Defense Minister Rabin was heading a team in the IDF and the defense ministry planning the Israeli army withdrawal from Lebanon. They had to take into account a variety of forces operating in Lebanon, among them the S.L.A.; UNIFIL and various local militias, not to mention the Syrian army. Two days of talks with UN Undersecretary-General Brian Urquart (19-20 September) provided the UNIFIL perspective. In this interview, Mr. Peres also dealt with the increasingly difficult position of King Hussein, caught as it were between Syria, Iraq, Iran and the P.L.O.
Q: Let's turn to Lebanon. Things have gotten much hotter there lately. The are many casualties.
A: We have casualties all the time in Lebanon. Unfortunately, there are weeks when there are more casualties. The solution doesn't lie in the rise and fall of the security barometer, but in our leaving Lebanon. The defense minister is working diligently now on a plan... As in any plan, it must include some political elements... The problem is to make the right combination of Lahad forces (S.L.A: - Ed.), U.N.I.F.I.L. forces, local agreements, and various measures by the I.D.F. which will truly guarantee the peace of the Galilee. These are feasible.
Q: You mentioned the S.L.A. After the Sakhmour massacre, hasn't it lost it ability to be Israel's vanguard in southern-Lebanon?
A: In the final analysis, [the S.L.A. under Lahad] has the same advantages and disadvantages that [the forces of the late Major Sa'ad] Haddad had. But it can't be said that Haddad was Israel's vanguard. He played an important role in southern Lebanon, although Haddad, without I.D.F. interest or backing, couldn't have survived. This is the case regarding General Lahad. He must play the same role that the Haddad forces played in the past.
Q: Is Israel asking the U.S. to serve as mediators between ourselves and the Syrians to speed up the I.D.F.'s withdrawal? The impression has been given that Mr. Shamir is raising this idea in the U.S.
A: No. We are talking about local agreements, of a local nature, not mediation in terms of shuttle flights, as we had with Rumsfeld. There's no such intention. There's no plan for any such show.
Q: In 1976, when you were defense minister, Hussein mediated between Syria and Israel regarding the "red lines" in Lebanon. In light of your ties with Hussein and the improvement of his relations with Assad, will you again ask him to perform a similar service?
A: No. I think the problems we have with Hussein are related to Jordan. I don't think that Hussein can play a role between us and Syria.
Q: You keep calling on Hussein to negotiate with Israel. Outwardly, it appears that your voice is a lone one.
A: Do we lose anything by our appeals? It's better that we call on him than that someone else call on him.
Q: But do you have some hope that anything will come of your appeals?
A: I would say that the very fact of our call can do no harm, but -only benefit. And in policy, you always have to leave room for the unexpected. If the question had been posed here several months before Sadat came to Israel whether we would come, this, too, would have been called a lone voice. No one can say for certain that Hussein will come, but no one can say for sure that he will never come. For this reason, what does Israel lose when it repeatedly invites one of its neighbors to talk?
Q: You early mentioned Sadat and Hussein in one breath. But aren't our relations with Hussein different from our [prior] lack of relations with Sadat?
A: My informal contacts with Hussein have borne fruit perhaps less dramatic, but no less important. In actuality, we have peaceful or at least calm relations with him. There is no border trespassing. The Jordanians don't allow infiltrators into Israel, the bridges are open, there are local water and transportation arrangements which work quite well. When we signed the peace agreement with Egypt, we said: The main thing is normalization. We have a certain level of normalization with Jordan; now it must be formalized, signed.
Q: Has Hussein become somewhat tougher than he was?
A: I don't know whether he's become tougher; his situation has become more difficult. He's under pressure due to the war in the Persian Gulf, and one must remember that the Arab world is moving from Pan-Arabism to Pan-Islamism; the wars today are more over religious ideology than over military nationalism. He (Hussein) is also always conscious of his relationship with Syria; he's a bit disappointed by the Americans. I would say that today he seems to be greatly disappointed with all those with whom he comes into contact. But the king is the master of his moods.
Q: Is this disappointment what is leading him towards Moscow?
A: What is leading him towards Moscow is first and foremost his desire to obtain surface-to-air missiles. And it's possible that the trip to Moscow is intended to pressure the west a bit, though we says he's serious about the missiles. On the one hand, he's drawn by the easy terms of Soviet weaponry; on the other hand he is concerned about what happened to this weaponry during [Israel's] war with Syria.
Q: And is Israel concerned about the possibility of his getting these missiles?
A: We will also be concerned about his- relationship with Moscow. It could get him in deeper than he wants.
Q: You're going to the U.S. what is Israel really seeking from the U.S.?
A: First of all, a wide-ranging discussion of U.S.-Israeli relations. There's a new government in Israel. The relations between the countries are not only deep, but also very intense. Everyday something happens, whether it's a war against terror, whether it's a war in the Persian Gulf, or Lebanon, or the economic issue. The fact is that during their election campaign, the only head of state invited there is the prime minister of Israel...
Q: And will you also raise the matter of strategic cooperation?
A: That is being dealt with on an ongoing basis. So unless a new decision is about to be made, which I don't foresee, I don't think the matter will come up.
Q: If my memory doesn't deceive me, you criticized this agreement when you were in the opposition.
A: We favored cooperation, but not directed against another superpower (U.S. S. R. - ed.), just as the Americans are very careful not to have it appear as an agreement aimed against the Arabs. It's simply a matter of precision in the formulation.
Q: Was the fight in Washington over the moving the American embassy to Jerusalem worth Israel's while?
A: Look, that's all over with. And like everything that's over, it becomes a matter for history.
Q: It's already part of the past?
A: I think so. Congress is recessing at the beginning of October, and I don't believe that it will manage to get around to this. But if this bill were passed, it would be an important achievement.
Q: You once tried to make use of West German Minister Egon Bahr to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union; Franz Josef Strauss you asked to help in making contact with China. What are you plans regarding relations with these two countries?
A: We will use any opportunity to resume ties with these two superpowers. But in the few days I have served in my post, believe me; I haven't had a moment to spare for these issues.
Q: But when you have time?
A: Of course I will then try to reach normalization, to create diplomatic ties with these two countries.
Q: And do you believe that there's any change, despite the fact that it appears that the current Soviet regime is more anti-Jewish and more anti-Israel?
A: In the past we've had relations with the U.S.S.R. under despots who weren't particularly likeable.
Q: Former Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky has accused you of capitulating to the Likud and accepting all its dictates. That's what a friend of yours says?
A: .1 don't know whether Kreisky can be described as my best friend, but how have I capitulated? He didn't say.
Q: The French president is considered a much closer friend of yours. Is it true that he plans to have representatives of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians meet at the Elysee Palace to try for a breakthrough on peace in the region?
A: I wouldn't turn down any meeting, except for international conferences with forces hostile to or having reservations about Israel taking part.
Q: And you of course number the P.L.O. among these?
A: Not only the P.L.O.; the Soviet Union, too, so long as it doesn't maintain diplomatic relations with us.
Q: Re Judea and Samaria: The population there, it's said, wants to test the new government, and that explains, for instance, the recent bus attack. How -will the government act?
A: It will do all that is necessary to assure the safety of the inhabitants, without distinction of national origin.
Q: Forcefully?
A: Forcefully! Absolutely! When it comes to security - no compromise!
Q: Don't you think that you are in a more comfortable situation than the Likud government was? For instance, "Peace Now" isn't being heard from; there was no demonstration following the Sukhmour massacre, even though our responsibility would at least appear to be greater (than at Sabra and Shatilla].
A: No, there's no resemblance [between the two incidents]. Not that I'm justifying the massacre at Sukhmour, but it was an instance of revenge, It wasn't an operation like - but I won't go into that.
Q: Looking back, do you think that the demonstrations and polarization during operation Peace for the Galilee were good for Israel?
A: Yes, I think that they restored many of Israel's friends and gave it the image of a democratic country.