Deputy Foreign Minister Beilin headed the Israeli delegation to the multilateral talks on refugees held in Tunis on 13 October. While there, he met with Yasser Arafat. In the following interview he discussed his talks with Arafat and stated his idea that the final resolution of the Palestinian issue should take the form of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. While this goal should not be negotiated at this stage, it should serve as a guideline for the talks. He also stated that the main idea of an interim solution was to see if the Palestinians are capable of controlling terror. He saw the Declaration of Principles as an irreversible fait-accompli. Text:
Q: According to the terms of Israeli-PLO mutual recognition, Arafat pledges to condemn terrorism. In your meeting with him last week, did you ask him to publicly condemn the killings of two Israelis in Wadi Kelt or the aborted speedboat raid from Lebanon for which George Habash claimed responsibility?
A: Arafat sees those incidents as activities against him. I told him that for victims, it made no difference if they were wounded or killed by Hamas or by the PLO, and it is also very difficult for public opinion in Israel to differentiate between different groups. He has to take into consideration this fact and to consider it very seriously. The attacks may even increase and I wanted him to think about this. Not that I have a very good solution.
I believe that when they are with their police in Gaza and Jericho, the picture will be a different one.
Q: Would you release Hamas prisoners?
A: I can't tell you. I believe that the criterion will be not membership in the organization but more the crime in which they were involved. But I cannot tell YOU that either. I think that really well have to tackle each case by case.
Q: In your meeting with Arafat, you mentioned a Palestinian-Jordanian, confederation, leading to an indirect rebuke by the prime minister. Do you regret talking about final-status issues?
A: Every other day the Palestinians say that their aim is to have a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.
We have to say that we are not going to compromise on Jerusalem, united under our sovereignty as the capital of Israel, and we do not see the 1967 borders as the permanent borders and that we prefer another solution.
It is our duty to tell our people, to tell the Palestinians, what the guidelines are for our permanent solution without negotiating with them.
It would be a mistake to negotiate with them now, but it would be a mistake not to refer to it at all.
I [reminded] Arafat ... [that] in 1983, he officially backed the idea of confederation with Jordan. The Labor Party passed a resolution on confederation in 1991. We refer to Switzerland or Canada as models of confederation, and some would point to other models.
By talking about confederation, there could be a kind of psychological change.
Q: Do you favor a confederation because you think the alternative of an independent Palestinian state is more dangerous or simply because you think the Israeli public finds a confederation more palatable?
A: I think that confederation is better for the Palestinians, for the Jordanians and for the Israelis. For us, the advantage of a confederation is that it is easier to demilitarize than a separate Palestinian state.
That is one of the reasons.... I look at it as easier than giving back territories, and otherwise it might become a kind of irredentist state.
For the Jordanians, I believe that it is clear. For the Palestinians themselves [it is also beneficial]. Otherwise they are speaking about a very small country. We are speaking about 90,000 sq. km. in Jordan and only 5,000 sq, km. in the West Bank. And 1,000 sq. km. in Gaza.
I mean, those areas are so small and Jordan is so big - and you are speaking about the same people, the same families.
It is very inefficient not to have such a connection.
Now we understand that to speak about the Jordanian- Palestinian state is too late. But to speak about the confederation which may have two major components with some connections between them, mainly of security and forces but a wide measure of self-rule is something which is, I believe, more than suitable and rational.
Q: What was his response?
A: His response was that he sticks to the resolution of '83 but he is not sure whether Jordan still supports confederation. By the way, I think that he is wrong.
Q: In the aftermath of the Israeli-PLO accord, are you committed to the future of the Hashemite Kingdom? Some say that in a private conversation, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres referred to King Hussein as the "last of the Hashemites"?
A: It is not really our duty to tell the Jordanians whether the Hashemite Kingdom is the best regime for them or maybe there is a better regime. It is not our business.
Q: You said the number of Palestinians refugees seeking to return is smaller than Israelis think. What is the basis of your estimate?
A: Those who left Arab countries do not dream about returning to the territories. Many of those who are now in Jordan and Syria became part of those states. They are actually moving the economy, and most of them are not thinking of any kind of return.
Q: There are Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan.
A: I believe in Jordan, this is not a big problem. I think the main question is Lebanon. They understand that the refugees will not be permitted to return to Israel.
Eventually, if there is a political agreement, I believe that maybe some of them will prefer to live in the West Bank. I don't believe they will go to Gaza. That will eventually be the solution for the problem.
This is not the way the Palestinians have dreamt about it, not the way Israelis often feel. This is my personal view and I may be wrong.
Q: Can you clarify your position on Jerusalem?
A: Jerusalem should remain united under the sovereignty of Israel, one city, one municipality. Within those parameters, we should take into consideration the specific problems and needs of the Palestinian population in Jerusalem. I agree with what Teddy Kollek wrote in Foreign Affairs four years ago that there should be elections in certain neighborhoods. But there is no way we will agree to two separate capitals in Jerusalem.
Q: Next summer, autonomy is scheduled to begin in all other parts of the territories besides Gaza-Jericho, with the IDF expected to protect all settlers and redeploy at the same time. Maybe it Is easier just to separate the populations?
A: The idea of an interim solution is to find out whether the Palestinians are capable of controlling terrorism.
This is the main question. If terrorism decreases, it is a whole new ball game. The view of the people and everything else will change.
If, God forbid, this is not the case - terrorism continues or increases - then I believe after five years, or even before that, we should tell the PLO with all due respect: "You didn't deliver the goods." From their point of view, they need the five years to establish themselves.
Q: I Your critics, such as Deputy Defense Minister Motta Gur, charge that you either indulge in wishful thinking or else assume that the other side bases its negotiating tactics on the same amount of goodwill as you do. Is this a fair criticism?
A: I don't think so. Contrary to some who criticize me, I am not sure that I am so naive. From the Israeli point of view, the results of Oslo are good results. Just some weeks before Oslo, the Palestinians were saying in Washington that Jerusalem had to be included in autonomy and settlements had to be dismantled.
I am not sure somebody much more hawkish than myself would have achieved better results. That's why I disagree with the common wisdom of "let's ask for more and eventually compromise for less," rather than say from the beginning what is important and stick to it.
Q: Just a couple of months ago, you lambasted American Jewish organizations for being right wing. Yet most of them have come out in support of the accord with the PLO. Doesn't this prove your assessment was wrong?
A: I have criticized the organizations for blindly following whatever the Israeli government says, without having a real dialogue. I just talked to an American Jewish group yesterday that published communiques supporting the agreement with the PLO.
I told them: "I am not totally enthusiastic about your support. I don't want you to support it just because We are the Israeli government.
"Because if this is the case, you would support another government that Would call for abolishing the agreement. If you don't like it and think it is too dangerous, I want to know."
Q: As someone who has personified dovishness in this country, how do you think the political spectrum will shift in the aftermath of this accord?
A: I hope we have legitimized something that was totally unthinkable [for many], but for doves in the Labor Party was thinkable for a very long time. I hope people will refer to it as a type of fait accompli. Even people who are not sure about this agreement or think we went too far, believe this is irreversible.
I think it will become a consensus in Israeli society. Even if there are disputes in the future, whatever we have done until now, the accord will become the baseline.
I believe that we have to enshrine in the minds of both peoples that the solution is not so difficult to achieve. The three main problems - Jerusalem, refugees and borders - are not so complicated.
I believe if we are ready to withdraw from most of the territories eventually after so many years that Israel wasn't willing to do that, the Palestinians will have to decide whether they are going to wait for another government that will be ready to redivide Jerusalem, return to the '67 borders and invite refugees to Jaffa. Or they are going to be satisfied with a pragmatic government that is not willing to go back to the '67 borders but is willing to do much in order to compromise.
This is the real dilemma for the Palestinians, but I believe most of them are very pragmatic. They will have to be satisfied with this current government because they will not find one more moderate.
I believe what was most unthinkable was the recognition between Prime Minister Rabin and Arafat. Now that this has happened, things will be much easier.