In a far-ranging interview in the German weekly Die Welt, the prime minister discussed the current state of the negotiations, the Israeli proposals to the Palestinians, the Syrians and the Lebanese, and the implication of the Israel-U.S. understanding on the deportees. He expressed the hope that 1993 will see at least one concrete agreement reached. Text:
Q: What are the prospects for the interrupted negotiations with the Arabs on a peace settlement? How do you propose to overcome the obstacle of the Hamas activists in Lebanon?
A: I believe that none of the two sides can put conditions to the continuation of the peace negotiations. I did not offer conditions to the Arabs to stop terror, violence, the killings of Israeli and Palestinians in the territories where we have the responsibility for their security. I do not believe that they have the right to put conditions to us, when we react to terror and violence. When the terror was at its peak against Israelis, I was asked by the Israeli public "How can you continue to negotiate peace, when they kill Israelis?" I said then as I say now: We negotiate for peace, as [if] there is no terror and violence and we cope with terror and violence, as [if] there are no peace negotiations - which means that terror and violence must not keep us from negotiating peace since the purpose is to end the conflict. I do not accept in principle, that whenever we take action, which is considered legal by our laws, against terrorism, especially when no one is killed or wounded, as was the case in the temporary removal of over 400 Hamas illegal instigators and organizers, we can be charged with obstructing the negotiations, especially since Hamas refuses peace with Israel and tries to end the negotiations.
Q: Do you think that this incident which offered Hamas a show-case for their cause and has interrupted the negotiations, will continue to stand in the way of progress in the peace process?
A: Since I consider that the compromise, which I reached with U.S. Secretary Warren Christopher was carried out by us and that the U.S. carried out their own commitment, i.e., not to allow a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel, the way should be open for resuming the negotiations. I hope that the Arabs will see this and come back to the conference table, because if peace is not in the interest of both sides, it will not be achieved. Making peace is not an act of charity, but a common purpose in the mutual interests of the adversaries. It can only be achieved by negotiations with the common objective to reach an agreement in order to end war, violence and terror, and to establish peaceful relations. Therefore, there must be a common denominator between all the participants of peace negotiations, who are in conflict with each other. This means, that the purpose of the exercise is to reach a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, a peace agreement, or to take significant steps towards peace on a bilateral basis between Israel and each of the Arab countries with which we negotiate - Syria, Jordan, Lebanon - and with the Palestinians in the territories (administered by Israel since 1967).
Q: Do you think that all three countries will actively support these negotiations or that there still is reluctance on their part?
A: I assume that they are interested in the peace process, but the test will come in the discussions with the Americans, when U.S. Secretary of State Christopher Warren will visit the capitals. The decision to resume the negotiations will have to be taken on that occasion, since afterwards, towards the end of the month, the Islamic month of Ramadan begins, when negotiations with Muslims will not be possible during that period. Then comes the Jewish Passover and we shall be in April.
Q: What would be Syria's own interest in resuming the negotiations without stalling for time and to allow progress, since Damascus seems to want only to terminate the state of belligerence without a binding agreement, at least as long as they cannot expect to get back the entire Golan territory?
A: I think that the Syrians understand that Israel is prepared to withdraw from the Golan Heights under certain conditions, and that they also think to what extent it would be advisable for them to fall back into a state of war, when Egypt is out of the cycle of wars and Iraq has suffered a real setback in its capability to assist militarily - apart from that there is little love lost between Syria and Iraq.
But above all the fundamental change of the international scene: The disappearance of the Soviet Union and the entirely different policy of Russia. It was the Soviet umbrella, that protected Syria since 1955/56 politically, militarily and economically. Today the Syrian debt for past Soviet support runs to about $11 billion, mostly for arms and equipment, and Russia, which is in serious economic difficulties, is trying to collect this debt, while continuing to arm Syria, but now against cash in hard currency, almost on delivery. This is an essential change to the disadvantage of Syria.
Apart from that the international situation has radically changed - and not to Syria's advantage: They realise, that there is only one super-power now, the USA. Under that condition, preserving the Arab-Israeli conflict, sticking to the old hostility toward Israel in latent war, is not going along with the American interest to acquire a position for introducing stability and tranquility into the region, where there are enough sources of trouble. Whoever tries to maintain the instability of hostile relations in this region comes into opposition to U.S. policy, and this time without an external back-up.
Q: You assume then, that this is a sufficiently strong strategic reason for the Syrians to work for a peaceful settlement?
A: I accept their readiness to participate in the peace negotiations, and I assume that they come with a bona fide disposition to end the period of wars and the permanent state of war with Israel as a result of this negotiation.
Q: And you do not expect such intentions to be hampered by incidents such as this Hamas camp out there in Lebanon with the international media impact on Arab opinion?
A: I am not saying that the Syrians can be insensitive to this phenomenon, but you have to bear in mind that some ten years ago they took very tough measures against Islamic extremists, then the Muslim Brothers at Hama, who tried to undermine the Syrian regime. The same problem of Islamic fundamentalists, which we face in the territories under Israeli administration, exists today in Egypt and in Jordan. In Egypt they attack foreign tourists in order to hurt the tourist trade, which accounts for 30 to 40 percent of Egypt's economic resources, and bring down the regime on the ruins of the economy. They have declared war against the Egyptian government. This war is going on in Egypt, not to speak about Algeria and Tunisia. This problem exists also in Jordan and, of course, amongst the Palestinians. You have to bear in mind, that while all Arab political groups in the territories of the West Bank and Gaza, the PLO, the Islamic Jihad and Hamas participate in the violence and the terror, but that Islamic Rhad and Hamas use terror in order to end the peace negotiations. They do not deny this, they say so openly. I hope, that the Arab countries, including Syria, which are interested in the continuation of the negotiations even if they do not agree with us, see the point that the peace process has to go on in the interest of all participants, regardless of this extremist opposition, which refuses any peace with Israel and tries to block it by terror.
Q: How can a common or mutual interest between Israel and the Arab countries plus the Palestinians be defined in real political terms so as to assure the success of the negotiations?
A: If there is to be peace in the region, a mutual interest must exist or emerge between all parties to the conflict, Syria and Israel as well as Jordan. Egypt, which concluded a peace treaty with Israel in 1979 and is no longer in a state of war since that time, has an interest to see the foundation of peace broadened and reinforced. What has been agreed upon between Egypt and Israel can be written into treaties with other Arab countries. There may be problems as to the terms of the treaties, but the Madrid Conference approach for negotiations would not have been agreed upon, had there not been readiness to negotiate and an interest in ending the state of war on all sides. Of course, one has to distinguish between the readiness to make peace and the conditions for peace, the treaty terms to be agreed on in the negotiations. And then, there will always be those, who are opposed to peace, but such opposition will have to be overcome. Nobody can give a clearcut answer to this question about the political opposition against the results of the negotiations beforehand, but once successes are achieved in the negotiations, a breakthrough will occur. Until then, there is no certainty.
Q: How long, do you think, will it take before positive results will be achieved in the negotiations, once these will have been resumed by all? Must we not expect a protracted negotiation, which may last for years to come?
A: I hope not. In my humble opinion, if there were no agreement at least with one of the (Arab) participants in 1993 or early in 1994, then there would be frustration on all sides and hence increased tension in the region. We are approaching a crossroads, where it will be decided which way the Arab-Israeli conflict will evolve: Towards a renewal of tension, escalation of the arms race, increased instability with growing risks, or on the contrary towards a peaceful settlement and stability in the region. This orientation for, the future will probably be decided within 12 to 18 months.
Q: What would the political finality of the direction towards peace be? To what end would the orientation lead or have to lead for stability?
A: Vis-a-vis Syria the present Government of Israel has clearly stated that we accept the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as applicable to the negotiations: We have declared that we accept the principle of withdrawal of armed forces of Israel on the Golan Heights secure and recognized international borders, but we shall not enter negotiations about the dimensions of such a withdrawal before Syria has given us clear-cut answers to two questions:
First: When they spell out the word "peace", does this mean open frontiers for the movement of people and goods across, and peaceful relations between the two countries including embassies in the two capitals, trade and policies encouraging normalisation between the peoples?
Second: Will a peace treaty between Syria and Israel stand on its own two feet as the treaty between Egypt and Israel, i.e. independently from relations with other parties, not subject to what will or will not be achieved in the negotiations with other Arab partners?
As long as we have no clear-cut answers on these two issues on a bilateral basis with Syria, we will not be able to say how much (or how far) we will withdraw. What this reminds me of, is the old question of what was first: The chicken or the egg? However, then at least we shall know where we stand with Syria. Israel has accepted the principle of withdrawal of its armed forces on the Golan Heights.
With the Palestinians, the problem is a little more complicated, because they see in the proposed interim agreement an arrangement that can lead to only one solution: the creation of an independent Palestinian state. But the letter of invitation to the Madrid peace conference, written by the two co-sponsors the USA and at that time the USSR, stated clearly that the solution to the problem will be in two phases:
1. Autonomy under an interim agreement for a transitional period of two years;
2. Not later that the 3rd year after the interim agreement will have been established, negotiations on a final solution based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338.
In our perception, the interim agreement should leave options, not only one solution.
While the Palestinians know that the present Government of Israel, in contradiction with the former Government, does not aspire to have the whole land of Israel under Israeli sovereignty. We say almost the opposite: That we do not wish to annex the bulk of 1.8 million Palestinians and the areas on which they are settled. On the other hand, we are opposed to withdrawal to the former lines of pre-June 1967.
So there is room for compromise, for political maneuverability, which did not exist with the former Israeli Government.
Q: Will they appreciate this difference fully?
A: I do not know. There is no simple and easy solution. But the international conditions have changed, although there are still problems.
Q: You said that the negotiations move towards a "cross roads" in the coming 12 to 18 months or so. You do not expect then, that a stalemate may develop until then?
A: I hope not. We will have to create something workable.
Q: Do you see the delay for a breakthrough in the negotiations with respect to domestic events in Israel such as general elections?
A: No, that is not the problem, I believe that the people of Israel are interested in peace, of course in a peace which will give them security. We work for that.
Q: Since your victory in the war of 1967, which you achieved as chief of staff and commander-in-chief, Israel holds the territorial advantage and you can negotiate, so to say, from a position of strength, in an international environment changed strategically to your advantage.
A: Yes, that is the case.
Q: When speaking of room for a territorial compromise without withdrawing to the pre-June 1967 lines, do you think of something like the Alton Plan with certain Israeli military outposts for security control of the West Bank as a Palestinian/ Jordanian territory?
A: In principle, yes, as far as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are concerned. But the Alton Plan did not deal with Syria. However, the great lines, the principles of the Alton Plan are the right ones: Not seeking specific parts of the land. In addition, there is a lot of wisdom in the two-phased approach I described.
The way I see it, the Palestinians will have the chance to run their own lives in their own way without outside interference, not under the dictation of others. One day, a complex may emerge, you may call it a federation or a confederation between Jordan/ Palestine and Israel - this is a possibility. What I do not want, is for Israel to bind itself to a precise formula. The best method is, to take a first step: the Interim Agreement for Palestinian autonomy, which nobody had offered them while they were ruled by an Arab sovereignty. The advantage is, that a Palestinian entity can be created, not a statehood, but autonomy is a political entity on territory... the thing is gradual progress, the importance is in the direction not in the concrete end.
Q: What about elections in the West Bank and Gaza?
A: In 1989, when I was defence minister in the National Unity Government, I proposed elections in order to select representation for the negotiations. Since then, we have negotiated without an elected Palestinian representation in the framework of the Madrid mandate. It would be a mistake to repeat the proposal for elections now, since it would cost valuable time and undermine the authority of the Palestinian negotiators. Later there could be election for an Executive Council of the Palestinian Self-Government to implement an agreement. We can only offer elections, they must decide how and when after the negotiations will have been concluded by an agreement.