44 Reply in the Knesset by Defense Minister Rabin on Lebanon- 12 February 1985

Before I begin my reply to the motions to the agenda, I would like to comment on and clarify concerning what MK Mattityahu Peled said regarding my letter to him and MK Miari. The two MK's approached me to obtain permission to make possible the burial of Fahd Kawasme - who was murdered in Amman - in Hebron. In my letter of reply (I am courteous, and make a practice of answering every MK who approaches me) I informed them what the government's decision had been. I accept responsibility for having proposed that the government inform the Kawasme family, which asked us for permission to bury him in Hebron, that if they would bring about a situation whereby our missing would be turned over to us, we would permit this [burial]. My reason for making this offer was that the PLO leader, in a boasting interview with an Israeli journalist, had stated that he was holding Israeli captives. Thus, out of responsibility for the fate of the missing and their families, I thought that [we should make this deal] despite the fact... that receipt of information regarding the missing should be something there is no question about, something that is done without getting anything in return. But what can we do? We are dealing with a murderous terrorist organization, and in order to free prisoners, we pay a heavy price in liberating assassins, as has been in the past and will yet be in the future. I thought that this should be the government of Israel's response; and this is what I passed along in my letter to these two MK's. I didn't assign them any mission in this regard, and any attempt on their part to depict it in such a light hasn't a glimmer of truth. Such a thing is inconceivable. We are making supreme efforts to obtain every scrap of information concerning the fate of the missing men, as we are continuing in tireless efforts to free the captives held by the terrorists. For this reason I don't want any misunderstanding here, any misrepresentation. These things must be clear.

Now for the motions to the agenda: I intend to present the policy and decisions of the present government regarding the entire issue of the security problems on our northern border and in Lebanon. I have no intention of analyzing the outcome of the war, either what happened or what did not happen. As minister of defense, I regard it as my main responsibility to find a solution for the problems as they exist today. The national unity government set down in its guidelines one clear objective in its policy on Lebanon. That objective has two facets: one, assuring the security and well-being of the settlements and inhabitants of the north; second, to do this without obliging -the IDF to remain in Lebanon for a long time, permanently. Consequently, the first decision which the cabinet made was to try - I emphasize, to try - to establish a dialogue with those with whom, if we were to reach a settlement, we would be able to reach agreed-upon security arrangements, which would in turn make possible both better security for our northern border and the IDFs return home. I'm amazed by MK Yossi Sarid, who criticizes the attempt to talk with Syria or other elements in Lebanon - when all these years I've head nothing but complaints from him as to why we don't try to talk with our enemies, because without talking to them it will be impossible to reach a political or semi-political solution, of the dispute between us even when the prospects are not brilliant. The cabinet, in my view justifiably, unanimously approved this step, recognizing that we must thoroughly exhaust even the faintest chance, to leave no stone unturned, in the search for a reasonable agreement, security arrangements which do not include the IDPs presence in Lebanon. And with whom would it have been possible to do this? With those who decide, with those with whom one must afterwards make arrangements - indirectly with Syria, directly with Lebanon. We did not try to attach any other objective to this exclusive aim of achieving security without the IDFs having to remain in Lebanon. We did not make our withdrawal contingent on the withdrawal of others, or on the Lebanese government's meeting certain political conditions. At first there were some encouraging signs; the Deputy U.N. Secretary-General even said at one point, in reply to our request, that he believed it would be possible to station U.N. troops throughout the area to be vacated by the IDF in southern Lebanon. I'm not the one who said that; a U.N. official said it after visiting Beirut and Damascus. There were other problems and possibilities, and we did not insist on maintaining the Southern Lebanese Army in its present form as a necessary precondition. We agreed that it should be incorporated into the Lebanese army according to a timetable which we would agree on with Lebanon. It's not unusual in Lebanon for a local force to be incorporated into the Lebanese army. Isn't the Eleventh Lebanese Army brigade in the Shouf a Druze Brigade? Isn't the sixth brigade in West Beirut a Shiite brigade, and isn't it influenced by its location, its ties, the problems of the place where it is located? I don't know whom it obeys more, the president of Lebanon or Nabih Berri.

We sought security arrangements based not on the Lebanese army, but rather on the UNIFIL force and a local Lebanese force, which we were prepared - and asked - to have incorporated into the Lebanese army. The sixth Shiite brigade in West Beirut is in its state; and the eleventh Druze brigade in the Shouf is in its state. At any rate, because of inter-Arab developments which I will not go into, Syria found itself isolated in the Arab world, and instead of being the one to accuse other Arab countries of the "disaster" that they might possibly talk to Israel, it found itself possibly accused of talking with us, even if indirectly. There has also been an argument within the Arab world whether war is the only way to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, or whether the political route [might solve it]; and, as is known, Syria continues to adhere to war against Israel as the only way of solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. We had reached a point at Nakoura where the argument between us and Lebanon (and indirectly, Syria) was over the actual deployment of UNIFIL north of the Litam River, on the expansion of UNIFIL's mandate, on increasing the force and expanding the area under its control. That was where the talks ground to a halt.

In any case, the political tack did not lead to any results. Under the circumstances, the defense establishment reached the conclusion that it was not possible, via talking indirectly with Syria and directly with Lebanon, to reach security arrangements of any kind whatsoever. Consequently, the question confronting us was - where do we go now? Four possibilities were presented to the cabinet: To remain on the Awali line for an indefinite period; to pull back to an interim line inside Lebanon; to withdraw to the international border in a single move; or to withdraw and redeploy gradually along the international border, while maintaining a security strip with local Lebanese forces backed by Israel. I would like to say why we could not remain on the Awali line indefinitely. In my view, it would have been impossible to reach a political settlement which would establish security arrangements in the foreseeable future.

In order to fight terrorism effectively - in this case, 90% or more of the attacks are perpetrated by the Shi'ites, Shi'ite terrorism; in southern Lebanon today, we have a Shi'ite-Israell conflict - three things were missing for doing this effectively: First, no political component of the national unity government has any political-territorial objective whatsoever in Lebanon. This is not the case with regard to Judea and Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. Secondly, on the other side of the Awali river, there was no government, or any chance that a government would arise, which would denounce the use of the areas north of the Awali as a base for terrorist activity against the areas and the IDF south of the Awali. I should like to remind you that between 1968 and Septemebr 1970, the struggle against PLO terrorism in Judea and Samaria was difficult; we paid a high price. The situation changed radically after September 1970. With all due respect to all the IDF's actions and reprisals, it was not they who put an end to the infiltration of squads, the firing of Katyushas and Jordanian artillery, [and brought about] the cease-fire. The decision by the Jordanian government to crush the PLO in Jordan, to eliminate Jordan as a real base of operations for the PLO organizations against Israel - is what has given us fourteen and one-half years of relative quiet along the Jordan River lines. The Jordanian government having disqualified Jordan as a base for action against us; the actions of the Jordanian army and security services -and, of course, the operations of the IDF and the Israeli security services too - combined to make possible the achievement of fourteen and one-half years of relative quiet, and I stress [relative]; people were murdered, terrorist acts were perpetrated even more were attempted. It was also made possible for us in the Golan Heights, where the Damascus government is upholding its commitments to prevent the penetration of terrorists from Syria via the lines that separate the two countries. It was also made possible in Sinai, certainly after the peace treaty, but also beforehand. In Lebanon there was not, is not and will not be a government which will be capable of that. And in these circumstances, when [the area] north of the Awali is increasingly becoming a base of activities and operations and penetrations which is growing in power, there was no good chance of combating terrorism effectively.

Thirdly, neither in Judea and Samaria nor in the Gaza Strip would we have succeeded - in addition to the two conditions I listed previously - in attaining the achievements we reached had we not severed the line between Judea-Samaria and Jordan. There is some controlled movement, and we opened the Green Line to the inhabitants of Judea-Samaria and Gaza, to free movement, to their integration into the Israeli economy, to their linkage to us. Without those three things obtaining in southern Lebanon south of the Awali, any prospect of combating terrorism would have been faint. I am being cautious; I do not want to say more than that. Justifiably, we have no political-territorial interest in Lebanon. There is no chance that a Lebanese government will act against terrorism. On the contrary, there is increasing encouragement of and aid for terrorism in southern Lebanon, and if we would have cut off the Awali and opened the international border, terrorist attacks within Israel would have increased. And without the serious ability, taking the long-term view, to combat terrorism as it exists in Lebanon today - it is less PLO terrorism, not that that might not return there - which is in the main Shiite terrorism, the main reason for which, or at least for its onset, was that they regarded us as an occupying element. Consequently, it seemed to the government, and in my view correctly, that it was time to make a decision, not about a fragmentary step, but about a new concept of how to defend the north, knowing full well that terrorism in Lebanon has not been eliminated. The PLO received a temporary blow, terrorism has not been eliminated, there is no one who can help Israel - as Egypt and Jordan, and even, you may be surprised to hear, Syria did - prevent the evolution of terrorism in Lebanon. Consequently, the problem will remain: How do you combat terrorism? Is it by means of our presence in areas within Lebanon, or by deploying along the border, within the security strip I mentioned, by maintaining Israel's freedom of military activity, to prevent the situation from reverting to what it used to be, as it was prior to June 1982.

This is the conception underlying the government's decision. The question has been asked: Why in stages? It is my assessment, for reasons I will not dwell on, [that this will allow us] to do this in a more orderly fashion - and I know that every move will exact a painful price: I am not trying to obscure this. As long as there is terrorism, we will pay a price, a painful price. I prefer that the IDF will operate offensively and not defensively - not in a way that exposes it, as moving or static targets, to every group of terrorists in every village or near every village. I have been asked a question, and I will not evade it. The last two or three weeks have seen an increase in the number of attacks. I would just like to point out that this increase is precisely in those areas which we are not about to leave at this time. Terrorism has not increased in the area which we will leave by 18 February. It has increased precisely in the security zone and in the area which is to be evacuated in the third stage. The eastern area is a different problem, a problem in its own right. The number of terrorist attacks there was always relatively lower than in the western sector, among other reasons because of the small Shiite population in that sector, and to a certain degree because Syrian policy on the lines between them and largely prevented the infiltration of terrorist squads - which the Druze do not do today in the Shouff. There is Druze-Shiite cooperation to infiltrate squads through via the Awali line. It may not be pleasant, but it's a fact. Consequently, it seems to me that there is no alternative to stages, and I do not say what our conclusion will be after the first stage. I know for certain that the cabinet's decision concerns a new defensive conception. It is true that at every stage it will have to reach a decision about implementing the next stage. But I know that the members of the cabinet who voted for the decision were those who saw what direction we were heading in, what kind of defense of the north we had in mind, and I am sure that they understood exactly what they were voting for.

I have been asked a few questions here, and I would like to reply. MK Benny Shalita asked whether the danger of war with Syria won't grow if we leave the Beka'a and Jebel Baroukh. Like a good Jew, I will answer with a question. Was the aim of the war, or the aim of "Operation Peace for Galilee," which the cabinet decided to launch, to reach Jebel Baroukh or the Beka'a? Was it to clash with the Syrians, and engage in war with the Syrians? Was that the objective of "Operation Peace for Galilee"? As far as was stated by the cabinet, in its resolutions, the objective was to strike at the terrorists, while striving and making an effort to avoid engaging the Syrians in a war. I speak on the basis of the cabinet's resolutions - consequently I do not understand the very question of MK Benny Shalita. Was that the aim of the war? Was that supposed to be the consideration? I do not want to express an opinion, but I have no doubt that by not remaining in the area we reduce the danger of friction and flareup between Syria and Israel. If and when Syria decides or does not decide to act against Israel, that will not play a part. Our presence there could facilitate things [for us], but not increase the dangers. In conclusion, I am convinced that the cabinet's decision, as it was made, is the [most] feasible solution, however you wish to call it: The best or the least bad; it is the correct solution in a difficult situation.