The bulk of the interview was devoted to the recent Arafat-Mitterrand meeting in Paris and the positive reaction to Arafat's statements in Washington. The foreign minister said that there has been no change in his view that under no circumstances Israel will not negotiate with the PLO. He added, that while President Mitterrand was a friend of Israel, his meeting with Arafat did not serve the cause of peace. Text:
Q: Is there an ideological basis for your current support for elections in the territories, or does it stem from the reality that has been forced on us, such as the intifada?
A: My support for elections is based on the fact that a dialogue constitutes the first step toward a settlement, if it is at all possible to achieve. For many years, perhaps too many, the accepted position in Israel was that we should talk with Jordan about everything connected with the Arab population of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. This was also totally justified.
Q: This option does not exist.
A: This option no longer exists because King Hussein changed his position by declaring that he was abandoning the area and the population. A realistic perspective on our part requires us to take this statement seriously. Hussein does not represent this population. We must identify its authentic representatives and launch a dialogue with them. In our terms, authentic representatives are those who are elected by the local population.
Q: And these, most likely, would be people who are identified with the PLO.
A: We are too quick to jump to conclusions which perhaps seem correct at first glance. We can't tell how the elections will turn out. There are polls and assessments, but sometimes there are surprises as well. I don't imagine that the results will be monolithic.
Q: Do you have any doubts that the individuals elected will be identified with the PLO?
A: I wouldn't be surprised if a portion of the people elected state that they are PLO supporters. Even the PLO is not a monolithic body. It, too, is composed of various factions.
Q: In other words there is a "kosher" PLO, and a "non-kosher" PLO?
A: I did not say that. Whoever is elected will be acceptable [as a partner to] a dialogue and negotiations. This still does not mean that we will arrive at an agreement. It's also possible that the chances of reaching an agreement are a function of who is elected. We will talk with whoever is elected.
Q: Eighty prominent figures in the territories have already declared that they will not cooperate with such elections.
A: I don't know to what extent they issued this statement of their own free will. A wave of terror is now sweeping Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District, and a day doesn't pass without the murder of individuals there who don't fully agree with the PLO line. I am really curious to know why some of those same people who were signatories to the petition are opposed to the elections. When I put myself in the place of a Palestinian living there, elections are exactly what I would want.
Q: Then why is it that you and other Cabinet ministers don't attempt to meet with figures in the territories in order to arrive at an agreement on the elections?
A: According to the distribution of tasks in the Cabinet, the defense minister is responsible for Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. As far as I know, he maintains direct contacts, as well as contacts through people working with him, with Palestinian figures. When I was defense minister, I also devoted a great deal of my time to talks with these figures.
Q: There are Cabinet ministers who are convinced that the notion of elections is a "time bomb" that will lead to an independent Palestinian state.
A: The danger of a Palestinian state being established in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District has existed -for a long time. We will do everything to prevent its realization.
Q: Aren't the proposed elections tantamount to a path from which there is no return, a path that will ultimately lead to a Palestinian state?
A: I don't believe that this is a path from which there is no return. Our conception is that prospects for a settlement are inherent in the first step, a dialogue. The dangers to Israel - including the establishment of a Palestinian state -which were latent in our sitting back, marking time and not adopting the prime minister's initiative, are greater than the risks entailed in taking the initiative. There are dangers and there are opportunities.
Q: What did you learn from Arafat's visit this week to Paris and his dissociation from the Palestinian covenant?
A: I would like to remind you of Arafat's interview with "Le Figaro" on the eve of his visit, in which he said that he is unable to alter the Palestinian covenant.
Q: But in practice, on French soil, he spoke in a different vein, and said that for all intents and purposes the Palestinian covenant does not exist.
A: He did not abrogate the Palestinian covenant.
Q: He made some explicit statements. Don't you consider this to be progress?
A: I do not see any substantive change of position in Araft's declaration in Paris.
Q: What would render Arafat and the PLO acceptable to you? A formal change in the Palestinian covenant?
A: No. Not even a formal change in the Palestinian covenant would make me change my mind. Our negotiating partners are representatives of the Palestinians in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District.
Q: Doesn't the fact that the U.S., France and many other Western countries officially recognize the PLO and Yasser Arafat mean anything to you?
A: It's a fact that some world leaders are making a pilgrimage in order to be photographed with Arafat and to shake his hand, and sometimes to embrace him, too. Perhaps only psychologists can explain the astounding phenomenon of their doing so with the person responsible for the worst atrocities that the world has witnessed since World War 11, a man who is directly responsible for the murder of thousands of people.
Q: Do you consider Arafat a more brutal murderer than Syrian President Hafez al-Assad?
A: I haven't made a quantitative comparison. But there is, nevertheless, a difference between the wars we have fought with Syria and Egypt, and blowing up aircraft in midair, taking hostages, harming children and infants - [the attack on] the Savoy Hotel, the murder of the athletes in Munich. We find it difficult to even draw up this long list. It is therefore surprising to see people standing in line nowadays to meet with Arafat. No political consideration could possibly justify this. An explanation should be sought in the field of psychology.
Q: But perhaps the psychological aspect pertains to us, to our apprehensions about holding a dialogue with our enemies?
A: I am familiar with the old saying that if you seek peace, you must speak with your enemies. On the face of it, you can't argue with this axiom. But it's not so. You don't speak with every enemy. One doesn't speak with the mafia, or with the neo-Nazis. Also, no one spoke with the Nazis, even though there were those who wanted to do so. Today we know this was a mistake. The meetings with the PLO only bolster the most extreme and violent element in the Arab World.
Q: Did French President Francois Mitterrand stab Israel in the back?
A: I wouldn't employ such hyperbolic terminology. President Mitterrand is a friend of Israel. I am certain of this. I was impressed by his concern for and commitment to Israel's security. But good intentions do not always lead to good results. I wouldn't suspect Mitterrand's intentions. He is convinced that this meeting with Arafat is part of his contribution to advancing the peace process. But the result is just the opposite. In any event, we are the ones who live in this region and we know who we're dealing with.
Q: In the not-too-distant past you proposed that Israel demand, in the framework of a permanent settlement, that Israeli sovereignty be applied in Judea and Samaria. Is this your position now as well, against the backdrop of the initiative for elections in the territories?
A: When we conduct negotiations on a permanent settlement, Israel will indeed demand the application of its sovereignty in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. I don't know when that will be, or who will then be sitting in the government, who will be the foreign minister or the person representing Israel in these negotiations. But there is no logic in attempting, at this point, to characterize the lines of a permanent settlement. This could torpedo the chances for an interim settlement.
Q: Were you surprised to hear the defense minister say this week that he intends to take more forceful measures in order to eliminate the intifada, if the residents of the territories are not cooperative with regard to the elections idea?
A: We must do everything possible in order to restore order and quiet in the area.
Q: I asked you to comment on Rabin's statement.
A: I don't wish to argue or to spar with the defense minister. He is responsible for security. We are both Cabinet members, and if I have any comments or suggestions on how to handle these issues - and I do, since I myself was minister of defense - then I must pass them on to Yitzhak Rabin directly, and not via "Ha'aretz."
Q: Doesn't the public have a right to know Moshe Arens's opinion on Yitzhak Rabin's measure of success, or failure, in quelling the intifada?
A: I'm not certain that this right has to be exercised. The public knows that all the members of the Cabinet bear a collective responsibility for decisions and policies. Consequently, I and the other ministers bear a collective responsibility for the attempt to bring calm and restore order.
Q: If you indeed bear the responsibility for this, do you think it could have been possible to achieve more effective results in suppressing the intifada?
A: Well then, if the defense minister said so, I am prepared to agree with him.
Q: You are admitting here, in effect, that it was possible to moderate the dimensions of the intifada and perhaps even eliminate it, but that this was not done.
Q: I have no doubt that the situation could have been improved.
A: Do you still back, as you did in the past, the induction of Israeli Arabs into the IDP
Q: Yes, I most definitely am in favor of inducting Israeli Arabs into the IDF. Israel's minority 'population cannot become integrated into Israeli society and identify with the state as long as it does not assume the civil responsibility of participating in the country's defense.
Q: Could you envision Israeli Arabs, in IDF uniforms, chasing Arabs in the territories and acting to quell the intifada?
A: This is happening even today. There are Arabs serving in the IDF, there are Bedouins who serve in the Border Police. The IDF protects all Israel's sectors; not only the country's Jewish residents, but also its Arab inhabitants.