On the eve of his visit to Washington, Mr. Shamir discussed some new ideas that he will be taking with him to the Bush administration. They will be based on the Camp David Framework and will be mainly in the area of an interim agreement. He felt that the conference of Jewish solidarity with Israel has removed Israel from its isolation and shored up its Jewish backing. On the issue of talks with Jordan, he was pleased that the 1987 London Agreement (between King Hussein and Mr. Peres) did not materialize since it called for an international peace conference that would have done Israel much harm. Excerpts:
( ... ) Q: Why did you think it necessary to bring Zionist Jews to Jerusalem and ask them to convey their solidarity with Israel?
A: The Jewish Solidarity Conference to a great extent took us out of the political isolation in which we found ourselves. In Europe, too, I heard it said: "Even the Jews aren't with you, who is supporting you?" This proved that the vast majority of the Jewish people backs Israel and that our country is not isolated.
Q: And did they not back us prior to the conference?
A: Before the solidarity conference, all we read and heard about the Jewish world was that it was split and incohesive in its positions and in its attitude to Israel and the country's situation. Those levelling criticism at the Government of Israel and disassociating themselves from -its positions were gaining the upper hand.
A very negative picture was obtained since our primary support in the U.S. is derived from American Jewry, which represents a weighty factor in the U.S. political spectrum. And then came the solidarity conference and the tables were turned. It established that all of American Jewry stands by Israel. It is important that our friends - as well as those who are not considered our friends - know that: There exists a deep Jewish solidarity and all the various ploys designed to weaken or annihilate us will be to no avail. It exists.
Q: Why do you condemn the publicity given to the Military Intelligence Branch's assessment of the situation? What bothers you?
A: I am troubled by the fact that a secret report was made public. Whoever publicized it committed a crime and violated the law. I hope he will be found out and will receive his just punishment. Of course, whoever commits an illegal act need not necessarily be explicit and precise in leaking information, and may create a wrong and far-fetched impression. The media pins heaps of conclusions and appraisals on this. But whoever presents us with intelligence assessments, does not provide recommendations. He merely makes an assessment of the state of the enemy camp.
Q: At well attended press conference you denied that such a report exists.
A: The media conveyed that the assessment of the situation spelled out that negotiations should be held with the PLO. This is sheer nonsense. The only material published was commentaries, and these can vary.
There have always been situation appraisals, but they have never been published. Regrettably, certain people found it necessary to take several items out of context and have them published. Even at the press conference held during the conference, I did not deny that such appraisals exist but, rather, that everything that was published was incorrect and did not correspond with reality.
Q: What sort of ideas are you going to take to Washington? Will there be anything new about them?
A: I am taking along good ideas to the U.S., and I will attempt to convince the Americans of this. When a position is to be presented before an important country such as the U.S., we draw up a situation appraisal, without repeating ourselves each time.
Q: In accordance with familiar guidelines, such as the Camp David Accords?
A: There are indeed guidelines, but there are also those issues which are derived from recent developments. I will say things to the U.S. Administration which it previously, perhaps, did not hear from me. I am referring mainly to ideas that relate to the interim agreement.
Q: Do you attach any extraordinary importance to the visit?
A: I am not exaggerating the importance of the forthcoming visit to the U.S. One should not overstress the importance of every visit. Matters cannot be resolved in a few discussions or during a two-day stay in Washington. This [visit] constitutes a step, an additional link in the relations between Israel and the U.S., and we will attempt to explain our position and listen to theirs. The object is to arrive at agreement and cooperation. This can always prove to our benefit, but not always do we succeed.
Q: Differences of opinion have already emerged, at least in the PLO matter.
A: The U.S. secretary of state has spoken of differences of opinion between us - there is no harm in that. The U.S. and its NATO allies don't always see eye to eye, but this does not jeopardize the pact between them.
Q: And [what about] the actual dispute?
A: On my trip to the U.S., I will discuss with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker his declaration which states that discussions between Israel and the PLO cannot be ruled out. At the same time, he says that he is opposed to a Palestinian state. To all appearances there is a contradiction here, and I will discuss this with him. After all the PLO's minimal demand is a Palestinian state. There is a danger in America's recognition of the PLO as being worthy of holding negotiations with. This is a very serious matter. As far as this matter is concerned, we disagree with the U.S. position and I will, in the course of my visit, explain why we regard this policy as a negative phenomenon.
Q: Why negative?
A: It has greatly encouraged the initiators of violence and its organizers in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. It was presented to them as a result of throwing stones and Molotov cocktails, and the strikes. There is nothing more encouraging for such acts than visible results. It [the U.S. position] is presented as an accomplishment and encourages the continuation and intensification of similar activity, in order to attain yet greater achievements.
Q: How would it be possible to change the atmosphere in the territories?
A: The atmosphere in the territories could be corrected within a day or two - they must put an end to the violence, and that will result in a good atmosphere. Everything we do is actually a result of the violence against us. If there are no violent acts - there will be a total and immediate change in the situation. But even if we should declare the IDFs total withdrawal from these areas, I am not certain that it would lead to quiet. We have seen that it is precisely then that the Arabs intensify the violence, attacking from behind.
Q: It is possible to take measures that will diffuse the tension, such as decreasing the IDFs presence and releasing administrative prisoners.
A: We could consider thinning out forces in urban centers, releasing administrative prisoners and administrative concessions - there is no principle at stake here, but I do not believe that the remedy for the situation lies here.
Q: According to the MIB assessment there are no leaders in the territories, apart from those connected with the PLO. Elections would apparently also bear this out. With whom are we to talk, and about what?
A: There are various ideas which could convince and influence elements outside the region. We are searching for ways of settling some of the conflicts of interest between ourselves and other elements in the region. The Arabs are not enthusiastic about elections. Where in the Arab world are there democratic elections? They do not exist. There can be leaders in the territories who are not connected with the PLO. There are educated people among them, intellectuals. I will not mention their names, for I shall cause them harm. The discussions between myself and Palestinians in the territories are continuing. It is interesting to understand these people and to convey my thoughts to them.
Q: Actually, a Palestinian state presents a greater threat to Jordan. Do the Jordanians say so?
A: The Jordanians know that a Palestinian state presents a greater threat to Jordan than to Israel. Jordan is aware of this, but does not admit it, because King Hussein is afraid. He too is not immune against each person who seeks to assassinate him, and he has bad experience in this area. But I do not doubt that he is not interested in a Palestinian state.
Q: What are your objectives vis-a-vis Jordan?
A: I aspire to achieve a formal peace with Jordan and a measure of cooperation, because of our common border and due to the fact that part of the Jordanian population is Palestinian.
Q: Will we ask them to extradite to us the terrorists who infiltrated into the Arava?
A: We will not demand of the Jordanians to extradite to us the terrorists who killed a soldier in the Arava. It is not customary. We will demand that they make sure that there is a quiet border.
Q: Looking back, do you believe that you erred in rejecting the "London Agreement" reached by Shimon Peres?
A: Rejecting the London Agreement is not an error and it would not have changed the situation. The purpose of the agreement was an international conference and till this very day I believe that such a conference would have caused us great damage and brought tremendous pressure to bear on us to accede to demands such as a complete withdrawal from the 1967 lines, or a Palestinian state. Such a conference would have decided in this vein, or made recommendations of this order.
Q: How do you at this point regard the political plans of Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin as well as those stashed away by Vice Premeir Shimon Peres?
A: These plans, both Rabin's and Peres's are subject to discussion. We are a country open to persuasion and being persuaded.
Q: On Sunday, it will be the tenth anniversary of peace with Egypt. Are you disappointed by this cold peace?
A: No. The peace with Egypt constitutes a process. The contrasts between us and the Arab countries are so deep as to being impossible to end in one stage or with a stroke of the pen on one agreement. It is a matter of a process that takes time. The peace agreement was actually the first step in the process. It opened the way and the development is very, very slow.
Q: President Mubarak complimented Israel on fulfilling its obligations.
A: This is correct. We fulfill our agreements and obligations of every kind. But we cannot say the same thing for Egypt. The Camp David Accords, for example, are not being honored by all sides. We are committed to them and have not done anything contrary to what is written in them. It is others who have not fulfilled them.
Q: Is there the possibility of a meeting soon between yourself and President Mubarak or King Hussein?
A: President Mubarak and King Hussein -will be in the U.S. at the time that I will be in Washington. But holding meetings with them is not dependent on geographic conditions. Why, if they want to hold meetings, both Mubarak and Hussein live here, very close to us. It depends on them and I am ready to meet with anyone. At the time, Foreign Minister Arens suggested to President Mubarak that he meet with me, but Mubarak made this conditional on my agreeing in advance to his stands. This is impossible.
Q: The Arabs of the territories are convinced that we have weakened. What accounts for this image of Israel?
A: The Arabs don't understand what democracy means and they don't attach any importance to it. When they read and hear about the different opinions in Israel, expressing dissension vis-a-vis the PLO and political solutions to the region, they see it as an expression of Israel's weakness, pandemonium, and a weakening of authority. Of course, they are wrong in their assessment. But it was always like this and they think that if they continue striking and attacking, Israel will collapse. This will never happen.