In the first Israeli reaction to the Hussein-Arafat agreement, Mr. Peres felt it was a departure from the 1967 Khartoum formula, but did not go far enough to constitute an offer to embark on peace negotiations. The prime minister did not see in the agreement a plan for talks, but felt that Israel had patience until such time when Hussein will come forward and negotiate. Meanwhile, it appeared as though the political deadlock would continue. Turning to Lebanon, Mr. Peres expressed the hope that the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon would be completed by the summer of 1985 irrespective of what happens on the ground. He also commented on disagreement with the Reagan administration on the Israeli request for an emergency economic aid of 1.2 billion dollars. The parts dealing with the defense and foreign policy aspects follows:
Q: "Newsweek" magazine termed you a political gambler; the daily newspaper "Ha'aretz," by comparison, called you the "national decision maker." How would you describe yourself - gambler? Decision maker?
A: I would say that every decision involves a kind of gamble, although there is also a gamble in not making a decision. I believe it is my job to decide even when there is an element of gamble in the decisions.
Q: Has this worked during the five months you have served as prime minister?
A: I hope so. I know I have done my best.
Q: Let us review the issues at the center of your activity, beginning with the Hussein-Arafat agreement. Although this agreement contains no explicit undertaking by the PLO to halt terrorism, or to recognize Israel ' it's even doubtful that it contains recognition of Resolution 242 - but nevertheless, isn't there any progress, any forward movement in this agreement? Even President Reagan said this evening that there was some kind of prospect for peace here.
A: I believe that there is even less in the agreement than what Hussein himself offered and hoped when he appeared before the Palestinian National Council, and essentially focused his remarks on the need to base negotiations with Israel on Security Council Resolution 242. There is no mention of Resolution 242 in the agreement between him and Arafat.
Q: But perhaps there would be a mention if the Americans undertook to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians in the negotiations?
A: To date the Americans have resolutely adhered to their longstanding and traditional position. The U.S. president, Mr. Reagan, yesterday reiterated three points: The need for the PLO to recognize Israel and its right to exist, as he said; secondly: Direct negotiations; and thirdly UN Resolution 242. 1 don't expect the Americans will change their position, although I am aware that part of the effort currently underway in Amman, is aimed at Washington no less than at Jerusalem: Perhaps this is one of the mistakes, because peace must be made with Jerusalem, not with Washington.
Q: According to the information at your disposal this evening, is this a serious peace initiative, aimed at entering into negotiations with Israel?
A: I would say that it constitutes a departure from the Khartoum formula, but it does not yet contain anything to bring about the opening of peace negotiations.
Q: Does it constitute a step forward?
A: It represents a step forward from an Arab standpoint; it is still not an offer to open peace negotiations, as we read it. Peace, after all, is a serious matter, Can peace be made with Israel by conducting negotiations with the Russians or with the Syrians? Can peace be made by not recognizing Israel? Can peace negotiations with Israel be conducted when its citizens are being shot at? In this matter, people have to be serious; it's not a game of words. First of all, I want to reiterate: Today like yesterday, and tomorrow like today, the national unity government proposes to the Arabs and to the Palestinians - although not to the PLO - true peace negotiations with no preconditions. We invite Hussein to come and sit (with us) - he can propose whatever he likes, and we will discuss everything he proposes.
Q: You are now inviting Hussein, you believed that he would come for political negotiations, but instead he goes and makes an agreement with Arafat. Didn't he to some extent put a spoke in the wheel?
A: I understand you have a complaint against Hussein; I also have a complaint against Hussein. My response is that I have patience. We don't change our minds. If you look back, you see that, after all, the Arab world is beginning to understand that it too must move towards peace. There was an Arab leader who understood that one had to move enough to make peace - namely, Sadat. I hope that such a day will also come. Until then, Israel will maintain the initiative, and I think the fact that we have maintained the initiative to some extent forced the Arabs to move, and I know that tomorrow there will still be no genuine proposal for peace, but I have not despaired, I am not disappointed.
Q: So in other words you believe that despite everything, King Hussein will indeed show up?
A: No - despite everything I believe that peace is vital to us and is vital to the Arabs, and that the Arabs have no choice, just as we have no better alternative than peace.
Q: Even so, Mr. Peres, don't you see at least the glint of a turning point, with the PLO for the first time agreeing to the formula of "territory for peace"?
A: What can we do with a glint? We need an actual plan. I don't like these terms: "moderation," or as you say, "a glint." The matter is very serious. A decision must be made that will permit all the sides to come and sit at the negotiating table. And I say again that peace can be made with Israel - not without it. With Israel - and not in place of Israel. And if it takes more time, then it will take more time. I haven't despaired, and I am not impatient.
Q: I'm a bit surprised at your great optimism. Even since the Rabat Summit in 1974, Hussein has tied himself to the Palestinians, to the PLO. What reason do you have for being so optimistic that this will come to an end, that Hussein will come alone and will abandon Arafat, after he has just signed an agreement with him?
A: Half a year ago, Arafat didn't dream of going to Amman and embracing Hussein, and acknowledging the partnership between them. What happened? Events forced him to change his stand. That is not enough, not sufficient. By the way, I do not pin any hopes on the PLO or Arafat. Arafat, in my eyes, is an obstacle to peace. He is not capable of making a decision; today as well he has sidestepped a decision. He hasn't agreed to 242, he hasn't put a stop to terrorism, he still demands a separate state, and so forth. But there are objective events that obligate the Arabs, and that obligate us to embark upon a path other than war.
Q: As you describe the situation, it looks like the political deadlock with Jordan is liable to persist at least until the end of your term in office: Perhaps you're missing an opportunity that you thought might come your way.
A: I don't think that the State of Israel exists according to the terms of office of its prime minister; rather, I think prime ministers exist according to the terms (of history) of the state. In other words, there are tides in the country's history; one of the necessary tides is in fact that of making peace. If it comes to pass during my term as prime minister I'll be very happy; if it doesn't, I won't alter my views.
Q: Given the current make-up of the national unity government, what can you, in fact, offer King Hussein, apart from the declaration that he should come without preconditions?
A: I can offer to Hussein the opening of negotiations. It's entirely possible that, consequent upon such negotiations, the views in the government will be divided. But the national unity government - and I'm speaking in the name of the entire government - agreed on two serious things which are worth repeating: First, to invite Hussein to negotiations for peace in the Middle East, with no mention of preconditions; and second, an explicit statement that Hussein can raise any proposal he sees fit, and the government will give serious consideration to any such proposal. Let him come to the table and propose whatever he likes; we'll discuss everything, and, naturally, we'll make our own proposals. But direct negotiations: one of the odd things in all these proposals now being made in Amman is for an international conference. What do the Arabs really want? For example, that we should attend a conference with the five permanent members of the Security Council and talk with Russia. Are we at war with Russia? Do we have diplomatic relations with Russia? Have the Russians taken a moderate stance in the Middle East? We want to talk peace with (the Arabs), face to face, with no preconditions.
Q: We will move now to the withdrawal from Lebanon: The attacks on the IDF soldiers continue on a daily basis. Why don't we speed up the withdrawal from Lebanon?
A: The government decided on a plan, which has a certain logic. The decision was to withdraw in three stages, with lessons being drawn between each stage from the previous stage, and we will enable either the Lebanese government or Lebanese forces to come to an arrangement, if possible. The interval between each phase will be, relatively speaking, quite short; we will carry out the plan as decided on.
Q: Would you say the entire withdrawal to the international border will be completed by the summer?
A: I very much hope so. I think it's vital; I don't see any point in spending another winter in Lebanon. I'm certain that all the members of the cabinet, the
Knesset, and the majority of the nation want us to put an end to this. We'll spare ourselves casualties, human casualties - something that we hold very dear. No one, in fact, has any suggestion about what we could accomplish in Lebanon by staying, nor is there any proposal that we stay in Lebanon for good.
Q: You seem to feel a sense of urgency, that this episode should be ended as quickly as possible.
A: To end it quickly, but not hastily. Neither attacks nor threats will affect the plan. The cabinet adopted a plan, and we must carry it out as decided, step by step.
Q: Vice Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir questioned whether the latest attacks aren't the consequence of a hasty decision and withdrawal. How would you answer him?
A: Let's say it's so; what's the conclusion? That we should stay? And if we stay, can anyone guarantee there won't be attacks? What are we talking about here? And weren't there any attacks before?
Q: But Mr. Shamir is calling for a reconsideration by the cabinet of its decision to withdraw; he's calling for a halt to the withdrawal.
A: No, I haven't heard any such call from him. This government, like any government, operates by majority decision; a majority decision is binding on all members of the cabinet; and we will carry out what's been decided.
Q: Doesn't the recent attack close to the international border give pause for thought about the future security of Galilee?
A: This isn't the first time there's been an attack close to the border; a year ago there was an attack in almost the same place - at a time when we hadn't decided on a withdrawal. What are the conclusions? There are no conclusions.
There are two methods to defend Galilee: Either from Lebanese territory or from Israeli territory. In my opinion, defending Galilee from Lebanese territory is proving very costly for us, and I think we can defend Galilee from Israeli territory in a way that is more flexible, more mobile, and in the last analysis, more efficient.
Q: And you don't expect pressure from the Likud - from Sharon, Shamir, Arens - to hold off the next stage, and maybe the third and final stage, of the withdrawal from Lebanon? Mightn't they have alternative solutions which they'll try and pressure you into accepting?
A: I don't wish to speak for any individual cabinet member; I am speaking for the majority of the cabinet members, i.e., for the entire cabinet. I haven't found that any cabinet member who voted for the entire plan has changed his mind or has a basis for changing his mind. The fact that there are ministers who think differently is perfectly normal in a democracy.
Q: U.S. Under Secretary of State Allen Wallis said this week that Israel will not be able to receive emergency assistance unless it carries out a significant devaluation of the shekel, halts government injections of funds, and principally, executes a drastic cut in the budget. Do you accept this American recommendation?
A: No. We had a disagreement with the U.S. on this issue. Incidentally, the quotation is inaccurate. First of all I would like to make a general comment about Wallis's remarks, which, if he was quoted accurately, surprised me a little. What does it mean we've wasted the $1.2 billion we received from the U.S.? We haven't wasted a single penny. We've been repaying debts. We've repaid $1 billion this year to the U.S. alone
Q: And we got another loan.
A: Yes, but the money we receive is for debt repayment. Now, how was this debt created? You should understand that too. We currently owe the United States $11 billion, of which $ 10 billion is for arms. As you will recall, we received $1.4 billion in U.S. aid as a grant, and another $300 million as a loan, and we're repaying it, not wasting it. Now, what is the problem we face? First of all, I should like to say something positive: What is going on between us and the Americans is a professional and friendly disagreement. There's no pressure; they think one way, and we another. On what do we agree, and on what do we disagree? We are agreed that we must balance the national budget, i.e. that we not spend more than we have, because if we do that, then we have to print paper - it's called money, but in fact, it's paper. That causes inflation. We also agree on how large a cut must be made: $2.5-3 billion.
Q: And what we don't agree on is the American demand that we carry out a devaluation?
A: No, there's a disagreement over the way the cuts should be made. We had three options on how to cut: One, by reducing the national budget, let's say by $1-1.5 billion; second, by reducing subsidies, which totalled $1.7-1.8 billion, and we decided to cut $1.2 billion; and third, by means of devaluation. We told the Americans immediately: "No devaluation." Right away said "no" to the devaluation. I repeat: There will not be a devaluation. Why not? First, devaluation would cause inflation, and like "the house that Jack built," the inflation will devour the devaluation. Second, everyone will suddenly be poorer, and we'll lose the nation's trust. And the main point: We have better alternatives: As I said, to reduce the national budget by $1.1 billion, to cut subsidies by $1.2 billion, and another $400 million in the cuts: The travel tax, the automobile levy, a tax on fixed-time deposits, and so on.
Q: Let's get back to political issues, starting with the situation in the territories. Your colleague, minister Chaim Bar-Lev, said the settlement at Tel Rumeida near Hebron was an act of arrogance and effrontery. Was Minister Bar-Lev also expressing your opinion?
A: In substance, yes. Words are a matter of individual choice. I don't wish to repeat Minister Bar-Lev's words; everyone chooses his own words, and in any case I'm not the minister or prime minister in charge of words. To the best of my knowledge, there is no decision, every by the previous government, to establish a Jewish settlement at Tel Rumeida. There is a decision by the Ministerial Settlement Committee, but not by the government. Our view - that of the party which, it's no secret, I represent is that our rights in Hebron have been upheld via the establishment of Kiryat Arba. We don't recommend that, besides Kiryat Arba, another town should be established in the midst of Hebron or adjacent to it.
Q: Does that mean you will oppose the Likud Ministers' demand to establish a settlement at Tel Rumeida or in the center of Hebron?
A: That's right.
Q: Then, given that you're planning to visit Judea and Samaria settlements soon settlements which aren't all in keeping with your political outlook - won't your visit grant them legitimation?
A: No. They [the settlers] are Israeli citizens. I honor decisions which were taken without my agreement, and I certainly respect the citizens living there in accordance with government decisions. I have no quarrel with them. I am also their representative; I'm not the prime minister of any one party or way of thinking. It is my duty as prime minister to represent all citizens wherever they are according to law.
Q: Moving on to Egypt: When you entered office, you pinned a great many hopes on thawing the freeze with Egypt. There was talk of your having a meeting with President Mubarak, and everyone expected a special Egyptian envoy to come to Israel. But he didn't come, and the agreement on Taba is still open. Is it possible that, in fact, Yitzhak Shamir was right to say we were degrading ourselves by chasing after the Egyptians?
A: I don't understand: Degrading ourselves in front of whom? Let's get this straight. Is it degrading for me to desire peace? Is it demeaning for me to wish to improve our relations with Egypt? I should like to know, in front of whom am I degrading myself?
Q: He said it was demeaning to be chasing after the Egyptians, to be offering them Taba.
A: Excuse me, we have an agreement with Egypt, half the responsibility for it is Egypt's, and half ours. I don't want the agreement with Egypt, the first peace agreement, to also be the last peace agreement between us and an Arab country.
Q: But even you, in your interview with the "New York Times," expressed disappointment with Egypt's, with President Mubarak's attitude.
A: I was critical, because I don't think that Israel-Egypt relations are summed up in the Taba issue. All of a sudden, Taba has become the "Alps" of the Middle East; one might think there are all sorts of things there. [In fact], it's one point in a macro-system, in a comprehensive relationship. Now to your question: I think the government must operate according to priorities. I think the first priority was Lebanon. I think we had to make the effort to end our entanglement in Lebanon.
Regarding Egypt, we've made a start, step by step. On Taba, we agreed that the multi-national force should enter. The Egyptians expressed satisfaction, more or less partial; the negotiations will continue. Today we reached an agreement on the Canada Camp. The Egyptians have acceeded to three or four demands of ours, namely: The opportunity to search for the remains of the "Dakar" submarine, the opportunity to search for the bodies of IDF soldiers who fell in the war, payment of a small debt on the oil pipeline which was left over, and increasing the amount of money being given to build a home for each refugee.
Q: Then you're content with the pace of development in our relations with Egypt.
A: I didn't say I was content, I said I would like to see it moving faster; it's moving more slowly, but it's moving. And I will do all in my power - speaking generally, there are people in Israel who think that the function of the state is to make an impression. In my view, the function of the state is to make policy, to decide on ways of doing things, to determine facts, to set the tone. I don't see in front of whom we're demeaning ourselves. Tell me, does the State of Israel look more degraded today than it did five months ago? I think that Israel today looks very respectable, both in the eyes of the world and in its own eyes.
Q: Do I understand correctly that we've already made enough concessions, and that now it's the Egyptian's turn?
A: One of the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee members said to me: If you yield on Taba, it will only whet the Egyptian's appetite. I asked him: Appetite for what? Sinai? The Rafah salient? Yamit?
Q: So why, then, are you, or Israel, not willing to yield on Taba A: Israel doesn't have to yield on Taba. There's an agreement, and it stipulates that on the Taba issue, there are to be three stages; First, negotiations; second, conciliation; and third, arbitration. I think Israel must abide by what has been agreed, no more, no less.
Q: Mr. Peres, one last question: We are sitting in the prime minister's office, where seven prime ministers have sat before you, starting with David Ben-Gurion and ending with Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir. Each of them left his or her own mark on Israeli policy. What mark would you wish to leave when you depart office?
A: I think it's dangerous to think along those lines. Once a person starts thinking about what marks he's going to leave, he begins thinking more about himself than about his office. I will answer you seriously: I want to get up in the morning and ask myself, what are the right, just, and necessary things I must do in performing my duty? And I hope to go to sleep at night feeling that I have acted accordingly. I see myself - and I'm not saying this out of self-aggrandizement - as a person who is serving a cause, serving a people. This must be approached seriously, without being egocentric; one must give expression to that which unites, do what is required, not be frightened by difficulties, and always remain sure that the great hope, that our ability to prevail over all the difficulties, is the source of strength which beats in each of us and in the history of our people.