In January 1989 Mr. Arens travelled to Paris, where he met with a number of foreign ministers including those of France, Egypt and the Soviet Union. Following the meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, it was agreed that the status of the Israeli consular delegation in Moscow be upgraded and its working and living conditions improved. Mr. Arens continued to oppose an international conference, saying it was not a good forum for carrying out direct peace negotiations. In the following interview he spelled out his views on the peace process, relations with Egypt, with the Soviet Union and with the United States. Text:
Q: Mr. Arens, after nearly two months on the job, what is your assessment of Israel's international standing at this time, especially in Western public opinion?
A: Generally, I would say that Israel is on the defensive. Western public opinion has been seeing for the past 14 months reports on television in which seemingly unarmed civilians including women and children arc confronted by soldiers in what seems to be full battle dress. And I think it's natural that anybody who does not know the context of these confrontations or the history behind them is very likely to sympathize with the civilians and not with the soldiers.
Q: You have spoken several times of the need for Israel to come up with a diplomatic initiative.
A: The peace process in the Middle East is one which moves at a glacial rate. It took Egypt 30 years and five war's to come and negotiate with Israel. Ten years have gone by and no other Arab country has come forward. I don't know that we can change the basic rate of progress in the Middle East toward and accommodation with Israel, but I think we should take the initiative to see if we can't move things along.
Q: Is there any chance that the current position of the government will be accepted by the world as an initiative?
A: I think any initiative we put forth will be the kind that we would expect would be implemented, otherwise it's just hot air.
Q: One of the principles of the Shultz initiative last year, and the secretary stated this several times, is that no peace process can move forward without the acceptance of the peace-for-territories principle. Do you accept that premise?
A: No. No, I don't. And I think the conclusion that was reached by Begin and Sadat 10 years ago at Camp David that the gap in perceptions, aspirations and fears was too wide to be bridged immediately and a permanent settlement reached. But, rather, you had to go towards an intermediate settlement which would create a better atmosphere and bring about a narrowing of gaps - and only then go on to negotiations on a final settlement. I think that this was right at the time and I think it is right at the present time, if anything even more correct now than it was then.
Q: But the Camp David accords specify that the talks on the final settlement should be based on UN Security Council Resolution 242. Doesn't that imply that by endorsing Camp David Israel endorses the principle of peace-for-territories as the basis of the final settlement?
A: 242 appears in the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, and was accepted by the Israeli government many years ago. To the best of my knowledge there has been no change in that position.
Q: And don't you interpret 242 as specifying peace for territories?
A: 242 doesn't say that in so many words. It's a mistake to focus just on the territorial dimension; that's not the way to achieve peace.
If you look at 242, you'll find that the wording is not unambiguous. There was an attempt made to make the wording totally unambiguous, by putting in a small three letter word - "the" - before the word "territories;" and, if that small word had been in there, it would have meant that by accepting 242 Israel accepts the principle of returning to the pre-67 borders. That word is not in there, and it's not by accident that it's not in there, and it's not by accident that very sa me 242 talks about the need for secure borders. And there are very few people around who think that the 167 borders are secure borders for Israel.
Just what part of the territories Israel would retreat from - and I remind you that Israel has already retreated from more than 90 per cent of the territories that came under its control in the Six Day War - and just where the secure boundaries for Israel are, that's a subject for interpretation; it bears directly on the permanent settlement and therefore again I think it is not something that is usefully discussed at the present time.
Q: Secretary Baker last week spoke of a Soviet role in the Middle East peace process. Last year, you opposed such a role, or at least attached very stringent conditions to such participation. Have you modified your views on that?
A: I didn't attach stringent conditions: I opposed an international conference which would involve the participation not only of the Soviet Union but also China and France, and I still don't think that it is a good forum for carrying out direct peace negotiations. So whatever thoughts I had on the Soviet Union were subsumed in my comments on the international conference, and nothing beyond that. I would say, in principle, any country might contribute to the peace process, if it has good will, if it's truly interested in the stability of the area and if, in addition to that, it has something to contribute in ideas as well as in other dimensions as well.
I think the Soviet Union falls in that category, and I have no doubt, certainly after my talks with Mr. Shevardnadze, that the Soviet Union would like to see peace and stability in the area. That may not always have been Soviet policy.
My impression is that they want to contribute in that area, and since they have influence with some countries in the area I would say in principle, yes.
Q: Do you see the Soviet Union moving towards re-establishing the relations in the near future?
A: Factually, you can certainly state that we are moving in that direction. We have a consular delegation there, they have one here. Shevardnadze told me at our last meeting that they'd decided to broaden or widen the scope of activity of the delegation, to include diplomatic activity as well, and the head of our delegation has already been received in the Soviet Foreign Ministry since my meeting.
My talk with Mr. Shevardnadze was really a very good, constructive conversation, a very friendly conversation. So it certainly seems to me that the Soviet Union would like to move in that direction. Just how fast, I don't know.
Q: You met many foreign ministers in Paris, in what was your first diplomatic foray as foreign minister. Could you say that you learned something new in those meetings?
A: One thing I learned during my tenure as ambassador in Washington that surprised me is the importance of personal relations. Until then, I was under the impression that in the final analysis the positions taken by governments could be deduced solely from an analysis of that country's interests. But I learned that personal relations play a great role here. I had a reminder of that in my meetings in Paris, not that they were of such earth-shaking consequence.
Q: Did such personal contact which you seem to have established with the Egyptian foreign minister play some role in resolving the crisis in Taba?
A: I keep a picture here of my Paris meeting with the Egyptian foreign minister, just in case he visits me here, as I suppose he will. We were very friendly, we had some good meetings in Paris. That's not a bad example. I don't think I would have that easily picked up the phone to him the other day and talked to him if we had not had these meetings in Paris and if we had not, at least, set the groundwork and the foundation for a personal relationship of liking each other and trusting each other, and I think those elements are there. That made it possible to speak to him on the phone almost like speaking to an old friend, and I think that made it possible to smooth over some difficulties.
Q: Aren't you concerned that once Taba is returned to the Egyptians they will be much freer to pursue a much more hostile policy? Wasn't Taba a whip which we have held over the Egyptians?
A: I don't think one can refer to Taba as a whip. What we want from the Egyptians is a return on the investment; we paid a great price for the Egyptian peace treaty and we want real peace with Egypt.
That's the concern of Israel, that having paid the full price of the ticket, we may not arrive at the final destination, that we may suddenly find ourselves without Sinai and without peace. It's a mistake to think that we can build this kind of fabric using a whip, that we can threaten the Egyptians into building this kind of fabric. We must find some other way of doing it.
Q: Next month will be 10 years since the peace treaty. And you were one of the main opponents of both-Camp David and the peace treaty. Ten years after, do you now admit that perhaps you were mistaken in some of your evaluations?
A: I voted against Camp David and the peace treaty - which are the very same thing, for the very same issue - which are the conditions of peace. I was for peace as much then as I am today. I thought the terms of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty were unsatisfactory. The most unsatisfactory element of all was the transfer of the Jewish population from the Rafiah Salient. That was an irreparable mistake. I don't think that transferring Jews, or for that matters Arabs, is consistent with making peace. If I had to do it over again Id be against it today.
I am frequently asked how is it that you talk of Camp David when you voted against Camp David. I think it's an asinine question. Israel is certainly a country that prides itself on its adherence to international obligations, and international obligations bind everybody. Once the treaty was signed, I am committed to it just like everybody else.
Q: In an article which you wrote for the Jerusalem Post in February, 1979, you called for a courageous re-examination of what you then termed three untenable assumptions: first, that Sadat would actually pull Egypt out of the circle of war following the peace treaty; second, that the new ruler, after Sadat, would honour the commitments made by Sadat; and third', that Egypt had joined the Western camp for the foreseeable future and would not return to the Soviet sphere of influence. So it seems that you then opposed not only the conditions of the peace treaty, but that you didn't believe that the peace treaty would hold out under any conditions?
A: I don't think that I said that these assumptions were valueless or totally wrong. But what is the connection between these assumptions and the peace treaty.? There is a direct connection between the degree of certainty that you attach to this whole process or the uncertainties, and the price that you are willing to pay.
Regarding the danger of Egypt returning to the circle of war: Well, that is not impossible. What we need to do is to build a dam so that this stream cannot run backwards anymore. And it is a source of concern to Israelis that we haven't been able to build this fabric, that we haven't been able to normalize relations to the extent that we can say that there's nothing to worry about - that they can have a coup d'etat, they can have a change of leadership, the peace relationship between the two countries is not so stable that nothing can upset it. Of course, you have to say that 10 years have gone by and there's been no war; that's not insignificant at all.
Q: The State Department Human Rights Reports describes substantial human right abuses by Israel. Are we violating human rights in the territories?
A: I know Mr. Shifter, and he's a very fine man, so my initial, intuitive response on being told that he has written something or the other is to treat it with considerable respect. Generally, I can tell you that when you have to contend with violence on a scale and scope that we have to deal with, it probably is impossible to maintain the standards of respect for human rights that we do ordinarily in Israel in day-to-day life. When you have people burned alive by Molotov cocktails being thrown at the busses, it's not easy, and maybe impossible.
Q: Fourteen Israelis have been killed since the uprising began, compared to 360 Palestinians killed and thousands wounded. We are not being accused of dealing with a problem, we are being accused of dealing with it harshly, of using excessive force.
A: The argument presumably is that we could have prevented people from being fire-bombed by using more lenient measures, that somebody knows how to do it better than we do, and could teach us a lesson on how to do it without there being these kinds of casualties on the roads and without what are considered to be violations of human rights. I doubt whether anybody can give us such a prescription.
When you talk about asymmetry in numbers, that's a specious description. It's not that you've got Jews on one side of the football field and Arabs on the other, and if this is the rate of casualties there must be something wrong there. What you've got is thousands, tens of thousands of Palestinians engaged in violence attempting to endanger the lives of people on the roads, faced by, in many cases, a very small number of Israelis.
If it hadn't been for the work of the IDF, then instead of tens of Jews who have been killed on the roads, it might easily have been hundreds or thousands.
Q: But many of the casualties are caused by the fact that the IDF goes into the towns and villages...
A: It's like any attempt to combat violence: do you wait for it to come, or do you try to take some pre-emptive measures? You can wait for it to come, but the results are liable to be catastrophic. Or you can go into villages, if you have information that people have been organizing this kind of activity.
Q: I would like to quote an interview which you gave to The Post in 1975, in which you said: "There is no reason why Israel should refuse on principle to talk to the PLO. On the contrary, Israel should agree to talk to anybody and everybody. The real point is what do we say to them. We have to tell the PLO, or anybody else, that they have finally to learn to live with Israel - an Israel which stretches from the Mediterranean Sea to the River Jordan. And we have to talk to the PLO, as to the Arab governments face to face." You seemed to have thought then that it was not important whom we talk to, but rather what we say ...
A: I hope you're not going back to my birthday ... That's your interpretation, and I don't think that it is correct to make such a universal conclusion that it's not important whom we talk to but what we talk about. Mainly because I think you want to talk to people that matter, that have a constituency, people who can make a commitment, people that it's worth talking to.
You have to see who are the Palestinians, and then decide whom you want to talk to. There are 700,000 Israeli Arabs within the sovereign boundaries of the State of Israel. We don't think of negotiating with them. They are part of our body politic. They play their role in formulating Israeli positions.
There is the Palestinian State to our East, called Jordan. That's not Israeli propaganda, that's a political and geographic fact. And if you insist on differentiating between East and West Palestinians, then 60 per cent of Jordan's population comes from West of the Jordan River, 1.8 million of them, more than Palestinians living in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. So it's inconceivable that you could address the Palestinian problem without talking to Jordan.
And King Hussein doesn't want to talk to us, and it's important to understand the reason for that: the man is afraid. He's not afraid that Israel will attack Jordan. He can go on without a peace treaty forever.
Q: He would have talked to us under the terms of the London Agreement, but that agreement was not adopted by the government of Israel.
A: Talking to us means talking to us directly. It should be under "terms." If you want peace, then sit down and talk to us, like Sadat came and sat down to talk peace with Israel. King Hussein had the perfect opportunity 10 years ago at Camp David. Why didn't he do it? He's being terrorized, he's being intimidated, he hasn't forgotten Black September.
The organization from which these threats emanate is the PLO. They are the roadblock to peace in the area.
So you're left with the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, who are all Jordanian citizens by the way, and according to concepts accepted in the world, Hussein should be the one to negotiate for them, as well as for Jordan. It's hard to contemplate a meaningful peace treaty in the area without the King.
I think that we should be looking for ways to engage them in a dialogue, and there too, the PLO is the obstacle. Everybody heard Yasser Arafat's recent threats to anybody who doesn't toe the line. So sure, you can knuckle under, you can give in. You have a mafia which threatens everybody - sure, let's go talk to the mafia! I don't think that's the way to peace in the area.
Q: Do you doubt that the Palestinians genuinely see the PLO as their representative?
A: I don't think we know. When you have this type of terrorism directed against them, when you have this type of punishment exacted... Last month, four or five people were killed there [by their own people].
Q: So how will this change?
A: The most important thing on the way to peace is to eliminate this fear. This is the major obstacle. And giving in to Arafat, or standing in line to shake his hand, like people in Europe - that's not the way to do it.