On 21 November, Jonathan Jay Pollard, an American Jewish naval intelligence analyst, was arrested in Washington and charged with spying for Israel. Two Israeli diplomats, who were serving in the Israeli embassy in Washington, returned home. The affair strained considerably Israel- U.S. relations. The U.S. demanded an investigation and Israel's cooperation in checking the case. Mr. Peres referred to the matter at the beginning of the interview, but refused to answer further questions. He then discussed a recent letter he recieved from President Mubarak, in which the latter expressed desire to deal with all issues separating Israel from Egypt, including Taba, the Ras Burka murder and the peace process. On Taba, Mubarak insisted on arbitration. Text:
Q: Let us begin with the espionage affair. Is Israel going to facilitate the Americans' investigation by providing them with documents and letting them interrogate the two Israeli diplomats who have already returned home?
A: We do not interfere with the legal procedure within the U.S., and within Israel we shall act in accordance with Israeli laws. I am not prepared to add anything to this.
Q: What conclusions will you draw from the Israeli investigation?
A: The conclusions that will be drawn will be designed to prevent hitches in the future.
Q: Does this mean they will be designed to prevent another case of Israel's gathering information in the U.S., our ally, against the will of that country?
A: You put it quite well.
Q: Why is the investigation here taking so long?
A: I do not want to go into all the details, since things are being checked, and this should be done thoroughly, without nervousness, it's an issue that should be dealt with full responsibility and very thoroughly.
Q: Do you already know whether affair ends at the military level, or whether it involves the political level as well?
A: I appreciate your curiosity, but I'm not prepared go to into further details.
Q: Why can't Israel, a country which suffered so many casualties in the Yom Kippur War - as one example - collect intelligence information in friendly countries as well, if our lives are at stake?
A: Our two countries have very close relations and voluntarily - there is no relevant law - refrain from collecting information which neither desires [to be collected].
Q: We've heard that there were several American attempts in the past to find out, so to speak, what's going on Israel.
A: You have a lot of information.
Q: But still, doesnt the hasty recall of the Israeli diplomats generate suspicions on the American side?
A: At this stage I see no point in going into this, it's a waste of time. I won't answer these questions.
Q: As we have no choice, let's proceed to our next item: Taba and Israel-Egypt relations. Does the letter you received from President Mubarak pave the way for improved relations with Egypt and, possibly a summit meeting?
A: A summit meeting is not an end in itself or a prize. The next thing we know, people will talk about peace in exchange for a summit, or lands in exchange for a summit. One should not overestimate the value of summits. The message of President Mubarak contains many elements which improve the situation and facilitate the political process.
Q: By what means?
A: First of all, by the president's attitude to an issue very painful for us: Ras Burka. The language he used, the promises he made to put the culprit on trial and to draw all the possible conclusions; he also sent a special emissary who paid a visit of mourning and condolence, which I think was an appropriate and timely gesture. Secondly, by his readiness to deal simultaneously with the totally of the issues on the agenda between us and Egypt, and also by his attitude towards the Jordanian and Palestinian question. On the Jordanian question, he is unequivocal; He says he believes that [King] Hussein does in fact desire peace.
Q: Does this it mean that President Mubarak no longer considers Taba a precondition for improved relations between the two countries?
A: If I understood right, the intention is to discuss all three topical issues. One sphere that we're interested in is filling the Camp David Accords with content, and by content I mean economy, commerce, tourism, culture, and so forth. The second issue he insists on discussing is Taba. And the third issue, which we insist upon, is the return of the Egyptian ambassador to Israel.
Q: Do you now have power-of-attorney to discuss the Taba question which has generated so many arguments in the government in the past?
A: The government decided to send to Egypt a delegation of representatives of three ministries - the Prime Minister's office, the Foreign Ministry, and the Defense Ministry - in order to examine the possibility of a conciliation or arbitration, or a combination of the two, a compromise, i.e. an arbitration or a conciliation document, or a document that would serve both purposes. The delegation went to Egypt, returned, and was supposed to continue its work, but then Egypt informed us that due to the Tunisia operation they were suspending the whole process indefinitely. Now President Mubarak has proposed to renew the talks in this first week of December - we weren't the ones who suspended them. That's what the inner cabinet resolution means, and well act according to it.
Q: Is there any new sign in President Mubarak's message that the Taba question will be resolved by arbitration, or do you perhaps have power-of-attorney from the cabinet to agree to arbitration?
A: One must state things as they are. Mubarak insists on arbitration, and that's it. There are two opinions in our cabinet: one opinion is - let's go to arbitration, and this opinion, I think, takes into account that we have a real case here, and that it cannot be taken for granted that Taba belongs to Egypt. Others in the cabinet insist on conciliation first, and on arbitration afterwards.
Q: Do you foresee a cabinet crisis as a result of these differences of opinion?
A: I saw many cabinet crises, and I also saw them pass. I hope that on this issue too we shall reach a decision, since the issue is a serious one. If Israel-Egypt relations are neglected, I think they will be filled with anti-Israeli content. If they are fostered, then they will be filled with pro-Israeli content.
Q: But the question is whether the balance of power within the government has altered so that a decision can be taken that will pave the way to negotiations with Egypt, for instance on Taba arbitration.
A: I hope so, because there may be decisions that we have yet to take. In fact, we have not taken any decisions. There is a disagreement which has yet to be resolved in either direction.
Q: Because of the deadlock in the inner cabinet?
A: Because of the deadlock, inter alia. But it may be that there is a way out which has yet to be discussed, and which will surface in the course of the work of the joint delegations.
Q: It seems to us that neither you nor Mr. Shamir has altered his stand. Will you send the Taba issue to arbitration even at the cost of disbanding the government?
A: You want me to put the cost before the decision, and I want to do the reverse.
Q: Was your enthusiastic response to King Hassan's invitation premature in light of the fact that shortly thereafter he refused to even receive a letter from you unless it came via the U.N. Secretary-General?
A: If my response had been delayed by a day, perhaps his reaction would have been delayed by a day. However, I did not invent anything. We all saw him on television. We heard what he said and saw his face. My reaction was directed to an invitation which he explicitly issued.
Q: In light of such a mercurial volte face, despite the fact that the king had been recorded on film - are you not included to scepticism with regard to the chances of reaching an agreement?
A: Even if the Arabs provide a thousand disappointments, I will not provide a single one. I am not responsible for what they do - nor do I grow disappointed with what they fail to do or what they declare and later retract. I think the search for peace is extremely arduous and complex. It is not material for the pampered. I haven't been served anything on a silver or golden platter. The search for peace is the stuff of stubborn people. I saw in almost every issue which I dealt with that many people despaired, grew disappointed, and said that nothing would come of it. I don't put stock in people like these. How did Roosevelt once put it? There are no desperate situations, there are desperate people. Even when the situation is difficult one must not lose hope. Despite everything I am familiar with Hassan's opinions. This is no secret. I have heard him.
Q: Have you spoken with him?
A: So I read in the newspapers. Do you doubt what's written in the papers?
Q: In other words you spoke with him. Could you tell us something about your conversations?
A: The papers also wrote about the contents of our conversations.
Q: So you talk with kings?
A: I talk with anyone it is possible to talk with. I don't know why he backtracked. I must say that this whole matter is in my eyes something of a riddle. Why did he extend the invitation? I didn't know that he would issue an invitation in public. And of course I don't know why he backtracked. Nonetheless, this is not cause for despair. I will persevere, and regardless of what is said I will not desist for a moment for a simple reason: I know what the alternative is. And it is not difficult to achieve the alternative. No effort is required from anyone wishing the situation to deteriorate in the reverse direction. This will happen of its own accord.
Q: You are seeking peace, but at the same time you or the Americans are evidently awaiting some sort of response from King Hussein in early December.
A: Correct.
Q: Doesn't the fact that Mubarak has once more opened the way to possible talks with Egypt again make talks with Egypt the top priority, over talks with Jordan?
A: The truth is that I would prefer dealing with the issues one at a time rather than simultaneously. Each one separately is sufficiently complex.
Q: First Egypt and then Jordan?
A: I would prefer first Egypt and then Jordan. But if there is an opportunity to talk with Jordan first, I will not reject it.
Q: Does it ever happen that reports you receive in the Prime Minister's Office are overly optimistic? For instance, Hussein. We all held our breaths and a government crisis was narrowly avoided. Suddenly Hussein is embraced by Syria, of all nations. Some even say that you precipitated a tightening of the bond between them. Do we really foresee regional developments accurately?
A: First of all, I greatly thank you for attributing such great power to me - such as the ability to tighten the tie between Syria and Jordan. This is nothing to sneeze at.
Q: But the upshot was hardly positive from our perspective.
A: But at least we see results. One need not exaggerate. If you are seeking a source for pessimism, I assume that there are several ministries which will provide you with this item as well. I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic. I think that a constant initiative must be maintained. The situation today is that people are awaiting Jordan's response, not ours. If the response is negative, this will not be at our expense. We have forged a situation by which Israel's international standing has been greatly improved, in which Israel appears as the initiator and a peace-seeking state, though with a not inconsiderable military force. I am not a "peacenik" in this matter, not an avowed pacifist - far from it. What have we lost? What has it cost us to have various reports published? Moreover, Hussein has always spoken in this manner. The novelty is that he is also speaking in a different manner.
Q: You exhibit great patience and say you will persevere. But your unique hourglass is running out. In ten months, there will be a new prime minister, undoubtedly with new priorities. Are you sure that an operative move with Jordan will evolve by the end of your term in office?
A: If I engaged in lotteries and guesswork I would ask myself this question and seek an answer for it. I don't ask what will happen by the time of the rotation. I ask what to do on a daily basis. Furthermore, this government has basic guidelines. I don't think the policy will change radically with the rotation.
Q: You said you would not hesitate to negotiate with Jordan if this opportunity presents itself, even though you would prefer to begin with Egypt. But within the understandable parameters, what response can Hussein give that will allow you as the head of the unity government to enter into negotiations with Hussein and all his partners?
A: Hussein has his problems, and we have ours. Whoever thinks that Hussein is offering peace in order to make me feel better is making a basic mistake. He is not doing any favors; we are not the equivalent of a charitable society: We are not doing Jordan a favor, nor are they doing us one. Hussein has reached the conclusion that he needs peace. If he doesn't need peace, then peace will never materialize. Jordan needs this, Hussein needs this. Therefore I believe that - and when I assess the situation he is in - he has arguments against this too, I'm not saying he doesn't - but on the whole he needs peace, and, consequently, he desires peace. As far we are concerned, we have agreement on entering into negotiations with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation which is not PLO. Hussein knows the parameters, in fact we went towards him a little with respect to the international forum, and he should understand that he must also go towards us on the issue of the Palestinian representation. Israel will not sit with the PLO, with Arafat, since he is not a partner, among other reasons, he is incapable of making decisions, he is always avoiding decisions and running after terrorism, that's what he does. That's how he spends his time. I told both the Americans, the Arabs, and the Europeans I met with: Dear sirs, you're wasting your time with this gentleman. He won't make a decision, hell be evasive, he'll run away, hell commit murders, Hell say a few words here and there to pretty up the picture. That's what happened in the past, and that's what's happening now. On the other hand, there are Palestinians and Palestinian leaders who want to enter into negotiations sincerely and in earnest.
Q: Was the appointment of Zafr Al-Masri as mayor of Nablus approved by the king?.
A: In any case we would have appointed Arab mayors. We don't want IDF officers to do a job which is not theirs. We have no interest to manage the civil or municipal affairs of Judea, Samaria, or Gaza Strip residents. What for?
Q: But was the appointment coordinated with Hussein, was he informed about it?
A: I see you're dying for me to say that it was coordinated with the king. And I say that the first reason is enough for me.
Q: There were claims against you that you don't treat the Golan Heights Law in the same way at the Jerusalem Law, and that you're saying we have what to talk about with the Syrians. Is it true?
A: If the Syrians want to talk, well sit with them, just like we tell the Jordanians: Direct negotiations without preconditions. I guarantee that the Israeli delegation will not propose to discuss the Golan Heights neither as the first, nor as the second item on the agenda. But you know, we're experts in hypothetical questions. I don't see Syria coming, I don't see that Assad wants peace. I think that Assad's genuine effort is to achieve hegemony and leadership in the Arab world. We are constantly upsetting ourselves by asking questions which in reality do not exist, not at this moment at least. What's the point of all these questions and answers? I do not at all see that either Syria or Assad are at all interested in negotiations with Israel.