Speaking to the Likud Knesset faction, Mr. Shamir said that "we will not give the Arabs one inch of our land, even if we have to negotiate for ten years. " Defense Minister Rabin was not concerned with this statement. He said that Israel had to start the political move and the plan was aimed at securing the resolution of the Palestinian issue and Israel-Jordan relations. He said that during the negotiations for a final settlement, each side will be able to raise its demands. During such negotiations Israel will be able to raise its demand for Israeli sovereignty. Mr. Rabin said that his party believed in territorial concessions "within the framework of peace, with Jordan as a Jordanian-Palestinian state on our eastern border. " The PLO had in the meantime rejected the plan. But that did not disturb Mr. Rabin, since the plan was aimed at the Arab states and international factors such as the United States. Text:
Q: Will Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's declared position that Israel will not give up an inch of land to the Arabs not frustrate any chance that the Palestinians will adopt the Israeli initiative?
A: At this point, the parties that make up the government have positions concerning everything related to the nature of the permanent solution. This is not what unites the major parties that today constitute the National Unity Government. The main problem facing us as a unified government, a National Unity Government, while we were aware of the differences of opinion regarding the permanent solution, was to find a way, a path, which in my opinion is the only one, to the heart of the matter - to everything concerning our relations with the Arab world and with the Palestinians - in order to begin the political move. The objective of the initiative approved by the Cabinet is to bring about progress from the current situation toward peace on our eastern border, meaning with Jordan, and a solution to the Palestinian problem. We recognized the fact that it is impossible today, on the Israeli-Arab level first of all, to attain this in one blow, in one move. We were aware of the large gap between every one of the components without which it is impossible to reach peace between Israel and the Arab world. Therefore, the initiative can be a joint initiative by all components of the government. It is also more realistic regarding the Arab world and the Palestinians if it is divided into two phases. Because as for the transition period to the interim agreement, it is possible to reach agreement, among ourselves as well, and the initiative is based on this.
Q: But is it not possible that a statement to the effect that Israel will not return any territories under any circumstances will sabotage the 6ther side's acceptance of the initiative?
A: By the same token, the Palestinians - even those who are today residents of the territories - do not hide the fact that their intention is to attain an independent Palestinian state, or a confederation with Jordan, and that when it is established in accordance with their aspirations - a thing which we will do our utmost to prevent - [it will be] a state in Judea and Samaria, East Jerusalem and Gaza. The basic differences of opinion between us and the Arab world are well-known. In spite of this, and knowing the difference which exists within the government as well, and even more so between ourselves and the Arab world and the Palestinians, including those in the territories, we must seek a way to advance, to change the situation, to create, through the interim agreement for a limited transitional period, a new reality which will perhaps bring about a change in positions; in their positions, we hope, and they have the right to hope for a changes in ours. This is the logic - and in my opinion the wisdom also - in dividing the progress to peace into two stages. As we all know, I belong to the Labor Party, and have always believed, since the end of the Six Day War, not [only] for the past year, two years or even ten years, that from our viewpoint, the most important thing is to attain peace and security as a democratic Jewish state. This means not swallowing the majority of the million and a half Palestinians living in the territories, and this also requires a willingness to make territorial concessions within the framework of peace, with Jordan as a Jordanian-Palestinian State on our eastern border.
Q: The PLO and residents of the territories have rejected the plan. What do you see as the next step?
A: First of all, the plan, or the initiative to be more precise, was not intended for the PLO. It was clear to us from the start that the PLO would in fact reject it. The initiative is addressed to residents of the territories, for two reasons. For the first time since May 15, 1948, the Palestinians are responsible. Within the area of mandatory Israel, they are the leaders of the struggle, and they are the ones who suffer from it. In the meetings I held, remarks were made that are essentially similar - not necessarily identical - to reactions they voice publicly. At the same time, I believe that if they were liberated from the threat of internal terrorism and general Arab pressure, including from Tunisia, many of them understand that this is a rare opportunity to progress, if not to the attainment of their declared objectives, then certainly to a significant change in their situation.
Q: You used the word "if." They are not free of this fear.
A: At this point, that is correct. I believe that what we should do at this point, therefore, is to concentrate on the initiative, as it was approved by the Cabinet, and to create conditions, through dialogue with the U.S., the European community and the Palestinians, and to focus the issue on the initiative and not on what the permanent solution will be.
Q: Should the new IDF policy in Gaza and the territories, namely the curfew and closure of Gaza, be seen as part of an effort to force the Palestinians to accept the initiative?
A: Israel's overall policy today concerning the events in the territories is a policy which stands firmly on two feet: a political foot, and this is expressed by the Cabinet decision on the peace initiative, meaning, we are proposing to them: "Come, let us sit at the negotiating table, we will advance in two phases to the permanent solution." By the same token, we must - I as defense minister certainly must, as must the defense establishment, including the IDF -ensure security in the territories in accordance with the constraints imposed upon us by law, as well as transmit a clear message to the Palestinians living in the territories: "Forget the possibility that with stones and Molotov cocktails you will bring about any kind of change in the political initiative." We have always learned that the condition for bringing any Arab element to a dialogue with us, to negotiations for peace or for a limited settlement, is to make them conscious by words and actions of the fact that by violence, in all its forms - whether war, we have never succeeded in completely uprooting terrorism, and certainly concerning the violence of residents of the territories -they will not attain anything from us in this way.
Q: Is there a chance that the same closure which was imposed on Gaza will be imposed on Judea and Samaria?
A: Right now I do not want to discuss a detail, a measure which is a specific temporary need, connected with specific conditions, and is part of our security actions, as a result of incidents which have taken place, which I will not give details of right now. It is important to see the overall picture, and not just a move made yesterday or today or tomorrow, but activity in two main directions: the peace initiative and the handling of this initiative in an effort to create an international, inter-Arab and Palestinian atmosphere that will illustrate to them that the tragedies which have befallen the Palestinian people in the past because they always said "all or nothing," have left them with nothing. This time they have the chance to advance in stages, without defining the nature of the permanent solution in advance. The second direction is to continue our activity. to assure the security of the territories, and to bring about a calming of the violence taking place there today.
Q: During your upcoming trip to the U.S., will you discuss the issues of East Jerusalem residents' voting status and international supervision of the elections in the territories?
A: I believe it is preferable for members of the government, when speaking publicly, and certainly in contacts with the U.S., to attempt to present the issues in the simplest form possible. The peace initiative which was approved by the Cabinet gives the structure for a clear process from here until the permanent solution, and leaves the nature and content of the permanent solution open for free negotiation, because the Palestinians too, and not only Israel, can present any proposal they desire. If we do not receive an answer in principle as to whether there is a willingness for [the initiative], it is not worth it to go into the details of all sorts of issues. It is very possible that they will say "we accept it in principle, but we have various reservations." We will have to discuss this when it happens. Before an answer in principle is given concerning the essence of the plan, its components, the method for r electing the Palestinian representatives, it is difficult and unadvisable to discuss the details or the nature of the permanent solution, beyond what is known as the position of the parties in Israel.
Q: In your early discussions with Shamir on formulation of the plan, did he mention to you fears that Likud members would not accept it?
A: In talks I had with the prime minister, the foreign minister and the vice premier, we dealt with the heart of the issues, and not with this topic.