While expressing confidence that an interim agreement with the Palestinians on the next phases of the implementation of the Declaration of Principles will soon be reached, the foreign minister was less optimistic regarding an imminent breakthrough in the talks with Syria. In the following interview, he also discussed economic issues and the Egyptian demand that Israel sign the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty. Excerpts:
NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA
Q: You always favored moving one front at a time. You've also said that 1996 is a dead year because of elections, so we're really faced with one year, 1995. Can Israel politically handle major concessions on both the Palestinian and Syrian fronts, or will it have to choose?
A: I think that in the coming few months we shall agree with the Palestinians on the second stage, which will leave us free up to 1996. We can have, in 1995, negotiations with the Syrians.
Q: Starting this week, Israeli and Syrian military efforts are joining ongoing quiet talks in Washington. Is this the type of format that can produce a breakthrough, such as when Moshe Dayan and Egypt's Hassan Tuhamy met in Morocco in 1977?
A: This is not Dayan-Tuhamy. Don't forget that Dayan was foreign minister. It was an entirely different level... The way it stands now I think the Syrians are too slow and too low [level].
Q: So you think that negotiations are not at a high enough level to produce a breakthrough?
A: Yes.
Q: Then what is the value of the current talks?
A: First of all, none of us wants to cut the negotiations. We want the negotiations to move on. So even if it's at a low level, it's better to have low-level negotiations, as opposed to high-level non-negotiations.
Q: How do you explain Assad's delay'? Where is he miscalculating?
A: We are not on the agenda in his eyes. He has another agenda and that is the Arab world. He wants to demonstrate to the Arab world that he knows how to negotiate better than anyone else. So he is negotiating the way he thinks it should be negotiated.
Q: But is it his view that Israel is so desperate for a deal that it will ultimately come around and accept his terms?
A: He thinks that he is winning. The Americans are coming his way, the Russians are coming his way, the Europeans are coming his way, without him moving. So he feels maybe that's a good way. And then he probably thinks that the U.S. can exercise much more pressure and "deliver" [Israel].
Q: Are you saying maybe the U.S. is not conducting these negotiations properly? And that too many visits there are only fueling Assad's misperception?
A: I don't think so. The [Americans] are holding the negotiations alive.
Q: Rabin has defined the role of multinational force peacekeepers on the Golan Heights in very minimalistic terms -monitors, like in Sinai. If their role is not important, given the possible sensitivities in the U.S., why do you need American peacekeepers for such a task, and not Canadians or some other nationality? Do you think deploying the U.S. has a deterrence value against Syria, or is such a move basically geared to winning Israeli public opinion in any referendum?
A: If there is an American presence [in the multinational force], the temptation of the Syrians to overlook the presence will become extremely low... [Such troops would be] carrying more prestige than arms. I don't think it is such a big issue, as we can see [with] the multilateral force in Sinai. It has a function, [and is] not costly. It is symbolic... It is like having an American signature on a document fit's an endorsement). Now, there will be an American signature on the map.
Q: Do you think the Syrians are using Lebanon now to gain leverage in the Golan negotiations?
A: It is hard to say... Clearly they are [always] using new weapons and new systems [in Lebanon]... [and] the Syrians are not particularly engaged in stopping them. We don't have any evidence that they are giving orders, but the air is clear for Hizballah. There are times of more or less permissiveness.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH PALESTINIANS
Q: As you negotiate the issue of redeployment, will you be guided by what you see Israel's final borders should be, or, alternatively, do you think the Palestinian Police should be deployed in every Arab population center throughout the territories?
A: I am negotiating. I am not ready to [reveal] the cards. I can say only the following things: We are not going to change or betray our ally who we signed the agreement with. An agreement can be changed only by an agreement. We don't want to depart from the DOP [Declaration of Principles]. I think the Palestinians understand that we have to learn some lessons from the experience in Gaza. We are looking for ways and means to secure the security of Israel. These are the guiding principles.
Q: What about the idea of full redeployment everywhere at least for a three-day period of elections?
A: I don't think this is a serious proposal. We cannot come in and come out. We have to be more reasonable about it and three days are not sufficient.
Q: When the idea of redeployment was reached in Oslo, it borrowed language from Camp David, but at the time of Camp David there were hardly any settlers in the area, now there are 120,000. Maybe you think Israel needs to revisit the idea of dismantling settlements even during the interim period? Do you preclude this?
A: I preclude it because whatever will happen with the settlements, it will never be a subject of negotiations between us and the Palestinians. Peace must be a clearly decided issue by Israeli law, not by the other side.
Q: But you preclude Israel unilaterally doing so in the interim period?
A: I preclude it in the negotiations, full stop.
Q: What about Hamas running in the elections?
A: Why does Hamas want to participate in the elections? Suppose they win. What are they going to do with the other Palestinians? I mean, it doesn't make any sense. If they go to win in order to destroy the peace, [then] the elections are unimportant; there will be destruction, not elections.
Q: A key question seems to be whether Yasser Arafat, the revolutionary, can make the transition to being a nation-builder. You've met him more than any other Israeli leader. Do you see a change in him? Maybe he's not capable. While he remains the overall head of the PA, maybe someone like Nabil Sha'ath should be given broad powers to run the day-to-day affairs?
A: First of all, we are not the book reviewers, [critiquing] the Palestinians. I think it is clear that they are embarking on the path of their administration and they can make their own decisions. We must be very careful not to give the impression that we are intervening in the running of Gazan life.
Q: As someone who has gotten to know Arafat, what have you learned about the man that would assure Israelis he is genuine about peace? Do you regret elements of Oslo?
A: What I have learned is about what the Likud did, not what the man [Arafat] did. The difficulties we are having in Gaza and the West Bank is the map that the Likud tried to introduce, a map that doesn't permit peace negotiations.
Q: So are negotiations impossible?
A: No. It's difficult, but it's not because of a single person, it's because of the nature of the map. And that's what makes it so complicated. And whoever is criticizing Oslo should really take their criticism and compare it to the alternative they are proposing.
The alternative is becoming worse and worse, When you look at the map demographically, between the Jordan River and the sea you have close to 3.5 million non-Jewish people and 4.3 million Jewish people. So I mean 60% against 40% is already the situation today, and the rate of birth of the non-Jewish population is double ours. So who believes settlers, what are they talking about? It's sheer demagogy, including the newspapers that support them.
Q: Some think that your thinking of final status has shifted from a pure territorial compromise solution to a more functionalist power-sharing sort of compromise. Is this true?
A: You have a 60-40 situation. Either you partition the land 60-40%, or you create a government for the 40%, that is 40% of the share.
The alternative is to use rifles and oppression, which I think is a mistake. I'm trying to think what is the best solution and which steps will lead to a permanent solution, because we [always] have in the back of our minds the third party - the Jordanians. So we have to work this out.
We must have a supranational economy and a supranational strategy, because the dangers today are not nations but problems, such as Islamic fundamentalism. I think that economically we should have a free trade zone that will comprise the Jordanians, the Palestinians and us. I imagine that we shall cooperate together against terror.
Q: So when you say functionalism, you mean more in terms of economics, and cooperation, but politically we're still talking partition?
A: It is a combination of the two.
Q: It seems that Israel has better relations with the Palestinians and the Jordanians than they have with each other. Doesn't this worry you? Doesn't this mean instead of your triangle, Israel will have to choose between them when it comes time to decide on the permanent status of the territories?
A: We want to see the Jordanians and Palestinians cooperating and growing together at least economically.
Q: I don't think Hussein has met Arafat since the Oslo agreement.
A: He doesn't have to and we have to employ patience and not give up.
MIDDLE EAST ECONOMICS
Q: Money does not seem to be pouring in for your Jordan Rift Valley project. A: This money is basically for the feasibility studies. In the meantime we are working on (obtaining] the rest of the money.
Q: What about the multilaterals on regional cooperation? The Israeli public was sold on the idea of European and Japanese assistance for major infrastructure projects. It has been three years. It's a big disappointment.
A: We are now building institutions. For example, a regional bank is the legitimate child of Casablanca. Or for the first time, we met in Budapest with five Mediterranean countries and European countries in a CSCE-type [Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe] meeting.
Q: How concerned are you about the confrontation with the Egyptians over the issue of renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)?
A: The Egyptians say they won't want to sign unless Israel signs.
We don't make any conditions. Let the Egyptians decide if they are signing or not. We have decided it for ourselves. We won't sign because until now Israel was never attached to any geographic part. We are floating in the air. And because we say that if Iran and Iraq signed the NPT, we are worried (about the treaty's validity). And thirdly, some people would like us to clarify where we stand. [But] if a fog is part of a deterrent, let's keep the fog.