By late September, after two rounds of talks in Washington, Mr. Rabin felt that the focus of attention should now be on Syria rather than on the Palestinian-Jordanian track. He was now offering to apply Resolutions 242 and 338 to the Golan Heights instead of the previous Likud formula which spoke of the concept of "Peace for Peace. " However, until Syria was prepared to discuss full peace and separate such an agreement from progress between Israel and Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinians, there was no point in entering into the territorial aspects of such negotiations. He ruled out new elections in Israel prior to withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Mr. Rabin also stated that for the time being there was no change in his Government's policy on amending the law banning contacts with the PLO. Finally, he enumerated the main achievements of his Government in its first seventy days in office. Among them were a better image for Israel, vast improvement in ties with the U.S., the approval of the American loan guarantees and the freezing of some 7,000 housing units in the settlements. Excerpts:
Q: (...) Are you driven toward intensive negotiations with the Syrians by a desire to be noted in history as the person who achieved peace with the cruelest enemy of Israel -just as Menachem Begin wanted to go down in history as the person who wanted to bring about the first peace agreement?
A: I have no historical account [to settle]. I have one consideration: As one who has experienced and seen all the wars of Israel, and as one who has seen the bereavement and the damage which they caused, wants peace in order to give them security. Today, conditions have been created which have reduced the danger of war between Arab states and Israel - at least for a span of a few years. Reality has demonstrated that the Arab world has no chance [of winning] a war against us in the coming years. And, because I have always believed that the precondition for an Arab ruler agreeing to enter into negotiations has been the recognition that military force will achieve nothing, it is my obligation as prime minister to now exhaust the chances to achieve peace.
Q: But, in recent years, you have been portrayed as suspicious of Syria and as someone who actually wants to accelerate negotiations with the Palestinians. Why did you change direction?
A: It is true that, when I was defense minister in the National Unity Government, I proposed that [we] concentrate on negotiations with the Palestinians. My approach was based on the desire to separately conduct negotiations with each Arab factor, This found expression in the May 1989 peace initiative, which led us to the brink of a meeting between us and the Palestinians in Cairo. But the Likud Government preferred the path of simultaneous dialogue with three Arab delegations. Thus was the Madrid formula determined.
Q: But how did the focus shift to Syria?
A: I saw no reason or possibility of changing this formula and we decided to examine what could be achieved with each partner, In the last two rounds of talks, in which we came close to substantive discussion, it became apparent that Syria is a clear address with a master capable of making decisions.
Q: But it seems that, at the end of the second round of talks by this Government, we are also stuck with the Syrians.
A: In the negotiations with the Syrians, we have not yet received answers to the two most substantive questions: Is Syria prepared for full peace - with open borders, diplomatic relations and normalization - and is [Syria] ready for a peace treaty which stands on its own two feet and is not conditioned on progress in the negotiations with the other delegations? Until we receive an unequivocal and clear response - in other words, affirmative - to these questions, we will not enter into territorial negotiations.
Q: Then, given that they are not answering, are we not indeed in the same frozen situation as the Likud Government?
A: Excuse me, but - in my eyes - there are two substantive differences between us and the Likud Government, with respect to the two fronts of the peace negotiations: with the Syrians and with the Palestinians. On the Syrian issue, the Likud Government never reached [the stage of] substantive negotiations. The practical negotiations actually began during the sixth round - the first of this Government. And it began because we said that Resolutions 242 and 338 will be implemented in the negotiations with Syria and we did not say that, in exchange for peace, there will be peace. There is, on our part, a willingness to enter a territorial component [into the talks], while - at the same time -we do not accept the price that the Likud Government paid to Egypt in exchange for peace as a precedent.
As to the Palestinians, we came with concrete proposals for general elections - the Likud only spoke of municipal [voting] - and with a willingness to be flexible on certain issues, but not with regard to matters that could [affect] an interim arrangement such that it ceases to be an interim arrangement and becomes a nucleus for a Palestinian state.
Q: Do you still believe that autonomy can be achieved within 6-9 months, as you proclaimed on the eve of the elections?
A: It is still realistic. Unless the Palestinians go mad and decide, this time as well - as is their way - to miss opportunities for the start of a solution to the long conflict.
Q: If I understand correctly, the "willingness to enter a territorial component" into the negotiations with Syria means: withdrawal - yes; return of the entire Golan - no.
A: At this stage, I will not enter into a territorial discussion. All my statements now - [regarding] to what I agree and to what I do not - will essentially become the starting point. As long as the Syrians have not affirmatively replied to our two questions, I have prohibited myself from entering into any detailed territorial discussions or into any solution -aside from the principle that we are not only offering peace for peace.
Q: I will ask [the above] differently; is there a chance for peace with Syria without the return of every centimeter of the Golan?
A: We are in the middle of negotiations with Syria with the intent not to arrive [at such a situation].
Q: An hour ago, you [hosted] Golan residents who marched from [Mount] Hermon. What will really happen - in any withdrawal - to the [Golan] communities?
A: I do not want to go into detail.
Q: Why not?
A: Because I do not want to say anything [about matters] that we will all seek ways to avoid.
Q: Will a withdrawal on the Golan not require new elections?
A: Under no circumstances [will new elections be necessary]. We went to elections with the decisions of the Labor party - within which it said that Resolutions 242 and 338, which speak of a withdrawal from territory, would be implemented within a peaceful resolution on all fronts.
Q: Is there any chance of a meeting between you and President Assad? He said that in a five-minute meeting between you, everything could be concluded.
A: I did not hear that he said that and I know of no willingness, [on the part] of Assad to meet with me--not for five minutes, and not for five hours.
Q: Could you be missing an opportunity here for a Sadat-Begin style meeting?
A: President Sadat proved to the Israeli public that he wanted peace even before an agreement was signed with him. He took a dramatic-historic course of action, also in his speech that was broadcast to the Egyptian parliament -during which he expressed a willingness to walk to the edge of the world and to come to Jerusalem for the sake of peace - as well as in his coming to Israel. He convinced the Israelis that he wanted peace and he toppled the wall of hostility and suspicion. Today, the problem with Syria is that I do not perceive any preparation, or a demonstration of willingness by the president and the administration there, to prove to Israel that they are really ready for peace.
Q: So do you actually believe that the true desire of Assad is toward peace?
A: I do not deal in belief. I have no x-ray [machine] to examine the intentions of man. I judge in accordance with courses of action, acts and statements. And this component is very lacking vis-a-vis Syria. And therefore, there is still room for caution as to the intentions of Syria.
Q: What does it do to you when people from the Golan, including members of your party, say that "Rabin deceived the people," or when they refer to your actions as an "obsession on the verge of madness"?
A: I regret this and I also understand their distress.
Q: Are you in favor of a change in the law which prohibits meetings with PLO members?
A: It depends what kind of change and the timing must also be examined. If, for example, changing the law will grant legitimacy for the United States to renew the contacts with the PLO, it is faulted. There is no change in the position of the current Israeli Government - that there should be no contacts with the PLO as an organization, and that the negotiations must be conducted with residents of the territories within the framework of the existing delegation.
Q: What is this game? After all, you are actually sitting with PLO members at the
talks.
A: No. I distinguish between two things. Our negotiations are being conducted
with a representation of residents from the territories with whom we must reach an agreement. Who they speak with is their problem. I perceive great importance in the maintenance of this principle because, in my opinion, the chance to achieve peace is conditioned upon strengthening the status of residents of the territories - most of whom want to achieve a solution. [The above] is not true with respect to most of those sitting in Tunisia, headed by the PLO leader.
Q: Do you not believe that Arafat wants peace?
A: The tragedy of the Palestinians is that, for the past 50 years, they had a leadership which aspired to achieve everything - and was left with nothing. The Palestinian story is a story of one missed [opportunity] after another. And I have a feeling that the current leadership also does not understand that it is liable to miss another chance. As time goes by, their chances to achieve something are reduced. (...)
Q: You have been in power for about 70 days. How would you summarize this [period]?
A: In 70 days, we have changed the atmosphere, domestically and abroad. And this was achieved via the following factors:
The world, for the time being, has accepted that the approach of the Government to the negotiations is to deal with substantive issues - and not procedure.
There has been a significant improvement in relations with the United States and in the image of Israel therein. We have reconstructed the network of trust between the senior echelons in the two countries.
The result of the above two [elements]: The acquisition of the immigrant absorption guarantees from the United States government
We have begun to change the order of priorities: We have frozen 7,000 housing units in the territories and we are in [the midst of] a reclassification process [affecting] the orders of priority - by area - across the country. (...)