56 Statement in the Knesset by Defense Minister Rabin- 13 March 1985

We are experiencing difficult and painful days with the terrorist actions currently being taken against IDF soldiers, mainly by extremist Shiite organizations. The government of Israel is grieved by and laments the death of IDF soldiers in Lebanon. The government shares in the deep mourning of the bereaved families and wants to express its condolences. The government sends wishes for a speedy recovery to all the wounded soldiers, and expresses its deep appreciation to the IDF soldiers and officers deployed in Lebanon so as to defend out northern border, its settlements and inhabitants.

Ever since I assumed office as defense minister, I have not seen, nor do I see, any point in discussing the consequences of the war in Lebanon, or in entering into a debate on controversial issues. I view my task as finding a solution to Israel's security problems on our northern border and in Lebanon as these appear now - of course, in line with the national unity government's policy guidelines and decisions. In the government's policy guidelines, one objective and only one was set to guide government policy, namely, guaranteeing the security of our northern border without the IDFs having to stay in Lebanon - i.e., bringing the IDF back home. The government's first decision was to try to thoroughly exhaust the chance to reach military arrangements with the Lebanese government on security, arrangements which would meet the government's objectives. The Lebanese government, entirely subservient in its basic policies to Syria, was to have attained the latter's consent. In order to achieve this end, we went to the Nakoura talks; we displayed maximum flexibility, we wanted to achieve these security arrangements. But in the course of the talks, it became clear that Syria wasn't willing to let Lebanon reach any arrangement with Israel other than complete capitulation to its (Syria's) dictates: Total withdrawal from all Lebanese territory without any security arrangements. I am convinced that it was the government's practical and moral duty to thoroughly exhaust every ghost of a chance to reach an arrangement with Lebanon, prior to making any unilateral decisions on our defense policy. What is happening now in Lebanon only shows why we were obligated first to exhaust every chance at dialogue.

Once it had become clear beyond a doubt that there was no chance of reaching an arrangement in the foreseeable future, then the government had to make a unilateral decision: Should we stay in Lebanon, even for years, so as to defend our

northern border? Or should we redeploy along the international border to defend our northern border, settlements, and inhabitants, while maintaining a security zone adjacent to our border with Lebanon? Much was said on these two basic alternatives, and I won't go into that. On 14 January 1985, the government decided in principle on the IDFs redeployment along our northern border - so as to defend it and the northern part of the country - a redeployment to be executed in three stages. The first stage has been completed; the IDF is currently executing the second stage in the eastern sector, facing the Syrians and the terrorists located in the area under their control. The time required to execute this stage has been determined by the IDF first and foremost according to logistical considerations which take into account the Syrian problem we face. I am convinced that the IDF will make every effort to execute this stage in the shortest possible time.

Terrorism in Lebanon is part of the way of life in that country. There is terrorism within each ethnic community and between the communities. Lebanese terrorism is one of the cruelest in the Middle East; I am referring primarily to the Shiits terrorist organizations. This is terrorism which at times is accompanied by manifestations of a madness whose extent is hard to grasp. The business of kamikaze terrorist attacks is something unique to Shiite terrorism, by contrast with the other terrorist organizations existing in the world today. The Shiite leaders, battling for the Shiite community's place in the Lebanese political and economic system, have turned the struggle against Israel into a major lever for accomplishing their aims. This is apart from the power struggles within the Shiite community itself, between extremist elements and even more extremist elements such as the Khomeinist Shiites, who view Iran's ruler as their mentor. For over a year, all attempts by Israel's government to talk with the Shiite political organizations were spurned outright. The government decision on the IDF's redeployment along the international border should have made Israel's intentions clear to the Lebanese, but the Shiite commitment to attacking the IDF and perhaps also Israel only gained momentum. Despite the declarations by Israel's governments that we didn't want even one square centimeter of Lebanese soil, Lebanese terrorism, primarily Shiite terrorism, continued and even mounted.

I should like to call your attention to several public statements by "Amal" Leader Nabih Berri., On 16 August 1984, the "Amal" leader announced that attacks on IDF troops in southern Lebanon would be stepped up. On 9 September 1984, he declared in a public speech that he'd ordered 50 Shiite youths to train for kamikaze attacks against Israel. On 6 February 1985, Berri stated he had had advance knowledge of the kamikaze attack against our troops at BurJ a-Shimali - an attack which had taken place the previous day - and added that this attack was part of the series of 50 kamikaze attacks which he had announced last September. I have cited these statements so as to make plain that it wasn't the IDFs course of action in Lebanon which determined the "Amal" leader's attack plans; the extremist, Khomeinist Shiite terrorist organizations have operated and continue to operate against Israel for their own reasons. So we have no choice: We must come to grips with this terrorism.

Under these circumstances, and in light of the Israeli government's objective to protect our northern border without the IDFs having to remain in Lebanon, we have no choice but to make clear to everyone in Lebanon, first and foremost the Shiite terrorist organizations, that there are two possibilities, and only two, for relations between us: The first - the one we desire - is peaceful coexistence on both sides of the international border once the IDF redeployment along that [border] is completed; and the second is that, should terrorism continue, we will have to react with great force, using all the means at our disposal. I should like to make this extremely clear: We shall not permit a situation of one-sided attacks against us.

The IDF will defend its troops until the last soldier leaves Lebanese soil. We will do this any way we see fit, considering the conditions and circumstances. We will maintain the IDF's norms of ethical combat even under these difficult circumstances. Combating terror by military means alone is difficult and complicated; it entails difficulties and pain. Despite all this, I should like to state that extremist Shi'ite terrorism will not determine Israel's defense policy. The government of Israel is determined to secure our northern border, to defend our soldiers and civilians, and under these conditions, to bring the IDF back home.