Mr. Rabin's visit to Washington following that of King Hussein to that capital. Upon his return, the defense minister reported in a press conference that the United States accepts Israel's views that in future negotiations, the PLO must not be represented, there should be no international conference involving the Soviet Union and Europe and there must be prior U.S. -Israel dialogue. He feared possible direct contact between the U.S. and the PLO which could eventually result in the U.S. recognizing the PLO after the organization would express recognition of Resolution 242. Mr. Rabin also spoke of recent incidents in Lebanon as the IDF was in the final stages of its withdrawal from that country. Text:
Mr. Rabin: Of course, my visit took place immediately following the week in which King Hussein visited Washington. So it was only natural that the political issue was the major one that came up in the talks, both with administration personnel and in the American media and public opinion. If I were to sum up where we stand regarding our relations with the U.S. in this sphere, I would begin by saying that the gist of Israel's stand is as follows:
Israel truly calls for peace negotiations with Jordan without prior conditions. Second, we are ready to meet with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation for the purpose of these negotiations, on one clear condition: That none of the Palestinian members is a PLO person. The third point: We are against holding these negotiations within the framework of an international peace conference in which the USSR will have a role parallel to that of the U.S. Our experience since the end of the Yom Kippur War shows that if it's possible to make progress towards peace, to arrive at peace, then in the first place the Arab state concerned and Israel talk directly, the U.S. helps out, and neither the USSR nor Europe takes part. The fourth point is, of course, that of preliminary U.S.-Israel dialogue. I expressed concern at the very existence of a dialogue between the U.S. and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, and against the backdrop of the fact that the administration is seriously considering - though during my stay in Washington no decision had yet been taken - the supply of arms to Jordan.
Today, in my view, the U.S. accepts the first three points - that is, it will encourage negotiations; accepts, at least at this stage, that the Palestinians in a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation should not be PLO people; and accepts that no framework is required of an international peace conference in which the USSR will play a parallel role [to the U.S.]. If I were asked what concerns me in Israel-U.S. relations in the light of this development, I would say that I am apprehensive and concerned that a meeting is liable to take place - even at a relatively low level - between an official U.S. representative and a Jordanian-Palestinian representation, which I believe will not include PLO people, because I have grounds for assuming that the joint goal of Jordan and the PLO is to arrive at some sort of [agreed] formulation, in the first place with the U.S., and it's no coincidence that PLO people are not affirming Hussein's statements at this time. It's not out of the question that what has been mooted both publicly and not publicly - that the Jordanian-PLO goal in such a meeting (and this is not necessarily the American stand) is to arrive at a situation in which the PLO will accept 242 and 338, and will thus implicitly recognize Israel's right of existence - this in return for U.S. readiness to recognize the Palestinian people's right of self-determination, which the PLO will view as a prodigious achievement, because they interpret it as support, if not direct then certainly indirect, for their demand for a Palestinian state.
In my assessment, it cannot be ruled out that this is the purpose of the meeting, at least on the part of Jordan and the PLO. After that takes place, and if it should come to pass, heaven forbid - namely, U.S. recognition of the PLO -the way will be open for additional moves by Jordan. Unfortunately, Jordan has not stated unequivocally that it is ready now to enter into peace negotiations with us. Jordan has preparatory conditions whose content and makeup are unclear.
As for the possibility of arms supplies [by the U.S. to Jordan], I expressed the Israel government's clear position to all those with whom I met: That we are against the supply of any arms to any Arab state that asserts that it is in a state of war with us. As is known, if there were expectations that King Hussein would declare the annulment of the state of belligerency, or the state of war, between Jordan and ourselves, he did not do so during his U.S. visit.
I also had the opportunity to present these positions in the electronic and print media, to appear before the council of Foreign Relations in Chicago, in New York, and before the Jewish leadership and the Jewish public. I think that at this stage the stand of the Israel government should be made known to the American public, because after all, the key to the relations between us and the United States is sincere dialogue and the clarification of our stand to the American public and the policy makers there.
Q: Mr. Rabin, what can you tell us about the activity of Israel and the defense establishment to terminate the incident between the SLA and the Finnish contingent in UNIFIL?
A: Regarding the incident itself. In my view this was an extremely grave incident. I have all the grounds for believing that a UNIFIL force, whether at local initiative or acting under orders from above, disarmed an SLA unit - made up entirely of Shiites, some of whom have been our partners for a long time - and the very act of disarming them at that place it took place constitutes the abandonment of the SLA soldiers to hostile elements which were not disarmed by UNIFIL. In my eyes there [should be] no fundamental difference between the Shiite militia of "Amal" and the SLA, from UNIFIL's point of view. It is inconceivable that Israel should acquiesce in discrimination by a UNIFIL position between one militia force and another. As is known, "Amal" does not belong to the Lebanese army, nor does the SLA. Is there really a Lebanese army in Lebanon? All of Lebanon is built of militias to which the Lebanese army attaches itself. I take a very grave view of UNIFIL's behavior in this instance. It should be made clear to UNIFIL - in the hope that this incident will be resolved and the people on both sides returned safe and sound - that it is inconceivable for it to adopt a policy of discrimination between one militia and another. UNIFIL would do well to realize this, and when the UN Undersecretary-General, Mr. Urquhart, arrives in Israel in a few days for a meeting which was scheduled between myself and him already two weeks ago - and not against this backdrop - since he initiated the visit following the subjects that were raised on the dialogue between Israel and the UN - I intend to raise this incident with all due seriousness. In the meantime, efforts are underway - and I trust that UNIFIL, which bears direct responsibility for the incident, and its soldiers are in the hands of the SLA - will in fact act towards dialogue both with "Amal" and the SLA in order to terminate the affair. By this I mean the mutual return of SLA soldiers on the one hand to their homes and families - they are all residents of the security zone - and of the Finnish soldiers to their unit. I am certain that the SLA and its commander will do everything in their power to ensure the safety and well being of the Finnish troops. Likewise, I hope that those who are holding the SLA troops will do the same.
Q: There are reports in the U.S. that Israel has decided to manufacture all the Lavi engines in the U.S. and not in Israel. Is this so?
A: I know nothing of any such decision. 1, at least, have not made such a decision, and as long as I haven't made it, it's not a decision.
Q: Should Israel change its policy following the SLA-UNIFIL incident?
A: Gentlemen, on 14 January the cabinet decided on a different deployment regarding the defense of our northern border, on how to prevent the disruption of the normal way of life of the northern settlements and their inhabitants by any terrorist element from Lebanon. This led to the IDF's redeployment along the northern border, to the formation of a security zone with our backing; I see no reason to change this policy. We just have to ensure that UNIFIL operates with equal balance vis-a-vis all the elements operating in the field - and the tighter its coordination with, on the one hand, the "Amal" militia, and, on the other, with the SLA, the more fruitful I believe our policy will be.