In his first interview after assuming office, Mr. Rabin elaborated on the distinction he made between "political settlements" and "security settlements. " In the "political settlements" existing contracts will have to be re-examined. "Not every building contract can be annulled. " The prime minister enumerated the issues that would be raised during the forthcoming visit of U.S. Secretary of State Baker. Among them were the acceleration and intensification of the negotiations. He thought the best chances for success existed in talks between Israel and the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. He hoped autonomy could be achieved within nine months. On the issue of talks with Syria, Mr. Rabin reiterated "We will not retreat from the Golan Heights in peace either. " Speaking on the Iranian nuclear threat, he felt that the problem must be dealt with by the international community led by the United States. An Arab-Israel peace is bound to reduce tension and friction in the region. He did not rule out secret channels in the negotiations, hinted of an early visit to Cairo and spoke at length on the need for international economic assistance to Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. The following are excerpts from the interview that deal with foreign affairs and defense:
Q: Returning to the surprise visit of James Baker, who is already arriving on Sunday to meet you and ask you a number of things pertaining to the future - but a settlement freeze will certainly be one of the more central [matters], I assume that he will ask you whether you will freeze settlements whose construction has begun in densely populated areas of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. What will your answer be?
A: I have already elucidated government policy and I have made a clear distinction between what I call "political settlements" and "security settlements." We have made a clear division between these [types]. (...) There are two [issues], even regarding those which I call "political settlements" - the establishment of new communities and what has been done, or is contracted to be implemented, in terms of construction in established communities. After all, you cannot expect that I will respond to you [in the same way] that I [intend] to answer Baker or later, to President Bush. (...) At this stage, there is no harm done to existing Jewish communities since, in my conception, self-administration/ autonomy for residents of the territories does not include defense matters, foreign policy or the responsibility for Jewish communities in the territories.
Q: I assume that you will also not reveal, before the Baker visit, whether you will agree to reduce the military forces [stationed] in the territories?
A: At present, I will not deal with any matter on which I must reply to the Secretary [of State] or the President. Our policy and order of national priorities are clear. They are derived from our considerations, and not as a result of this or any other American request. I want to note that a number of matters will be raised, including the pace of negotiations - not only with the Palestinians; we also want to continue talking to Syria and Lebanon. It appears to us that the chances [for success] are greater in all matters connected to the achievement of self-rule or autonomy for Palestinians in the territories, because then we will enter into an interim arrangement for a limited transition period. A permanent solution is not at issue here, certainly not where the future of Jerusalem is concerned. So, give me time. In another four days, Secretary Baker will arrive here and - together - we will search for the formulas which are consistent with. our conception, and with Israeli law. Not every building contract can be annulled, depending on which phase [is being implemented]. There are things which have not yet been examined totally. We have only been a government for less than 48 hours and you already expect detailed answers from us. (...) The issues that will be raised are related to the acceleration of the peace process, the making of peace and to election the Palestinians, for instance, are demanding elections for a legislative council such a thing is inconceivable. We are talking about the Camp David Accords concerning elections for an administrative council or a self-rule authority that will manage the autonomy. Therefore, there are a number of matters, approaches and formulas. I will not tell you today what I am about to tell [the United States].
Q: [Will] all agreements be delayed until after the elections in the U.S.?
A: Obviously, I will take our policy, as well as our desire to achieve peace and hold a dialogue with the Palestinians, into consideration (...)
Q: (...) Would you be prepared to say that, in general, you will bring new proposals that the Americans have not heard?
A: I believe that I will bring formulas that are different than those of the previous
Government.
Q: You met with Baker and National Security Advisor Snowcroft when you were in opposition; you certainly know the American position. Do you imagine that the current administration will make the same distinction as you between political settlements and security settlements?
A: We will wait and see.
Q: According to your declarations thus far, you view the peace negotiations in a completely different way than your predecessors - much more accelerated and intensive ...
A: We want to get as far as we can, within the framework of the bilateral talks with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, the Syrians and the Lebanese, toward continuous negotiations. [We want] to make progress wherever possible not according to a coordinated schedule, but wherever progress can be made.
I think that the best chance [for success] exists [in talks] between us and the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. If new things come to light vis-a-vis Syria, I would also be very happy to achieve peace with Syria.
Q: (...) You said that you would work toward [the achievement of] Palestinian autonomy within nine months. You will have to speak to them at a pace accelerated far more than with the other delegations, given the fact that these are more complicated matters. Will the Arab states agree to let the Palestinians run ahead?
A: We will wait and see. (...) Peace is not imposed; there must be two parties to peace. I believe that, in our proposals, some of the problems [experienced] by Palestinians in the territories are better answered than they were by the previous Government.
Q: The Palestinians and all the heads of the Arab states received your speech to the Knesset, and the invitation you sent to King Hussein and the Palestinian delegation, with ambivalence - maybe even with hostility. Does this not indicate that no change has taken place there, while such a turn-about has happened here?
A: Even if they had accepted some of [what I said], would they have said that they did, for bargaining purposes? I believe that progress toward peace between us and the Palestinians can be made, via dialogue and negotiations - and by taking steps that do not frustrate the chance for progress toward making peace.
Q: We have learned from history and, if we recall the peace process with Egypt, we know that there were public declarations - but these are accompanied by, and against the background of, contacts with Dayan and others. Have there been secret contacts [with the Jordanians and Palestinians]?
A: I did not have any contact before becoming prime minister. I think that there may be countries - including the United States, Egypt and maybe others - that can render assistance without harming the bilateral [character] of the negotiations. [These countries] can influence and maybe moderate positions beyond the bilateral dialogue. The negotiations are bilateral, but I am convinced that there are elements which can influence the parties talking to us -given the new international reality - with respect to the great possibilities that also can be proposed to the Palestinians. For example, they will offer to dispatch hundreds of millions of dollars for investments; to create employment, and in order to improve their standard of living. In Gaza, if autonomy is created, funding sources will be found to solve some of the economic problems - thereby keeping Gazans in Gaza. There are new possibilities and it is worth examining them all. Whoever does not seriously try to achieve peace, will not achieve peace. As I have repeatedly said, from the moment we decided that the Jewish state would be established in Eretz Israel, we determined who our neighbors would be - more than 100 million people from the Arab states and the Palestinians. Thus, we have only two
choices: either to live, or try to live, in peace - or to fight forever. A government which does not seriously try to make peace while taking reasonable risks, does not fulfill its commitment to its citizens. (...)
Q: Do these risks also apply to [peace with] Syria? Would you, for instance, be prepared to negotiate a separation of forces on the Golan, such as political sources around the world have reported?
A: I will not go into details regarding Syria. I have already said that we first want to hear, from Syria, that it is ready for full peace with Israel - just as Egypt has done. I have never heard this. (...)
Q: (...) Peace with Syria is also a matter of give and take. What can we give Syria? According to Shamir, we cannot give anything: peace for peace. Is that your approach as well? Or can we discuss territory for peace?
A: I met with the Golan communities committee before the elections. I told them that, in 1974, we signed [an agreement] on the separation of forces between us and Syria. We gave two kilometers of Kuneitra and reached the separation of forces agreement that the Likud attacked and opposed in the Knesset. For about 17 years, every resident of the Golan has enjoyed personal security from terror and knifings - such as there is not in any other sector: not in Bat Yam, not in Jerusalem, and not on bus #405. 1 asked them whether those two kilometers were worth that security and not one person answered in the negative. I repeat: we will not retreat from the Golan Heights in peace either. (...) We are not talking about a separation of forces; negotiations with Syria are about peace.
Q: When you said [at the Labor party conference] that we must relinquish territory not by centimeters, but by kilometers, what did you mean?
A: I was referring to the permanent solution which will not occur in this term.
Q: Do you indeed intend to travel to Egypt in a few days?
A: There is a possibility that in this coming period I will travel to Egypt. When I know for certain, I will make an announcement.
Q- How soon?
A: I said earlier, I think that in the negotiations, in addition to the bilateral meetings, we must activate elements that can ease, and assist, in the bilateral negotiations. Not with their participation, not in the negotiations, not in the actual room. I think that the U.S. has a role, I very much hope that Egypt can also be of help.
Q: This is, by the way, a change, because our previous Government requested the Americans to avoid involvement as much as possible, and you say that you are actually interested that they be involved and help?
A: You seriously believe that they were not involved? Did they [the Arabs] not report to Baker and his aides, following after every discussion? They [the Americans] were not approached to attempt to ease here, to ease there.
Q: In other words, it's a matter of semantics.
A: No, it's a matter of admitting what you are doing.
Q: Also the Europeans, by the way?
A: I don't know about the Europeans, I would enlist every element that could possibly ease for us the bilateral negotiations with the Jordanians, with the Palestinians, with the Syrians, with the Lebanese. Anything to make it easier for us to attain our goals. Not by participation in the room, but through outside activity.
Q: On the topic of Iran, you of course know that the Iranian nuclear threat is perhaps the "hottest" topic recently concerning Israeli security. There have been many discussions at the top echelons on this issue. What can be done to neutralize it? There is, after all, no direct connection between Israel and Iran, and despite the range, there is an impression that in the final analysis, we will need again some sort of heroic operation that will extend as far as Iran,
A: Look, there is no doubt that the danger of bringing nuclear weapons into the Middle East is one of the most central issues that concerns the survival of Israel. We are not dealing now with the Intifada, or with terror, with all the pain and sorrow and concern, they do not pose a threat to the survival of the State of Israel. In the matter of nuclear weapons, Iraq used to be the most advanced of all the Arab states, including Iran. And I have no doubt, that thanks to the Gulf War, Iraq received a hard blow to developing its nuclear weapons. This is something that Israel, in my opinion, could not have done [itself] without having to conquer part of Iraq, something not even worth considering. Because the Iraqis learned their lesson. Since 1981, their entire nuclear program has been spread out and scattered in such a way that aeronautical activity i la 1981 cannot be a response to the Iraqi nuclear program the way it was in reality [in 1981]. 1 am not going to get into what the Iranian program is. I have no doubt that one of the not short-range problems - and I don't think we are speaking of Iran in a range of three, five, maybe not even seven years - one of the problems of facing these dangers is the international cooperation that the U.S. must spearhead: the reduction of the friction in the Arab-Israeli conflict by making peace wherever possible, without this peace damaging the security of Israel. We must see also what is right under our noses, not two kilometers here or one kilometer there, but rather what awaits US.
Q: But with Iran, Mr. Prime Minister, we cannot expect an agreement soon. and if I remember correctly an article you published in the newspaper "Politics" a few months ago, you spoke there of a time period of years, not many, in which we have to prepare for this threat in face of the nuclear arming of the countries of the Middle East. This time period, it seems to me, is growing smaller.
A: It is not decreasing by that much. A lot depends on what we do, in the area of making peace, something which could help [us get] international participation, led by the U.S. along with other elements, in a war against nuclear arms proliferation including Iran.
Q: Why did you take upon yourself so many senior positions? During the election campaign you waved the banner of unemployment, the social issue, the political issues, the security issues. In the end, you, one person, however talented you may be, have taken upon yourself all three jobs - labor and welfare, as well as defense, and also prime minister.
A: Look, first of all, I think that part of the chance for change, the change of national priorities, is also connected to the political issue. If we progress in making peace, if we succeed in reaching an agreement of significant progress with the Palestinians, the political picture will change. We will be able to enlist resources from outside. There will be more willingness in the world to invest in us, perhaps it will be possible to achieve a reduction in the Arab boycott. Some of the economic problems are connected to political issues. Whoever does not understand this, in my opinion, is in error.
Q: Maybe we should phrase it differently. Do you in principle believe that a prime minister and a defense minister should be one person, or maybe you have not found one member in the Labor party who can fulfill this position?
A: Let us separate between the subject of labor and welfare which we are leaving open out of the chance in order that after a certain amount of time it may bring another party or parties to the coalition.
Q: Precisely this topic, which is so important, which you so emphasized during the election campaign ...
A: The key to labor and welfare is not only within this ministry. It is first of all dependent on the resources. It is first of all dependent on the Treasury which is the key to allocating the resources. On the subject of prime minister and defense minister, I did this because I see a link and a connection, at least for the near future, whose time period I do not want to estimate whether it will be one year or two, between advancing the political issue and between the security issue problem, first and foremost, of controlling what goes on in the territories. Here: in order to prevent a phenomenon which was presented to me as fact on the first day - elections at al-NaJah University.
Q: In other words, a future defense minister should not make mistakes that the prime minister has to repair or pay for?
A: (...)
Q: You mean, that you in fact took on both the role of prime minister and became defense minister, and you believe in principle it is worthwhile uniting both these positions?
A: I said for a reasonable time period, a year, two years, until we realize this chance for advancing the making of peace.