Mr. Rabin revealed that Israeli emissaries have been talking to Shiite leaders in southern Lebanon about the possibility of co-existence with Israel. However, no progress was achieved The Shiites, mainly their "Amal" organization demanded Israeli withdrawal, but refused to give any commitment to a cease fire after the completion of the withdrawal. Under the circumstances, Israel had no choice but to engage in the "iron-fist" policy. The defense minister attributed 90% of the attacks to the Shi'ite and some 10% to the PLO, some of whose units were back in Lebanon. The interview was given four days after the IDF operated north of the Litani River, killing 34 terrorists and blowing up 11 houses. On 12 March the U.S. vetoed a Lebanese draft resolution in the Security Council which sought to condemn the Israeli action. France supported the condemnation. Text of the interview follows:
Q: It is currently being argued that we are making the Shiites our sworn enemies, even after the withdrawal.
A: I would say there is a real danger that the Shiite leadership - both of an organization like "Amal" which is considered less extremist, and certainly of the radical Khomeinist Shiite organizations such as "Hizbollah" - has already passed the point of no return in its hatred for the IDF, and perhaps also for Israel. To assume that the Shiite problem will be solved once the IDF pulls out of Lebanon - if only things would turn out that way.
Q: Do you think things in the north will turn out otherwise?
A: It's hard for me to hypothesize, or to build the defense of our northern border based on optimistic assumptions. In Lebanon, generally, only the bad hypotheses have proved correct. I don't recall any favorable ones which have proved correct.
Q: So you expect terrorism to continue?
A: Terrorism will continue in Lebanon. Operation Peace for Galilee did not wipe out terrorism in Lebanon; it will go on existing and posing a threat to Israel. The PLO may have been dealt a blow, but Palestinian terrorism will continue, and now Shiite terrorism, too - which has far graver potential than does Palestinian terrorism.
Q: Whom should we hold responsible for this Shiite terrorism?
A: The current and future leadership in the south will bear responsibility; ... It won't be released from responsibility for every person there, apart from the Palestinian camps. It's entirely possible that once such a Shiite leadership does arise - and I hope it will - a situation will be created in which the very fact of our having left Lebanon will solve the problem. If so, well and good; if not, then well attain coexistence via a confrontation which will be painful at first.
Q: Meaning well hold Nabih Berri responsible for any attacks?
A: He and others, or some other leadership. My hope is that there will be a clear, consolidated leadership for the Shiite community in the south; then we will at least have someone to turn to, since we haven't anyone in Lebanon.
Q: Are we looking for ways to talk with them?
A: We tried for over a year.
Q: And now?
A: We've sent them emissaries in the period since I took office as defense minister. Their reply has been indirect; they haven't agreed even to say they'd been in contact with us. They said: "First leave, then well decide what well talk about with you." My predecessor, Moshe Arens, received similar replies.
Q: Have you given up hope?
A: No, I haven't given up hope. But I have despaired of talking with them under the current circumstances. It would be wonderful if the optimistic hypothesis - that once the cabinet decision is executed and we are redeployed on the international border, our withdrawal will end Shiite motivation [to take action] against us - were to prove correct. But I'm not too optimistic that that is what will happen.
Q: What do you anticipate?
A: I expect that even after we are deployed on the international border, there will be a phase of some confrontation with the Shiites. At this stage of confrontation, should it occur, we will have to make absolutely clear to the Shi'ite leaders that their responsibility is comprehensive in nature: Not only for the struggle, but also for the existence and life of the heavily-populated Shiite area. We will make clear to them that there are only two possibilities: Either there will be peace on both sides, or they will take action against us - at which point their way of life will be so upset that they will, via negation, become ready for co-existence with us, just as the PLO in 1981 to a certain extent reached the same conclusion.
Q: Are you referring to the south?
A: The problem and the threat to the safety of the northern settlements come only from the southern area of Lebanon. In the eastern sector, where more Syrian-controlled Palestinian terrorists are liable to be located, there will be a different struggle - to which we must also find a solution.
Q: What's happening with the [Palestinian] terrorists now?
A: I would say that future terrorist activity in the western sector will depend on Shi'ite consent. The situation will be the reverse of what it was before the start of the war in Lebanon, when the PLO was the dominant factor in its role as the military force, despite its numerical minority vis-a-vis the Shi'ites. Now the situation will be different: The Shi'ite majority will be the one to dominate. To what extent will the Shi'ites and the PLO cooperate? From my point of view, that has no bearing on the confrontation with the Shi'ites in the western sector.
Q: Are the [Palestinian] terrorists shooting at us, too?
A: They don't exist as a factor except in the camps in Ein Hilweh and Beirut. Their activity constitutes but a small portion of the entire range of attacks against us.
Q: Are they perhaps gearing up for action against us?
A: In the first stage, there will be an inter-Palestinian struggle - between Arafat's men and Abu Mussa's men - over control of the camps. In Tyre and Sidon, Arafat's men have a better chance of gaining control of the camps; in the eastern sector and in northern Lebanon, Abu Mussa's men have the better prospect of gaining control.
Q: Can the second stage of the withdrawal be shortened?
A: I would say that everything will be done to shorten it, and theoretically, parts of the second and third stages could be combined [and executed] simultaneously. I hope that the cabinet will make its decisions on time so as to permit evacuation at the swiftest possible pace.
Q: What is keeping us from putting stages two and three together and, three months or less from now, taking up position on the international boundary? Who is keeping us from doing that?
A: I don't think stages two and three can be put together [and executed] simultaneously; but in certain sectors, the third stage may be put together and executed simultaneously with the second stage.
Q: Why can't the entire second stage be put together with the entire third stage?
A: I can't go into that.
Q: Who's shooting at us in Lebanon now? Can they be characterized: 12 year-olds, 80 year-olds, Shiites, PLO?
A: Generally, 90% of the attacks are perpetrated by Shiite organizations; the main, most influential organization in the south is "Amal."
Q: Are their terrorists organized into cells or gangs?
A: The Shiite community hasn't been organized. The most organized body in the Shiite community has been "Amal," which is built on local sections with an umbrella organization in Beirut. But it's not a system which exercises total control. Even within "Amal" there are struggles - for instance, between Nabih Berri and his deputy, and with others. The mainstream's control and influence are not absolute.
Q: Is the main center in Beirut issuing the orders for attacks?
A: The main center gives general instructions, sometimes more detailed orders; but the ongoing direction of the attacks is in the hands of the local "Amal" organizations. There's plenty of arms in Lebanon.
Q: As defense minister, aren't you disturbed by the fact that the IDF is busy protecting itself and is coming across as frightened and terrified in Lebanon, thereby losing its forceful, aggressive image?
A: One of the reasons for our taking the initiative - i.e. searching for the perpetrators on their home ground, searching for their weapons in the villages - was so as to change the way the IDF acts, from action which is merely a reaction to action taken by initiative. It certainly has been painful for the Shiites or for the Shi'ite terrorist organizations.
Q: Lately you've been saying that you believe and hope the IDF soldiers will be home by the Jewish new year. Can you say today that they will be home much before the new year?
A: I very much hope so.