The Palestine National Council, the so-called "parliament in exile" of the PLO, met in Amman from 22 November 1984. By then Egypt and Jordan had resumed diplomatic relations. The meeting witnessed an effort to bring about a reconciliation between King Hussein and Yasser Arafat. In his speech to the Council, the King called on the PLO to accept Resolution 242 as the basis for political negotiations with Israel. But the King also called for an international peace conference and the granting to the PLO of an equal standing. He invited the UN and the major powers to sponsor such a conference. He also demanded that Israel accept the principle of peace for land.
Reacting to this speech, the Prime Minister said that Israel could not accept any of the conditions presented by the King, rejected the idea of an international conference and called upon the King to enter into direct talks with Israel without prior conditions. Text:
Mr. Speaker, distinguished Knesset,
The renewal of diplomatic ties between Jordan and Egypt, the rift in the P.L.O. and the P.N.C. meeting in Amman, and the resumption of diplomatic ties between Iraq and the U.S. are basically events within the Arab world rather than openings in Arab-Israel relations.
The Iran-Iraq war has deepened the split within the Arab world, causing new alliances and rifts within it.
Syria, which is close to Iran and linked with Libya, is trying to win hegemony in the Arab world. It is trying to intimidate Jordan, compete with Egypt and gain control of the P.L.O. in order to make it a totally Syrian tool. This Syrian policy has aroused obvious reactions. Jordan and Egypt have drawn closer to one another Iraq identified a more real danger to its existence than the supposed American-Israel "danger;" and Arafat was compelled to fight anew for his survival, his leadership and the independence of his organization.
The Palestine Council convened in Amman after Syria had brought about a rift within its ranks, and after other Arab capitals had refused to host it.
At the council there was a very interesting appearance by King Hussein. He took the P.L.O. sharply to task, Albeit [in a] camouflaged [manner]. He told the conference delegates that the P.L.O. had decided to go it alone - and where it had got to. He praised his grandfather for deciding to accept the U.N. Partition Resolution in 1947 and challenged Arab fatalism regarding the time element. Time passes for you, he said, and I quote, "in waste, arguments, derogation, and bickering." "What makes you think" he asked, "that the coming generations will benefit from better conditions to achieve what you have not managed to achieve till now?" "Is it within your capability," he went on to ask, "to halt time and the progress of the enemy, and leave him as active as usual?" He warned the P.L.O. members: "The evasion on their part," he said, "is a mistake," when they think that "the world begins and ends with you."
The king made a number of suggestions to those attending the council: That they adopt U.N. Resolution 242; advocate "peace in return for land;" enter negotiations in a Jordanian-Egyptian partnership; call for an international conference to settle the conflict in the region, etc. The Council adopted Jordan as its [new] seat, but rejected the Jordanian program as a basis for its policy. It publicly criticized 242, it rejected the Reagan Plan, insisted on the P.L.O.'s exclusive representation of the Palestinian issue, and reiterated that it would "continue the armed struggle" in other words, terror. "To uproot trees, to burn fields, to attack men, women, and children," as one of them said in his remarks.
This time again, as before, Arafat won the leadership, but gave up, again as before, on choosing a clear policy line. The desire for unity, even partial, in the P.L.O. put off any political decision.
From our point of view, even those among us who regard 242 as a basis for negotiations with Jordan, we cannot accept this as a prior condition for negotiations; a basis, yes - a condition, no. Negotiations must begin without preconditions, and each side has the right to present its proposals.
The idea of an international conference is rejected by all in Israel. It is actually intended to deny Israel negotiations on terms of equality. A conference in which the most extremist representatives of the Arab world would participate would compel all the Arab countries to radicalize their positions, to link any sort of move to a series of complicated and difficult steps, and in effect to apply pressure on Israel, instead of holding negotiations with it.
Israel believes that there is no point in holding negotiations. It were better for the sides to meet face to face, without appliers of pressure, and without proponents of rejections.
Once again I appeal to King Hussein and propose to him direct negotiations with no preconditions. On behalf of the entire government, I can promise him that any proposal he raises will be considered by us seriously and with respect. We have no illusions: The issue at hand is very complicated, and it is unlikely to be resolved by one single step. If Jordan is indeed interested in peace - and peace is a mutual matter - [then] it must agree to begin negotiations immediately and conduct them patiently. We must be prepared to advance towards peace gradually, and not in just one jump. Via gradual treatment, we shall be able to remove many obstacles, strategic and psychological, on our path, and promote each of our two countries' interests in a better economy, calmer neighborly relations, and an atmosphere which would make a permanent solution possible.
We appeal to the residents of the territories and say to them again: Between sterile terror and autonomy in the immediate stage, it is not a reign of terror but self-government which will ensure their future and enable them [to live] better lives, at this stage. We are prepared to negotiate separately with Jordan, or with a combined delegation: not P.L.O., not terrorist; a delegation which aspires to peace with Israel, not to peace without Israel. We signed a peace [treaty] with Egypt. A realistic dimension, not just [A] formal [one], is needed for peace. We have an interest in normalizing relations with Egypt while solving those few issues still in dispute, and while seeing Egypt as prime leader, on the Arab side, towards peace in the Middle East and the entire region. President Mubarak was one of the charters of the strategy of peace, and I anticipate that he will continue to implement it in full regional scope.
If indeed there is a general change in atmosphere in the Middle East, Israel will welcome it warmly. But the time has come for talk in various directions - sometimes in the direction of opening up and sometimes in the direction closing off - to turn into a real encounter and negotiations between the sides. No side will accept the opinion of the other prior to negotiations, or in place of negotiations. Peace will be established only via open and direct dialogue.
Members of the Knesset,
Israeli is confident of its ability to defend itself militarily, and of its ability to [conduct] political dialogue with its neighbors. We shall not for one moment stop cultivating the strength needed for our survival, and we shall not hesitate to propose repeated initiatives for peace. We are convinced that what is needed now is not another plan, no more theoretical peace plans; what is needed now is a partner and another partnership for dialogue under conditions of equality and mutual respect.
We do not feel that peace proposals are charity which the Arabs tender us, or charity which we tender the Arabs. The Arabs, like us - and we, like the Arabs must strive for peace instead of war, and for exchanges of words instead of exchanges of fire. And if it should require patience, we shall gird ourselves with patience. We shall not lose [our] perspective [with regard] to peace.