With less than two month to go as prime minister, under the rotation agreement, Mr. Peres discussed in the following interview certain issues in Israel's foreign relations. He answered questions on Israel 's relations with South Africa, the renewal of diplomatic ties with the Ivory Coast and Cameroon, Israel-Soviet relations after the Helsinki talks, and the forthcoming summit conference between himself and President Mubarak, due to be held in mid September. Naturally, Israel-America relations also figured prominently in the interview. Text:
Q: Mr. prime minister, you must have heard Minister Moshe Aren's remarks, who termed you a "lame duck." He meant that maybe you should just turn over the keys and resign. Is this how you see the final period of your term as prime minister?
A: I have no intention of being a lame duck by any means. There are more lame expressions than lame ducks. If someone imagines that after rotation, my colleagues and I will start taking a Likud line and a change will occur, he's not living in the real world. We started a policy and I will continue in it with all my strength, in my new position as well. Certainly in the diplomatic sphere, but not only there.
Q: With the summit meeting between yourself and President Reagan take place? What are your expectations from this meeting? And if it does not take place - should we see this as being for political reasons?
A: The prime minister is also the representative of the Jewish people, and he must try to occasionally meet with the Jewish public, most of which is in the United States. I have not been in the U.S. for over a year; during the year I have received many requests from Jewish communities in the world to meet with them. Even if I did not have a meeting in Washington, I would go to meet with the Jewish communities in the United States and Canada. We're currently trying to coordinate timetables. But the meeting in Washington is not purely ceremonial; we must consider a political and economic package. We have an interest in coordinating with the U.S. regarding the Middle East issue. We have scored points in this regard over the past two years both in American public opinion and with the Administration. Taking into consideration the Gramm-Rudman law, we have to raise some new ideas regarding defense aid and economic aid, and I have some thoughts how we can guarantee the continuation of the aid in the current American framework in the future as well. I want to discuss this in Washington. In Canada we are trying to do what we succeeded in doing in West Germany, France and England: to establish joint funds for research and development and to arouse the interest of the industrialized world.
Q: Has there been a change in Israel's operative stand regarding South Africa in view of the chance to improve our relations with African countries?
A: Up until now, Israel's policy vis-a-vis South Africa was expressed by Israel's opponents. Israel's stand was almost never heard. There was an attempt to portray Israel as almost being responsible for apartheid. There is absolutely no basis for this. Israel cannot accept this, and I say again: a Jew who supports racism ceases being a Jew. As to the operative policy regarding South Africa: Israel is not a superpower, and I do not advise pretending to be a superpower. We're a nation that is not large, deeply involved in a many of its own problems, and I don't think Israel must serve as the leader regarding the matter of South Africa. I explained this to our African friends as well.
Q: What is more of an obstacle to establishing relations with other African states the South African matter, or a continuation of pressure from the Arab-Moslem world?
A: First and foremost is the clash between the Moslem and the Christian populations in Africa. There's a conflict there. There are those who say: we're Moslems, but we support a secular state and do not think that our being Moslems must prevent having contacts with the State of Israel. But there are also others. During my recent visit to Cameroon I heard expressions like "the Soviet-Moslem campaign." That is, the question of whether Islam is a religion or a form of politics which to a great extent determines the level of relations established with Israel. One should add to this that Israel's overall image over the past two years has also had its effect. The two African states which renewed relations with us lately, the Ivory Coast and Cameroon, are important states politically as well as economically, and there is no doubt that this step comes after a period of political consideration.
Q: How do you respond to the growing criticism which claims that you gave up the principle of reciprocity within the framework of the contacts with the USSR?
A: I did not give up on reciprocity and we did not decide on setting conditions. There's no need to begin every round of negotiations with an ultimatum. The Cabinet decided beforehand that if the Russians would request - so would we. We would respond and they would have to accede. I don't think that we must come to every discussion with a loaded pistol and with an ultimatum. The principle of reciprocity has not changed, and the principle of setting conditions was not introduced. There was no need for this.
Q: Isn't there an operative dilemma here, in light of the pressure being brought to bear by the Jewish people and the nations of the world on the Soviet Union regarding the release of Prisoners of Zion and immigration of Soviet Jews?
A: We have a knack for creating artificial problems. I am for both quiet diplomacy and open diplomacy. I never proposed stopping the public, open and unequivocal pressure on the part of the Jewish people and the State of Israel regarding everything connected to the fate of Soviet Jewry and the opening of the gates to their immigration to Israel. This needn't prevent maintaining a diplomatic campaign. I'm not among those who believe that each time we must discredit one of these two paths. We should and must follow both.
Q: What are your expectations from the summit meeting with President Mubarak? The editor of "Al Musawwar," Makhram Muhammad Ahmed, who is very close to the president, wrote that without an Israeli concession on the Palestinians, the summit will fail and that Egypt will refuse to hear Israel's three "no's." Do you plan to come to the summit with other stands besides those that you raised in your talks with King Hassan in Morocco?
A: I know of no prior setting of conditions before my meeting with President Mubarak, and I would also not accept any such setting of conditions. I definitely agree that the future must be discussed at this meeting. In our agreement with Egypt there are two sections. One relates to Egypt, and the other to the continuation of the peace process, including a solution to the Palestinian problem. With the signing of the Taba agreement and the return of the Egyptian ambassador to Israel, we can all essentially turn our attention to the continuation of the peace process and the resolution of the Palestinian problem, but no preconditions were set, nor will there be any.
Q: Is Israel going to take further steps or propose new initiatives?
A: The Camp David accords constitute the most far-reaching document on the Palestinian issue. This document contains enough formulations to continue the peace process, and in fact I am always drawing from it. Peace is a process which involves creating an atmosphere of peace, the fading of the danger of war, and a style making negotiations possible. Certain aspects of our policy did not only bear political fruit, but also brought intellectual achievements. Until now people used to start out with proposals for solutions and with peace formulas. 1, however, believe that emphasis should be placed on opening negotiations, that negotiations should be embarked upon even if there is no agreement. Those who want to reach an agreement prior to negotiations will never succeed in achieving anything. Therefore, I define the policy which I follow in one sentence: "To create all the preconditions required for launching negotiations and to conduct negotiations without preconditions."
Q: It appears that Hussein did not respond to your initiative and did not take advantage of the opportunity, thus stalling the political process which you are talking about. Are you disappointed?
A: Things must be seen as they are. Apart from the problem of relations with Israel, Hussein has a problem which is not less grave: developments on the Iran-Iraq front. Whoever wants to understand Hussein's policy must take it into account that he also has the problem of an eastern border. Our eastern border is Jordan. His eastern border is Iraq. Nonetheless, two things happened in the past two years. First, Hussein adopted an unequivocal stand against Arafat, freeing us of the need to do this. He is demonstrating to the world that Arafat cannot be a party to negotiations. Second, the policy he adopted vis-a-vis Judea and Samaria is gradually replacing the pro-PLO orientation, and ultimately also reducing the level of terrorism.
Q: There is a conflict between Hussein and Mubarak. Hussein wants Arafat out, while Mubarak is opening the door before him and trying to force him into the negotiation room. How will this conflict be resolved?
A: The problem is not that of the door but that of the man. Mubarak will also find out that even if he opens the door, this does not mean that Arafat will enter. Hussein also started out with opening the door. The door was open, but the rejectionism remained.
Q: Can Mubarak's meeting with Arafat before your summit meeting with him torpedo the summit?
A: Mubarak believes that he can change Arafat. I don't hold such a belief.
Q: Can the PLO in the territories thwart the peace process, and are you going to continue meeting with local Palestinian leaders?
A: Beyond any doubt. I will continue to meet with them. The PLO can certainly constitute an obstacle, as it has in the past forty years. Our relations with Arabs are on the way towards improvement and not toward deterioration. I believe that talks with Arafat damaged Hussein's standing. When Hussein and Arafat were saying "There is no difference between us," many Palestinians decided they might as well opt for Arafat. Only now, after the split, Jordan is beginning to recover and recoup its losses. My impression is that this position is gaining growing support in the territories.
Q: Have we promised U.S. Secretary of State Shultz to carry out a reform of taxation and the capital market in order to reduce the public and state involvement in the economy and channel funds to production and business? Is there an explicit commitment, a timetable?
A: There are no commitments, and no one is demanding commitments of us. We receive advice from friends, and we hold discussions within the framework of a joint group of American and Israeli economists. There are discussions, but there never was an order or a commitment. However, we should be aware that the Americans are saying: We are ready to grant you financial aid provided you fulfill the statements which you yourself are making and which the aid is intended for. That's legitimate. And thus it transpired that in the past two years Israel was viewed by the world and by the U.S. as a nation which made a correct use of aid. Funds were indeed channeled for purposes which had been agreed upon. Even a bank giving out a loan must be convinced that its client is investing the money correctly. During my first trip to America, the U.S. gave Israel $1.5 billion on top of its regular aid. So are the Americans really barred from asking whether these funds were invested appropriately?
Q: Are you worried about the rise in the standard of living and private consumption, which is liable to return to the "merry days of Aridor"?
A: This is a transition stage. The state budget was cut to a degree unprecedented since the establishment of the state. The number of employees in the public sector was also reduced. Capital was released, and we had to invest it to a large extent in ailing enterprises. The current feeling of relief stems partly from the strengthening of the shekel and the increase in its purchasing power. In fact, this is what we had in mind. I'm against waste, but I'm not against an increase in the standard of living. We just have to maintain a sense of proportion.
Q: As for the rotation...
A: I don't understand these questions. I'm not going to become a government clerk. We entered the Government in order to rebuild the economy, and this is a responsibility which we cannot discard. I don't believe that half of the Cabinet can rebuild the economy. Economic recovery depends on both halves of the Cabinet working together.
Q: Do you fear that the investigation of the GSS affair is liable to generate a government crisis and delay rotation?
A: I have no intention of intervening in the investigation process or predicting its results.
Q: Looking back, do you think that you should have perhaps acted differently in the GSS affair from the start?
A: No. I believe that the law in Israel imposes certain functions upon me and certain functions upon the judicial sector. When such a question arises, it is incumbent upon me to present the security and political significance of the issue, and this is what I did. Afterward the judicial authority entered the picture, and it is the one that must make the final decision. The moment judicial authority made the decision, I accepted its judgment.
Q: Are the recommendations of the Yariv commission on this issue already being applied, or are you waiting for the new GSS chief to assume his post?
A: The recommendations are being applied.