In a series of meetings with his senior advisers and the leaders of the Israel Labour Party, the prime minister was putting the finishing touches on his peace initiative. He was encouraged to be more specific on details by Secretary of State Baker. An American delegation was due in Israel for talks on the peace initiative. He was convinced that there was by then an agreement in the cabinet to his plan. He did note that there was also some opposition within the Likud party. He admitted that the plan did entail some risks, a point made by Minister Ariel Sharon, but felt that a strong Israel could take such risks. Text:
Q: The passing week has been marked by murder in Jerusalem, the kidnapping of soldiers, and especially violent disturbances in Gaza. As we approach the 41st Independence Day, aren't we, essentially, in a very difficult situation?
A: Independence Day is, in many ways, a day of reckoning, a day for reflection, a day for summing up the passing year of Israel's existence. Sometimes the main essence of the passing year is reflected in the day itself.
What we are witnessing in these days is a certain peak of a desperate attempt by the extremist Palestinian elements to thwart our peace initiative.
The Arabs, generally, but more so the Palestinians, or those Palestinian circles which adhere to the PLO, are facing a dilemma: To join a process of peace, or to continue with the intifada. They cannot do both at the same time. It's clear to them that, if they enter a peace process, the intifada must come to' an end, at least for a few years.
Today, they are convinced that at this point the intifada has brought them many achievements and that it might bring them even more achievements in the near future. And Arafat, at least, is trying to create the impression, the atmosphere, that he is rapidly approaching the achievement of the goal - the establishment of the Palestinian state. And that he is achieving this by means of the intifada.
And you can see, in every decision that is made in recent months in meetings of Arab leaders, with or without the PLO, the first item on the agenda is to maintain the intifada, and to increase it. In Arabic they say "the blessed intifada" - because they see the intifada as paving their way to their target. And suddenly, Israel comes along and tries to change the course of developments, to the direction of negotiations, negotiations which will take years, and no one can tell, at least the Palestinians can't, how this process will end. In any case, they view this development as a danger that will destroy their way to victory.
That explains this escalation of violence, in every field. It doesn't always succeed, but this is their wish; you can see it in all the leaflets, in all the statements. Arafat sits in Paris and is conducting an "offensive of peace," and from there he says: 'We must continue to increase the intifada until we reach Jerusalem, the capital of our state.' That means that he's telling people in Gaza and in other places: 'Continue, escalate the struggle, escalate the violence, if you want me to continue on my march of victory.'
That's where we stand today. So what are we supposed to do? It's clear: On the one hand, we must resolutely stand by our proposals, we must consolidate and formulate them, we must strengthen the national unity and consensus around them; and, on the other hand, we must prove to the people of the intifada that is not an alternative, that we can suppress it, that we can break it, that the violence cannot overwhelm us and cause us to lose our control.
Israel can enter this process only from a situation of resolute, determined and forceful internal strength. We must believe that the conflict can be ended in this way, and on the other hand we must prevent the other side from any deviation from this course.
Someone could try to cheat us, to lie to us: someone might say, 'let's cheat the Israelis just like Mohammed (the Prophet) did.' They always bring these examples of how Mohammed used all sorts of ruses to overcome his opponents in Mecca and Khaibar and all of these. They always have these examples of Mohammed's strategies (tahbulot). Someone might say, 'let's accept elections, but as soon as the people are elected, they will proclaim themselves the government of Palestine, or something like that.' Israel must be prepared and ready to immediately stop such an attempt, and to stamp it out at once.
Therefore we are in a critical era today, and if we overcome the peak of these critical events, then there is a serious chance that the peace initiative will take off.
Q: But doesn't it elicit gloom that, 41 years after the state was established, we are still facing the same battle that we did 41 years ago?
A: There is no reason to get addicted to gloomy feelings. One should not succumb. Forty years of history are not a long period. It's a fact that 40 years ago the state was established against the wishes of the Arabs, and the Arabs have yet to accept its existence. And, from their point of view, they have good reasons not to accept its existence: we are surrounded by many Arab countries, they have allies, they have natural resources, they have certain advantages over us, and we are still alone in our struggle. We try to obtain allies, we have certain allies, but the war continues, we have yet to achieve peace and tranquility.
People can complain about this situation, but in no way should we blame ourselves and say 'we have sinned.' We did everything possible, we have always said that that we prefer peace, that we prefer negotiations. The other side refuses, because of all of its advantages and its refusal to reconcile itself to our existence.
And when one of them does put on a smiling face - he is only trying to cheat us. He wants, in return, that we should close our eyes and enter a trap.
We must tell the Arabs today that they are wrong if they think that they have two alternatives. Israel will live, and will exist here, and the only alternative is peace with Israel. Peace, in fair and reasonable conditions, and what we are proposing is fair, logical and reasonable.
The terms do not basically contradict the principles of either side, and therefore it's the only way. We must take it.
Q: You mentioned the fact that the PLO is giving instructions to increase the intifada in order to undermine the peace process...
A: I don't know if it is instructions, but the PLO is inciting, and the PLO has its own people in the territories, and that's the way they perceive the situation. Look, they tell the residents in the territories, those who are suffering, 'the achievement of our aims is near. It is worthwhile for you to suffer. Don't get tired. A bit more, a bit more.' They paint an optimistic picture.
We know that, in more closed discussions, they do not, view the situation in such an optimistic light. But they want to encourage the masses, and the masses are naturally attracted to pretty pictures.
Q: So what will bring the residents to join Israel's peace initiative without approval from the PLO?
A: Well, as they say, you can't lie to everybody all the time. The people in the area will eventually realize that all these tales about the independent state which is at the doorway are without any foundation. That these are lies, illusions. And we know very well, from numerous contacts that we have had, that many today in the territories of Judea, Samaria and Gaza want to achieve something, they want to reach an agreement with us. So I hope, we hope, that the forces will be found, perhaps with the help of neighbouring Arab states, which will enter the process with us.
Q: So you actually believe that the process can go forward without the OK of the PLO?
A: We don't want to negotiate with the PLO. That is well known. Because the PLO is not interested in this process. The PLO is genuinely opposed, it's not a pretence. They are opposed because this contradicts their objectives, it contradicts their policies. The PLO has no reason to enter such a process. What does the PLO want? A Palestinian state, immediately. But we say we oppose a Palestinian state, this is the national consensus. So what will they talk to us about?
We are offering a process, we are saying: In the second stage of the negotiations, each side will be able to propose his solutions, but we will have to reach a solution which is acceptable to both sides. In any case, the Palestinians have nothing to lose from such a process. They can only gain. They have a chance to reach a situation which is far better than what they have today.
Q: You said before that we have to prove to the Arabs that the intifada can be suppressed, that it can be broken. Can it, in fact?
A: I said that we must prove to them that the intifada is no alternative. To prove to them that, with violence, they will be unable to coerce us into accepting things which we do not want to. And that therefore they have no logical reason to continue. Because after all, they are causing untold suffering and damage. To themselves, more than to us. We have to do all we can to weaken the intifada, and to break this attempt to break us.
Q: Your peace initiative contained four points, but it appears that the other three, except for elections, have been shunted aside.
A: Oh no, we stand by them, absolutely. It's natural that the media latches on to the matter of elections, which seems more relevant, more actual, because of the intifada, because of the disturbances. But we are insisting that the conflict with the Palestinians cannot be ended without ending the conflict with the Arab states. It's insufficient. It won't solve the problem. Because it's conceivable that we will reach a solution with the Palestinians, and Arab states which will reject this agreement will to go to war against us. That's possible. So then what have we achieved? Therefore we are telling the international community, 'we can't do it alone'; that things should be done parallel, in conjunction. To strive at the same time for an end to the state of war which exists between us and the Arab states.
Q: Are the points interconnected? Are they linked?
A: Of course, the matters are connected, but there is no absolute linkage. It's connected, because everything is aimed at the same target - the end of the conflict. A comprehensive settlement to the comprehensive conflict.
Q: You met this week with the leaders of the Labour Party on drafting the general lines of the peace programme. What is the situation on this matter?
A: We are getting near, we have almost agreed on everything.
Q: On the details as well?
A: Somewhat. There is no point in dealing with all the details as long as there are no negotiations going on with the other side. Therefore there is no point in all sorts of internal arguments before there are negotiations. But more or less.
Q: Do you include the vote by residents of East Jerusalem among issues with which "there is no point in dealing right now"?
A: Yes, I think that on this matter as well we won't reach any decisions at this time.
Q: But you do oppose their participation.
A: Absolutely. But I don't attach any importance to the personal opinions of any of us. I usually don't say what my personal opinion is. I made my position on this matter public after the contrary was publicized, as if I support it. So I didn't want any misunderstandings. I am opposed to it now, just like I was during negotiations for the implementation of the Camp David Accords.
Then we had already reached this point in our negotiations with the Egyptians and with the Americans, with Carter, and then we were opposed. So for the time being, this matter is better left alone.
Q: Is your opposition absolute? Is it yehareg ubal yalavor? ("Over your dead body').
A: (Laughing) I am not willing to lehehareg, but my opposition is adamant.
Q: What about the matter of international observers?
A: We didn't deal with this matter. We don't need it. We are sure that if we proclaim general, free and democratic elections, then that's the way it will be. We believe in ourselves.
Q: But sometimes justice has to be seen...
A: All right, so we will show it. Experience shows that we live up to our commitments. Even Mubarak said so, he dared to say so.
Q: You mentioned the risk that the elected Palestinians would proclaim a Palestinian state. How will we prevent this? How will we achieve this prior agreement to the process?
A: There has to be prior agreement to the process as a whole.
Q: But agreement by whom?
A: By the body with whom we will negotiate.
Q: So the agreement won't come before the elections.
A: It must come before the elections.
Q: But before the elections no one has been elected. So who will agree?
A: So how will you vote? Elections will be held only after agreement with a body which is going with us to the negotiations. Agreement has to be for the whole process - there has to be agreement for the first stage, that we are talking about self-rule, and not something else. And that after several years negotiations will start on the permanent settlement. In accordance with these principles. That must be clear. So the agreement must include what will be the tasks of these people once they are elected, what they are supposed to do.
They can't come after the elections and declare 'we constitute the independent regime here and we say so and so.' This will be a gross infringement of the agreement, and this will give us the right, indeed it will obligate us, to do away with the whole process.
Q: But who is this "body"?
A: It will have to be a Palestinian body. Perhaps if Egypt and Jordan will want to join, we will welcome them, At the time we spoke with the Egyptians, and we thought that after we reached agreement with them, there would be elections for the autonomy among the residents of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. They will elect their people, and these people will constitute the body which will rule, which will administer this autonomous region, and with them we will negotiate subsequently about the final status. That is what we had in mind then.
Now we have changed the order a bit, but basically it's the same.
Q: Do you have a picture of what the interim arrangements will look like?
A: That will be a matter for negotiations. The principles are the same: there will be self-rule, there will be wide-ranging rights for them to manage the affairs, except for matters of security, which will be under our full and absolute responsibility, and foreign affairs. And there will be certain matters which will be administered jointly, such as infrastructure. But there is still much to be negotiated - what will be the executive, how many people will serve on it.
Q: Minister Sharon has termed the plan a grave danger to Israel's existence. Do you agree with him in any way?
A: There are always risks. But in any case we can face this danger as long as we are strong, as long as we control the situation, as long as the Israeli government is strong, resolute, and knows what it is seeking.
Q: Will the plan being formulated now be brought to the cabinet for formal approval?
A: I think that, in one way or another, we will bring it to the cabinet.
Q: There was some talk in Labour that perhaps Israel should not commit itself formally...
A: I think that we will decide that this is what we are negotiating about, or something like that...
Q: Do you expect this document to serve as the basis for the talks with the American delegation which is coming here at the end of the week?
A: These are not negotiations, these are talks. It's not with them that we have to make peace. They are constantly taking an interest in the plan, and they have pledged their support for it. They will probably tell us about the position of the Soviets, because they are coming here straight from Moscow.
Q: There appears to be some regression in the process of closer relations with the Soviet Union.
A: Perhaps. I am not sure if there has been an actual regression; let's say that progress has stopped. It appears that for a certain period everything in the Soviet Union was under revision. This includes relations with us. It appears that they have recently reached the conclusion that they must protect their assets in the area, especially the radical Arabs, Syria, Libya, the PLO. And therefore this prevents further advances with us, although what was achieved until now is continuing.
I am hoping for a change for the better. In any case, what (Foreign Minister Eduard) Shevardnadze said in Cairo was not encouraging. And they have had very sharp statements against our peace initiative.
Q: Is the matter of superpower auspices for peace talks still relevant?
A: At this time, it is not. There is no place for it in the current initiative. We don't need any initiative by the superpowers which will start the process. We would like all the countries in world to support the process. If more countries will speak like the U.S. has spoken, it can definitely help. That's why we are so disappointed with France.
Q: But Foreign Minister Dumas had some positive things to say about the elections.
A: That's true, but if he is speaking about an international conference, and an independent Palestinian state, than this runs against the grain of the whole initiative.
Q: Perhaps you could now tell us what you were doing in Hungary.
A: (Laughs) I spoke with the leaders of Hungary.
Q: Were you surprised by the reactions here to your trip?
A: Perhaps people are seeking sensations. And it's not always possible for people who deal in these matters to satisfy this appetite for sensation.
Q: Are the Hungarians stipulating that economic links must precede diplomatic ties?
A: No they are not. What was published is not true. They think that relations are developing normally, and that we will reach full ties, this is their estimation.
Q: Your initiative now carries the sub-title 'the Shamir-Rabin plan'. Is there any political conclusion to be reached from this coordination between you and the defence minister?
A: No, there are no political objectives save one - safeguarding the national unity. There has to be strong unity in Israel, and between Israel and the Jewish people abroad. We have all recently realized that this link has a strong political weight.
Q: But perhaps you and Rabin should actually be in the same party?
A: No, no, no. We haven't spoken about it, and we don't think that. I haven't spoken to him but speaking for myself, the only aim is to repel the attacks against us, and to achieve peace through national unity. If we achieve that, I will say dayenu. It's quite possible that, in the second stage, our ways will part. Perhaps it will be less critical then.
Q: Finally, perhaps you would like to say something about your controversial statement last week.
A: Which statement?
Q: About the need for civilians to make sure that terrorists do not get away in one piece.
A: That's nothing. It was blown up out of all proportion. I called on citizens to be more alert to the dangers. The public must understand that it is a partner, a partner to the concern for security. We hear Jews saying that the state must provide security. I don't like to hear this. It is we who created the state: what is the state, some external body? Times are difficult, and each one must view himself as a partner to the national experience.
Q: Shouldn't something be done about events such as the behaviour of the crowd following the murder on Jaffa Road?
A: Look, I am against lynching, this runs against my beliefs completely. But it is natural that there are such outbursts sometimes. It points to an unhealthy atmosphere. That's why there is a need for more national solidarity.
I remember in the 1930s, when I was still quite new here, in the first days of the meoraot, I happened to be in Shuk Hacarmel. And suddenly somebody cried "Arabs are coming from Jaffa." But nobody ran away. People who were there cried, "Come on, let's take rods and clubs," and they ran towards Jaffa. As a young man, newly arrived from the Diaspora, I found much encouragement in this. I knew this would not protect us, but as a phenomenon, it is a healthy thing.