In August and early September, terrorist attacks in both the territories and inside Israel intensified. Some originated from within the areas, others with help from the PLO bases in Jordan. Israel warned Jordan on a number of occasions, both publicly and privately. King Hussein replied that he was doing his best to prevent terrorist acts from across the river Jordan. The targets of these attacks were both civilians and IDF soldiers. The main scenes of the attacks were in Arab cities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Mr. Rabin discussed the rise in terror in this interview and maintained there was no civil rebellion there. He also discussed U.S.-Israel ties following the Murphy mission which failed to produce any tangible results. Text:
Q: All the measures taken by the defense establishment recently have essentially been ineffective. Terrorism is continuing - Hebron, Nablus, Ramallah, Jenin - you certainly know as well as we do. Don't you as the defense minister have an answer to the new wave of terrorist acts?
A: We are facing a problem of terrorism from several directions. The war in Lebanon did not solve the terrorist threat from Lebanon. We chose a certain way of dealing with it. Following the war in Lebanon, the PLO headquarters -including its terrorist components - the headquarters of the western sector, the headquarters of "Force 17," which by the way left Lebanon totally undamaged, today are found in Jordan. This certainly has an effect on what is happening in the territories.
Q: Mr. Rabin, we'll get to the terrorist headquarters in Jordan later on, but my question, which I want to focus again, is whether you as defense minister do not have a solution to the new wave of terrorism we are witnessing?
A: We are acting. We have an enemy in the form of the terrorist organizations who have recovered from what happened in Lebanon, [and are] exploiting the new circumstances, and I believe that through what is taking place now, in a certain period of time, which I cannot determine - not long - I believe we will find an answer to some of the problems, but I have not promised and I will not promise that it is possible to eliminate terrorism once and for all, via some kind of good war, via one step, or any one measure. The Israeli people, since the beginning of the return to Zion some 100 years ago, faced, faces and will face Arab enmity so long as an overall diplomatic solution is not found, and we will have to struggle with terrorism, with a threat on the part of the Arab nations' armies, if we want to exist, if we want to ever reach peace.
Q: You're speaking of terrorism perpetrated by the terrorist organizations. We hear again and again about terrorism perpetrated via local organization. This is another story.
A: Look, there is no doubt that to the extent that there is local organization, it does hot result in any reality cut off from the overall system, from the atmosphere which exists in several of the Arab countries, among the residents of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza District - this must be seen in the right context, and this type of organization is against a nationalist, radical background versus Israel. They [these locally organized groups] include several hundred; they by no means express the desire of the majority of the residents to continue in peace, to continue living in peace with us without any connection to what their political views are.
Q: Let us focus on the last incident in Hebron. Minister Sharon today proposed in the cabinet deporting 600 terrorists, destroying parts of the Casbah, perhaps to build a road in the middle of Hebron - in your opinion, is this the answer that should be implemented regarding the residents of Judea and Samaria?
A: Regarding the proposal or proposals that exist regarding deporting the 600 terrorists which were freed at the time in the exchange for our three prisoners - this seems to me strange. An Israeli government, which I was not a member of, made a written undertaking via the Red Cross to Jibril's organization concerning three things: That in the exchange, we would not be able to veto any name of a terrorist demanded in return; that any terrorist interested in remaining in his place of residence who informed the Red Cross of this would indeed remain; and the third undertaking was that none of the terrorists to be freed in return would be tried nor any measures taken against him regarding the offense they were tried for. True, nothing was agreed regarding the number of terrorists, but let me continue and say: As defense minister, since taking my post, after this undertaking was given, I see myself as responsible and a partner to this decision. For this reason, to propose today that 600 terrorists be deported which an Israeli government undertook not to deport - seems strange to me. Regarding the widening of the streets in the Casbah: Really, anyone who has ever visited the Casbah knows that when one speaks of widening these narrow passageways, which are almost intertwined, in the Casbah - this would mean destroying the Casbah. I don't plan on destroying the Casbah.
Q: Perhaps the step proposed by Minister Shamir today - carrying out deportations without legal obstacles?
A: I would very much want deportation to be an effective weapon. But to the same extent, the problem is not in the area of the executive authorities. If there is a desire to deport [someone) within a few days, one must come and say via legislation in the Knesset that the authority of the Supreme Court, sitting as a High Court of Justice, does not apply to Judea and Samaria. Whoever wants to propose such legislation in the Knesset - go ahead and propose it. I won't.
Q: In response to a series of attacks, the defense establishment has acted not only via deportations, but also via collective punishment such as detentions, prevention of passage to Jordan. It has been proven by the amount of attacks that this is not effective. Why then are you continuing with it?
A: I don't accept this [argument]. I am convinced that the overall system we are acting in returned to preventive intelligence activity - preventive on the basis of an intelligence infrastructure. We must remember that for three years, when a part of the security and intelligence services were not in Judea, Samaria and Gaza - they were transferred to Jordan - damaged this infrastructure of ours in these territories. They have returned. We have left Lebanon. I believe that in a short time we will know - and we have already seen results - most of the recent attacks have been solved. The perpetrators have been captured. This is not enough. We must prevent before the attacks are perpetrated, although it is very important that, when an attack takes place, when a brutal murder takes place, the perpetrators be swiftly apprehended and punished.
The other thing is: we are not involved mainly with collective punishment. After five or six years of not employing neither deportation orders nor administrative detention - only in the last week or two have we begun this. I believe that there will be results from this.
Q: Is there a continuation of this? Have we only started?
A: To date, we have field deportation orders against four people; [regarding] administrative detention, to this point in the past 10 days this has been applied against 68 people. I plan on using all these measures wisely against inciters, against those who create an atmosphere which encourages terrorism, against those who perpetrate terrorism. Against those who are active in terrorism, those who organize terrorism - to the courts.
Q: Let's go on to the matter of the terrorist headquarters in Jordan. You warned King Hussein not to permit activities of the terrorist headquarters from Amman, and the activity continues nonetheless. The question is: Isn't Hussein influenced by your warnings, isn't he worried?
A: The warning is not my personal one - there was an appeal by the prime minister, by the government. For now there is no sign that King Hussein and Jordanian government understand the full severity of the situation that they have created. I would say that a strange situation was created following the war in Lebanon. The potential terrorist threat from the north has not been reduced... it may have even increased. And on the other hand, we have gotten the PLO headquarters back again - in Amman. In Amman, they are 10 times if not 100 more serious and dangerous from a terrorism standpoint than they were in Lebanon or Damascus. King Hussein opened his country's gates [to the terrorists] based on the assumption that he would use Arafat as a seal of approval vis-a-vis the Arab world for the sake of his political maneuvers. He knows what his considerations were. From our standpoint, in terms of the increase in terrorism from within Judea and Samaria, from within Gaza, this is serious.
Q: When you send him messages, does he respond? What form do his responses take regarding the warnings of the prime minister, of the government?
A: I will formulate my words carefully. If we correctly understand what I heard from official American representatives, his argument is: I am preventing terrorism.
Q: This is true?
A: And so, when we are speaking of border terrorism - the firing of katyushas, the infiltration of armed gangs from Jordan, the Jordanian army is doing everything to keep the terrorist organizations from this. It is preventing training camps for terrorists due to be sent to Israel. He is permitting the PLO headquarters, the elements who deal with directing terrorism, to recruit - we have prisoners. An example: An unemployed Gaza engineer. He was told to go to Jordan to receive money. He got to Jordan. He was directed to the headquarters of a terrorist, PLO body. He was told: you won't get money. Well give you 5,000 Dinars if you go back to Gaza and carry out attacks and recruit another member. We have dozens of such examples. So what is happening: The headquarters in Jordan are unbelievably active - thanks to the freedom of movement which exists between Judea, Samaria, Gaza and Jordan - in recruiting, in the sending of orders, in the giving of money to individuals, and I have no doubt that it has an effect in addition to the fact that Arafat called Amman in 1970 "the Hanoi of the Palestinians." He sees it as "Hanoi" and today we are witness to this activity. In my opinion, it cannot be that Hussein is not aware of this. And if he doesn't know about this, it's even more serious. But from our standpoint, Hussein knows about this. And if he does not stop this activity, let him know that with all our desire to maintain a system of good neighborly relations, the terrorist headquarters won't be immune because they are located in Jordan."
Q: Do I understand from this that the fate of the terrorist headquarters in Lebanon and other places, which were directly attacked by Israeli air force planes - will this also be the fate of these headquarters in Jordan?
A: I won't divulge how - but one thing I at least learned from what happened to the state of Israel, and which was not exactly positive, when we speak of Lebanon. We must look for a way to combat terrorism without ensnaring us in a war in which the one who is damaged is the Israeli people, and the loser is not necessarily the terrorist element.
Q: The question is how long the defense minister will restrain himself in light of the terrorist headquarters activity in Jordan?
A: What, do you want me to tell you about it here?
Q: Recently there have been an increasing number of attempts to infiltrate via the sea by terrorists belonging to Fatah, or via Lebanon after arriving there from the sea. Do the orders to these terrorists also come from Amman?
A: I can't say exactly where they come from. But there is no doubt that today, along with Tunis, where there are terrorist headquarters, I believe that the western sector headquarters, and the headquarters of "Force 17" - which are the central elements in directing terrorism - are in Jordan. There has been an effort, and it continues, some of which is known, some of which is unknown. The navy has carried out unbelievable operations in preventing this terrorism. Even here, there is a part which is unknown, and I will not say more about it, but I will say this: We see every terrorist target in the entire Mediterranean Sea as a legitimate target for attack against us [sic] and it doesn't matter where it may be."
Q: In Algeria and Tunis as well?
A: You said that.
Q: I want to return for a second to what you told King Hussein about the new policy he is taking which permits the terrorists to act from Amman - does this policy by King Hussein essentially close off the Jordanian option which the Alignment supported for so many years?
A: If I had to say what the situation looks like today, King Hussein's policy based on four stages: Murphy's meeting with a Palestinian-Jordanian delegation; a so-called recognition by the PLO of Resolutions 242 and 338; the legitimization of the PLO by the U.S.; an international conference - this today is the joint policy of Jordan and the PLO, of Hussein and Arafat. So long as King Hussein goes hand in hand with Arafat regarding this policy, I do not see any possibility for advancement of the diplomatic process.
Q: Doesn't this freeze frighten you? For example that the freeze will bring about an increase in terrorism, and perhaps what you don't like - a civil rebellion in the territories?
A: There is no civil rebellion in the territories.
Q: How would you term what is going on in the territories?
A: I will explain exactly what I mean: A civil rebellion is a way of saying a civil uprising. It is just the symptoms of a civil rebellion which have decreased greatly in the past year: Strikes, commercial strikes, demonstrations, burning tires, stone throwing - all these have dropped considerably. The opposite is true - the problem is painful, tragic. But these are the actions of the few against Israeli individuals, with those seemingly responsible in Judea and Samaria from the standpoint of the Arab residents continuing without any interruption which were so regular in the past. But let me continue and say: It is possible that the freeze with Jordan as a result of Jordan's going hand in hand with the PLO has brought, and will bring, a worsening of the situation. It is the State of Israel's responsibility, if we do not want - and I believe we do not want, and justifiably so - to talk with the PLO, to give it standing, we must stand up to this struggle. We must fight terrorism and prove to Jordan and the PLO that they won't achieve anything politically via terrorism, and we must tell Jordan: If you want peace - disassociate yourselves from the PLO, and then there is a chance.
Q: Mr. Rabin, if I were to summarize this political segment, then from what you said it appears that maybe the Likud is right in claiming that there is no one to talk with, there is no partner for negotiations, and the current situation will essentially continue for many years.
A: I would be careful about prophesying... I think that Israel policy today be directed first and foremost to positively warming up peace with Egypt. Because I will continue and say that under these circumstances, if we do not succeed in escaping the freeze in the relations between Israel and Egypt, we are also liable in the long run to endanger the peace with Egypt. If we show that it is possible to improve relations with Egypt, if we convince the Americans that the PLO is a terrorist organization with whom there is no point in even deluding ourselves into thinking we can negotiate with, and if the Americans don't create illusions for Hussein that it is possible to achieve a dialogue with the Americans following the Hussein-Arafat agreement, I believe, though this will not happen immediately, that Hussein will get smart, with Egyptian encouragement, with U.S. encouragement, and with the encouragement of Israeli wisdom, and that along with the improvement of relations with Egypt, a vista of negotiations with Jordan will also open up.
Q: Chief of Staff Moshe Levy said yesterday that the IDF was preparing for a possible surprise attack by the Syrians in the Golan Heights. Is there anything in the Syrian deployment that hints of this possibility?
A: In the course of the Lebanon war, Israel sought to get the Syrians out of Lebanon. Following the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon, the Syrian army removed most of its armored forces from Lebanon: Two armored divisions. There is no question that this development, along with the tremendous strengthening of the Syrian army since June, 1982, gives the Syrians more freedom of movement. It would not bother me if one of these Syrian divisions would leave its present location and redeploy in Lebanon. It would worry me less in Lebanon. However, we do not sets Syrian policy. The potential for war exists, but I must add that as a nation Syria stands alone. That is, if it decides on military action against us, it knows that it will be alone. None of us possessed the prophetic ability to forecast developments before the Six Day War, Yom Kippur War, - and certainly not the Lebanon War. I would prefer to be well prepared for any eventuality - even an illogical one. Logic has not proved to be a dominant factor in mid-East developments.
Q: The picture you depict is quite bleak: stalemate on the east, problems in the south, katyushas today in the north -three terrorists who had infiltrated to perpetrate attacks were captured - trouble with Syria. Where are we headed?
A: Look, I was born in this city over 63 years ago. When I was born, the number of Jews in Mandatory Israel was slightly over 80,000. Whoever does not understand that the return of Jews to Zion is a protracted and perpetual struggle, which must be conducted with understanding and patience and without seeking instant, extreme solutions, whether from the right or the left; whoever doesn't understand that we must seek peace and coexistence, with security; whoever doesn't understand the truly Jewish concept, that one cannot hasten and force the coming of the "Days of Salvation"; whoever is unwilling to stand fast in the face of struggle - will get nowhere.
Q: Your colleague, Minister Ya'acov Tsur said, and I quote: "We must explain to the public that we will not necessarily reach rotation in light of the behavior of the Likud." Do you feel the same way?
A: The National Unity Government, which was not a marriage out of love, was a product of the election results, and the distress on all levels: Economic, social, security, and political. In summing up its first year one may say that despite everything it made two significant achievements: termination of the military involvement in Lebanon - and I as defense minister can say that even with all the internal dissent it was easier to accomplish this in a national unity government; and the fact that we have begun to deal with the economic crisis. If we have managed to do these two things, then this is sufficient for the first year. However, any Israeli government which does not seek peace wherever possible - and I mean first and foremost an improvement in relations with Egypt - is not, in my opinion, carrying out its mission. I would like to believe that this can be done in the framework of a national unity government as well. Therefore, my starting point is the coalition agreement. But if it becomes clear that there is a torpedoing either of the functioning of the government or of the exploitation of the chance to improve relations with Egypt along - forget, for a moment, the peace process with Jordan - I think that we will have to think twice about what we are sitting in the government for.
Q: Then you would also explain to the public that the rotation will not necessarily take place.
A: I didn't say this. The question is not the rotation, but the purpose of sitting in government. If the purpose is getting out of Lebanon, then we achieved this, even though we did not solve the problem. Other purposes: To solve the economic problems and advance the peace.