On 7 April, Yasser Arafat rejected the Shamir plan. Later it was also dismissed by Palestinian Arab leaders in the territories. They wanted Israeli withdrawal prior to the elections, and U.N. supervision of the elections. Mr. Peres thought that the U.S. should be given time to study the plan. It was also clear that it would convey its contents to the PLO. Mr Peres discussed, in the following interview, some of the difficulties that elections in the areas would pose. Among them who can vote who can be elected, who will supervise the elections and a host of other related issues. Excerpts:
Q: In view of Yasser Arafat's rejection of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's plan, should it be shelved even before it has a chance to develop?
A: ( ... ) I would say that an examination should be made; as long as the Americans are willing to examine [the plan], they must be given the chance to do so. We certainly should not hurry to bury it. It was possible to foresee that this proposal would meet with significant difficulties, and I believe that the initial reaction is not surprising. As long as 'the U.S. is examining, let it do so. We must take into consideration, however, that it is doing this with the PLO as well.
Q: Yes, the U.S. is conveying Shamir's plan to the PLO.
A: This is as clear as day. Actually, Mr. Shamir did not protest the ties being maintained by the U.S. with the PLO.
Q: Will U.S.-mediated indirect negotiations between Israel and the PLO now commence?
A: Israel will certainly not view it in this manner, and the U.S. will certainly view it exactly- in the manner you described. This in one of the differences that has been created as a result of the visit. We remain firm in our stand that we reject negotiations with the PLO, whether direct or indirect.
Q: Is the PLO likely to agree to the plan if it is assured involvement in negotiations on a permanent settlement?
A: I believe that the elections themselves, the moment they become clear, - or, more precisely, until they become clear - will arouse mountains of opposition and problems. There are at least several questions that can be said, in advance, to be controversial. First, what kind of elections: political or municipal?
Q: Which one, in your opinion?
A: I prefer political ones, because in this case there is a wish to elect a representation that will enable the holding of negotiations.
Q: Does this include East Jerusalem?
A: The second question concerns East Jerusalem. The third question is whether [the elections] will be held in some way under some sort of supervision, or under external or international observers.
Q: Would you recommend that elections be held with U.S. observers?
A: I would not be opposed to observers from the U.S. House of Representatives. I believe that we have nothing to hide. As you know, I was defense minister in 1976 when municipal elections were held in Judea and Samaria, and they were exemplary. There was not a single complaint of discrimination, distortion or corruption; these were the best kind of democratic elections that can be imagined. I therefore see no reason to hide anything.
Q: Would you favor the participation of East Jerusalem residents as well?
A: I would leave this question for last, and I would not turn it into a bone of contention. But as yet I do not see all the other things happening.
Q: Will every candidate be acceptable, even if he is a PLO supporter?
A: Yes: Every candidate who is not involved in terrorism and is a resident of the territories.
Q: Will all those who are elected ultimately be PLO supporters who will demand a Palestinian state, or do you believe that individuals who support the Jordanian option will also be elected?
A: It is difficult to guess, of course, but I estimate that the overwhelming majority will not differ in their opinions from PLO members. They will be different in that they are not members of the PLO and are not involved in terrorism. It should be taken into consideration that they may be even more extreme than PLO members, whether in the religious direction or in the direction of supporting more extreme terrorist organizations.
Q: Does the slow, cautious and gradual pace of the Shamir plan conform with your own pace?
A: There is clearly a need for an interim settlement, to be followed by a permanent settlement. The question is whether linkage only with regard to time will suffice in moving negotiations, whether we are saying that there is no need
to add content to this linkage; without this, I doubt if the process will move forward.
Q: Before the prime minister's visit to the U.S., President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker defined what they regard as acceptable principles for a permanent settlement: land for peace, political rights for the Palestinians, and perhaps an international conference or negotiations with the PLO. Will the U.S. exert pressure on Israel to resort to other solutions if Shamir's plan does not succeed?
A: I do not know whether this will lead to pressure, but these are the American positions. They have repeated them, albeit in a different formula - I don't know if it is an easier one - for example, an end to the Israeli occupation. Again, we must remember that we are not at war with the U.S.; we have a friendship with it. We are involved in a conflict with the Palestinians, and this conflict must be resolved.
Q: There have been reports that you will issue a peace plan of your own when Shamir returns from the U.S. What should we expect?
A: I do not think that Shimon Peres has to come out with his own plan. I believe that the Alignment must relate to the new situation that has been created, and it will probably do so within several weeks or months.