The opening of the Peace Research Center at Tel Aviv University afforded Mr. Rabin the opportunity to review the peace process since the end of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. He noted the 15th anniversary of the Sadat visit to Israel and reviewed the Camp David Accords and the Israel- Egypt peace treaty. Referring to the current talks, he could not detect a breakthrough, but thought there was nevertheless some progress as the talks created their own momentum and dynamics. Mr. Rabin did not see the need to change the Madrid conference formula at this time, but wanted to fill it with a different content. There was a standstill in the talks with Syria due to Damascus's insistence that Israel give a prior undertaking for full withdrawal. He thought, however, that without an agreement with Syria, there could be no agreement with Jordan and Lebanon. As for the Palestinian track, the prime minister felt that much more time was required to reach an agreement. There was a feeling that the Arab world was waiting for the Clinton administration to establish itself before there could be meaningful progress. Excerpts:
(...) The issue is not where "peace" stands in the order of national priorities - but rather how, under what conditions and in which ways will it be possible to achieve [peace]. (...) 15 years ago tomorrow, 19 November, Egyptian President Sadat came here. I have no doubt that the course of action [taken] by President Sadat was a historic breakthrough toward bringing down the walls of hostility between Egypt and Israel, and was certainly a high point in the process between Israel and Egypt, which began at the end of the Yom Kippur War. The daring and dramatic course of the Egyptian president - maybe more than all of the other negotiations - brought about the possibility of achieving the first and only peace treaty between an Arab state and Israel.
At times, actions are more persuasive than the dialectics of [participants in] political negotiations. In the reality of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the psychological components and the worlds of interest-related terminology can be changed via a convincing act. It is not sufficient to talk with those [involved] in negotiations; not only governments, but - first and foremost - the two peoples who are in a state of war to which their leaders seek to bring an end. (...)
If it did not bring down the walls of hostility, the arrival of President Sadat certainly lowered them significantly - to such an extent that, had it not occurred, I do not know if an Israeli Government would have been capable of [forfeiting] the price for peace paid to Egypt after approximately another year and a half of negotiations. There is no doubt that this was the climax of the political course of action which began with the Yom Kippur War. I will candidly offer my opinion: This same war and its painful price brought the Egyptians and the Israelis to alter their positions, compared to the period prior to the war. It is sometimes unfortunate that a war is needed to change positions. It is appropriate to learn lessons from the past, even if history does not repeat itself.
There is no doubt that the action of President Sadat, which was unparalleled in the relations between the Arab states and Israel, brought about the continuation of the process, which ended with the signing of the Camp David Accords. And here, too, without American intervention - on the level of the president of the United States I am doubtful whether the Camp David [Accords] would have ever existed. Remember the 13 days of "quarantine" by the American president, Egyptian president, and Israeli prime minister. And [recall] the two events which also brought this meeting to the brink of crisis: The Camp David Accords, another half-year, and another [round of] shuttle diplomacy - not by the secretary of state, by the president of the United States \ within the last 24 or 48 hours prior to the signing of the agreement on the signing of a peace treaty, then the initialed signatures until the [actual ceremony] on the lawn of the White House in Washington. It is also worth remembering that the precedent of a price for peace was created. A painful price, without similar precedent in the past, before the establishment of peace.
Where do we stand today? We are in the middle of negotiations, on the basis of the Madrid conference formula. A new formula, a formula in which those invited to the conference with the two super-powers - (including the former] Soviet Union (...). Those invited to the meetings, basically the representatives of the three Arab states contiguous to Israel with which we have not achieved peace and representatives of Palestinians in the territories. Essentially, all those which constitute the close circle (around] Israel, except for Egypt. (...) This is the new formula.
I will refresh your memories a little: From 1949 to 1967, limited agreements or treaties like the peace agreements, were only achieved when we conducted [separate] negotiations with one Arab country. It was so when agreements were concluded in 1949, until the cease-fire. First came Egypt, then came Jordan. Afterward, came Syria - which already did not have to come to Rhodes. One meeting in Rosh Pina, one meeting at the Syrian customs station. And, afterward, Lebanon. And, essentially, there were 25 "years of drought" from 1949 to 1974, when there came an agreement between Israel and an Arab state. Not in 1956, not in 1967, not during the War of Attrition - none of these wars ended in agreements: bilateral, limited or comprehensive, between Israel and each of the Arab states with which it had been at war All these ended with United Nations Security Council resolutions. (...)
In reality, a renewed start to negotiations and the achievement of limited accomplishments only began after the Yom Kippur War. In 1974, the disengagement agreement with Egypt was concluded in separate negotiations. The disengagement agreement with Syria was concluded. In September 1975, [there was] an interim agreement. In September 1978, [there was] Camp David [and], in March 1979, [there was] a peace treaty.
Never was an agreement reached in accordance with the conduct of such a formula as the Madrid conference - a formula according to which all the Arab delegations come at the same time, to the same place, for negotiations with Israel. Is this good, is this bad, is it progressing, is it slow? The future will tell.
The formula is divided into two fronts. On the bilateral plane, Israel [deals with] the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation -being conducted on two tracks: Palestinian and Jordanian - with Syria and with Lebanon. Beyond this, there are the multilateral negotiations: the creation of expectations and their realization, primarily in the Arab world - what can be extracted for the good of each country and the people living therein. (...) The multilateral negotiations are derived from the heart of the bilateral conflict between us and the Palestinians; between us and Jordan; between us and Syria, and between us and Lebanon. The multilateral negotiations may perhaps be the spice for the parties - see what can be done, and how the Middle East will be different and better when peace is achieved. To our sorrow, two partners to the bilateral negotiations are not participating in the multilateral negotiations: Syria and Lebanon.
I want to present my conception, the conception of the Government - the current Government to the negotiations. The first question which posed itself (at least to me) was whether to accept this formula. Is it better? And, more than once, I asked myself whether the negotiations are not captive to the past experience - negotiations at a given time with one Arab state or other Arab element - which have brought us treaties.
In light of this, is there a reason to change the framework? I have reached the conclusion ... that any attempt to change the framework would be in error. That would direct attention to the framework, to procedure, to administration, and not necessarily to the contents. Therefore, I myself reached the conclusion - which was perhaps obvious - that the framework must be maintained, but, to seek ways of filling it, at least to the degree that it is dependent on us, with content. In a simple analysis it is clear that from among all the partners, there are two key partners, as well as other partners who can contribute. Jordan, however, cannot join us in making a contractual peace, based solely on the bilateral relations between it and us, with no relation to the negotiations between us and the Palestinians in the territories,
(...) In the same way, there is no need to reiterate, there is no possibility of an agreement with Lebanon, until we reach an agreement with Syria. Therefore, the focusing on changing of the modalities, was first and foremost for the two delegations, the two representatives; a peace treaty with Syria, and establishing an interim arrangement for a transition period with the Palestinians.
(...) I do not envision a realistic possibility of telling the Syrians "peace in exchange for peace" only. That may perhaps be desirable, but whoever genuinely seeks peace must understand that there is a price for peace. In the reality of the Middle East, certainly after the precedent of the peace price to Egypt. Therefore, I have said and I directed the delegation to say - Resolutions 242 and 338 are applicable to achieving a peace contract between Israel and Syria. This signifies - withdrawal of IDF forces to secure and recognized borders. Their deployment will be determined in the negotiations, after Syria clarifies to us - clarifies in a manner which cannot be interpreted ambiguously and it does not matter through which channel, that the Syrian interpretation of the term "peace" is peace - open borders to the passage of people and merchandise; diplomatic relations; embassies; and a commitment to an effort to normalize relations. The second thing - that the peace between us stands on its own two feet, and will not be conditional on what is or is not achieved; what does or does not occur in the negotiations between us and the other Arab delegations. And as long as we do not receive a clear answer - either in open dialogue or through other means of communication - we will not commence in detailing the degree of territorial withdrawal.
I believe that the Syrians were quite surprised at first, but recovered quickly. I would say, that with the Syrians, at least in the negotiations, we are in a situation that were I to view it objectively, they do not want to say "a full peace on its own two feet" before they know which withdrawal we are referring to. As for us, it is only natural that we do not define the scope of the territory to be withdrawn without knowing what we get in return.
Is there a possibility of achieving a contractual peace treaty with Syria, at a better price than that exacted in the peace with Egypt? I believe the Israeli Government has an obligation to achieve this, to do everything to achieve it.
I want to add that I was interviewed on Sunday by the "Washington Post" and I also said some of things that I will again say here, and I was pleased to read, yesterday, something which does not happen too often - that even the editorial in the "Washington Post" supports what I said and [looks at the] Syrian [position] very severely. (...) In the eyes of [the Syrian delegation head] I am "the one who wishes to destroy the peace."(...) And today, strangely enough, people are in negotiations with the Syrian delegation, and yet in September in Damascus, a conference convened of all Palestinian rejectionist movements - Jibril, Habash, Hawatmeh, Abu-Mussa; and all the others -where the whole purpose of the conference is to call for strikes, escalation, disruptions, increase in terror. And for what goal? To bring about the Palestinian delegation stopping its participation in the peace negotiations with Israel. After a month of demonstrations by thousands in Damascus suburbs and other cities - I don't think I will be insulting anybody in Syria if I say that this kind of conference and others of its sort in Syria - cannot take place not only without the approval of the authorities, but also not without their complete backing, even if it is concealed, to these phenomena. The Jibril "El-Kuds" radio station in Syria, on a daily basis, broadcasts propaganda, incitement whose political intent is to stop the peace talks between the Palestinian delegation and Israel.
That is from one side. On the other side - Hizballah. Hizballah is not an organization which Syria oversees. Iran is its leader, its guide, [it] inspires Hizballah's [policies] with its own policies. it also supplies the funds, and the arms - all via Damascus. The headquarters, the training grounds of Hizballah, in the Beka'a, in Beirut, are all in areas still under Syrian army control.
(...) Now Hizballah is intensifying its activities, and only last weekend, the Hizballah secretary-general came out and demanded that the Lebanese government, in light of the incidents in South Lebanon, call the Lebanese delegation to return home. (...) It is clear, that if two countries involved in peace negotiations wish not just to maintain the diplomatic dialogue between these government representatives, but rather wish to create confidence between nations moving towards peace (...) if we are trying to build trust - that peace is approaching - this is certainly not the way to promote faith among the Israeli public; when the face of the country which does these two things I have said, is indeed first of all and above all towards peace.
At the same time, I believe that both Syria and Israel, I think the Palestinians as well - if these two problems are resolved - the problem of Jordan and the problem of Lebanon will also be resolved. I believe that we are on a path of no return, but to reach peace, even if it takes another year or two years. I think that the reality of the international situation, the regional situation, the genuine need of nations and countries, is to arrive at a resolution of the dispute. Therefore, even if my position was not received enthusiastically, certainly not in regard to the Golan Heights, you saw the demonstration in Malchei Yisra el square. [This was an impressive demonstration and I am not suggesting we ignore the existence of positions and feelings on this issue], I am convinced certainly as prime minister, that we must continue on our way -- and to distinguish - between dealing with terror and continuing, even as we grit our teeth, with the negotiations and not giving those who wish to sabotage the peace process by means of terror, the pleasure of letting these terrorist acts stop the peace negotiations.
In the Palestinian sphere the problem is more complex - even if initially it does not involve any territorial concession from us. (...) The problem of the Palestinians is ostensibly simpler; the Palestinians are in a situation where they have nothing. For fifty years the Palestinian leadership has stated "all or nothing," and was left with nothing. There is no cohesive leadership, there is terror, and fear. I believe that among the leadership of the territories and outside of the territories, maybe even in Tunisia, there are today Palestinian leaders who have wised up, and they understand, that they cannot repeat the mistakes of the past; that every time something is proposed - we say yes and they say no. Ever since the first partition plan by Lord Peel up to the partition plan of 1947, from the reality of 1949 and 1967 when the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip were in the hands of Arab countries and there was no desire in trying to solve the Palestinian problem.
There are many among them who understand that it is better to establish the nucleus of a Palestinian entity, even if it is administrative - an entity which will operate through an administrative council, an executive council - to run their lives - that for the first time they will determine to a large extent their lives of the largest Palestinian sub-unit - those 1.8 million Palestinians who live in the territories. I think we have proposed to them far-reaching proposals which do not deviate from dealing with central components of the permanent solution. Not a legislative council - an executive council, because a legislative council, a legislative body, is the first sign of a state, or a seed to an independent state. We talk about an executive council of an interim arrangement. We have told them: "We are not dealing with territories, we are dealing with land, with willingness to share (...) We can discuss the future of these lands. But on condition - ad hoc. That the concept of an interim arrangement of administering an executive council, that this concept should be the guiding one. Law courts, police, sub-legislation, not primary-legislation authority, willingness to hold general elections, whereby residents of the territories elect from among themselves and by themselves, we will not impose elections, we are offering elections. We are witnesses to the fact that the Palestinians, like the Syrians, since the beginning of the peace talks, during the period of the present Government's tenure - must relate to concrete and practical problems, not to generalities. Concept - in its practical meaning.
I said, and am repeating, that I have a feeling - which I hope will be [proven] false - that he who stands at the head of the PLO fears (maybe justifiably, from his personal perspective) that, if such a system is created, its members will certainly be chosen in democratic elections and will be given budgetary means. They will recruit the taxes, they will decide on budgets, and they may also recruit funds. The Arab world which has, until today, paid lip-service only, will not be prepared to invest one cent for the sake of the Palestinians in the territories. Such a body will control 1.8 million Palestinians, this population (as we said earlier) which is the largest Palestinian community. Such a body will become the source of Palestinian identity and then what will the organization sitting in Tunis do? Someone to whom I told this tried to make an irrelevant analogy - what happened to the Jewish Agency or to the Zionist movement upon the strengthening of the national movement, certainly with the establishment of the State?
I believe that, with Jordan, the problems are influenced more by progress - or lack therefore - than with the Palestinians or the Syrians. Lebanon is a Syrian protectorate. Do I see progress? I can wholeheartedly say yes. Not a breakthrough, still not a breakthrough. I see, read and hear the content of the talks, as well as a large portion of what does not find expression either - because, today, there are concealed talks, meetings between delegation members, there are sub-committees, there are already talks and I sometimes feel that there is really a need for constant dialogue, since the same terms, the same words and the same sentences (in terms of language) are identified and understood differently - sometimes completely - and, without drawing closer via speech (not declarative pronouncements and not always during formal negotiations), it will be impossible to come to understand even when the parties do not disagree or do not want to accept.
And, therefore, I see progress in the relation of an understanding about what we want, what we intend between us and the Palestinians. Sometimes, through stoppage and disagreement, this is a process of a meeting of divergent approaches - with rational and emotional elements - and so, I continue to believe that we have embarked on the correct path.
It will take time. It is not inevitable that there will be another round in December - and I still do not know: On our part, if the Americans invite [the parties] and the Arabs comply, we will be happy to come. I believe that if there is another round, there still will not be a breakthrough. I hope that I am proved wrong, but it is my assessment that - in the Arab world - they are waiting for President-Elect Clinton to take his place as president of the United States, because they estimate that the current situation is an interim one, of an outgoing administration and before the new administration which will bear responsibility for the consideration of all Middle East elements over the next four years [takes office]. Certainly in the peace negotiations the network of relations with the United States must also be taken into consideration.
Thus, we began [this] round three months ago. The negotiations are more continuous, require more meetings, more dialogue and a change of positions of the part of Israel, in the hope of a change of positions on the part of the Arab world, and they will come. Not to mention that the actual change in positions, the actual presentation of Israeli positions as they are today - has created an international atmosphere much more comfortable for Israel - toward the realization of goals in other areas, in the defense field and particularly in the field of economics, with implications for society. Consequently, I would say that we are at the beginning of the path.
True, the Madrid conference [took place] almost one year ago. I am not objective, I am only expressing my opinion, but I think that negotiations not on the basis of peace for peace - such as on the basis of Resolution 242 with Syria -but on the basis of peace for a willingness to withdraw IDF forces to safe and recognized borders; the acceptance of the withdrawal principle, without defining the extent. This constitutes a change in substance, which opens a sincere portal toward reaching peace with Syria. [There has also been] a practical change in Israeli positions - no 7,000 housing units, cutting them expresses a trend of sincerity to reach a settlement with the Palestinians. Not only in these positions, but also in what was done and not done. Thus, I am looking forward with faith and hope. If it takes another half-year, another year, we will get there. We will arrive at a solution, and not only with one part of those with whom we are negotiating peace. And if we achieve [peace] with another one, it will take a little longer, but we will get there too. And with another. We have embarked on the path about which, I believe, there is no choice - it will lead us to peace.