On 29 June 1994 Yasser Arafat announced his intention to visit Gaza and Jericho in the coming days. The government, waiving aside the required two weeks notice for such a visit, approved it and Arafat arrived in Gaza from Egypt on 1 July, where he addressed a large crowd On the morning of his arrival Foreign Minister Peres answered questions connected with the Arafat visit, Israel-Syria negotiations and economic development of the Middle East. He also discussed the report of the Shamgar Commission which investigated the 25 February 1994 Hebron Massacre and found that it was the action of one man alone. It absolved the IDF and other security services from responsibility, but suggested new guidelines for improved security in the Cave of the Patriarchs. Text:
Arafat's Visit
Q: How would you advise Israelis to react to Yasser Arafat's visit this week? The visit is causing ferment.
A: They should be more relaxed. I don't know why everybody is making such a big deal. What is this - the Exodus from Egypt?
Q: Do you see it as a historic moment?
A: The historic part began with the Oslo and Cairo agreements. This is just part of the implementation.
Q: Do you understand why Palestinians are excited about such an occasion?
A: We are interested that they feel good and are happy. The success of autonomy is [a success for all of us].
Q: Prime minister Rabin has said Arafat, like every Moslem, can pray at the holy places in Jerusalem, even though it appears that it won't happen on this trip. What do you think?
A: He did not ask to come to Jerusalem now, so why do we have to raise it?
Q: How do you react to those people, such as Rabbi Goren, who have called for Arafat's assassination?
A: The attorney-general has ruled not to take action [against Goren]. So we condemn [Gorens] position, time and again.
Q: What do you expect to come out of your and the prime minister's meeting with Arafat next week at UNESCO?
A: We will talk about continuing negotiations, There are two options. One is to implement early empowerment and the other is to negotiate expanding autonomy to other parts of the territories.
Q: Are they mutually exclusive?
A: No.
Q: If the Palestinians do not agree to hold elections, is it fair to say that Israel will not feel itself obligated to redeploy the IDF from Arab population centers throughout the territories in the next few months?
A: We don't make it a condition. It is an option.
Q: Can the IDF redeploy out of Hebron while the settlers remain?
A: When the Lord gave birth to a problem, He also gave birth to an answer. There are many options, and I don't want to get into the negotiations before they begin.
Q: What do you say to those settlers who are worried about their future and believe you don't understand their fears?
A: I say to them that they must also be fair. We negotiated an agreement in which all the settlements remain where they are. Did the Likud achieve this? Compare our negotiation to that of the Sinai. We had a more complicated negotiation. What do they want? They don't accuse [us because] of what we are doing, but ... what they think we will do. It's a [premature] condemnation.
Q: Should the municipal borders of Jerusalem be adjusted inward or outward?
A: No. Not in either direction.
Q: Some believe this political constellation of Labor-Meretz may not return after the next election, so you may find it in your interest to accelerate final-status talks on the disposition of territory. You have recently said publicly that this government has only 12 months of work ahead before the pre-election jockeying begins.
A: I would say accelerate the second stage of self-rule, move forward on Jordan, and move ahead with Syria.
Q: But what about moving ahead on final status with the Palestinians?
A: No, final status may become a final conflict.
Q: Are you hinting there might be a two-part final-status agreement, where Israel solves what is possible, but defers the unsolvable to at least a later date?
A: Yes, we could reach a situation where we agree on 90 percent of the issues; and [on] the [remaining) 10 percent we shall agree to disagree.
Q: Does not any final status mean dismantling settlements?
A: I am not so sure. The problem is the relationship, the alienation between the people. If you can bring people together and have coexistence, then what is the problem?
Q: What about Jerusalem? Are you heading for a deal with the Palestinians on this issue? Perhaps a functionalist-type solution as advocated by Teddy Kollek in a 'Foreign Affairs' article a few years ago?
A: I don't want to talk about Jerusalem. All I have said is that Jerusalem is closed politically and open religiously. We are not going to build a wall of Berlin in the heart of Jerusalem and we are not going to forbid the freedom of worship.
Jordan
Q: You have promoted talks with Jordan, and now they appear to be moving ahead in earnest in July. What can be accomplished, and what are the underlying principles guiding the Israeli position in those talks?
A: I think we have to make clear the following points to Jordan: We recognize the legitimacy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; and while some have said Jordan is Palestine, I think Jordan is Jordan.
Q: Israel is committed to the existence of the Hashemite Kingdom indefinitely?
A: Yes.
The second point is, what is [properly under] Jordanian sovereignty will belong to them, just as what is [properly under] Israeli sovereignty belongs to us. Third, cooperating economically can transform the Jordan Rift in the Arava into a valley of peace. We can attract investment, we can produce water, we can enlarge tourism. We can bring jobs and life to tens of thousands of families. Fourth, we are [keenly aware of] Jordanian sensitivity concerning the holy places in Jerusalem.
We do not intend to ignore it or reject it. The idea of King Hussein having a religious dialogue, without referring to a political dialogue, is a worthwhile approach. The king says the sovereignty of the holy places belongs to the Almighty in Heaven. I think it is an interesting expression.
Q: How do you explain that Jordan is splitting off from Syria now and negotiating with Israel on its own? Is it due to the Israel-Palestinian economic agreement, and their fear that the train was leaving the station?
A: Yes. They realized that our accord with the PLO is a fact and not just a negotiation. They also realized that the Syrians were not moving.
Syria
Q: With Secretary of State Warren Christopher expected to arrive in a couple of weeks, has the time come yet for the US to put forward its own bridging proposal to break the deadlock between Israel and Syria?
A: I think not. A bridging proposal would put the US above these negotiations. The Syrians must show a readiness to deal with us.
Q: There are rumors that during your last trip to Europe you spoke with people who could serve as a back channel to negotiations with Syria. Is there any truth to that?
A: There is no shortage of back channels, but what doesn't exist is Syrian readiness to negotiate on both levels - the level of public attention, and the level of cabinets. People watch television today. They have to be convinced that the two nations are really interested in peace. On the other side, on the secret side, you have to air out differences and try to come to a compromise, where you try, you attempt, you praise, you negotiate.
Q: Is it fair to say that you have asked other European foreign ministers or maybe other interlocutors to serve ... ?
A: Whoever shows a readiness to do so, we encourage.
Q: And has this been going on?
A: It's going on, but without results.
Q: Do you put hope in this?
A: I'm trying. The Prime Minister and I are trying.
Q: Could you say how long this has been going on? A few months?
A: We are trying this all the time. The Americans are also trying to convince the Syrians.
Q: Can you confirm that these third parties are French, Austrian, British or Norwegian?
A: No. The minute I do so, it is no longer secret.
Q: The idea of US troops on the Golan Heights has attracted some attention in the US. Is it fair to say that we're talking about a monitoring force and not a fighting force?
A: We haven't reached that point at all. We were never anxious to have American soldiers defending our lives. We may end up monitoring or something like it. We shall see; it's too early. And you know it's too early to kill options or create options. With all due respect to the negotiations, why should we do it?
Q: You've mentioned the CSCE (Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe) idea as being helpful in the Middle East. But how can it provide any security for Israel while it has proved utterly useless to stop the killing in Bosnia?
A: The business of peacemaking is today a home product, not a superpower product.
Q: So a CSCE idea would not replace local security arrangements?
A: No, it would elevate them. Security arrangements today are not just military [arrangements], but also political and human relations.
Q: Some say you see the CSCE idea as a means of maintaining a modicum of communication with the Syrians in the event that peace talks fail. Can there be a CSCE if there's no peace agreement between Israel and the Syrians?
A: Look, the fact is there are multilateral negotiations with 12 Arab countries participating. Let me say something else here more bluntly. I think that all of us, including the experts, must adopt a little bit more modesty. Because what was forecast did not necessarily happen. So a person may say something is impossible, but how does he know?
Role of Expertise
Q: You consistently say there are no experts about the future, only about the past. At its core isnt this an anti-intellectual approach? Aren't you basically saying you don't need analysts anymore?
A: We need experts for the future. On the contrary, this is an intellectual approach. The great thing is to divorce ourselves from the world of yesterday, and recognize the world of today; and [we're] not even speaking of the world of tomorrow.
Q: So what makes a person an expert of today?
A: To tell the truth, to say the truth as it appears to them. For example, to say how communism collapsed, to tell the true story, what made it collapse. I'm not saying anything [beyond] reason. I don't suggest fortune tellers. I'm simply calling [for people] to open [their] eyes, and see not the world of tomorrow, but of today, where science is more important than territory, where technology is more important than natural resources. Information is more powerful than governments.
Q: You've mentioned in your recent book that territory is unimportant in an age of missiles. Yet Kuwait was vanquished by a conventional army.
A: We focus on the tank but the next war will come from the unconventional missile. The way of the strong against the weak is to conquer territory, while the way of the weak against the strong is to conquer equality. The way of the weak against the strong is to use the knife. No matter how poor you are you can get nuclear bombs.
Q: Yet the last war was a conventional war.
A: It was an unconventional war. It used American technology against the Iraqi army.
Public Support For Peace
Q: I know you have a strong bias against polling data, saying you are not elected to take the public pulse every day. However, the public does need to be convinced to move forward on the peace process. There are two polls out saying only 37 percent want to move forward. Does this concern you at all, and how do you plan to change that?
A: People were frightened with what would happen initially in Gaza. Some great experts said it would be a catastrophe, and the violence would rise. They said the Oslo Agreement was idiotic, and whatnot. Now look at their faces. What of all those pessimistic views came true? Nothing. So I'm not impressed. People already forgot about Gaza. They think it's prehistory... I'm convinced there is a stream of history that even the public polls cannot stop. Suppose we have a majority of people saying we don't like it - so well stop?
Q: So what you're saying is, so long as it's the correct approach in your view, then the level of public support is immaterial?
A: It's not immaterial, it's unstable. One day there's a happy poll, next day not happy. I'm not impressed by it. Furthermore I want to tell you something. I have a feeling of revolt against them [the pollsters]. Because I feel more and more people are prisoners of the image-making. Our task is not to make an image, but to create a situation
Q: It seems you have deliberately taken on a specific role in the peace process, a combination of bulldozer and lightning rod. You charge ahead, don't seek to explain, but just move forward. Does it bother you to be unpopular?
A: I don't think it's helped my popularity. I know there are problems. [But] I know the Likud is off-balance. I feel myself in some ways the most independent political figure in Israel. Nobody can add to what I have done, and nobody can take away from what I did.
Q: Some believe you're disconnected from the public when they talk about security fears, and about your vision for a new Middle East.
A: I think I started ideas that had a great deal of opposition but gradually it's making its way. People come up to me and say I remember -you told us about "Gaza first" - 15, 20 years ago. Now I'm saying the same thing about Jordan: it will come true.
Q: Do you see it as a historical vindication?
A: Yes, I do see it as a vindication. I don't have to react to editorials in the paper, or cartoons, either.
The Jerusalem Letter
Q: I want to ask you about your "Jerusalem letter" to the late Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst. You insisted that you did not cover this up, saying you wrote to the Norwegian and not to Arafat. Yet, the public feels your explanation is weak and this has hurt your credibility. Can you not admit that you made a mistake?
A: I regret that it became public.
Q: You mean your only regret was that it did not remain secret?
A: Yes, as a secret letter it had strength, but once it was revealed, it became weak.
Q: Otherwise no regrets?
A: No regrets.