On 8 November 1984, Israeli and Lebanese military delegations opened talks in Nakoura on security arrangements in Lebanon after the IDF redeployment. The United States did not attend and the meeting was under UN auspices. Two days later, the Lebanese suspended the talks under pressure from the Shilite Amal militia. The talks resumed on 15 November after Israel released the Sidon Amal commander. Israel proposed a two-part security zone. The area closer to Israel to be controlled by the SLA, north of the security zone, UNIFIL will be in charge. It was clear to all involved that the fate of the talks hung on Syria 's consent. This was the first part of the following interview. The second dealt with the PLO 's refusal to give King Hussein green light to negotiate with Israel. The abridged version follows:
Q: The Nakoura talks began with Syria's consent, yet lately (Syria) has again dug in its heels in an extremist stance. What, in your view, are Syria's intentions?
A: We saw favorable signs in Syria approximately two months ago; but now it seems to have toughened its position. It's not inconceivable that this stems from developments such as Arafat's success in convening the Palestine National Council, the Hussein-Arafat rapprochement, the resumption of relations between Egypt and Jordan and between Iraq and the U.S., the feeling that a Cairo-Amman-Baghdad axis is being formed, (and) the talk, in the wake of this axis's formation, about a possible resumption of the diplomatic initiative for peace talks with Israel. All this isolates Syria and scores a coup for American policy. Consequently, Syria is attacking this axis and its policy, particularly in view of the fear that it will lead to a continuation of the American initiative. The Syrian Ba'ath party congress met at the weekend; this, too, is one of the elements affecting Damascus's position. It may be that Syria has also come to the conclusion that Israel has no choice but to make unilateral moves, in which case it prefers to pay less for something which it's likely to get in any case.
Q: How do you view Hussein's latest pronouncements? Were you involved in the exchange of messages between Hussein and the prime minister? Can we expect a new peace initiative along the lines of the peace with Egypt?
A: I don't know of any messages between Peres and Hussein beyond what's been said publicly, i.e., the Israeli government's call to Hussein to come to negotiations without preconditions. As for the situation as a whole, the political development within the Arab world, Egypt's rapprochement with Jordan, and the P.L.O.s dependence on Egypt and Jordan - all these, plus Hussein's call (for the P.L.O. to accept resolution 242 and the principle of territory for peace - ed.) create more favorable conditions for possibly resuming and expanding the peace process. But it's my perception that Egypt is principally interested in returning to the Arab fold. I think it will be very difficult to get any initiative rolling unless the Americans are the ones to set it in motion. And first there are two obstacles to be removed: Israel's involvement in Lebanon and thawing the freeze in Israel-Egypt relations. I wouldn't say this is not possible during 1985.
Nevertheless, there are still some substantive obstacles: The P.L.O. hasn't yet given Hussein its approval to start negotiations with Israel, and I'm not sure Hussein would do so without P.L.O. approval. The P.L.O. hasn't consented to Hussein's call for it also to accept 242 as a basis for continuing the peace process. Moreover, Jordan's call for a peace conference under the aegis of the U.N. with the participation of all parties involved, the P.L.O. included, is not acceptable to us, nor for the U.S., I think. The second flaw is that an international conference under U.N. auspices means two chairmen: A U.S. one and a Soviet one. Nothing of this kind (with two chairmen) has yet succeeded. We have only succeeded in bilateral negotiations. Thus, if Hussein insists on this format it is a guaranteed formula for failure, which neither the U.S. nor Israel can accept.