions) as for the way we relate to each other. And for what? About something we did not do.
And in this way you add fuel to the fire, the fire of anti-semitism, of blood libel. This is what you are doing (prolonged interruptions).
You continue to make a non-stop outcry, shouting that you know what you are doing. But I want to tell you now not just what you know about what you are doing. Since we entered west Beirut and found material in the terrorist command posts, I would like to tell you a little bit, not about what happened in the past, but what happened now, during the war. I would like to tell you about the organized campaign to topple the government conducted by elements in the opposition and several within the news media. They want an inquiry commission? The toppling of the government is what they want. (interruptions). By the way, King Hussein also wants a different government. He wants you (the Alignment) - and he has his reasons.
From the first day the Likud came to power, and even during the crucial difficult days of the war, the defense war in Lebanon, they did not stop even for a minute. And today some of the "putsch" proponents are lending both direct and indirect support to some of the elements in the American government who have decided to dictate the Reagan Plan to us, or as an alternative, to bring down the government.
Regarding the mutual support given to the personal attacks on me and their aim, I will cite yesterday's "New York Times": "Therefore there is no doubt that Reagan to some extent, and his aides to a greater degree, would like to see changes in the Israeli government and especially the removal of Defense Minister Ariel Sharon" (translated from the Hebrew - ed.). The "New York Times" is a serious paper, but fortunately for us, Washington does not appoint, deputize or dismiss ministers from the Government of Israel. Not Washington. My dear adversaries from home and abroad. This is Jerusalem and not Saigon. It would be well for you to remember this.
How has it happened that a chorus of enmity and venom has arisen among us? Self-hatred such as this? To dare to say here among us that we are guilty for the slaughter in Beirut, and that we are guilty for the murder of Bashir Gemayel. As I say, this has been happening throughout the war. (interruptions).
We will yet come back and discuss the attempt to undermine the government and the conduct of the war. The campaign which has been waged against the Government is characterized first and foremost by one line - let us fight the Government even at the price of undermining our achievements in the Lebanese war, until at times it seemed that it was more important to the opponents of the Government to expel the Government from Jerusalem, than to expel the terrorists from Beirut. Yes, certain opposition elements sank this low, intentionally and unintentionally.
Now that we are in the staff headquarters of the P.L.O. in west Beirut as well as in the "city" of Beirut - it is worth your while to listen to this part, it is very interesting - it has become clear to me to what extent the P.L.O. leaders also based their resistance during the months of siege on the differences of opinion within Israel. They also pinned their hopes on these. The leaders of the P.L.O., in their deliberations for instance, reached the following conclusion on seeing the internal confusion in Israel, and I quote from material - we are prepared for an investigation committee on this topic. In order to make things easy for you, we will make it a confidential investigating committee.
The leaders of the P.L.O. came, for instance, to the following conclusion on seeing the internal confusion in Israel: "The main thing is to strengthen the size of the demonstrations throughout Israel, and all means should be harnessed to this goal." They were referring to the "Peace Now" demonstration which took place, and explained, I go on with the quote "If the demonstration in Tel Aviv isn't repeated, its entire effect will pass." End of quote from the senior leadership of the terrorist organization (interruptions).
This is the way the terrorist command in Beirut exploited the attacks on the government in Israel "in order to withstand the siege," and continued with their deliberations in west Beirut, at the staff headquarters which we have now reached, and I quote "Haim Bar-Lev wanted Sharon put on trial. These people want to retreat and to judge Sharon. All these things, God willing, will put pressure on the Israeli government." End of quote.
Gentlemen, I say here with all responsibility, the war in Beirut was definitely extended. Yes, the war was lengthened also because of the irresponsible, uncontrolled and mendacious attacks on the government. And that is definitely an issue for an investigating committee. I am willing.
I am willing for it to take place behind closed doors (interruption).
We will supply the data and you will learn what damage you caused (more interruptions) well, this is the price of democracy, which is precious to us.
We succeeded, despite attempts to undermine the government, in stabilizing our military position in Lebanon and enlarging the area of our achievements.
And above all, at the moment we are completing the mopping-up operation, searching for and collecting the captured arms from the terrorist centers in West Beirut and thus we will complete the unprecedented operation of expelling the terrorist organizations from Beirut.
The last phase, the one you have attacked here, began last Tuesday. As you know, we never wanted to enter west Beirut, but the dramatic events forced us to. .
The following is what I had to say on the entry into west Beirut, as I reported to the Cabinet meeting on 16 September 1982: "The day before yesterday, at 16:45 in the afternoon, while I was travelling, I received a report on an explosion involving Bashir. After about two hours, at about 19:00 hours, I had a consultation with the Chief of Staff. I spoke with the head of army intelligence, I consulted with the head of the "Mossad", and I spoke with the head of the Security Services. There was no clear information on whether Bashir was alive or dead. We had doubts, because none of our people saw him alive; and therefore we analyzed and estimated the serious problems which might develop in the event that Bashir had been killed.
It must be recalled, and we spoke about this in the Cabinet, that the terrorists left behind about 2,000 men. All this in contravention to the agreement, despite our having repeatedly warned the Americans about this. We also reported on this to the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee.
What were our thoughts on this issue? That through our security forces, at a later stage - and I don't want to go into details here - we will carry out the search for these people, in coordination with the government of Lebanon, we will apprehend them, or hit them, as was required by the circumstances at the time. This action could have been done only on the condition that the city was open and secure. This was also the terminology which I used in discussions with Ambassadors Habib and Draper, when we talked of the need for the city to be open and secure.
It should also be remembered that according to the agreement, the terrorists were to have turned over their heavy weapons to the Lebanese army on 22 August. This was not done. We warned the Americans about this too.
We faced, in my opinion, a very serious problem. It must be remembered that some 2,000 armed terrorists were left in the area, along with another 7,000 members of various leftist organizations in west Beirut, members of 27 different organizations from the "Murabitoun," which is the largest organization, through to the smallest organizations of a few score men. All of them armed. The danger we faced was that in view of the utter confusion, the terrorists would re-occupy their positions and we would again have a divided city. We were not concerned with how such a divided city would affect the Lebanese government; we do not deal with the Lebanese government. We were interested in one point, that through the re-erection of this wall, and by the terrorists' and the members of the leftist militias' maintaining weapons stores in the areas where they were, we would face the problem of a renewed situation -though not like the precious situation, since then there were 15,000 armed terrorists who left Beirut - but a new situation which could have far-reaching implications.
This was our assessment. The Prime Minister had contact with the Chief of Staff and myself two nights ago, at 12:30 at night. It was agreed that we would occupy key points in the city which will enable us to continue our activity and will prevent the serious situation which could have been created, which I now described. This was not a simple matter. It must be remembered that we are deploying very limited forces in Beirut. We had to mass forces. And here I must praise the General Staff for its swift action. An airlift was organized at night to the Beirut International Airport. Anyone who remembers the demands made on us to turn over this airport can understand why it was forbidden to so do. In a few hours we concentrated forces with scores of "Hercules" flights, in preparation for carrying out the operation.
It was our assessment that indeed there are some 2,000 terrorists and armed militias in the city, but we thought that the resistance would be relatively light, if at all. Therefore, in the first hours, when I reported to the Prime Minister - that was at 08:30 - after I had studied the situation and seen the force advance, all was still quiet. As the hours went by, there was return fire with the following weapons: from tanks, which certainly should not have been in the terrorists' possession, according to the agreement, through to anti-tank guns, heavy machine guns and mortars. Loaded Katyushas were also found. It was absolutely clear that these terrorists had not handed over their weapons and indeed were maintaining terrorist centers in different places, especially in the Fakahani, Sabra and Shatilla areas.
I would like to say sometimes - and this does not happen often - there are critical moments in which an immediate decision must be made. In my opinion, in the situation we faced there was a critical point which could have put us back in the situation whereby west Beirut would again be guarded by terrorist and militia forces, and behind them what was there before would retrench.
Therefore, in my opinion, this decision was not only crucial, but was actually a last-minute decision.
So you will certainly understand that the entry by the Phalange into the camps, when the Lebanese army refused to enter, was a natural step - in order to prevent losses to our forces. The inhuman tragedy which occurred was beyond our control. With all the pain and sorrow, we will not agree to shoulder it. We are continuing to check and study various details connected with our systems of coordination, concentration, command and reporting, but we will check strictly and meticulously.
We are now approaching the stage of withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, and we will advance through this to the final goal - peace and security with Lebanon. This is within our grasp, especially if we stop leveling blood libels against ourselves and unite in a common effort.