In the first interview he granted to an Arab newspaper, Prime Minister Rabin explained at length his views on the resolution of the Palestinian issue. He stood by his statement that he was ready to set an election date in the territories, around March-April 1993, for an administrative council. This body will deal with civil affairs in the territories during a transition period of five years. He elaborated on his views regarding the present position of the Palestinians and the need to start thinking of a permanent settlement. He did not think that there was a danger that a separate agreement with Syria should deter the Palestinians. He indicated that a meaningful Israeli move toward Syria can come only after President Assad meets with him as a clear signal to the Syrian people that their leadership is ready to reconcile with Israel. Excerpts:
Q: Your Government has been in place for three months now, and the situation in the occupied territories seems to be returning to the time when you were defense minister (...); are we going back to the old days of the Intifada?
A: I hope that we are not returning to [the days of] the Intifada, even though I cannot deny that there are increased activities of violence in the territories. There are three reasons why I do not believe that we are returning to the former situation: First, I believe that - to the extent that logic plays any role in the decision of the Palestinians inside and outside the territories - we are in a process of negotiations. We have crossed the line which then existed, unfortunately [whereby] we did not see the Palestinians in the territories as a legitimate partner with whom we have to negotiate, and reach an agreement and start to implement it. If you remember, the Camp David Accords spoke about negotiations between Israel and Egypt over the establishment of autonomy. On 14 May 1989, when I was the defense minister, even the National Unity Government agreed to the principle that the Palestinians in the territories should be our partner toward negotiating an agreement. I hope the Palestinians understand that it was the first time Israel was ready to see them as a partner in a political, peacemaking process.
Second, I believe that we are better equipped and trained to cope with this particular phenomenon of violence. I did not believe that the Intifada had ended. The Intifada, within the last one and a half years, shifted from popular participation therein, to terror activities. I believe the Palestinians realize that terror activities do not attract the attention - or even the respect - of the international media and, therefore, we are better trained and equipped to cope with terror. This does not mean that we can eliminate any single terror activity, such as the kind which occurred last Saturday night.
Third: I believe that, although - when I became prime minister - I wanted to give a higher priority to the solution of the Palestinian problem, I found that, whenever the Palestinians approached practical problems to be solved on the basis of the concept that we have to move on two phases - as agreed before the convening of the Madrid conference -they could not yet adjust themselves [to this dual process]. We have to move in two phases: [The initial phase] must be an interim agreement, which does not include the main elements of a permanent solution: territory and [the creation of a] legislative body. It is an interim agreement that leaves [everything] open to both sides in the negotiations on a permanent solution. It does not exclude the right of the Palestinians - when we negotiate, no later than the beginning of the third year of autonomy - to negotiate the permanent solution on the basis of Resolutions 242 or 338. But, when we negotiate the implementation of an interim agreement for a transitional period of five years -with negotiations on a permanent solution beginning no later than its third year - there can be no elements of the permanent solution.
As opposed to the former Government, we are saying that we are ready for a timetable for a general election; the former Government offered only municipal elections. As I publicly declared in September, I am ready to set a date -April-May 1993 - for general elections in the territories, in which the Palestinians of the territories will elect their own executive or administrative council - not a legislative body. You cannot go - or agree - to elections without knowing what you are going to elect. Therefore, if it is an executive body, I am ready to set a date [for elections] and to say that - by the beginning of December - we will form a large subcommittee to decide upon the mobility of the elections. By the beginning of February, we will decide what spheres of influence will be given to this executive body because it is quite a complicated situation. (At any rateJ they did not respond positively to us. In the absence of cohesive leadership on the part of the Palestinians, we also changed the position of Israel relating to Syria - vis-a-vis that of the former Government. We stated publicly to the Israeli public - not only at the meetings of delegations - that we accept that Resolutions 242 and 338 are applicable for the achievement of a peace treaty between Israel and Syria. This means that, in the context of peace, there will be a territorial dimension. But we do not want to enter the territorial issue before we know that we are talking with the Syrians about peace, in the real sense: open boundaries, for movement of people and goods; diplomatic relations; embassies; normalization of relations, and that - secondly - the peace treaty between our two countries can stand on its own two feet, without the influence of being conditioned by what does or does not happen in the negotiations with the other delegations. (...)
Q: Why do you not release half of the 12,000 Palestinian prisoners [held by Israel]?
A: I have said in the past - and will say again - that we cannot solve the problem by military means alone. It is by a combination of the [following] two [elements]: On the one hand, we have to make it clear to the Palestinians - as we had to do with the Arab countries - that they will not achieve anything through the use of violence, hostility, war and terror. And, at the same time, the Arab countries have agreed - and the Palestinians must agree - that we must shift the solution of the problem from violence, hostility and terror to the negotiating table. If they will not understand that the only place a solution can be found is around the negotiating table, they will continue with violent means,
Q: Why do you not make the first step and shift the way you deal with the situation in the occupied territories?
A: The more we show that we are giving in to violence, the (more that] chances around the negotiation table will be reduced. No leader of an Arab League country would have [sought] peace with Israel if it were not for the realization that, through the use of force, they cannot achieve what they can achieve around the negotiation table.
Q: One of the reasons for the violence has been that many Palestinians feel that, in one year of peace talks since the Madrid [conference], their delegation cannot show their constituents anything concrete.
A: [That is] because they are dealing with the symptoms of the problem but are not yet ready to tackle the solution. Let us not forget that the Madrid conference came about as a result of the crisis of the Government. The Palestinians were then [at a] very low [point] in public opinion terms - because Arafat joined with Saddam Hussein -and they maintained a low profile. They recovered from the impact of the crisis in the Gulf. As I said before, Palestinians are not ready to deal with practical problems and to bring about change in the territories because they are afraid to tackle the practical issues. Without their solution, we will not start anything new. They have not yet swallowed the concept that we are talking about an interim agreement and not the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. As long as they will not agree that - at this stage - we are dealing with an interim agreement and not with a permanent solution, very little can be done. They have not used the opportunity offered them; we are now beginning the third round [of talks] since I have become prime minister. It seems to me that they are afraid. There is no leadership that can take a real decision and the tragedy of the Palestinians, over the last 50-60 years, has been that their leadership has aspired to everything and remained with nothing. They have never understood that you have to begin with something less than [total] aspirations - starting with Lord Peel in 1937 and with the partition plan in 1947. For 19 years, when the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip were in their hands, there was no attempt to create a Palestinian state; it was then in the hands of the Arab world. Why? Because they still had the illusion that it would be possible to get rid of the very existence of Israel.
Q: Now the Palestinians are reconciled to the fact that Israel exists and have even recognized it. They would not agree that they do not have a leadership, They have a leadership which you do not recognize.
A: There is a framework for the negotiations to which they have agreed; it is the Madrid conference framework. There is a clear-cut basis for what we have to do with the Palestinians. From the very beginning, they have been unable to adjust to it which is not the case with Syria. The problem is that, in the framework of Madrid, there are two issues: Israel and the Palestinians, and Israel and Syria. (...) Lebanon is a Syrian protectorate and cannot decide anything without Syrian approval. The Jordanians could - and I wish they would - play a more effective and positive role, but they are also limited in their capability to influence the Palestinians to the extent that they want. Without beginning to resolve at least one of the two key issues Israel and the Palestinians, or Israel and Syria - there will be no meaningful movement. One of the reasons for the Palestinian frustration is that it appears there have been better chances [for progress] with the Syrians. The world looks on this part of the negotiations as more promising because there is somebody - Assad - who can take decisions.
Q: If the Palestinian delegation cannot make decisions, why not talk directly to the decision-maker himself?
A: We negotiate with the representation of the Palestinians from the territories. We are fully aware that they consult with others, and we do not believe that some people in Tunisia play a positive role. I believe that there is a basic difference between the two (groups] - the leadership of the Palestinians in the territories is fully aware of the problems of the Palestinians in the territories and they tend to be more pragmatic than the people of Tunisia.
Q: But there would not have been peace negotiations unless Tunis had given the green light to these people to whom you are talking.
A: I cannot deny that the leadership in the territories cannot manage on their own. I believe that, today, their problem is not only Tunisia. I believe that the resistance [presented] by the ten organizations which convened in Damascus and by Hamas - this part of the Palestinian side - opposes the whole peace process. Therefore, I believe that the people in the territories are more fearful of the extremists [than of Tunisia]. (...)
I believe that the Palestinians have missed the opportunity to start with something - and I hope that it will not continue this way. They cannot expect Israel but to comply with what we committed to in the letter of invitation to the Madrid conference.
With the Palestinians, we are dealing with an interim agreement for a transitional period, limited in time, before negotiations on a permanent solution. Without this step-by-step movement, everything will fall apart. Any attempt to move from the present situation to a permanent solution will lead to either an explosion or a stalemate. Take only the issue of Jerusalem: If we begin negotiating over the status of Jerusalem, [it will result in] deadlock. (...)
Q: Could you not strengthen the position of the moderates?
A: There is a lot of -criticism in Israel today -why did you make those gestures? Why did you release 600-800 prisoners? Did it help you? Did it bring about tranquility? We made certain gestures to show good will, not to those who have taken part in the violence. We hoped that it would assist in moving toward solving the problem, and what happened? So far, nothing has happened. As a result of the increased force of the opposition, it has created the deadlock of the prisoners' strike. I have to be candid with myself - did these gestures help? (...)
Q: But you know that these gestures are not fundamental issues. What the Palestinian delegation needs is something concrete that will change the reality.
A: That is what we expected of them in the negotiations, instead of dealing with gestures all the time. They only want one subcommittee - human rights; [what about] the violence in the territories? Do you think that I am happy holding over 6,000 prisoners in military installations? But as long as there is violence, we will use force to deal with it. The solution must be political - to change the situation in accordance with what has [already] been agreed: ISGA -Interim Self-Government Arrangements with the Palestinians. But they refuse to tackle the problem; they started to talk about legislative bodies, which are not a solution for the interim arrangements.
Q: What about water and land?
A: There is no territorial dimension [to an interim agreement]. Once you start dealing with a territorial dimension, you begin tackling the problem of a permanent solution. You must first agree about the concept - what are we going to establish, what are the spheres of influence [and the like]. We prepared a 33-page paper on 15 spheres that will be delegated to the Palestinians, but we cannot start with one issue.
Q: Do these spheres refer to certain land or are they in the air?
A: They are not in the air; they apply to the Palestinians who reside in the territories. We are ready to negotiate both water and land, but we must first have a partner with whom we can begin to negotiate [such issues].
Q: The Palestinians claim that they are not given access to any basic information - [demographic] statistics, etcetera. Are you going to give them access?
A: They will get all the information once we agree about the concept. [Now] we are only negotiating around the concept. We [agreed] to tackle [the process] issue-by-issue, but it is not only your issues [which are on the table]. And, not only one issue; let us tackle the whole problem. If we reach an agreement about one issue, it will get nowhere. ( ... )
Q: (...) What does "Palestinian" mean to you?
A: It is not up to me to decide. We recognize the Palestinians as an entirely different entity than us: religiously, politically - you can even say nationally.
Q: Do they have national rights?.
A: What are national rights? We agreed to start by interim agreement and not to go beyond it at this stage; we have a timetable as to when we negotiate a permanent solution. (...) However, I can give you many examples where different religious, political or national entities do not [have their own states]. There are 50 million Kurds and I am yet to see Iraq, Turkey and Iran accept their right to a state.
Q: How do you imagine the long-term future of this national entity?
A: I believe that we have to start and to then see what happens. There are many options.
Q: But everyone starts from his own position. Where do you start from?
A: I do not want to annex 1.7 million Palestinians and make them Israelis. [However], that does not mean that I am willing to give back all of the territories by no means. What we have to do is change the present situation -- to give [the Palestinians] the right to run their daily affairs. Afterwards, for example, some [Palestinians] have said that there could - in the long-run - be some sort of federative solution between them and us. Maybe a confederation between us, the Palestinians and Jordan. I do not believe that the time is now right to deal with this idea. In the long-run, (...) I am all for assisting to build industry in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. I do not believe that, at this stage, the Palestinians - without the beginning of a political solution - are capable of bringing about investment, building and the improvement of their physical facilities. I wish that the rich Arab countries would begin to invest in the territories -even not via Israeli channels. I will give you an example: In 1987, 1 was approached by the head of the UNDP who wanted to build a new sewage system for Jabalya (the largest refugee camp). But he warned me that $1.5 million was invested by Saudi Arabia. I told him that, if they want to invest $200 million in the territories through your UNDP channel, I would more than welcome it. I would like to see fewer Gazans coming to work in Israel. It would increase the personal safety of the Israelis. I am not happy to see them coming to work here; I wish that there would be their own sources of employment and less inter-working as long as the present situation exists. But none of the Arab countries is willing to invest. Europe speaks about assistance a lot; I hope they come through. Look what the UNDP did for the fishermen of Gaza - they built them modern facilities, and we more than welcomed it. (...)
The more we deal with the permanent solution, the less there will be a possibility to start changing the situation. Most important of all is to start moving ahead on the political negotiations. Once we bring about the change, we will create new realities and many new ideas will come. Let us not be dogmatic now - we must start with what has been agreed upon: interim self-government arrangements. I do not want to commit to a certain idea. It is legitimate for them to say that they aspire to this, as long as they now focus on the interim self-government arrangements. (...) Let us put aside what each of us would like to see as the permanent solution and focus on the ISGA - leaving open what will happen in the permanent solution.
Q: What happened to the promised abrogation of the law forbidding Israeli citizens from contact with members of the PLO?
A: I believe there has been misunderstanding here. It will not change the Government position of negotiations only with the representation of Palestinians from the territories in the bilateral talks. It will deal with individuals. I believe that I will have to check its implementation on the basis of new realities. [Such an action] may lead people in the United States to change their suspension of the talks between their Government and the PLO. The United States has committed that, until the PLO [halts] its terror activities, all contact will be suspended. I do not want to facilitate the United States to [lift their ban]. At the -same time, as opposed to the former Government, I have said that we are ready to include not only Palestinians from the territories in the multilateral negotiations as long as they are not members of PLO bodies. (...) I would like to see the participation of Palestinian refugees from Lebanon, Syria and Jordan - more than that of people from the territories because they are the people whose problem has to be solved.
Q: Are there conditions under which you would consent to speak to the PLO?
A: I [advocate] the same policy of which I advised the prime minister in 1989 to negotiate with the Palestinians of the territories. With whom they talk is not our business.
Q: Is Arafat right to fear a separate peace between Israel and Syria?
A: Agreement has to be reached on a bilateral basis. I believe that the Palestinians would be the first, but I have been greatly disappointed by their attitude so far. They had a unique opportunity; I do not know for how long there will be a readiness on the part of an Israeli Government to be more forthcoming - to, at least, begin with the ISGA. We were ready for general elections; we are ready to go to through detailed negotiations on all the spheres under the responsibility of this executive body; we are ready to be much more forthcoming. We cut 7,000 housing units which would have been built under another Government. We cannot change; time does not work in one direction, Time has not historically worked for the Palestinians. In 1947, they could have had a state. From 1948 to 1967, they were in control of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, but no more.
Q: What about security and political settlements?
A: I distinguish between settlements which are built in areas of security importance to Israel - along the confrontation line, the Jordan Valley and the Golan Heights. This issue will be included in the negotiations for a permanent solution. (...) In the past, I have not supported the building of political settlements. (...) All issues [such as the right of return] must be negotiated once we reach a permanent solution. If we bring up issues relating to a permanent solution today, there will be a stalemate.
I was born in Jerusalem over 70 years ago and I have a clear conscience vis-a-vis the Palestinians - because we always offered a compromise and they always rejected it. In 1947, there could have been a partition plan - who rejected it and who accepted it? The [Arab world] made a decision to go to war against Israel and created this problem.
Q: Do you see Assad as a man of his word?
A: We know that, in the Arab world, there is no democratic society. Would we wait for a change, or are we ready to negotiate with the existing regimes? All the Governments of Israel have decided that we had to negotiate with the existing regimes - even though we know that changes and upheavals can take place - but we always had to keep a margin of security, sometimes territorial and sometimes not.
Q: Would a peace agreement with Syria automatically lead to an Israeli withdrawal from the security zone in Lebanon?
A: We negotiate on a bilateral basis with the purpose of a comprehensive peace. We learned the hard way that Egypt, Syria and Jordan cannot represent the Palestinians. With Lebanon, the story is different. I do not know if Assad can guarantee security [in the north]. We would like to see a Lebanese government maybe with the backing of Syria - that could control [Lebanon], but I do not believe that the Lebanese would do anything like this without Syrian (approval].
Q: How do you view the strategic importance of the Golan Heights?
A: The question is whether Israel can be secure [once] there is a signed agreement. (...) Less than two years ago, an Arab country invaded, occupied and annexed another Arab country. In the Middle East, international agreements are neither the Koran nor the Bible - unless they are backed by strength they will not be valid. (...) Whoever says that territory has no importance in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict (...), [forgets] that it will not only be [waged] with missiles. (...)
President Sadat came to Israel and convinced the people of Israel that he wanted peace, and even then it took one year after his visit until the Camp David Accords were signed - and another six months to sign the peace treaty. We cannot sign a peace treaty without proof - to the Syrian people - that their leader is ready to reconcile with Israel via a meeting of their leadership with the leadership of Israel. I did not ask for a summit meeting now. I do not expect Assad to do what President Sadat did - but has there ever been a peace established when the leaderships do not want to meet each other? (...)
Q: Do you welcome the French efforts in the Middle East?
A: We believe that the responsibility for the peacemaking process lies with the parties to the conflict. It must be with bilateral negotiations within the context of the Madrid conference framework. Nobody can make peace, but the parties to the conflict. We see all this mediation as shifting from the main course of the bilateral negotiations.