In the following article, Mr. Rabin argued that while Israel's security situation was the most comfortable Israel has ever known, nevertheless, the Middle East being a volatile and unpredictable region, Israel must prepare itself for any eventuality. On the talks over Lebanon, he felt that secondary considerations such as with whom and where the talks will take place, should not deflect Israel from reaching a combined military political solution. Even indirect talks and third party mediation were preferable to the continued sinking in the Lebanese mire.
Israel's situation is not an easy one: An unfinished war in Lebanon; a frosty peace with Egypt; a certain disappointed hope among many Israelis that the peace with Egypt would occasion a breakthrough in other sectors of the Arab-Israeli conflict; a frustrating economic plight, due to a gap, the likes of which I can't remember, between the sense of individual well-being and the state of the national economy. At this time, under current constraints, we must chart our defense policy.
The dilemmas and problems bound up with the security of the country, of its inhabitants and its borders haven't fundamentally changed. The dimensions, circumstances, and solutions may differ - but at bottom, the problems remain the same. In determining defense policy, we must decide between readiness and a state of alert: Between preparedness over the long term and our immediate needs; between the fundamental security problems and the current, ongoing ones.
The implications of ongoing security for the state's survival are limited, but they do trouble some of the population in a certain part of the country. The problem of ongoing security - which sometimes plagues us on a daily, and even an hourly, basis - is more pressing, but it is liable to divert attention from the fundamental security problem.
With respect to the fundamental security problem, too, the current situation is somewhat paradoxical. When you try to picture the situation, Israel's security situation seems good. Egypt is outside the circle of hostilities, certainly for the foreseeable future, thanks to our peace treaty with Cairo. Iraq is tied down in its war with Iran, and so long as it is occupied on its eastern front, that takes some pressure off our eastern front. Syria remains the only hostile factor whose army is capable of taking action against Israel. Relations between Jordan and Syria are strained, and it's difficult to conceive of Jordan joining forces with Syria today, when even in the Yom Kippur War, it didn't take part from within its own territory.
On the face of it, the situation is one of the most comfortable we've ever known. But we've all gone through the upheavals in the Middle East situation, which take place faster than the building of the military force needed to withstand them. Thus there is no choice but to prepare ourselves for what could happen, (to prepare in light of) the current possibilities - or at the very least, always to take them into account.
In the wake of the Lebanese War, the question arose as to whether there are limits to the use of Israel's military might; can everything be attained via arms; can a successful military operation, sweeping though it may be, yield far-reaching political decisions or important long-term military achievements. In my opinion, there are limits to what military might can achieve. In two wars the Sinai Campaign and the Lebanese War, with all the basic difference between them - we learned that through war, we cannot reach the point of being able to absolutely impose our political will on an Arab nation, and certainly not on the entire Arab world. The theory that we can impose a peace initiative on an Arab country by means of war is an illusion. It cannot be done. But by the same token, it would be a mistake to underestimate the effect of Israel's military might in terms of deterrence, tipping the scale (in battle), and moving the conflict's solution from the battlefield to the negotiating table.
The Yom Kippur War, in its political consequences, was the cumulative expression of a succession of wars which led the Egyptian leadership to realize that it could not achieve anything by war. This in turn led to the conclusion that the Arab-Israeli conflict could only be resolved via negotiation. The Disengagement Agreement between Israel and Egypt was the first Arab-Israeli agreement since the 1949 Armistice Agreement. That was the harbinger of a new political future - at heavy cost, it is true, but with important and far-reaching political compensation.
When talking about ongoing security problems, there is sometimes a disposition towards military, rather than political-military, solutions. But when I look around me today, I see three sectors contiguous with Arab countries which are quiet. There is quiet along the Egyptian-Israeli border by virtue of the peace treaty; but even before that, there were long stretches of calm, even without the peace treaty. Along the longest border Israel shares with an Arab country namely the border with Jordan, there has been calm for over 14 years, ever since "Black September" - a calm which isn't rooted in any formal-legalistic agreement. The circumstances of 1970 gave birth to a new situation. Jordan realized that, even if it had to employ its own forces, it was in its own best interests to prevent terror from its soil - this, without benefit of any agreement. From a formal-legalistic point of view, the only thing that exists is the U.N. cease-fire resolution of June 1967. But within this same legalistic context, a bloody war of attrition was waged for three years. Now things have been relatively quiet and calm for 14 years. Political-security solutions must be found without introducing problems of prestige, without always looking for formal legalism.
The Golan Heights, too, have been quiet for over ten years following the disengagement agreement. I remember what our friends in the opposition said to us: It won't last 6 months; whom are you trusting, the Syrians? But look, we have had ten and a half years of calm - based on an unwritten agreement by Syria's hostile and brutal president that he wouldn't allow terrorists to infiltrate from Syrian territory beyond our common border in the Golan Heights. This agreement is upheld almost more (strictly) than those in the other sectors. Wise solutions are measured on the basis of who will sit with whom, or via whom the promise is made. Israel's main remaining problem (centers on) one sector whose role in the Arab-Israeli conflict was (once) secondary to that of the other sectors - both at the fundamental level and in terms of ongoing security. I won't go into what has happened in the past two and a half years in Lebanon, but I will say one thing: without a serious attempt to tread, in this sector too, the path of a combined political and military solution - without regard for legalistic formalism, the issue of where we shall sit, with whom we shall sit, and under whose sponsorship we shall sit - we won't attain any results. What is needed is an approach different from that which has heretofore prevailed. Even if it is unpleasant, we must take a sober look at who makes the decisions and must search for the solution together, even if indirectly. What is needed is a sober approach which, while not arrogant, is confident of our might. We must clearly define what we want, and must be sufficiently clear-thinking to know what we can attain under the present circumstances.
Unless we do so, we will continue sinking in the Lebanese mire. I believe that another way is possible, and I am certain that we will try to follow a different path a path which has typified all the other sectors, but which is at the same time suited to the Lebanese situation. I believe that this way, we will be able to find a solution, even if not an everlasting one.
All this must be done within the context of severe economic constraints. I believe that if we follow the path that has characterized Israel's mainstream in its approach to security and peace - namely, that everything is not attainable now, but rather in the course of a gradual historical process wherein the building of the economy, society, culture, values and security is combined - then we will surmount even our current difficulties, and weather what is in all regards a trying period, in the best possible manner.