16 Reply in the Knesset by Defense Minister Rabin to motions to the agenda on Lebanon- 6 November 1984

Madame Speaker, Members of the Knesset... At the start of my address, I wish to make clear that I am replying to today's motions to the agenda on the subject of Lebanon on behalf of the government and according to its decisions, with which I personally am in accord.

The government's policy in Lebanon is defined in section 16 of the basic guidelines. This section stipulates, and I quote: "The government will do everything necessary to ensure peace for the Galilee. Security accommodations will be determined to enable an I.D.F. withdrawal from Lebanon within a short period of time to be fixed by the government."

The practical significance of this policy, of the aims defined therein, is a single objective which combines security for the Galilee with removing the I.D.F. from Lebanon. It is impossible to accomplish one part without the other also being achieved.

We shall do everything to prevent a restoration of the situation in southern Lebanon to what it was prior to 6 June 1982. We shall prevent the terrorists from the P.L.O. terrorist organizations from re-establishing themselves in southern Lebanon, attacking the residents of the north, obstructing the normal conduct of life in the Galilee settlements. By the same token, we shall not extend the I.D.F.'s stay in Lebanon by a single day. We shall not risk the life of one more I.D.F. soldier for goals which are not the security goals defined in the government's basic guidelines. The government attaches top priority to acting so as to achieve the objectives defined in its basic guidelines.

As defense minister, I see attaining the government's goals as a major objective. However, the question is not how to define the goals in Lebanon solely in a general manner; there is a need to specify what the approach to the solution is, what security arrangements are desirable as well as possible in the given Lebanese situation, with whom to implement them, via which moves [and] what initiatives should be taken so as to achieve the government's objectives in Lebanon.

Regarding the fundamental approach, there can be two basic possibilities: The first, which the government has chosen - to strive for a military-political solution which, if reached, will have a chance of achieving security without the I. D.F.'s having to remain in Lebanon.

The second approach: A unilateral and primarily military move. It is very doubtful whether this can achieve the two parts of the government's combined objective: [Namely], security for the Galilee without the I.D.F.'s having to remain in Lebanon.

We should learn, and not copy, from the experience which has been accumulated over many years on the borders which separate us from the other Arab countries. Along the longest border dividing Israel from an Arab country -between us and Jordan - relative quiet has prevailed for 14 years. I.D.F. soldiers need not fight and be wounded day after day so as to prevent terrorist infiltrations and Katyusha [rocket] firing on our settlements, on our inhabitants from Eilat to Tiberias. Since September 1970, without any formal agreement, there have been an understanding and military arrangements which have enabled us to maintain quiet along the border with Jordan.

For more than ten and a half years, the Golan Heights have been quiet. Syria is not numbered among Israel's friends; it currently espouses a policy hostile to Israel. But by force of circumstance, it is observing the separation of forces agreement; and, in effect, there is no terrorist infiltration from Syrian territory, over the line between it and us on the Golan Heights, for attacks on Israeli targets. It emerges that even a hostile element, under certain circumstances and for pragmatic reasons, even if only temporary and partial - and ten and a half years is long time -can come to the point of making decisions which help us maintain peace and security along the borders.

The situation in Lebanon is more complicated. Nevertheless, the government has chosen the combined route of working towards reaching an understanding and political agreements which will make possible reasonable security arrangements, to guarantee both security and the 1. D. F.'s departure from Lebanon.

What are the security arrangements we are proposing, whose achievement alone will enable the I.D.F., by consent, to leave Lebanon? First, that the area to be vacated by the I.D.F. be taken over in its northern part by the bulk of the U.N.I.F.I.L. troops, from the sea to the Syria-Lebanon border. The southern part of this area is to be taken over by troops of the southern Lebanese army, which is made up of local Lebanese and which is an example of one of the any military forces today existing in Lebanon, such as the Christian forces, the Shiite forces, the Franjieh forces, the Karameh forces, the Jumblatt forces. Most unfortunately, there is no Lebanese army; there are armies in Lebanon. The Lebanese army only exists insofar as it is identified with the sect in whose territory it is deployed.

The southern Lebanese army will take over all the territory of southern Lebanon from which [our] settlements can be attacked by Katyushas and similar weapons, and will prevent organization of any attempt by terrorists to return to the area.

The second element: The Israel Defense Forces, after they return home, will retain the right granted every sovereign state under Paragraph 51 of the U.N. Charter, the right of self-defense in the full sense of the term. Should it become clear that the southern Lebanon army is unable to cope effectively, the way will be found to attack terrorists who try to infiltrate southern Lebanon so as to attack our settlements.

The third element: Understandings that other forces in Lebanon, both foreign and local, will not move south across the line now held by the Israel Defense Forces.

With whom do we wish to reach a dialogue of one sort or another? With those elements without whose understanding and agreement it will be very difficult, in my view, to achieve this entire objective: Syria, but mainly the Lebanese government, with which we must reach a written inter-governmental accord via negotiations between military delegations on the security arrangements, and only on the security arrangements, [and] and with the U.N. -for U.N.I.F.I.L., along with the S.L.A., is an element of the highest importance in the security arrangements we are proposing. These are the elements with which, one way or another, we must reach understandings and accords.

What are the moves and initiatives which we have taken and are taking? As early as my sixth day in office as defense minister, I applied to an authorized representative of the U.S. government for the U.S. to take the initiative on achieving a dialogue with Syria and with Lebanon, so as to reach our objective; and on the seventh day - with the assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations. And today, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State is in the Middle East; and contrary to MK Vilner's opinion, the Syrian president and vice-president are receiving him for talks. The Syrian foreign minister declared in New York that he has no objection to U.S. mediation between Israel and Lebanon to achieve an I.D.F. withdrawal and security arrangements in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese government has acceded to the U.N. Secretary-General's request to hold direct negotiations between Israeli and Lebanese military delegations at Nakura, with U.N. participation, so as to discuss these issues.

I do not with here to deal in guesses as to the motives of Syria, Lebanon, the U.S., or the U.N., why they will or won't agree to talks so as to reach a military-political solution which will grant reasonable security enabling an I.D.F. departure. I think that the government, as a government which bears responsibility for the security of the Galilee, for the security of I.D.F. soldiers, must exhaust every chance of achieving such a solution; for in the complex Lebanese picture, this is the only solution which can satisfactorily meet Israel's objectives as these are defined by the government.

I'm not promising that the solution is already in our pocket. It will take a struggle in the negotiations; we will have to insist on the conditions which will guarantee such security arrangements as without which we cannot say: we are leaving Lebanon because our northern border has indeed been secured. I think that this is the government's responsibility to the people: To thoroughly exhaust this chance, with but one objective -an objective which combines reasonable security for the northern settlements and their inhabitants with the I.D.F.'s return home.

The negotiations have not yet been exhausted; I cannot say today when we will arrive at the conclusion that they have been utterly or mostly exhausted. The talks have not yet begun. The Karameh government, for some reason, did not agree yesterday to take a decision in the absence of one minister who refused to return from Algeria so as to authorize the delegation to go to Nakura. We were told today that the meeting will be held on Thursday. Well wait and see. We are determined to thoroughly exhaust this avenue of direct negotiations with Lebanon on security arrangements, to exhaust indirect avenues of reaching understandings with other elements who will agree to these security arrangements, so that they will contribute their share, so that we will indeed find a solution similar - [though] in more difficult circumstances - to that found on the border dividing us from Jordan, and on the Golan Heights -arrangements which have proven themselves, despite their political, military, and judicial complexity.

So long as this avenue hasn't been exhausted, we will not say what we will do in the event we do not succeed. So long as this avenue hasn't been exhausted, we will take no unilateral step. So long as this avenue hasn't been exhausted, we will do all we can to maintain the security of the Galilee and that of our troops in Lebanon. That is the government's decision.

I propose that the Knesset refer the motion of MK's Victor Shem-Tov and Yossi Sarid to the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, and remove from the agenda the motion of MK Vilner, who has tried to depict the State of Israel as a mercenary hired by a foreign element, something which is intolerable.