A day before the completion of the first stage of the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon, the defense minister devoted most of the interview to the role of the IDF in that country, the test it underwent and the continued threat of terrorism from that country, be it PLO, or Shiite or from other quarters. He thought that Syria would not necessarily enter the Bekaa Valey after the Israeli withdrawal. Turning to other issues, he felt that Israel's order of priorities must be the economy, the completion of the withdrawal from Lebanon, warming up the relations with Egypt and then Jordan. He felt that the recent Arafat-Hussein agreement did not signal any major departure from previous positions, perhaps with the exception of the PLO obliquely accepting Resolution 242 as the basis for future negotiations. Text:
Q: Mr. Rabin, in recent weeks we have often seen IDF soldiers in Lebanon facing the TV cameras and saying "I'm afraid, I'm afraid" - what does it mean for the IDF that so many of its soldiers feel like that?
A: I will not pass judgment on the feelings of the soldiers; moreover, I don't determine my own stands according to those feelings - and certainly not according to those feelings alone. The central question that the country is facing is: What is the answer to the terrorist threat as it exists, as it existed and as it will exist in Lebanon? It is this alone that determines my course of action.
Q: Nevertheless, you were the chief of staff in the great victory of the Six-Day War. Do you think that Israeli youth has changed, that they have lost something of their inner fortitude?
A: Absolutely not. I believe that today's Israeli youth is better than the youth of the past - but even the best army in the world cannot, in a military operation, attain objectives that are unattainable. Therefore the major problem is not the IDF - the IDF is a prodigious, excellent army, made up of the probably the finest youth in the world - the question is how, why and under what circumstances it is put into action.
Q: Yet Zeev Schiff [Defense Affairs Commentator for "Ha'aretz'l who has just returned from the U.S., has written a second article arguing that the myth of the IDF has been shattered, has perhaps been eroded and seriously undermined, even in the eyes of our American ally. That is, as though the main asset we possess vis-a-vis the U.S. has been weakened, as a result of what the U.S. army has seen of the IDF's performance in Lebanon.
A: I don't think that is accurate. I had the opportunity of being in the United States, and of meeting with the secretary of defense, Pentagon officials, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, nearly all the Joint Chiefs themselves - and I don't think that your colleague Zeev Schiff is right. It's impossible to judge the IDF according to its combat performance in Lebanon against the terrorists. Nor can its capacity to attain Israel's objectives be judged given the fact that it was assigned a political mission which it was incapable of achieving.
Q: At the same time, there is an entire generation that served in Lebanon immediately after basic training, let's say -which has already managed to complete its compulsory service and which is an army of flack jackets, an army that is on the defensive, an army that's always recoiling: That's not the army that you sent into the Six-Day War in 1967.
A: I agree with part of what you said - but an army must carry out whatever mission it is charged with. I believe that most of the IDF's soldiers, and certainly its commanding officers, know that the mission that was carried out in Lebanon, and is still being carried out there, is first of all not the mission by which the IDF will be tested. The central threat against which the IDF must deploy itself is the defense of the very survival of the State of Israel; and the threat to Israel's existence - to the degree that there is such a threat - originates with the Arab armies. In its combat against the Syrians [in Lebanon] the IDF came across differently: the air force had impressive achievements against ground-to-air missile batteries and in dogfights. The ground forces also scored achievements. But when a regular army is sent into battle against terrorists, it can attain certain achievements; what cannot be expected is that it will attain political objectives when the political objectives it is supposed to attain via combat are unattainable. Not even the finest army can attain political goals which someone may delude himself into thinking are realizable.
Q: Mr. Rabin, if these are the problems that face the IDF in its battle against terrorists who strike at it - you spoke once about the war having let the Shi'ites out of the bottle - the question arises why the IDF shouldn't withdraw straight to the international border instead of remaining in large parts of Lebanon where the same process will continue which has just led us to leave 22 percent of the territory we held?
A: That wasn't the reason we left. We determined - and precisely for the reasons that you mentioned at the outset -the character of the IDF: Where its strength lies, where it is less strong. The IDF is in the main an offensive army, an army that prefers to attain its objectives by means of offensive operations even when the overall goal is a defensive one. Therefore, once the political process had been exhausted, the government, with the aim of finding a solution that would enable the IDFs withdrawal and the determination of agreed security arrangements which we found acceptable - the government's decision to redeploy along the international boundary in three stages, including the creation of a security zone, was actually made in order to restore to the IDF its characteristic method of operation: Its offensive mode of operation, instead of deploying or - excuse the expression - at times being spattered across broad areas in hostile zones; and to attain the central objective and the government has one single agreed central objective: To ensure the security and normal mode of life of the northern settlements and their residents.
Q: You spoke of the objective agreed on by the government: Withdrawal to the international boundary A: I didn't say that. I said ensuring the security of the northern settlements and their residents, and maintenance of their normal mode of life, without the IDF's having to remain in Lebanon on a permanent basis.
Q: Do you think that the first stage of the withdrawal, as carried out yesterday, could have been implemented if Yitzhak Shamir were prime minister?
A: I won't answer hypothetical questions. I believe that the establishment of the national unity government today allows the government of Israel to deal more effectively [with key issues] than any other form of government, given the results of the last elections. There are two issues which in my view are the most essential for Israel: Amelioration of the economy, with the social ramifications this entails; and termination of our military involvement in Lebanon.
Q: But was the line determined for the first stage of the withdrawal drawn up for political reasons, or is it a militarily convenient line?
A: I did not make this proposal out of political considerations of any kind. I thought that, given the situation in Lebanon, where you have to expect the unexpected, it was worth going ahead in stages - not in one fell swoop, not by total withdrawal, but to see, after the initial stage - for a limited time - the ramifications for the move; to see to what degree the Lebanese army is capable of taking over; to see, for example, to what degree internal Palestinian and other quarrels will find practical expression - and only then, and this will not be a lengthy period, to initiate the execution of the second stage. In the second stage the primary problem is the Syrians. Everyone is an expert at making predictions; but in my view, when it comes to Lebanon, all the experts were wrong.
Q: This new line which the IDF is now holding - is it a defensible line, a reasonable line for self-defense?
A: You can't view it as a line. You have to view it as deployment in a zone as part of the execution of the overall plan -an overall plan whose initial stage is known once we decided what we actually wanted. One of the problems in Lebanon was that the final objective wasn't always clear - what we wanted to attain - only after which was it possible to determine, in line with our final goal, how to go about getting there. A sine qua non for the execution of correct policy is to define your ultimate goal: That was what the government determined in its decision to redeploy along the international boundary in three stages.
Q: The religious ministers were very angry that the withdrawal was carried out on the Sabbath, and one of them, Yosef Shapira, told Israel Radio that you should have consulted with the IDF Chief Rabbi before the withdrawal; whereas you were quoted as saying that the withdrawal was carried out on the Sabbath our of life-and-death considerations. What were those considerations?
A: Irrespective of consultation or non-consultation with the IDF Chief Rabbi, our problem was a simple one: The date of 18 February, by which we undertook to execute the first stage of the withdrawal, was known to everyone. We had indications, and perhaps also reports - I won't go into that - to the effect that terrorists from all the organizations were getting ready to launch attacks on that day. Therefore we decided to take them by surprise. What does that mean? To carry out the evacuation as close as possible to the date decided on; after determining the required arrangements for the orderly transfer of the area to the Lebanese army; and at the least expected time.
Q: But why not a day or two earlier?
A: You can always ask "why?" It is my assessment that what the various terrorist organizations least expected was a withdrawal on the Sabbath. Therefore I thought that if we could save even one IDF soldier from being wounded, that was the right way. Moreover, it wasn't even my idea: The suggestion originated with the General Staff, out of the considerations I have mentioned. I adopted it, brought it to the inner cabinet, and it was accepted unanimously.
Q: There is already talk about the second and third stages of the withdrawal, and there was speculation today that the second-stage withdrawal would last about three months. Can you confirm this, and perhaps also tell us, in your assessment, how much time will pass before the third stage is completed?
A: I will not go into timetables. As you know, the government determined the concept, but reserved to itself the decision regarding the execution of each stage. It is my appraisal that we will, first, have to form an initial impression as to what is happening. I know this hurts; I know there will be attacks [on the IDF] - in the past three weeks most of the attacks did not take place in the area we have evacuated, but largely in the areas which we will evacuate in the third stage. But there is place to [form impressions].
Q: But doesn't this increase the likelihood that the government will decide not to implement the third stage?
A: I hope that a broader perspective than that will be the determining factor: How are we to respond to the problem of terrorism from Lebanon? Let us not forget that the PLO was dealt a severe blow, but the PLO was not liquidated -and terrorism in Lebanon was certainly liquidated. On the contrary, a terrorist element has been added which until the Lebanon war did not perpetrate a single act of terrorism against Israel - I refer to Shiite terrorism. I will not undertake today to say how that terrorism will evolve: Whether it will continue to pursue the IDF into Israel territory, or whether certain elements among the Shiites will do this. This is something that simply did not exist prior to the Lebanon war. Terrorism in Lebanon exists: We will have to go on dealing with it. We want to deal with it via a different method. Therefore we must examine well what is going on. The second sector is the Syrian one. There, in addition to the terrorist element, there is also, to a certain extent, a question of what the Syrians will do.
Q: Do you think the Syrians will enter the Bekaa once we leave it?
A: I don't want to make assessments. I would say that certain units of the Syrian army are liable to move southward -small units, and not much further south than they were in 1976. But whether the Syrian army will remain in Lebanon in such large numbers - that I don't know. There are differing views on this within the IDF and in other circles. Is it such a bad thing for Israel that part of the Syrian army remain in the northern section of the Bekaa, and not necessarily return to the Golan Heights? There are divergent views on these questions, and I won't go into them now. However, this is a second sector where we will have to examine what happens. I don't want to create an impression here of foot-dragging, or a of a time-extention; it's my assessment that within a week or two or three we will have to discuss the matter and agree on a recommendation to make to the cabinet regarding the next step.
Q: There have been assessments - perhaps superficial ones - that the successful Shi'ite terrorism against the IDF has had an effect on terrorism in Judea-Samaria, with the terrorists therefore stepping up their actions. Do you agree?
A: There is absolutely nothing to indicate that there is any connection between the two. Let me give an example: In the past three or four months, PLO or Arab terrorists have murdered four Israelis. Two of them - I refer to the murder at Cremisan - were perpetrated. by a person who was imprisoned in Jordan for five years, returned to Deheishe, was employed by an Israeli guard service, was sent by them to an Israeli establishment in Jerusalem, where a soldier left his rifle unguarded, and that person took the rifle and committed the murder - he wasn't part of any organized terrorist network. And that accounts for 50 percent of the murderous terrorist acts [in this period].
Q: But don't you accept that there is a feeling among the Arabs of Judea-Samaria - who are really not Shiites - that terrorism against the State of Israel produces results?
A: I think that precisely the residents of Judea-Samaria have a different experience. I think they have found that it won't work here. I also think that today the main problem in Judea-Samaria - and perhaps to a lesser extent in the Gaza Strip - is precisely political developments. The fact that King Hussein and Yasser Arafat have reached some kind of vague agreement, that Jordan has been opened to Arafat's organization, that there is a fierce dispute with Syria as to whether the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict lies in war, as the Syrians suggest, or via the political route, as Jordan and Egypt desire - it is precisely these issues that generate more complex problems than the problem of terrorism.
Q: I can't understand from your comments whether you are hopeful in the wake of this Jordanian-PLO rapprochement, because it will keep the PLO off the path of terrorism, or whether you reject it and consider it a military risk.
A: It is both my own view and part of the government's basic guidelines that the government of Israel should make an effort to thaw the cold peace with Egypt, and to expand the peace process to encompass Jordan - on the basis of Israeli readiness to call on Hussein to enter peace negotiations without prior conditions, though not the PLO: Let Hussein bring Palestinian leaders from among the residents of Judea-Samaria and the Gaza Strip, let him bring others - but not the PLO. Thirdly, this will naturally not be done within the framework of a UN-sponsored international conference in which the Soviet Union is an equal partner to the United States.
Q: Would you not agree with what President Reagan was quoted as saying that the Hussein-Arafat agreement evinces a certain progress?
A: I'm afraid that in the meantime the agreement is very obscure. It's proving to be good public relations for the so-called moderate [Arab] states in the U.S. even though it's without the PLO's having accepted Jordan's fundamental condition, namely [Security Council Resolution] 242; without its agreeing to give Jordan power-of-attorney as the partner to negotiations; and thirdly, what is involved is an international conference framework, and not direct dialogue, but at most the participation of Egypt and the United States, which are in fact Israel's first partners in the first peace between the Arab world and Israel.
Q: Do you still adhere to the order of priorities you stated in the U.S. - the economy, Lebanon, Egypt precede any possible political developments on the eastern front?
A: My assessment is that what is required of Israel, and also depends largely on ourselves, is, first of all, amelioration of the economy; secondly, finding a solution even a unilateral one - on how to cope with the terrorism in Lebanon without the IDF's remaining permanently in that country; thirdly, to thaw out the cold peace with Egypt. We paid a very heavy price for that peace, and it's inconceivable that it remain cold. Incidentally, I don't think that without at least the attainment of the two latter objectives, beyond the problem of the Israeli economy - namely, finding a solution to Lebanon and a certain thaw in Israeli-Egyptian relations - any serious prospect exists of expanding the peace process, meaning the co-option of Jordan, and I stress: Jordan, and not the PLO.
Q: There is a demand, advanced largely by your Likud colleagues in the cabinet, to change the law so that people like MK's Peled and Miari can be brought to trial for meeting with Yasser Arafat. Do you support this stand?
A: I am satisfied with the existing law. I don't think any additional law is required. I think that each case must be judged on its own merits. The Attorney General has the means and the possibility to decide when [to prosecute].
Q: When you were prime minister you did not prevent Peled from meeting with PLO leaders?
A: In the first place, when I served as prime minister I was not aware of any Israeli personage with whom I met who met with Arafat. After all, there is a difference between a meeting with some PLO leader like Sirtawi, who was assassinated by intra-PLO elements, and a meeting with Arafat. The precedents of meetings with Arafat were created under the Likud government, and I do not recall that those who met with Arafat in Beirut were brought to trial by the Likud government.