A year in office, Mr. Peres discussed Israel's foreign relations, which he felt were proceeding on the right track. He confirmed there were many differences of opinion within the government and the cabinet, but denied that they led to a diplomatic stalemate and deadlock. He also discussed the Taba issue and his view of future negotiations with Jordan. Text of the sections dealing with foreign affairs follow:
Q: During one of the inner cabinet sessions, you said: "This government wouldn't even have approved the Camp David Accords" - perhaps your expression of the neutralization and mutual blocking of initiatives in the government. I want to ask you: What then is the point of heading such a government, which you describe as essentially neutralized?
A: First of all, this is one expression, and it's correct, because there are people in this government who voted against the Camp David Accords - and this is what I was referring to. This is a real fact. But when I sum up the year, the 12 months, with all the difficulties, and all the arguments, I think that there we have something to show for ourselves, and there is something to believe in. With all the difficulties that there are.
Q: But in the diplomatic sphere, things remain deadlocked.
A: That's what you say. Why do you say this? Let me for once take stock with you: In the diplomatic sphere, our relations with the United States are at their peak, in all areas. What is the diplomatic sphere? Israel's international status has vastly improved. We withdrew from Lebanon. Criticism on our policy regarding the territories has diminished. We have begun a substantive dialogue with Egypt. Until a year ago there was a total deadlock. The Egyptians said that not one Egyptian minister would come to Jerusalem - and two have come: Osama al-Baz came; even in Nairobi, the Egyptian delegation did not align itself with the typical Arab positions. Of, course no miracle or change took place at once - but a deadlock? how so?
Q: I'm referring to the fact that the peace process remains deadlocked - no Jordan, no Egypt.
A: Of course, we have many problems. What - over 37 years, everyone solved all the problems until now?
Q: I am speaking about the past year.
A: So I am saying that a change has taken place. We left Lebanon. The dialogue is being reopened with Egypt. Israel's standing and image in the world has improved. Our relations with the U.S. are at their peak - there are not many nations like this in the world. You could also see how we are received during visits, from France to Japan. From the U.S. to Italy.
Q: I don't want to enter into arguments on semantics, but everyone in the political establishment agrees, and so do you, that essentially there is no diplomatic movement. If we are more specific...
A: Who said that I agree with this? I don't agree.
Q: You don't agree?
A: No. I think that there are still no results. I think that the road to peace is strewn with innumerable obstacles... this is the nature of diplomacy.
Q: Let us talk about something more specific. You were the standard bearer of territorial compromise and the Jordanian option for many years, for at least seven years as head of the opposition. This diplomatic approach of yours does not stand up to realities.
A: How do you know?
A: We see what is happening in the field.
A: And what do you see?
Q: I see things like this: That you don't have the possibility of reaching any kind of an agreement with King Hussein...
Q: Where do you get this from? Where?
A: So maybe you'll tell us here...
A: Really - listen, I say that as far as the Jordanian matter goes there is both progress and regression - both this and that.
Q: Can you speak about the progress?
A: Yes. You should also know about it. To date, or until recently, King Hussein for example was unwilling to enter into negotiations with us unless the results were pre-guaranteed. This is the first time, essentially, that he has accepted our position. He says: Let's enter negotiations without preconditions [and] without a guarantee
of the results. This is progress.
Q: But this is combined with the intervention of the PLO, together with Arafat.
A: Of course it's combined; the situation is mixed. Of course he's mixed in. What did you think - that this is a cakewalk along some date-palm lined avenue? Of course - I'm not surprised about this. In general I think that on the road to peace - just like the road back from it - there will be numerous obstacles, and regressions, and disappointments, but we are not living in a diplomatic graveyard. I certainly am not.
Q: We are moving on. There is no secret to the fact that you are making substantial efforts to meet with president Mubarak, and he is putting you off.
A: Here too this is not a correct description. I am not making any efforts to meet with President Mubarak.
Q: But you would like to meet with him?
A: No. Of course I'm ready to meet with him. This is not the goal... I am making tremendous efforts so that Egypt will not leave the circle of strategy in favor of peace. I want to find some kind of compromise between us and Egypt. I don't see these things the way a journalist does, nor as a series of meetings. I see this as a line of policy - I said at the beginning that we were going to proceed along the following priorities: Ending the war in Lebanon; changing the situation in the territories; solving differences with Egypt; and only after that would we begin the Jordanian-Palestinian matter.
Q: And regarding Egypt, Taba is still deadlocked...
A: It is deadlocked, but our relations with Egypt are not deadlocked. They started with a little bit of tourism, they started a little trade, they started visits - in any event, there is a dialogue.
Q: Have you set a time limit for yourself regarding how long you are prepared to accept the deadlock, at least regarding the Egyptian matter? You have one more year to be prime minister.
A: The problem is not mine. The problem is that of the State of Israel. And the problem is not one of time - I'm not someone who works according to a contract. The problem is one of direction, and effort. What must be done, essentially? Should we give up and say we'll deteriorate to the abyss of confrontation?
Q: If you speak of direction, we heard Yitzhak Shamir say: "The Taba issue annoys me. Why should we hurry? Do we have such a large country, such an expansive country? We have nothing to give away - we have given up enough territory." So like Shamir says - what's making you rush?
A: When he says that we gave up enough territory, that is a correct description. The governments headed by the Likud gave up 60,000 square km. And now our relations with Egypt are deadlocked over - let's say - 900 to 1,000 square meters. By the way - we're talking about a place that has no strategic importance. But the problem is not Taba, and I was a bit surprised over the things that
Q: But this is combined with the intervention of the PLO, together with Arafat.
A: Of course it's combined; the situation is mixed. Of course he's mixed in. What did you think - that this is a cakewalk along some date-palm lined avenue? Of course - I'm not surprised about this. In general I think that on the road to peace -just like the road back from it - there will be numerous obstacles, and regressions, and disappointments, but we are not living in a diplomatic graveyard. I certainly am not.
Q: We are moving on. There is no secret to the fact that you are making substantial efforts to meet with president Mubarak, and he is putting you off.
A: Here too this is not a correct description. I am not making any efforts to meet with President Mubarak.
Q: But you would like to meet with him?
A: No. Of course I'm ready to meet with him. This is not the goal... I am making tremendous efforts so that Egypt will not leave the circle of strategy in favor of peace. I want to find some kind of compromise between us and Egypt. I don't see these things the way a journalist does, nor as a series of meetings. I see this as a line of policy - I said at the beginning that we were going to proceed along the following priorities: Ending the war in Lebanon; changing the situation in the territories; solving differences with Egypt; and only after that would we begin the Jordanian-Palestinian matter.
Q: And regarding Egypt, Taba is still deadlocked...
A: It is deadlocked, but our relations with Egypt are not deadlocked. They started with a little bit of tourism, they started a little trade, they started visits - in any event, there is a dialogue.
Q: Have you set a time limit for yourself regarding how long you are prepared to accept the deadlock, at least regarding the Egyptian matter? You have one more year to be prime minister.
A: The problem is not mine. The problem is that of the State of Israel. And the problem is not one of time - I'm not someone who works according to a contract. The problem is one of direction, and effort. What must be done, essentially? Should we give up and say we'll deteriorate to the abyss of confrontation?
Q: If you speak of direction, we heard Yitzhak Shamir say: "The Taba issue annoys me. Why should we hurry? Do we have such a large country, such an expansive country? We have nothing to give away - we have given up enough territory." So like Shamir says - what's making you rush?
A: When he says that we gave up enough territory, that is a correct description. The governments headed by the Likud gave up 60,000 square km. And now our relations with Egypt are deadlocked over - let's say - 900 to 1,000 square meters. By the way - we're talking about a place that has no strategic importance. But the problem is not Taba, and I was a bit surprised over the things that Mr. Shamir said - and I respect his opinion. What is this about if we go to arbitration we will lose Taba? So then why did the government agree to arbitration - the previous government? I think that we can go to arbitration; that we have real arguments; and it is not clear to me at all what we will lose it [the arbitration case]. The problem is not Taba, the problem is Israeli-Egyptian relations. We paid so dearly to achieve this peace - so now we should endanger it?
Q: Yitzhak Shamir also says that of late there has been friction in the personal relations between you - for example, it is said that parts of your last private conversation were leaked.
A: Did he tell you this?
Q: Those close to him.
A: Wait, I want to understand - did Mr. Shamir tell you this?
Q: Not personally.
A: Not personally. Then I am not aware of any friction. In the last conversation between us, there was agreement from the outset about what would be made public, and I am convinced that you didn't hear any complaint from Mr. Shamir.
Q: And you don't accept the argument from those close to him that you sometimes act behind his back in the political sphere - sending delegates to the U.S...
A: Do you want me to react to every bit of gossip? There are people who deal in gossip - I am not one of them.
Q: Another question in this regard - there are ministers in your party who criticize you for not using your authority as prime minister enough. For example the matter of Minister Sharon... making harsh statements about you, and you restrain yourself.
A: They have the right to criticize. Listen, did Mr. Begin act differently towards Sharon who was in the Likud government? In any event, Mr. Sharon had an outburst in one of the inner cabinet meetings, and he apologized as he should have.